| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 7068 of 2010
| ALAN DAVIES | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| STATE OF VICTORIA | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | WILLIAMS J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATES OF HEARING: | 7, 8 and 12 June 2012 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 15 August 2012 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Davies v State of Victoria | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2012] VSC 343 | Amended 14 November 2012 |
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EMPLOYMENT – Action for wrongful dismissal – Termination of employment as disability development and support officer – Disabled resident of Community Residential Unit dragged across hallway– Whether ‘serious misconduct’ justifying dismissal under s 33(1)(d) Public Administration Act2004.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr M Bromley | Clemens Haskin |
| For the Defendant | Mr A Clements | Minter Ellison |
HER HONOUR:
For almost 15 years, the plaintiff, Mr Davies, was employed by the Department of Human Services (‘the Department’) as a Disability Development and Support Officer or in a similar role. On 24 September 2009, the Department terminated his employment, on the ground of ‘serious misconduct’. This happened after a Departmental investigation in relation into an incident on 2 May 2009 involving ‘CJ’, a disabled person in his care (‘the incident’).
The parties agree that it was a term of Mr Davies’ employment contract that it could only be terminated in accordance with ss 20 and 33 of the Public Administration Act 2004 (‘the Act’). Section 33(1)(d) permitted the Department to terminate his employment ‘on the ground of serious misconduct’.
Mr Davies alleges that his dismissal was wrongful and in breach of his employment contract. He claims damages from the State for resulting loss and damage.
The issue
The issue is as to whether the State has established that Mr Davies’ behaviour during the incident amounted to ‘serious misconduct’ within the meaning of s 33(1)(d) of the Act and justified his dismissal.
‘Serious misconduct’
It is common ground that, under applicable common law principles, the State has the onus of proving that Mr Davies engaged in such serious misconduct.[1] It is also agreed that the standard of proof should be that described by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[2] and that the Court should not lightly make a finding of serious misconduct against him.
[1]Rankin v Marine Power International Pty Ltd (2001) 107 IR 117, [241] (Gillard J).
[2](1938) 60 CLR 336, 361-2.
There is no definition of ‘serious misconduct’ in the Act. ‘Misconduct’ is, however, defined in s 4 as follows:
misconduct includes—
(a) a contravention of a provision of this Act, the regulations or a binding code of conduct;
A ‘code of conduct’ under s 4 is a code of conduct issued under s 63 of the Act. Mr Davies acknowledges that, as a public sector employee, under s 63(3) of the Act, he was bound by the Code of Conduct For Victorian Public Sector Employees (No 1) 2007 (‘the code of conduct’). Section 63(5) effectively confirms that a contravention of a binding code of conduct…
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- Case
- [2012] VSC 343
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the actions of the appellant constituted 'serious misconduct' that justified his dismissal. The court had to assess the severity of the misconduct and whether it met the threshold of 'seriousness' as outlined in the relevant legislation. This involved examining the circumstances surrounding the incident, the appellant's intent, and the impact of his actions on the disabled resident. Additionally, the court had to consider the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness in the context of the dismissal process.
The court, in its reasoning, found that the appellant's actions did indeed constitute serious misconduct. It was determined that the dragging of the disabled resident across the hallway was a severe breach of the trust and responsibility inherent in the appellant's role. The court held that such conduct was not only a failure to perform the duties of the position but also an abuse of the position, warranting termination. The court also found that the dismissal process adhered to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal as justified and lawful.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed, and the original decision to terminate the appellant's employment was affirmed. The court confirmed that the dismissal was justified and appropriate under the circumstances and that the appellant's rights were not infringed upon during the process.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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