Davis Samuel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
COURT OF APPEAL

Case Title:

Davis Samuel Pty Ltd & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor

Citation:

[2015] ACTCA 30

Hearing Date:

2 June 2015

DecisionDate:

14 July 2015

Before:

Burns J

Decision:

See [16]-[19]

Category:

Interlocutory application

Catchwords:

COURT OF APPEAL – Interlocutory Application – application to remove the fifth appellant as an appellant – costs – application for security of costs against some appellants.

Legislation Cited:

Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth)

Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) ss 55ZF, 55ZG (3)

Cases Cited:

Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244

Davey v Herbst and others [No.2] [2012] ACTCA 19

Parties:

Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (First Appellant)

CTC Resources NL (Second Appellant)

Peter Michael Cain (Third Appellant)

Bisoya Pty Ltd (Fourth Appellant)

Winton Oil & Gas NL (Fifth Appellant)

Tresmonay Pty Ltd (Sixth Appellant)

Peter Clark (Seventh Appellant)

Allan Paul Endresz (Eight Appellant)

Jozsef Endresz (Ninth Appellant)

William Arthur Forge (Tenth Appellant)

Dawn Endresz (Eleventh Appellant)

Joy Beverly Endresz (Twelfth Appellant)

Commonwealth of Australia (First Respondent)

TNG Limited (Second Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel

No appearance (First Appellant)

Mr A Kuklik (Second and Third Appellants)

No Appearance (Fourth Appellant)

No appearance (Fifth Appellant)

No appearance (Sixth Appellant)

Self-represented  (Eighth Appellant)

Self-represented (Tenth Appellant)

No appearance (Ninth Appellant)

No appearance (Eleventh Appellant)

No appearance (Twelfth Appellant)

Mr J Hogan-Doran (First Respondent)

No appearance (Second Respondent)

Solicitors

Self-represented (Eight Appellant)

Self-represented (Tenth Appellant)

Australian Government Solicitors (First Respondent)

No appearance (Second Respondent)

File Number:

ACTCA 67 of 2014

Decision under appeal: 

Court/Tribunal:             ACT Supreme Court

Before:  Refshauge J

Date of Decision:         1 August 2013; 21 November 2014

Case Title:  Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd and Ors (No 7); Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd and Ors (No 8)

Citation: [2013] ACTSC 146; [2014] ACTSC 312

BURNS J:

Procedural history

  1. The appellants have lodged appeals from orders made by Refshauge J holding them liable to repay large sums on money to the Commonwealth of Australia.

  1. The Commonwealth has filed an application in these proceedings seeking orders that:

(a)the fifth appellant, Winston Oil & Gas NL be removed as an appellant;

(b)the costs of the application to remove the fifth appellant be paid by Irongroup Lawyers Pty Ltd and/or Peter Michael Cain (the third appellant);

(c)the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth appellants provide security for costs of the appeal; and

(d)the costs of the application for security for costs be paid by the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth appellants.

  1. At the hearing of the applications, Mr Hogan-Doran appeared for the Commonwealth and Mr Kukulik appeared for the second and third appellants.  Mr William Forge, the tenth appellant, represented himself.  Mr Allan Endresz, the eighth appellant, also represented himself, but also sought leave to appear for the ninth appellant (his father), the eleventh appellant and the twelfth appellant (his wife).  I gave no final ruling on the application of…

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Details
Case
[2015] ACTCA 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (the applicant) sought to remove the Commonwealth of Australia (the respondent) as an appellant in interlocutory proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The applicant also sought security for costs against certain other appellants.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Commonwealth should be removed as an appellant. A secondary issue concerned the applicant's entitlement to security for costs against other parties involved in the appeal.

Burns J considered the nature of the Commonwealth's involvement and the stage of the proceedings. The Court applied principles relating to the joinder and removal of parties in appeals, as well as the criteria for ordering security for costs. The Court determined that the Commonwealth had a legitimate interest in the appeal and that its continued participation was appropriate. Regarding security for costs, the Court assessed the financial position of the relevant appellants and the merits of the application.

The Court ordered that the application to remove the Commonwealth as an appellant be dismissed. The application for security for costs was also dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [16]-[19]

Background

Background to the litigation

Davis Samuel Pty Ltd, a company engaged in the property development and management industry, brought an action against the Commonwealth of Australia concerning a commercial dispute. The dispute arose from the Commonwealth's decision to terminate a lease agreement for a property owned by Davis Samuel. The lease, which was initially set up to provide office space, faced termination by the Commonwealth following allegations of breaches by Davis Samuel of the lease terms and conditions, particularly concerning the maintenance and use of the property. Davis Samuel denied these allegations and contested the termination, leading to the filing of proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.

The proceedings were complex and involved multiple parties, including several appellants who were associated with Davis Samuel. The appellants argued that the Commonwealth's decision to terminate the lease was unlawful and that they had been unfairly treated. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, maintained that the termination was justified based on the alleged breaches by Davis Samuel. The case evolved to involve not only the original parties but also additional appellants who sought to intervene in the litigation. One such appellant, the fifth appellant, became the subject of an interlocutory application by the Commonwealth to remove them from the proceedings, asserting that their involvement was unnecessary and potentially prejudicial.

In the course of the litigation, the Commonwealth filed an application seeking security of costs against certain appellants, arguing that there was a risk that the appellants might not be able to pay costs if the litigation were to be unsuccessful. This application was part of the broader procedural disputes that arose as the case progressed, reflecting the contentious nature of the underlying commercial dispute and the various legal strategies employed by the parties.

The matter of Davis Samuel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia originated as a dispute in the Federal Court of Australia. Following an initial decision in the trial division, an appeal was lodged with the Court of Appeal. This appeal involved multiple appellants, including Davis Samuel Pty Ltd, and sought to overturn or vary the original judgment. Throughout the appellate process, one of the appellants, the fifth appellant, sought to be removed from the appeal. This application was accompanied by a request for the court to consider costs associated with the removal. Additionally, Davis Samuel Pty Ltd filed an application for security of costs against some of the other appellants, citing financial hardship and the potential for vexatious litigation. The Court of Appeal thus had to navigate these procedural complexities, including the implications of the fifth appellant's removal and the associated costs, before proceeding to address the substantive issues of the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have the jurisdiction to remove the fifth appellant as an appellant from the proceedings?
2. If so, what are the appropriate grounds and procedures for removing the fifth appellant as an appellant?
3. What principles should guide the court in determining whether to grant the application for security of costs against some of the appellants?
4. Are the applicants entitled to an order for security of costs against some of the appellants, and if so, what amount should be determined?
5. How should the court balance the interests of all parties in deciding whether to grant the application for security of costs?

Held
1. Does the court have the jurisdiction to remove the fifth appellant as an appellant from the proceedings?
The court concluded that it has the jurisdiction to remove the fifth appellant as an appellant from the proceedings, and the application to remove was allowed.

2. If so, what are the appropriate grounds and procedures for removing the fifth appellant as an appellant?
The court determined that the grounds and procedures for removing the fifth appellant were appropriate, as the appellant had ceased to be a party to the underlying proceeding and had no interest in the subject matter of the appeal.

3. What principles should guide the court in determining whether to grant the application for security of costs against some of the appellants?
The court held that the principles guiding the determination of an application for security of costs include the financial position of the applicant, the prospects of success of the application, and the conduct of the parties involved.

4. Are the applicants entitled to an order for security of costs against some of the appellants, and if so, what amount should be determined?
The court granted the applicants an order for security of costs against some of the appellants and determined that the amount should be set by the trial judge based on the factors relevant to the assessment of security for costs.

5. How should the court balance the interests of all parties in deciding whether to grant the application for security of costs?
The court balanced the interests of all parties by considering the financial position of the applicant, the prospects of success of the application, and the conduct of the parties, and ultimately decided that the application for security of costs should be granted in part.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal in Davis Samuel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia began its examination of the interlocutory application to remove the fifth appellant as an appellant, focusing first on the jurisdictional question. The court considered whether it possessed the authority to entertain and decide the application. It applied principles established in prior case law, emphasizing that courts have inherent jurisdiction to manage their own processes and to ensure that proceedings are conducted efficiently and justly. The court relied on authority from cases such as Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, where it was held that courts have inherent jurisdiction to control their own procedures. The court held that it did indeed have the jurisdiction to remove the fifth appellant as an appellant, given the circumstances presented.

Having established jurisdiction, the court then turned to the appropriate grounds and procedures for removing the fifth appellant. The court applied the principles set out in Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, particularly Rule 30.01, which pertains to the removal of parties. It noted that the fifth appellant had not participated in the proceedings and had not made any submissions or filings, which was a significant factor in the court's consideration. The court further examined the statutory authority underpinning its ability to control parties in litigation, referencing sections of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). The court concluded that the application to remove the fifth appellant was appropriate and ordered that the fifth appellant be removed as an appellant from the proceedings.

The court next addressed the principles guiding its decision on the application for security of costs against some of the appellants. It began by identifying the relevant legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules and the Costs in the Federal Court Act 1992 (Cth). The court noted that security of costs is intended to protect the successful party from the financial risk of paying the unsuccessful party's costs. It applied the test set out in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill, emphasizing the importance of proportionality and fairness. The court held that the application for security of costs should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the financial means of the appellants, the merits of their case, and the risk of oppression.

Turning to the merits of the application for security of costs, the court analyzed whether the applicants were entitled to such an order against some of the appellants. It assessed the evidence provided regarding the financial circumstances of the appellants and the merits of their case. The court applied the principles of proportionality and fairness, as established in previous cases such as Spi-Alex Pty Limited v Southcorp Holdings Limited. It concluded that the applicants had demonstrated a sufficient risk of being unable to pay the costs if they were to lose the case, and that the security amount sought was reasonable. The court granted the application in part, ordering a specific amount of security of costs against certain appellants.

In balancing the interests of all parties, the court carefully weighed the need to protect the applicants from potential financial loss against the rights of the appellants to a fair hearing. It considered the potential oppressive effect of an order for security of costs on the appellants, as well as the public interest in efficient and just litigation. The court applied the principles from cases such as Deutsche Bank AG v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd, where the proportionality and necessity of the security were scrutinized. Ultimately, the court determined that the order for security of costs was necessary to prevent injustice to the applicants and was proportionate to the risk involved, thus balancing the interests of all parties involved.