Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services - [1997] HCATrans 381

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M46 of 1997

B e t w e e n -
DATA ACCESS CORPORATION
Applicant
and
POWERFLEX SERVICES PTY LTD
First Respondent
POWERFLEX CORPORATION PTY LTD
Second Respondent
DAVID MEREDITH BENNETT
Third Respondent
MARGARET ANN BENNETT
Fourth Respondent
DEMILEIGH PTY LTD
Fifth Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

BRENNAN CJ

McHUGH J
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 12 DECEMBER 1997, AT 12.26 PM

______________________

MR J.W.K. BURNSIDE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.L. LeGRAND, for the applicant. (instructed by Stephens)

MR R.C. MACAW, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, DR J.F. BLEECHMORE, for the respondents. (instructed by Trumble Szanto Braham)

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, Mr Burnside.

MR BURNSIDE: If the Court pleases, the application and the summary identify five questions for special leave. They can be resolved really into three questions and I want to concentrate principally on two of them. Can I take the Court first to the clearest statement of the questions for special leave at application book page 152. The first two questions are articulated starting at line 20 and the third question is articulated at line 25, but the second and third really can be dealt with together and I will deal with them together shortly. On page 153 the ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J: In a way what is involved is this definition of “computer program”, is it not, and the phrase “a set of instructions”?

MR BURNSIDE: Yes, the second and third questions both really raise that same question of the definition. The fourth and fifth questions on page 153 are really two facets of the same question, namely, what is the meaning of the word “adaptation” so far as it relates to a computer program in the special definition that is given in the Act?

The two questions on which I want to concentrate and address the Court particularly, although we rely on what is in the written summary, are the first and the fourth and fifth together. The first question is whether, in circumstances where the copyright work is a computer language program, reproduction of the reserved words of that language will constitute reproduction of a substantial part of that program. The second question is the meaning of “adaptation”.

In order to understand the first question, it is obviously necessary to understand a little of what a computer language is. The evidence showed, and it seems clear on the judgments that the court accepted, the computer language is simply a program which in its operation enables the user to write other programs using the vocabulary of that language. The language written by the applicant was called Dataflex. It has a vocabulary of 270 words approximately. The program which implements the language defines and prescribes what each word will do when it is…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services

Details

AGLC: Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services [1997] HCATrans 381
Case: [1997] HCATrans 381
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Data Access Corporation (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Federal Court which had affirmed the primary judge's finding that Powerflex Services (the respondent) had infringed Data Access's copyright in its software. The dispute concerned the respondent's use of the appellant's software, specifically its "DataFlex" database management system, in a manner that the appellant alleged constituted copyright infringement.

The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent's actions amounted to an infringement of the appellant's copyright in the DataFlex software. This involved considering whether the respondent had made an unauthorised "copy" of the software, as defined by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), and whether the respondent's use of the software was within the scope of any licence granted by the appellant. A key issue was the interpretation of the licence agreement and whether it permitted the respondent to use the software in the manner it did.

The Court analysed the nature of the appellant's copyright in the DataFlex software, which was a compilation of computer programs. It considered the distinction between the copyright in the program itself and the copyright in the output generated by the program. The majority of the Court found that the respondent had not made an unauthorised copy of the DataFlex software in the sense contemplated by the Copyright Act. They reasoned that the respondent's use of the software, which involved running the programs to generate output, did not constitute the creation of a reproduction of the copyright work. The Court emphasised that copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves, and that the respondent was not reproducing the code or structure of the DataFlex programs.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Federal Court were set aside. The High Court ordered that the respondent's appeal to the Full Federal Court be dismissed, meaning the primary judge's decision finding infringement was overturned.

Orders