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DAT v Police

DAT v Police

Case [2002] SASC 219 12 July 2002

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D A T v POLICE
[2002] SASC 219
Youth Court Appeal

DOYLE CJ. The appellant is a youth as defined by the Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) (“the YOA”).
On 16 May 2001 the appellant pleaded guilty before a Magistrate in the Youth Court to a charge of an offence. The Magistrate recorded a conviction. Exercising her power under s 26 of the YOA, the Magistrate imposed an obligation on the appellant. I will explain the nature of an obligation shortly. The obligation was of six months’ duration. The conditions of the obligation included a condition to be of good behaviour for the duration of the obligation.
During the period of the obligation the appellant committed two offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty in the Youth Court. One of the offences was being in possession of equipment for use in connection with the smoking of cannabis, contrary to s 31(1)(c) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) (“the CSA”). The other offence was being in possession of a bicycle reasonably suspected of having been stolen, contrary to s 41(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) (“the SOA”).
The appellant was also charged with failing to comply with the obligation imposed on him, in that he had not been of good behaviour for the duration of the obligation. The conduct constituting the offences against the CSA and the SOA respectively was relied upon as constituting the failure to comply with the obligation. This further offence is created by s 26(2) of the YOA. To this further offence the appellant pleaded not guilty.
The sequence of events in the Youth Court is not completely clear. I gather that the prosecutor proved the obligation imposed on the appellant and that the parties treated the pleas of guilty referred to, and the convictions referred to, as proved, and that the parties treated the facts on which each plea of guilty was made as proved in relation to the offence under the YOA. The prosecutor led no other evidence. The appellant gave no evidence.
Counsel for the appellant advanced two submissions before the Youth Court. The first was that the appellant could not be convicted of the offence under the YOA, because the conduct that constituted the offences under the CSA and the SOA was relied upon in proof of the offence under the YOA, and to convict the appellant under the YOA would be to convict him twice for the same conduct, namely the acts or omissions that constituted the offences under the CSA and the SOA. The second submission was that the appellant was guilty of the offence under the YOA only if it was proved that he knew that the conduct relied on was a breach of the obligation, and if it was proved that he intended to breach the obligation. It was submitted that there was no evidence proving such knowledge and intention.
I gather that the Magistrate rejected the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading DAT v Police

Details

AGLC: DAT v Police [2002] SASC 219
Case: [2002] SASC 219
Decision Date: 12 July 2002

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DAT v Police, the appellant contested his conviction for breaching a good behaviour obligation imposed by a Magistrate. The appellant was found to have committed the offences just one month after the obligation was signed. The nature of the dispute centred on whether the appellant was aware that his actions constituted a breach of the obligation. The matter was heard in the higher court, which had to decide whether the Magistrate's findings were legally sound.

The legal issues revolved around the interpretation and application of the good behaviour obligation. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Magistrate was correct in concluding that the appellant knew his conduct was a breach of the obligation, and if there was sufficient evidence to support this conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court considered whether the appellant's age and the timing of the offences could influence the understanding and knowledge of the obligation.

The court examined the evidence and found that the appellant's conduct was such that it was reasonable to infer that he knew his actions were in breach of the obligation. The court noted that the obligation was straightforward and signed by the appellant himself. Given the short period between the imposition of the obligation and the commission of the offences, the court held that the appellant could not have genuinely forgotten the terms of the obligation. The court was satisfied that the Magistrate was justified in concluding that the appellant was aware of the breach, and there was no evidence to suggest otherwise.

The court rejected the appeal and upheld the conviction, finding that the Magistrate's decision was well-supported by the evidence and aligned with legal principles. The court's decision underscored the importance of clear understanding and adherence to court-imposed obligations.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ

In any event, it was open to the Magistrate to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew that his behaviour amounted to a breach of the obligation. The offences were committed only one month after the obligation was imposed. The obligation was signed by the appellant. The obligation to be of good behaviour is a simple one, readily understandable. The appellant could not have forgotten that the obligation had been imposed. His conduct was such that it would be easy to infer that he knew that it was a breach of the obligation, without any evidence other than that tendered before the Magistrate. I mention that the appellant was 16 years of age. I would have been prepared to make a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew that his conduct was a breach of the obligation. There was nothing in the material before the Magistrate to give her any reason to hesitate in reaching that conclusion. However, it is not necessary for me to resolve the matter on this basis.Conclusion For those reasons I reject the submissions put in support of the grounds of appeal. I dismiss the appeal against conviction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ

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Citations

AGLC Citation

DAT v Police [2002] SASC 219

Most Recent Citation

Lecornu v The Queen [2012] VSCA 137

Cases citing this decision · 8 of 8 shown

South Australia Police v Hill
[2022] SASCA 22 Para 5

…double jeopardy principle to the extent necessary to allow convictions on both offences. [43] Maple v Kerrison (1978) 18 SASR 513. [44] DAT v Police (2002) 83 SASR 237. [45] Loader v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 86. [46] LeCornu v The Queen (2012) VSCA 137.…
Lecornu v The Queen
[2012] VSCA 137 Para 1

…in analogous circumstances – first in Maple v Kerrison [34] and, more recently, in D A T v Police .[35] [34][1978] 18 SASR 513 (‘ Maple ’). [35](2002) 83 SASR 237 (‘ D A T ’).…
R v Sansbury
[2010] SASCFC 8 Para 30

…f parole. The breach warranted separate punishment, even if the escaping custody offence was the only breach of parole: DAT v Police [2001] SASC 219; (2002) 83 SASR 237 at [37] Doyle CJ. On Mr Muscat’s approach the period served under the Parole Board order would reduce the head sentence and, by the appropriate propo…
Wright v Police
[2008] SASC 216 Para 34

…In DAT v Police [2002] SASC 219 Doyle CJ, at [22], referred to the decision of Environment Protection Authority v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 502, in which Gleeson CJ stated, at 507: Both the proposition that a person cannot be punished twice for the same offence, and the related proposition…
Taylor v Lanyon
[2006] QDC 321

…(1969) 119 CLR 257 Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 122 A Crim R 568 Commissioner of Taxation v Doudle (2005) 195 FLR 76 DAT v Police (2002) 83 SASR 237 DPP for NT v WJI (2004) 219 CLR 43 Grace Brothers Pty Ltd v Magistrates , Local Courts of New South Wales & Another (1988) 84 ALR 492 He Kaw Teh v R (1985)…
R v Waugh
[2005] SASC 470 Para 10

…e if it is not the same conduct, or substantially the same conduct, which is relied on for each offence. [3] (1998) 194 CLR 610. [4] [2001] SASC 219; (2002) 83 SASR 237. [5] [2004] SASC 127; (2004) 88 SASR 326. [6] (1998) 194 CLR 610 at 618 [24]. See also Rucioch v Police [2004] SASC 127; (2004) 88 SASR 326 at [27].…
Police v W, R
[2005] SASC 119 Para 14

…or. He stated that he was unable to find beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew his conduct was a breach of the obligation: see Dat v Police (2002) 83 SASR 237. He said: “Given the limited intellectual functioning of the youth and given the uncertainty about when he signed the various obligations I have grav…
Rucioch v Police
[2004] SASC 127 Para 20

…I considered the decision of the Full Court in O’Loughlin at some length in DAT v Police [2002] SASC 219; (2002) 83 SASR 237. I concluded that O’Loughlin does not establish a principle as broad as that submitted by Mr Dadds. I remain of that view.…

View all 8 citing cases →

Cases cited in this decision · 3 of 3 shown

He Kaw Teh v The Queen
[1985] HCA 43 Para 5

…s an essential element proof of a guilty or blameworthy state of mind, often referred to as the mental element of the offence: He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523. In any particular case it is necessary to identify the content of the mental element, or the particular state of mind that must be proved, and then…
[1997] SASC 6172
[1997] SASC 6172 Para 5

…d then to consider whether the presumption that that state of mind must be proved is displaced. I canvassed some of these matters in Police v Pfeifer (1997) 68 SASR 285 and in Question of Law Reserved (No 2 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 502.…
[1964] AC 1254
[1964] AC 1254 Para 13

…ed by this Court at length in R v O’Loughlin ex parte Ralphs (1971) 1 SASR 219, by the House of Lords in Connolly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, and by other courts in a number of cases. The terrain is that of double jeopardy.…

Legislation cited in this decision · 6

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
1 mention (from Para 29)
Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA)
1 mention (from Para 2)
Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA)
1 mention (from Para 3)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
1 mention (from Para 26)
Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA)
1 mention (from Para 3)
Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA)
1 mention (from Para 1)