Dansie v The King - [2024] SASCA 26

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
DANSIE v THE KING
[2024] SASCA 26
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David)
21 March 2024
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED
The appellant, Peter Rex Dansie, was tried by judge alone in the Supreme Court of South Australia for the murder of his wheelchair-dependent wife, Mrs Dansie.
On 16 April 2017, the appellant and his wife visited Veale Gardens in the South Parklands of Adelaide. There, the appellant positioned his wife in her wheelchair on a rock near the northern edge of a pond. He admitted pushing the wheelchair into the pond. The appellant subsequently entered the pond himself but was unable to rescue her. It was common ground during the trial, and on appeal, that Mrs Dansie died by drowning.
The prosecution case was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wife into the pond with the intention to kill her. The defence case was that the appellant’s actions were either accidental or, at the very least, there existed a reasonable possibility that they were accidental. The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial. The appellant did not give evidence and relied on his version of events given to emergency services personnel and during police interviews in the aftermath of his wife’s death.
The trial Judge found the appellant guilty of murder, convicted him, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 25 years.
This appeal was remitted to the Court of Appeal following a successful appeal to the High Court against the majority judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103; Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651). The sole ground of appeal before this Court is that the verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
Held, by the Court, dismissing the appeal:
1. After conducting an independent review of all the evidence presented at trial, and after considering the submissions put forward by both parties, this Court is satisfied that the evidence was sufficient in nature and quality to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder. It was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed Mrs Dansie, seated in her wheelchair, into the pond with an intention to kill her; and to reject beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s account of having accidentally pushed her wheelchair into the pond.
2. Observations as to the correct approach by an appellate court on an unreasonable verdict ground to viewing a video recording of a defendant's police interview.
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487, applied.
Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103; Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; Tiwary v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 193, discussed.
Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651; Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618, considered.

DANSIE v THE KING
[2024] SASCA 26
Court of Appeal – Criminal: Kourakis CJ, Bleby and David JJA

THE COURT: This appeal was remitted to this Court following a successful appeal to the High Court of Australia against the judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal.[1] Peter Rex Dansie (‘the appellant’) appeals against his conviction for the murder of his wife, Mrs Dansie, following a trial without a jury.[2]
[1] Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103; Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651.
[2] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215.
The appellant and his wife had been married for almost 44 years. Mrs Dansie had a stroke in 1995, and as a result suffered from various cognitive deficits and physical disabilities. By 2015, she was living permanently in a nursing home, and was wheelchair dependent.
On 16 April 2017, the appellant and his wife visited Veale Gardens (‘the Gardens’). There, the appellant positioned his wife in her wheelchair on a rock close to the northern edge of Rockpool 7 (‘the pond’). The appellant, admittedly, was pushing the wheelchair when it entered the pond. The appellant followed his wife into the pond but was unable to rescue her. It was common ground at trial, and on appeal, that Mrs Dansie died by drowning.
There were two trials: an initial trial miscarried; a second trial proceeded before another Judge sitting without a jury. The evidence adduced by the prosecution was largely in the form of uncontested transcripts of evidence from the aborted trial and unchallenged witness testimony, video recordings and documentary exhibits. The appellant did not give evidence.
The prosecution case was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wheelchair-bound wife into the pond, intending to kill her. There was no dispute at trial, nor on this appeal, that the appellant pushed his wife, seated in her wheelchair, into the pond, where she drowned. The defence case was that his actions were either accidental, or that at least there existed a reasonable possibility that they were accidental. Defence counsel relied on the various accounts given by the appellant to ambulance officers and police in the aftermath of his wife’s death. The prosecution case was circumstantial.
The issues at trial involved what inferences were able to be drawn from the largely unchallenged evidence. The ultimate issue was framed by the trial Judge as whether the prosecution could prove that Mrs Dansie was murdered thus excluding accidental drowning as a reasonable possibility.[3]
[3] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215.
On 20 December 2019, the trial Judge found the appellant guilty of murder, and provided reasons for his verdict. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Full Court of the Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Appeal. The grounds of appeal included, inter alia, that the verdict could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeal, by majority (Parker and Livesey JJ, Nicholson J dissenting), rejected that ground of appeal and dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to the High Court on the sole ground that the majority erred in its approach to the ground that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and remitted the matter to this Court.
Accordingly, the sole ground of appeal before this Court is that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. The task to be undertaken by this Court, in considering whether the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, is as stated by the High Court in M v The Queen:[4]
Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations.
(citations omitted)
[4] (1994) 181 CLR 487 at [493] per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
What is required is independent consideration by each member of the Court of whether, applying the test in M v The Queen and assessing the whole of the evidence adduced at trial, there was no reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. As part of that task, the appeal court must form its own views on what inferences should be drawn from the evidence, even if they might be characterised as jury questions.
The reference to whether the verdict is ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ in M v The Queen is to be taken as ‘equivalent to the statutory formula referring to the impugned verdict as “unreasonable” or such as “cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence”’.[5] Further, the approach outlined in M v The Queen is to be followed ‘in exactly the same way where the trial has been a judge alone as where the trial has been by jury.’[6]
[5] MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606 at [58] per McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ.
[6] Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [15] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ citing Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47 at [12] per French CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ, [82] per Gageler J.
The case against the appellant was largely a circumstantial one. In such a case, a jury or trial Judge sitting alone cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of guilt if there is a rational inference or hypothesis consistent with innocence open on the evidence. The correct approach to a circumstantial case is well-settled and ‘neither at trial nor on appeal, is a circumstantial case to be considered piecemeal.’[7] Given the evidence at trial was largely uncontested, and the appellant did not give evidence, the advantage of directly observing and hearing the witnesses, which the trial Judge enjoyed, ‘must be slight’.[8]
[7] R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618 at [48] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.
[8] Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [15] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ.
The ultimate question for this Court is not whether error can be identified in the reasons of the trial Judge or whether there is a pathway to proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; rather, each member of this Court is required to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence, both as to its sufficiency and quality, and determine whether it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt, and whether the trial Judge must, as distinct from might, have entertained a doubt as to the appellant’s guilt.[9]
[9] Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559 at [113] per Hayne J.
The appellant contended that this Court should conclude that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; namely, that the appellant pushed his wheelchair-bound wife into the pond with the intention of killing her. The appellant submitted that his account of what occurred at the pond, as conveyed in his 000 call to ambulance officers and during his police interviews, is a reasonable possibility. Before this Court, the appellant largely adopted the analysis undertaken by Nicholson J (in dissent) in the Full Court.[10]
[10] Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103 at [358]-[385] per Nicholson J.
On the other hand, the respondent contended that when the prosecution case is considered as a whole, including the appellant’s version of events and denials, this Court can be satisfied that there is no reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence and it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.
The evidence adduced on the prosecution case
The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial and, for the most part, the evidence was not in dispute at trial; rather, defence counsel challenged the inferences sought to be drawn from the evidence. The appellant largely accepted the factual findings made by the trial Judge but contended that the incriminatory inferences drawn by the trial Judge should not be made by this Court upon an independent review of all the evidence. This Court is entitled to treat findings of fact made by the trial Judge about which no issue is taken in the appeal as an accurate reflection of so much of the evidence as bore on those findings.[11]
[11] Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [16] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ.
General background
The appellant and his wife married in 1973 and, at the time of her death, had been married for about 44 years. They jointly owned a home at Waterfall Gully and two commercial rural properties in the South-East of South Australia. Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke in 1995, resulting in various physical and cognitive disabilities that required the use of a wheelchair. Subsequently, the Public Advocate, along with the appellant, became her joint guardian and administrator. In his reasons for verdict, the trial Judge outlined the largely unchallenged evidence as to a dispute regarding the most appropriate place of residence for Mrs Dansie after her stroke, heard before the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). His Honour said:[12]
[12] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [26]-[32] per Lovell J.
In 1995, Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke. A lengthy stay in hospital was followed by many months of rehabilitation. Unfortunately, Mrs Dansie did not make a full recovery and was left with permanent cognitive deficits and weakness in her right leg. Her permanent disabilities meant she could not return to work. Mrs Dansie’s contributory superannuation policy entitled her to access a defined benefit pension for life. Mr Dansie became the full-time carer for Mrs Dansie. They lived in the Waterfall Gully residence built by Mr Dansie. Statements by Mr Dansie to the police suggest that he continued to work for at least part of the time he was caring for Mrs Dansie.
Due to her cognitive problems, the Public Advocate was, in 2004, made a limited and joint guardian with Mr Dansie. They were to make decisions about her residential and care requirements. The joint guardianship ceased in 2009; Mr Dansie again became her sole carer. In 2015, Mrs Dansie contracted a serious illness (E. coli infection), requiring admission to the Royal Adelaide Hospital and then the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. On discharge in September 2015, Mrs Dansie was admitted to the Nursing Home in respite care. In November 2015, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were again appointed joint guardians. Mr Dansie wanted her to return to the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate considered that the premises were unsuitable. The dispute was to be determined in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). In September 2016, Mr Dansie conceded that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home. Mrs Dansie’s status at the Nursing Home then changed from being in respite care to becoming a permanent resident. This change had financial ramifications for Mr Dansie.
For reasons not fully explained, Mr Dansie and his son Grant became estranged not long after Mrs Dansie returned home after completing her rehabilitation in 1996. In 2000, Grant left home while in his final year at school. After finishing school, Grant studied at Griffith University in Brisbane and then in Copenhagen. Since 2001, he has lived overseas and currently lives in Norway. Grant always attempted to maintain a loving and caring relationship with his mother despite that, after her stroke in 1995, she was a “different person”.
Grant considered that Mr Dansie deliberately obstructed him from having access to, and contact with, his mother. He also became concerned that Mr Dansie was not providing Mrs Dansie with adequate or appropriate care. Grant was not able to ascertain how his mother’s finances were organised. Ms Ginny Giorgio, a neighbour and friend of Mrs Dansie, had similar concerns. It appears that Mr Dansie, from 1995, controlled Mrs Dansie’s finances. Mr Dansie always denied suggestions that he did not appropriately care for his wife or that he did not look after her finances properly.
The relevance of the evidence, whether the allegations be right or wrong, is that the concerns of Grant and Ms Giorgio led to a number of contested applications before the Guardianship Board (later the SACAT) commencing in December 2005. The applications and decisions are summarised in Exhibit P39. I discuss the relevance of the applications later in these reasons. By way of agreed background, I note the following:
·On 9 December 2005, the Guardianship Board ordered that the Public Advocate be appointed “limited guardian” for Mrs Dansie in relation to whom Mrs Dansie had contact. Grant’s application for an administration order was dismissed. Mr Dansie continued to look after the finances without supervision.
·On 24 October 2007, Mr Dansie was formally appointed administrator; this required him to file a yearly financial report of Mrs Dansie’s finances.
·On 14 May 2009, the Office of the Public Advocate ceased acting as a limited guardian for Mrs Dansie.
·Mrs Dansie inherited $46,686.00 following the death of an uncle. After deducting approximately $7,000 (being a deficit in her accounts), Mr Dansie invested the remaining amount in the home.
·Between 2010 and 2014, the financial examiner at the Public Trustee examined the financial reports filed by Mr Dansie and found them to be satisfactory.
·On 20 November 2015, SACAT appointed Mr Dansie and the Public Advocate (represented by David Cripps) as joint guardians for Mrs Dansie. The SACAT also made a finding that Mrs Dansie had a “mental incapacity”.
·Between January 2016 through to June 2016, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were in dispute as to whether Mrs Dansie should return to live at the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate had concerns about the suitability of the premises.
·On 20 June 2016, the Public Advocate applied to review the Guardianship Order as the joint guardians were “unable to act jointly” about the suitability of the premises.
·On 5 September 2016, the Public Advocate withdrew the application for sole guardianship as Mr Dansie had agreed that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home rather than reside at the Waterfall Gully residence.
·On 1 March 2017, Suzanne Rozman replaced David Cripps as the Public Advocate.
·On 6 March 2017, Ms Rozman raised with Mr Dansie the possibility of a review of the administration order and an investigation into Mrs Dansie’s finances.
·On 27 March 2017, Grant Dansie and Ms Giorgio filed applications to review the appointment of Mr Dansie as administrator and joint guardian. The application was listed for hearing in July 2017.
In general terms, at the time of Mrs Dansie’s death, Mr Dansie remained in sole control of Mrs Dansie’s finances and was a joint guardian with the Public Advocate; applications to review both matters were before the SACAT. I deal in more detail, later in these reasons, with the Public Advocate’s contact with Mr Dansie leading up to the death of Mrs Dansie.
The appellant challenged the validity of those ‘concerns’ expressed by his neighbour Ms Giorgio and Grant Dansie. The trial Judge made no finding as to their accuracy and found that the appellant ‘performed the role of carer adequately’[13] and that ‘he did provide an adequate standard of care’.[14]
[13] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [35] per Lovell J.
[14] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [35] per Lovell J.
Mental and physical condition of Mrs Dansie

Before this Court, the appellant accepted the largely unchallenged evidence as to Mrs Dansie’s physical and mental condition at the relevant times. This body of evidence encompassed CCTV footage showing the appellant, unassisted, transferring Mrs Dansie from her wheelchair to the front passenger seat of his car on the afternoon of 16 April 2017. The trial Judge found that the footage established the following matters:[15]
·To transfer Mrs Dansie, Mr Dansie put his right arm around, and to some extent, under Mrs Dansie’s left shoulder.
·At that time, Mr Dansie’s right arm was obscured in the video but it appeared to be, to some extent, around her right shoulder as well as her left.
·Mrs Dansie was then lifted by Mr Dansie out of the wheelchair. Mrs Dansie, as she began to move out the wheelchair, placed her right hand on the roof of the car immediately above the front passenger seat.
·Mrs Dansie then appeared to be upright and supported by Mr Dansie’s left arm and her right hand was still on the roof of the car.
·Mrs Dansie appeared to shuffle to her right, assisted by Mr Dansie’s right arm. His left arm was then visible and was not supporting Mrs Dansie at all.
·As Mrs Dansie moved towards the passenger seat her right hand moved down the roof to the left windscreen strut and Mr Dansie appeared to still be supporting her with his right arm and hand.
·Mrs Dansie bent a little to ensure her head cleared the roof of the car and became seated in the car.
[15] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [50] per Lovell J.
The trial Judge also made the following findings based on uncontested evidence as to Mrs Dansie’s physical and mental condition:[16]
[16] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [52] per Lovell J.
·Mrs Dansie, as a result of her stroke in 1995, was left with permanent residual weakness on her left side.
·Mrs Dansie also suffered permanent short-term memory loss.
·Over the years, Mrs Dansie’s mobility became more restricted, including restrictions in all limbs but more pronounced on the left side.
·After her hospital admission in 2015, Mrs Dansie’s mobility worsened and she became wheelchair bound.
·Over the years, there was slight deterioration in Mrs Dansie’s already compromised cognitive abilities.
·As at April 2017, Mrs Dansie was unable to stand unassisted; with assistance she could weight bear for a short period of time.
·Mrs Dansie retained some strength to hold herself upright by holding onto a fixture, for example, a car door.
·Mrs Dansie’s strength in her arms had reduced in the months before her death but she retained some capacity to assist her carers with transfers and support, to an extent, her weight.
·Mrs Dansie had impaired dexterity and required assistance with hygiene tasks; she lacked insight into her need for care.
·Mrs Dansie could not manage sustained or repeated movement of her limbs due to fatigue and weakness.
·Mrs Dansie’s flexibility was severely restricted but she maintained reasonable balance when sitting in her wheelchair.
·Mr Dansie was physically capable of lifting Mrs Dansie from the seated position to the standing position with some assistance from Mrs Dansie.
Layout and topography of the Gardens and the pond
It was common ground between the parties that on the afternoon of 16 April 2017, the appellant visited his wife at her nursing home and took her on an outing to various locations in Adelaide before travelling to the Gardens. There, he positioned his wife in her wheelchair on a rock at the edge of one of the many rockpools in the Gardens. He admitted pushing Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair, with her seated in it, into the pond where she drowned. The appellant made a 000 call to emergency services shortly before 6:30pm. Ambulance officers arrived a short time later, followed by police officers. Mrs Dansie was located lying face down in the pond. The wheelchair was also in the pond. The appellant was observed as wet to his ‘belly button’.
There were no eyewitnesses to what had occurred at the pond.
As to the layout and topography of the Gardens and the pond, the appellant accepted the accuracy of the trial Judge’s summary of the evidence. The pond in which the deceased drowned was one of several rockpools situated in the Gardens. In relation to the layout of the Gardens, the prosecution relied upon an aerial photograph,[17] a plan,[18] and a bundle of eight photographs taken by a drone showing various areas, including the pond.[19]
[17] Trial Exhibit P3 – Aerial view of Veale Gardens.
[18] Trial Exhibit P4 – Plan of Veale Gardens note tendered at the original trial.
[19] Trial Exhibit P5 – Bundle of eight photographs of Veale Gardens taken by drone.
At its widest point, the pond was approximately six metres wide, with a depth ranging from approximately 1.1 metres to 1.15 metres at its deepest point. Near the northern edge, the pond was approximately one metre deep. The southern edge of the pond was shallower but exiting the pond from that end was not possible. The side of the pond was constructed of stacked stone, and the base was made of solid concrete, although it was covered in silt and mud.
Sealed paths run in an approximately east-west direction on either side of the pond. The distance from the northern edge of the pond to the northern path was approximately 10 metres. The area around the pond was not flat. To approach the pond from the southern end required walking up a mound with the southern end of the pond nestled into that mound. Practically speaking, access to the pond was only possible from its northern edge.
The northern side of the pond was bordered by rocks around its perimeter. While the southern side of the pond had a safety fence, there were no barriers on the northern edge. The pond can be accessed from the northern side of the Gardens via an area of grass located between the pond and a sealed footpath running in a roughly east-west direction through the Gardens. To access the pond from the northern end required leaving the sealed path and travelling across the grassed area. There was a slight incline from the path for about four to five metres, followed by a slight decline for a similar distance, leading to the northern edge of the pond.
During the trial, a bundle of photographs was tendered, including images of three of the rocks (marked A, B, and C) bordering the northern edge of the pond.[20] Rock B was particularly significant as the appellant told police that he placed the wheelchair on it, positioned sideways to the pond and facing east; that is, not towards the water. It was from this position that the appellant claimed he accidentally pushed the wheelchair, in which Mrs Dansie was seated, into the pond.
[20] Trial Exhibit P6 – 24 pages of photographs (‘Trial Exhibit P6’).
There was evidence that Rock B was approximately 1600 millimetres in length[21] and approximately 800 millimetres wide at its widest point.[22] While relatively flat, Rock B had a higher point in the centre, with a section of approximately 300 millimetres where the rock slopes down from the high point to the dirt. Rock C was immediately to the east of Rock B, and there was a depression between them, visible in the photographs.[23] The width between the base of the rear wheels of the deceased’s wheelchair was 560 millimetres, and the distance from the front to rear wheels ranged from 420 millimetres to 495 millimetres, depending on the orientation of the front wheels.
[21] In the east-west direction, that is, running along the edge of the pond.
[22] In an approximate north-south direction.
[23] Trial Exhibit P6; Trial Exhibit P23 – Booklet of six photographs of the rockpool said to have been drained; Trial Exhibit P30 – Booklet of photographs relating to Mr McKenzie’s evidence.
There was CCTV footage showing Mrs Dansie’s body in the pond.[24] The footage depicted the police locating the wheelchair in the pond and removing her body from the pond. The trial Judge made the following unchallenged observations about the video material, which can be taken to accurately reflect the evidence:[25]
·Initially the fountain was still operating and water was being projected from near the top of the rocks on the southern edge and landing towards the northern end of the pond.
·At approximately one minute and 26 seconds, the rocks identified as A, B and C can be clearly seen.
·At approximately one minute and 50 seconds, Mrs Dansie’s body is adjacent to, but partially to the east, of Rock C. The water is lapping over the edge of Rock C and the rock immediately to the east of Rock C due to the action of the fountain.
·The fountain, when the body was removed from the pond, was no longer operating.
·At one minute and 30 seconds, the water level is overlapping the edge of Rock C and to a lesser extent the rock immediately to the east of Rock C. While there were two police divers in the pond, which would raise the water level, it must be remembered that Mr Dansie, who weighed 130 kg at the time, stated he had been in the pond attempting to save Mrs Dansie.
·At two minutes and 18 seconds, Mrs Dansie’s body was rotated by the police divers and placed on a stretcher. The rotation was performed easily.
·At two minutes and 30 seconds, Mrs Dansie’s body was removed from the pond over the top of Rock C. This action required the least amount of lifting due to the water being, on the edge at least, at the same level as Rock C.
[24] Trial Exhibit P16 – Disk showing removal of deceased from pond.
[25] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [85] per Lovell J.
It was agreed at trial that: the air temperature at Kent Town at 6:00pm on 16 April 2017 was 20 degrees Celsius; the minimum temperature was 13.7 degrees Celsius and the maximum was 23.9 degrees Celsius; sunset was at 5:50pm; and civil twilight was from 6:14pm to 6:16pm. There was also uncontested evidence that on 18 April 2017, at around 2:50pm, police measured the water temperature of the water in the pond. It registered 18.5 degrees Celsius. At the time, the air temperature at Kent Town was 28.5 degrees Celsius.
The evidence also revealed that the appellant’s height ranged between 182 centimetres and 185 centimetres. If standing straight, the water level of 1.1 metres in the pond would reach just above his stomach and below his shoulders. If his knees were bent, the water level would be close to his chest.
Wheelchair and tyre marks
Police officers located Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair at the bottom of the pond in the southwestern section, approximately two to three metres from the northern edge (the accessible side of the pond). The wheelchair was removed from the pond and subsequently examined by Mr Sage, a vehicle examiner for the Major Crash section of the police, on 24 April 2017. Mr Sage observed that both brakes were in the ‘off’ position. The pneumatic rear tyres of the wheelchair were underinflated, with the recommended pressure for the tyres being 60 pounds per square inch (‘psi’). The left tyre was inflated to 18.5 psi and the right tyre to 22 psi. Mr Sage tested the operation of the brakes independently and collectively. To engage a brake, a lever is pushed forward, lowering a knurled bar against the tyre. The pressure of the bar against the tyre prevents it from turning. Mr Sage was able to push the wheelchair with no difficulty. An identical wheelchair with tyres inflated to 60 psi was also tested. With the brakes operating, he was not able to move that chair. Mr Sage accepted, however, that he had not tested the brakes on the original wheelchair with anyone sitting in it.
Brevet Sergeant White, a crime scene investigator, took photographs relevant to the investigation.[26] They included tyre marks he observed near the pond, travelling in a north-south direction.
[26] Trial Exhibit P6.
Sergeant Veldhoen, an officer attached to the Forensic Response Section and expert in tool, shoe and tyre mark comparison, used the photographs taken by Brevet Sergeant White to conduct a physical comparison between the photographic images of the tyre marks and the tyres of Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair. Sergeant Veldhoen gave unchallenged evidence that at least three separate actions of the wheelchair tyres were necessary to create the tyre marks. One explanation could be that the same tyres made all three marks by the wheelchair being pushed forward, brought back and then pushed forward again; or alternatively, another wheelchair with the same brand of tyres may have contributed to the marks. He was unable to say anything about the direction of travel of the wheelchair at the time it made the tyre marks.
The appellant’s version of events
The only direct evidence of what may have occurred at the pond immediately before Mrs Dansie drowned was from the appellant in various recorded interviews with emergency services and police. Those recordings included: a 000-emergency call; conversations with ambulance officers and police officers at the scene; a police interview at the Grenfell Street Police Base; an interview during the search of his Waterfall Gully residence; and an interview upon his return with police to the Gardens.
On the prosecution case, the appellant’s account given in the aftermath of his wife’s death was implausible. Furthermore, it was submitted that he deliberately told untruths, which significantly undermined his credibility. The prosecution also contended that the appellant’s demeanour, or the way in which he gave his account, and the lack of distress he displayed in the aftermath of his wife’s death also adversely affected his credibility. It was submitted by the prosecution that the appellant’s demeanour in providing his account and his lack of distress was so unusual, and contrary to the expected human response to the circumstances he faced, it pointed towards him having committed a deliberate act of murder rather than accidentally pushing his wife into the pond.
The 000 call
The appellant made a 000 call to emergency services on 16 April 2016 at about 6:26pm. The call lasted six minutes and 40 seconds. The prosecution tendered a disk containing audio of the call[27] and a transcript of the audio.[28] During that call, the appellant stated that he pushed his wife into the pond. He said, ‘[m]y wife is in a wheelchair’ and ‘we were just turning around to go home and it was getting dark’ and ‘we, ah, um, I couldn’t move her, I said take the, take the brake off and she did and all of a sudden she, she ah, ah, all of a sudden she, ah, wasn’t there anymore.’
[27] Trial Exhibit P1 – Disk containing 000 call made by the appellant on 16 April 2017.
[28] Trial Exhibit P2 – Transcript of exhibit P1.
The operator then asked, ‘where is she now?’ to which the appellant responded, ‘[s]he’s still in there, I cannot get her out’.
The appellant said that he had been ‘in there for about a quarter (inaudible) … trying to get her out’. When the operator suggested he try and lift her head out of the water, or ‘sort of tilt her head back’, the appellant said, ‘look I just about couldn’t get out of the pond myself, I’ve got [back] problems with bad legs from diabetes’ and ‘the first thing I did was chucked the phone’. The operator encouraged him to ‘try and lift her head’, ‘try and lift her up’, ‘try and float her up’, ‘push her towards the edge of the pond’ and ‘push her up against the edge just to try and get her head out of the water to try and help her there’. The appellant responded by saying that he had tried those actions, but she was ‘too heavy’ and ‘she’s really heavy’. He indicated that she had been under water for approximately 10 minutes. The operator also suggested that he ‘try and roll her onto her back, when she’s under water she will be quite buoyant ... just try and roll her’. It was at this point that the ambulance officers arrived at the pond.
The prosecution alleged that there was a lack of urgency in the appellant’s call to the operator; that he expressed no distress at all; and he did not immediately alert the operator to the fact his wife was still in the pond. The trial Judge noted (and it was not challenged) that it was approximately one minute and 10 seconds into the phone call that the operator was made aware of the fact that Mrs Dansie was still in the pond. On the prosecution case, the reason why the appellant expressed no interest in getting back into the pond or in attempting to keep his wife’s head above water, while waiting for the ambulance officers to attend, was to ensure that enough time had elapsed so that Mrs Dansie could not be resuscitated.
Ambulance officer Mr Giles
Ambulance officers arrived at the pond at about 6:29pm. They observed the appellant standing on the north-west side of the pond. As they approached, he turned and pointed at the pond and said, ‘in there.’ Mr Giles, one of the ambulance officers who attended the scene, gave evidence that the appellant told him that it was his wife who was in the pond and that she had been in the pond for about 25 minutes. He said that he had been in the pond trying to get her out but was unable to. The appellant explained the circumstances of how his wife came to be in the pond, in similar terms to his explanation during the 000 call. Mr Giles gave evidence that the appellant said ‘he tried to turn the wheelchair around, he wasn’t able to. He asked the patient to take the brakes off. As she’d done that, the wheelchair had rolled into the pond and he’d been unsuccessful in trying to get her out.’ Mr Giles said the appellant also told him that ‘she was wheelchair-bound and that she’d been strapped into the wheelchair.’ Mr Giles observed that the appellant was wet ‘up to his belly button’, that he appeared ‘quite calm, didn’t appear too upset or too panicked. Almost looked a little bit deflated, like he was exhausted’.
The evidence of Mr Giles was only challenged to the extent that he asserted that the appellant said Mrs Dansie was ‘strapped into the wheelchair.’ The trial Judge did not accept the evidence of Mr Giles on this topic, as the wheelchair did not have straps and the appellant ‘at no stage during lengthy interviews with the police, made such a suggestion.’[29] We have also proceeded on the same basis, as this alleged comment is inconsistent with other evidence indicating that the wheelchair had no straps. Additionally, nowhere else in his extensive interviews did the appellant make any such comment.
[29] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [164] per Lovell J.
On the prosecution case, the appellant’s conversation with Mr Giles was relevant to demonstrate the appellant’s lack of urgency at contacting emergency services after his wife entered the pond. The prosecution sought to draw this inference from the fact that he told Mr Giles that his wife had been in the pond for about 25 minutes. Considering the arrival time of the ambulance officers, this implied that Mrs Dansie was in the pond for about 15 to 20 minutes before the appellant made the 000 call to emergency services, which was relevant to show the appellant’s lack of urgency in his efforts to rescue his wife.
Police interviews
Sergeant Clague (‘Clague’) was the first police officer to attend at the Gardens. He arrived at about 6:34pm and spoke to the appellant. The evidence of Clague was not disputed at trial nor on appeal. He said the appellant told him they had come to the Gardens to ‘see the ducks or feed the ducks’ and ‘she leaned down and took the handbrake off’. The appellant said that he had hold of the wheelchair when she ‘fell in’, and he tried to remove her from the pond but found her ‘too heavy’. The appellant insisted that it was an accident.
The appellant then pointed to a tree, asking Clague if he could ‘get those things’. Clague instructed Mr Dansie to leave them there, later finding that those items were a sheet, a mobile phone case, a sandal and a set of car keys.

Clague observed that the appellant was wet, appeared ‘unfazed by it all’ and calm.
A short time later, Constable Senior (‘Senior’) arrived at the Gardens, and Clague requested that he take a ‘last to see, first to find’ statement from the appellant (as required by the Coroner in relation to any death). Senior commenced taking a notebook statement in narrative form from the appellant. During this process, another police officer requested that she also video record the statement. Accordingly, from 6:57pm, the latter part of the statement was recorded by video in addition to being reduced to writing. The appellant signed the written statement, and a copy was tendered to the Court.[30] A copy of the video recording of the statement was tendered,[31] and a transcript of the recording provided as an aide‑memoir.[32]
[30] Trial Exhibit P10 – Copy of statement taken by Senior Constable dated 16 April 2017.
[31] Trial Exhibit P8 – Three disks labelled A, B and C relating to conversations with Mr Dansie on 16 April 2017.
[32] Trial Exhibit P9 – Transcript of disks P8A, B and C.
In his signed written statement, the appellant provided the following account of how his wife came to be in the pond, and his actions in trying to rescue her. He said:
It was about 6.00 pm when we went to leave. The wheelchair was resting on a flat rock. I told Helen to take the brakes off but she took them off a bit quick for me. I was already pushing against the chair because I thought it was stuck and didn’t realise the brakes were on, so when Helen took off the brakes the chair rolled into the water face first and her head was down. I grabbed my phone and keys out of my pocket and threw them aside. I got into the water which came up to my chest, I tried to roll her over but wasn’t able to. I pushed her closer to an edge to try and get her in a position that I could get her out but I couldn’t. I could feel her arms moving but I don’t really recall much else that happened. I was in the water trying to help her for maybe 15 – 20 minutes when I then got out of the water and called 000 and asked for the ambulance. I waited on the side of the water until the ambulance and police arrived. Helen was no longer moving. The guy on the phone asked me to get back into the water but I was worried if I did I wouldn’t be able to get out. I remained on the phone the whole time.
The appellant also said that when he placed the wheelchair on the flat rock, his wife was facing down the side of the pond (that is, in an easterly direction) rather than facing towards the pond (that is, in a southerly direction), and the rock could have been wet. He also indicated that prior to going to the pond, he and his wife engaged in the following activities: they visited an IGA on Hutt Street to purchase snacks; went for a drive down to Henley Beach and along the Esplanade to Outer Harbour; went to Semaphore to drop off some Easter eggs to his godson’s children; parked at the Bunnings store on Port Road for a 30-minute ‘snooze’; and attended the car wash at On The Run (‘OTR’). He said they then attended the Gardens at about 4:00pm where they spent one and a half to two hours ‘looking at the gardens’ and ‘watching all the … ducks.’
After signing his written statement and while being transported back to Grenfell Street Police Base, the appellant continued to discuss other largely extraneous topics. These included: his vehicle (a grey/silver Mercedes); his relationship with his son; his role in looking after some Chinese wine-making students, although he commented that most had returned to China; his resistance to cold weather; a policeman at Beachport whom he described as ‘the biggest crook he knew’; details about his sister and her personal circumstances; a city in China (Sheyang) he visits annually; various work projects he has completed for police; and details of a ‘break-in’ at one of his commercial properties in the South-East.
Relevantly, he also said that he needed to retrieve some warm clothes from his car, stored in a ‘[woolies] bag in the back seat,’ as he usually ‘[leaves] in shorts in the morning’. The appellant also referred to the fact his wife had a stroke 20 years ago, stating that he expected to lose her then. He said, ‘you know, the last … twenty-odd years it’s just been … a bonus.’ He remarked, ‘Helen’s one of those … those people that … everybody likes.’
Interview at the Grenfell Street Police Base
Upon arriving at the Grenfell Street Police Base, the appellant commenced a video-recorded interview with Brevet Sergeant Munn (‘Munn’). The interview commenced at 8:55pm. A copy of the recorded interview was tendered,[33] with a transcript provided as an aide-memoir.[34] The interview concluded the following morning at 12:12am, lasting over three hours, albeit with periods of silence.
[33] Exhibit P11 – Four disks recording conversation between Brevet Sergeant Munn and the appellant at Grenfell Street Police Station on 16 April 2017.
[34] Exhibit P12 – Transcript of disks P11 1-4.
During the interview, the appellant raised many topics extraneous to the allegations to which we will not refer in any detail. Relevantly, the appellant was questioned as to the events at the pond. In relation to how Mrs Dansie entered the pond, the appellant gave the following explanation:
·He thought the water features in the Gardens were all a foot deep as he had previously ‘poked a stick in to see how deep they were’ to measure the risk as there were ‘no rails or anything there’.
·He parked the wheelchair side-on to the pond (facing east) on a ‘huge flat rock,’ which was ‘big enough for the wheelchair to sit on it’. He thought it was a ‘stable platform’ for the wheelchair.
·While preparing to leave, he encountered difficulty moving the wheelchair; attempting to push it, he thought it was stuck against a rock so he instructed Mrs Dansie to ‘take [her] brakes off’, which she did, resulting in the wheelchair ‘disappear[ing] into the pond’.
·He still had hold of the wheelchair at this point because he was pushing it.
·He was unsure whether she released the brakes on one or both sides but was surprised because it moved ‘pretty quickly’. He did not know whether the chair lunged forward or how it happened.
·He was pushing the wheelchair ‘fairly hard’ because he thought it was obstructed ‘by a piece of rock or something’.
·He could not explain why the wheelchair ended up in the pond instead of moving ‘straight ahead,’ but thought perhaps ‘she took one side off before the other,’ acknowledging that this was ‘purely surmising’.
·He was uncertain if the wheelchair ‘toppled over’, he described it as ‘just there and then not there’.
·Tossing his belongings ‘against the tree’, he ‘hopped in’ to try and support her. He described ‘pulling and pushing carrying on,’ as he noticed ‘further rocks getting close to the water’. He clarified that this was the path he took to get out, and where ‘Helen was when your guys came’.
·He agreed he managed to ‘drag her to some degree’.
·Although he could see her when she first fell in, he could not see the wheelchair because the water ‘was pretty deep’.
·He struggled to ‘[come] to grips with the fact that ... we could have been put in that … situation’. He emphasised the depth of the pond and the absence of fences or railings, mentioning that some areas do have railings at the top, which he was familiar with because ‘we walked all through these … [paths]’.
Munn then asked the appellant about his actions after Mrs Dansie entered the pond. He said:
·He could not confirm if she was face down when she entered the pond. At one point, he observed ‘the back of her head’. He struggled to recall whether he could see her face or not. Eventually he said that he could not remember.
·He dragged her to the side of the pond, but it was no shallower there.
·Anticipating the need to call for help and aware that his phone, keys, and glasses were not waterproof, he threw them next to a tree. His initial focus was on trying to ‘stabilise’ his wife before calling for help on his phone.
·While acknowledging that it might sound ‘cold and clinical,’ he attributed it to his experience as a ‘commercial pilot,’ where he was required to make decisive decisions.
·Once in the water, the biggest struggle was the cold and the depth.
·He thought Mrs Dansie was struggling as she was clutching onto him with her hands. He described the subsequent events as ‘a blur,’ emphasising his efforts to try and ‘move her over to where [he] could get her out’ but said he had trouble doing so.
·He could not remember whether she was trying to twist herself over.
·Trying to extract her from the pond was made more difficult by jets of water, which he described as being ‘bloody cold’, hitting him whenever he attempted to ‘try and do something’.
·When asked if he attempted to turn her onto her back, he said that his focus was on trying to move her over to the other side. He acknowledged that, in hindsight, turning her would have been ‘a great thing to get [done]’. He wanted to get her out of the water.
·He estimated spending about 20 minutes in the water trying to get Mrs Dansie out of the pond. Failing to do so, he eventually decided to exit the water himself.
Munn then questioned the appellant about his actions after he exited the pond. He said:
·After finding his glasses, he dialled 000 straight away.
·He admitted that his conversation might have been ‘pretty garbled’.
·He informed the 000 operator, ‘my wife has fallen in ah I’m at Veale Gardens ah my wife has fallen into a little pond, I can’t get her out’. While uncertain about his exact words, he believed it was ‘something like that’.
·Within a few minutes, he saw ambulances traveling down South Terrace and over the hill, prompting him to call out to them.
·He knew the other waterways were only about a foot deep as he had poked a stick into them during a previous visit a couple of weeks ago to see how deep they were. He assumed this pond’s depth would be similar.
·He described Veale Gardens as a ‘very relaxing place’ and mentioned that he and his wife usually ‘call in there on the way to somewhere else’.
In response to further questioning by Munn, the appellant shared the following information:
·A bag of his clothes was in the car, as sometimes when they go out, ‘things happen and we want to stay longer’.
·His wallet and an Armani watch were in the car. The watch had been there ‘for a couple of days’, as he had been working on his old ute and was ‘careful about taking it off now before I work.’
·He thought his wallet might be in the centre console of his car.
·He had taken his wife’s spare clothes out of the car with the intention of doing something else with them, although he ‘forgot what’.
At this stage of the interview, Munn informed the appellant that she would type the information he had provided to her into a formal statement. While this occurred, the appellant spoke of various extraneous matters. Munn received a phone call and left the room at which time another police officer, Senior Constable Finne (‘Finne’), entered and remained in the room with the appellant. Before leaving, Munn told the appellant that she was going to ‘try and speed type a bit’ to which he replied that he had been through this once before when his wife had her stroke and it nearly drove him mad, but he had his work to throw himself into. He then engaged in conversation with Finne, again about largely unrelated matters. It was at this point of time, he said that his wife has ‘just taken up more and more of my time’ but ‘you know I don’t begrudge her’ and ‘you get married not for the good times but for all times’.
Munn returned to the interviewing room and advised the appellant that police intended to search his residential premises. The appellant indicated that his wife had not been there for ‘at least 12 months’. Munn asked the appellant if he was in a relationship with anyone else now. The appellant responded by saying:
·He has never been involved in a romantic relationship with anyone else. During visits with friends overseas, they often take him to restaurants and show him around, but ‘there’s … never been any sex’.
·Chinese women often approach him on Facebook or similar platforms. They are either older ladies seeking marriage or younger girls in the 18 to 25 year‑old age group who typically seek assistance with English and job opportunities.
·Currently, there is one lady, Sophia from China, who he has not met but ‘sounds like an interesting person’. He clarified that by ‘interesting’ he did not mean ‘to get into bed with’. He said he told her that obtaining a visa is unlikely.
·He has to decide whether to maintain communication with her, in which case, when he visits ‘she’ll show [him] around and have good fun’ or discontinue contact. He stressed that, at this stage in life, he needs the friends.
·He described the woman in question as 58 years old without her own business and emphasised that she is unlikely to secure a visa to come to Australia. He said he has told her this but ‘she won’t listen’.
·Referring to her as ‘hardly a spring chicken,’ he acknowledged that some of their conversations have been ‘steamy’. However, he reiterated that he has ‘never met her and that’s all I can say’.
Next, Detective Brevet Sergeant Cox (‘Cox’) entered the interview room and explained the search warrant to the appellant. As part of his explanation, Cox told him that police would be looking for computers or electronic equipment. During this discussion, the appellant voluntarily disclosed having a ‘number of overseas friends’. He again referred to a ‘58-year-old lady from China,’ acknowledging that their conversations over the internet were occasionally ‘risqué’. He reiterated that he had never met her and that he had never had sex outside of his marriage. He said his conversations with her could be described as ‘steamy’ and mentioned that ‘she’s after a husband,’ but clarified that he told her ‘she will never get a visa to Australia’. He attributed his online interaction with her to boredom and explained that he had not been with his wife for 18 months, saying, ‘so you know the conversation was risqué’. He spoke of plans to visit friends in China, where he would ‘be expected to see her’ as well.
When expressly asked about the content of the computers, the appellant specified, ‘this lady that I talked about is the only one.’
Cox also raised the topic of returning the appellant’s wallet. In response, the appellant said that his watch was also in the ‘centre bit’ of his car because he had been ‘doing some work on the ute.’
Search of the Waterfall Gully premises
Police then transported the appellant to his home at Waterfall Gully where they conducted a search of the premises late on 16 April 2017 and into the early hours of 17 April 2017. Police engaged in conversation with the appellant during the search, which was recorded on video and tendered as evidence.[35] During the search, the appellant referred to his ongoing dealings with SACAT. He discussed a letter from the Public Advocate, recounting a past issue with a new staff member. He said:
Now, she’s new this year, um about five years ago I had a, a problem with another new girl and I finished up getting together one of the senior guys there, and um, it was sorted out um and everything she’d raised as a problem … was discounted … um now this one should happen the same way.
[35] Trial Exhibit P19 – Four disks numbered 1-4 Newbury (Trial Exhibit P19); Trial Exhibit P20 – Transcript of part of the four disks comprising P19 (aide-memoir)
Despite police officers indicating that there was no need, the appellant went into considerable detail explaining financial statements created for the Public Trustee, stating that unless he explained, police would not understand.
After the search was completed, Detective Brevet Sergeant Newbury (‘Newbury’) along with Sergeant Ward (‘Ward’) and Munn accompanied the appellant back to the Gardens. As they were travelling there, the appellant inquired about what arrangements he should make for his wife. Munn advised him, ‘there’s no reason that you couldn’t start making some enquiries or some phone calls with some funeral homes’. The appellant responded:
… a couple of months ago … I was sick of getting these phone calls, people try to sell me insurance, um so I went down to that ah the funeral home on ah Greenhill Road … And um, ah I found out the, level cover I wanted was about $3,000 … Um so, um I sort of, well no I didn’t, I didn’t get a full quote or anything but … Um at least I got a start.
At the time of this conversation, they were passing a funeral home on Greenhill Road.
After arriving at the Gardens, and while police were trying to locate the area where the appellant had parked his car, there was the following exchange between the appellant and Munn about the Gardens:
QCos you go, you go there quite a bit really, you were saying. You said, you used to go there quite a bit.
AOnly, only probably for the last two weeks.
QYeah.
AUm you know ah, I always knew it was there but.
QUsed to always drive past it.
AAh yeah, had never been there.
QYeah.
AAnd Helen was talking about, about ah seeing some gardens.
QYeah.
AAnd ah, she’s often been to the botanical gardens and um I just did a bit of research and said “hey what about going there for somewhere new”.
QYep.
AWish I’d never heard of the bloody place.
While the police car was being parked at the Gardens, the appellant again discussed his dispute with SACAT over his wife’s care and made comments denigrating his neighbours, the Giorgios. After a pause, the appellant added, ‘the only positive thing was that it was quick and she didn’t suffer’.
Interview back at the Gardens
Upon returning to the Gardens, police continued to interview the appellant, and the conversation was recorded and tendered as evidence.[36] The appellant retraced his movements from earlier in the day. By this time, it was about 3:00am and dark. He indicated that he parked his vehicle opposite 124 South Terrace and then entered the Gardens with his wife in her wheelchair. The wheelchair had been in the boot of his vehicle. He said that he was the only person at the nursing home who could manoeuvre his wife in and out of a vehicle without assistance. He said that they always used the same route to enter the Gardens and that he had visited there on approximately three or four occasions but could not recall the exact number. That afternoon, they walked around and made a few stops, including at a few other rockpools in search of ducks. They spent about two hours in the Gardens before reaching the pond. He indicated that some of the bridges over the creek now had water flowing over them. In reference to one specific bridge, he said, ‘… the next one up looks suspect because it’s under flowing water … so I just grabbed a stick and poked it in to see how deep it was … When we first came out here’.
[36] Trial Exhibit P19; Trial Exhibit P22 – Transcript relating to conversation at Veale Gardens.
The appellant led police to the pond and pointed out where he positioned the wheelchair before it entered the pond; that is, on the rock subsequently referred to at trial, and on this appeal as Rock B. He said, ‘It wasn’t pointing in, it was pointing to the side … I thought it was wider than that. I thought both wheels were on there. But apparently not’. He agreed that it was not wide enough to accommodate two wheels of the wheelchair.

As to what occurred after he positioned the wheelchair on Rock B, he said:
·It was starting to get dark, and everyone had left, so they decided to leave. He began pushing the wheelchair (indicating that he used both hands and moved in a west to east direction) and instructed his wife to release the brakes, ‘so she took the brakes off and all of a sudden she disappears’.
·He described the water as ‘bloody deep’, with ‘sprays that were coming down into it’.
·He tossed his phone, keys and glasses towards a tree and jumped into the water. His wife was in the water for about 10 seconds before he entered.
·Describing the situation, he said, ‘she sort of rolled over and I sort of jumped in and it was a lot deeper than I expected it to be. The jets of water were bloody freezing, um, and like I said I couldn’t get her out of there so I tried to move her up there’ (motioning towards the eastern end of the pond) ‘which looked a bit lower but I couldn’t get her out there either. I finished up coming out of the water.’
·Although he could not say with any certainty that once in the water she rolled over, he thought she did. He recalled seeing the back of her head at one point and the side of her face at another. He did not know which direction she rolled (whether from her back to her front, or vice versa, or from her side to her back) but that was not important for him to remember, as his primary concern was getting her out of the pond.
·He thought she was tangled up in the wheelchair – he was pushing and shoving her towards the end (indicating in an easterly direction).
In relation to his initial approach to the pond, the appellant said that he travelled along the sealed bitumen path and then pushed the wheelchair through the grass, opting for the ‘the shortest distance’ to the pond. Upon reaching the pond, he turned the wheelchair sideways and positioned it on the rock (Rock B). He agreed that the wheelchair was facing slightly downhill. He said that he brought her over to view the water, explaining, ‘in previous visits we’d seen, um, seen ducks diving in the, you know you could get up really close to them. Whereas out on the, by the river, by the creek as soon as you go near them, they’d shoot off’.
The appellant also told police that:
·As he was concerned about the possibility of Mrs Dansie releasing the brakes, he avoided positioning the wheelchair pointing towards the pond and instead turned it sideways. He thought it would be safe, having previously tested the water in the creek and assuming a similar depth in the pond. There were no guard rails.
·He thought he would have told her to apply the brakes, as that was something he typically did, and he usually watched while she did so.
·He thought it was a ‘safe bet’ that the water in the pond was shallow.
·As it started to get dark, he decided it was time to leave. When attempting to move her, he seized control of the handles but encountered resistance. He instructed her to ‘take the brakes off’, which she did. He said she must have taken them off quickly because ‘the wheelchair just went phoom and it was gone’.
·He was pushing the wheelchair forward, facing in an easterly direction, but because it was getting dark, did not see the ‘hollow’ between Rock B and Rock C to the east. He turned the wheelchair in a northly direction, pushing her forward instead of pulling her back. He could not explain why he did not pull the wheelchair backward, except to say that he underestimated the turning circle.
·The wheelchair fell about one metre from the flat of Rock B, east of the drainpipe, as shown in the video recording.[37]
·He said he thought the rock might have been slippery due to water.
·He was unable to say whether he let go of the wheelchair with his wife in it or after she had fallen out.
[37] Trial Exhibit P19.
The appellant was asked whether he was ‘a hundred per cent sure’ that was how it happened. He responded, ‘No, no. I’m just … trying to work it out in my own mind whether, whether that was what happened and I can’t see an alternative thesis’. When Newbury suggested to him that his version of events seemed implausible, given that the wheelchair was facing east, and he purportedly moved it in an easterly direction before turning it in a northerly direction, yet she was ejected in a southerly direction into the pond, he explained, ‘it’s really impossible for me to remember how quickly I turned off of this rock. You know, one minute she was there and the next minute she wasn’t’. He clarified that he was pushing forward and ‘thought there was some obstruction, some problem in the rock’. He added:
Well it’s not a flat rock, is it. But, but this is a, this is a normal situation when she leaves the, leaves the brakes on. Um, you, you gotta push her in the direction you want to go but when you can’t move, so tell her to take the brakes off and she does and away you go.
When questioned by Ward, ‘Would you normally get her that close to … the water’, the appellant remarked, ‘What’s the best way to answer that’ and then did not provide a response. He said that he held onto the wheelchair as it went into the pond until he could no longer maintain a grip on it.
The appellant was asked if he was directly behind her while pushing the wheelchair to leave. In response, he stated that he would have had to step to one side (that is, to the right and closer to the water) to turn the wheelchair. He then said, ‘I can see the problem’ – indicating that taking one step to the right would have placed him in the pond. He continued, saying, ‘… I’ve thought about it and I cannot, well the only thing I can come up with is that, that she took the brakes off quickly and, choooh’. He then said, ‘Oh it’s got to the stage now where my suppositions are mixed up with any recollections’.
As to his personal items, the appellant said:
·He had his phone and car keys in his pocket and he tossed them towards the tree. His glasses were also tossed in that direction. He then jumped into the pond.
·He did not have a watch on. He had been working on the old ute, replacing a fan belt. Earlier that day, he had purchased replacement belts and planned to fix them before picking up Helen. Consequently, he took his watch off and placed it in the car.
In relation to his actions after entering the pond, the appellant provided the following account:
·He slid into the water about 10 seconds after his wife fell in, expecting it to be shallower. He entered the water at the same spot where she had fallen in.
·His immediate concern was to extract her from the water.
·He attempted to manoeuvre her hips around the pipe to facilitate her removal but was unsuccessful due to its height.
·He traversed the pond’s edge in search of a suitable place to get her out, but he was unable to do so. He tried moving her along but found it impossible to lift her over the edge, so left her in the position she was eventually found by ambulance officers.
·He was able to intermittently lift her head above water, but his primary focus remained on removing her from the pond.
·He rolled her over to bring her closer to the edge. She encountered considerable difficulty, exhibiting signs of distress, including ‘gulping and gasping’. Her head remained above water for a period.
·She was trying to move herself towards the edge.
·He acknowledged seeing her face at one point, suggesting she must have been ‘face up’ at some stage.
·He encountered trouble negotiating the bottom of the pond, not only due to its depth but also because of an icy cold jet of water hitting him. Although his head and shoulders remained above water, the slippery conditions posed additional difficulties.
·He agreed that he could have supported her head to keep her face out of the water, but said his focus was on getting her out of the water. He decided not to stay in the pond because he thought she would not ‘last very long in that sort of climate’. His ‘primary thought was she’s in the water, I’ll get her out of the water and then we can work on everything else … But just remember at that stage I hadn’t, hadn’t called any assistance on the phone … so, you know, the buck stops here. I had to get her out of the water’.
·Before calling 000, he yelled out, even though he had observed everyone leave the park. He called out multiple times but found himself running out of breath.
·He proceeded to exit the pond and dial 000. The operator urged him to return to the water, but he declined because he was concerned the ambulance officers would not be able to locate the pond. He also expressed concern about re-entering the water, given the initial difficulty he had getting out. He did not continue yelling for help as he was having a lot of trouble finding his breath at that stage.
·His wife was not positioned right up against the eastern edge of the pond, but she was not too far out either. After exiting the pond, he reached in and attempted to pull her out, but he found it impossible to do so.
·She did not splutter or move around for very long. By the time he managed to bring her to the eastern end of the pond, there was no sign of movement; she was 'just dead weight.’
·While he was in the pond, she tried to hold onto his arm. He could not recall if it was one arm or both arms.
When directly questioned by Newbury about whether he had deliberately pushed his wife into the pond, he denied it. He explained:
Helen’s family... has put both Helen and I through hell to try and get their hands on Helen’s mother, ah money. Helen’s mother is 90, 91, I’m, I’m sure she’s left nothing to Helen and myself. I couldn’t wait for her to die and make a claim against her estate, because Helen’s a, an invalid, to try and recoup some of that money that they have cost us... for both Helen and myself. You know her, you know, her fees in the nursing home are quite high, while I’m wealthy um ah this would have been in my view poetic justice to be able to claim that back.... Now with Helen dead, that option’s gone. Secondly, when Helen, Helen had her stroke 22 years ago I left my job in the ABS and spent the next 22 years looking after her. You know this isn’t just looking after her, this is 24/7, the old, I’ve travelled extensively with her, I’ve, I’ve looked after her. Now I didn’t do this under sufferance, I did this because I wanted to. I, I wouldn’t see any benefit in then going and killing her.
As to any suggestion that there was a suicide pact, he said:
Helen’s not like that, she’s a nice person. You know, she just is a nice person. I [imagine] you’ll go out to Valley View and talk to the people out there … They’ll tell you the same thing, everyone loves her. And I loved her, I, you know, we’ve been married 44 years.
Prosecution submissions at trial that the appellant’s account be rejected
It was the prosecution case at trial that the appellant’s version of events (as provided in the 000 call, discussions with ambulance officers, and police interviews) should be rejected as implausible.
More specifically, in relation to the appellant’s decision to position the wheelchair on Rock B, the prosecution submitted that there was no innocent reason for placing it so close to the water’s edge. It was unnecessary to do so to ‘see the ducks’. Further, given the appellant’s description of Rock B being sprayed by water jets and slippery, his decision to place the wheelchair on Rock B was inconsistent with his claim of being ‘safety conscious’.
As to the appellant’s explanation of how the wheelchair entered the pond, the prosecution submitted that it was inherently implausible. It contended that by moving the wheelchair in an easterly direction and then turning it north (or to the left), it was unlikely that the appellant caused the wheelchair to fall in a southerly direction (or to the right) and into the pond. Moreover, the appellant’s account that Mrs Dansie releasing the brakes caused the wheelchair to suddenly move was inconsistent with the evidence that both brakes were either inoperable or at least not functioning effectively; thus, releasing the brakes would have little impact on the movement of the wheelchair.
Finally, the prosecution submitted that the appellant’s account of his conduct after his wife entered the pond and the reasons behind his inability to save her from drowning lacked cogency. The prosecution emphasised that, during police interviews, the appellant stated that he did not attempt to keep her head out of the water as he was concentrating on getting her out of the pond. It was submitted that even if he was genuinely unable to get his wife out of the pond, alternative options were available. He could have supported her, kept her head above water and guided her to the edge, where she could have held onto a rock while he telephoned for assistance. The prosecution stressed that there was evidence that Mrs Dansie could bear weight.
For the prosecution, it was also submitted that it was improbable that the appellant was unable to roll over his wife, as he claimed in his interviews. This was contrary to the ease with which police divers were able to turn her body over, as depicted in the video recording. Mrs Dansie’s weight would not have impeded this action, given the evidence of the pathologist that a person is more buoyant in water. Additionally, the appellant, being an able-bodied man who, for example, was able to assist his wife in and out of his vehicle without aid, undermined the credibility of his claim.
It was not the prosecution case that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder by omission by reason of his failure to save Mrs Dansie once she entered the pond. However, the prosecution did rely on his failure to rescue her as circumstantial evidence in support of the prosecution case that the appellant deliberately pushed her into the pond with an intention to kill her.
The prosecution also alleged that the appellant displayed an absence of any discernible urgency during the 000 call, consistent with his purported desire that his wife not be resuscitated, and a lack of distress when speaking with ambulance officers and police in the aftermath of his wife’s death. The prosecution contended that, during his lengthy conversations with police, the appellant spoke about many trivial or extraneous matters and in doing so, demonstrated little emotion about the sudden loss of his wife. It was the prosecution’s submission that, even allowing for the vagaries of personality, the appellant’s demeanour was inconsistent with a man who had accidently and tragically caused the death of his wife; and was consistent with, if not supportive of, a deliberate act of murder or, at the very least, consistent with a possible motive to kill his wife.
Lies
On the prosecution case, the appellant’s credibility was undermined by several lies he told in the aftermath of his wife’s death. The purported lies were not relied upon as evidence of guilt but as relevant to the appellant’s credibility. They were as follows:
·During police interviews, the appellant was asked why he left his watch in the vehicle. He claimed, on three separate occasions, that he had removed his watch because he needed to work on his vehicle. He told Munn that his watch had been in his car ‘for a couple of days’. He said that it was an Armani watch, and he was ‘careful about taking it off before I work’. Later in the same interview, he said that it was in the car ‘because I was doing some work on the ute’. When questioned about his watch by Ward, and after explaining how the fanbelts in his car had broken, he said ‘today I got replacement belts and, um, I was going to fix those before I picked Helen up so I took my watch off and put it in the car’.
There was evidence of CCTV footage from the nursing home which showed the appellant wearing his watch upon arrival. Additional CCTV footage obtained from the OTR store at Woodville captured him wearing his watch at 3:39pm that day, after collecting his wife from the nursing home.
It was uncontested that the appellant was wearing his Armani watch after picking up his wife that afternoon, rendering his explanation to police as to the circumstances in which he left it in the car plainly untrue. On the prosecution case, the appellant’s repeated false explanations to police on three separate occasions constituted a deliberate untruth or lie.
·The appellant downplayed the nature of his relationship with Sophia. He initially told police that Sophia was an ‘interesting person’ but ‘not to get into bed with’. This assertion appears to be contradicted by the content of his QQ messages with her (discussed later).
·The appellant failed to disclose his messages with ‘Rose’, falsely asserting that Sophia was the only woman he communicated with online.
·The appellant falsely described his treatment by police to various individuals, including journalist Ms Alice Monfries. Ms Monfries was employed as a television reporter. On 19 April 2017, she approached the appellant at his home. The appellant agreed to speak with her but not to have the interview recorded. He spoke about the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence and provided details largely consistent with his police interviews. He also spoke about his poor treatment by police. At trial, defence counsel accepted that his statements regarding police mistreatment were inconsistent with other evidence and untrue.
Additionally, the appellant told Ms Monfries that when he entered the pond, the water reached up to his chin. However, this assertion was contradicted by both the evidence of the pond’s water depth and the observations of ambulance officers who noted that he was wet up to his stomach.
·The appellant failed to disclose the full extent of his searches concerning funeral costs.
The prosecution alleged that the appellant’s lies undermined the credibility of his claim that he accidently pushed the wheelchair into the pond.
Other evidence
The prosecution also relied on the following bodies of circumstantial evidence in support of their case: evidence of premeditation and the appellant’s motives to commit the offence.
Evidence of premeditation
The prosecution alleged that the offending was premeditated. Specifically, the prosecution relied on the appellant’s actions in leaving his watch, wallet (containing $400) and dental plate in his car prior to taking his wife to the pond. Additionally, he brought a spare set of clothes for himself that day, but not for his wife, which he stored in his vehicle. The prosecution alleged that his decision to leave his belongings in the vehicle and have a spare set of clothes, exclusively for himself, suggested a pre-meditated plan to kill his wife as he anticipated getting wet that afternoon or evening and wanted to avoid damaging his possessions or feeling cold.
The prosecution also relied on a log of recorded outings from the nursing home spanning from 12 November 2015 to 16 April 2017.[38] The accuracy of the log was not challenged. It established that from 25 August 2016 to 16 March 2017, the appellant took his wife on only one outing. Yet, from 17 March 2017 to 16 April 2017, the appellant took his wife out of the nursing home on eight occasions. The prosecution alleged that the increased number of outings was consistent with the appellant looking for a place to commit the offence. Defence counsel at trial submitted that it was open to the trial Judge to find that the appellant’s limited outings with his wife during this period were due to the heat. However, the prosecution noted that the log also indicated that during a comparable period the previous year, from November 2015 to the end of February 2016, the appellant took his wife out of the nursing home on nine occasions. The prosecution submitted that the appellant’s renewed interest in taking his wife on outings from 17 March 2017 onwards must also be considered in the context of his previous visits to the Gardens. During those visits, he admitted to testing the depth of various rockpools and creeks, consistent with him exploring how and where to kill his wife.
[38] Trial Exhibit P48 – Recorded outings Mrs Dansie from Valley View Nursing Home.

It should be noted that the appellant did not describe any of these scenarios when attempting to explain the wheelchair’s entry into the pond to police. The only mention was at one point when he said that he ‘thought [the wheelchair] was … wedged under [the] rock’. Nor were any of the above-mentioned scenarios put by defence counsel in his closing address to the trial Judge. However, they were pressed upon this Court as part of the appellant’s broader submission that upon this Court’s independent review of all the evidence there was a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence and it was not open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.
The gap between Rock B and Rock C was estimated by Newbury to range between 10 and 15 centimetres. This was not a relatively large gap and there was no significant decline in elevation. Mrs Dansie weighed 117 kilograms. The scenarios described by Nicholson J, and expressly adopted by the appellant, are to our minds unlikely, albeit possible. The appellant would still have to exert considerable force to make the wheelchair, with Mrs Dansie weighing 117 kilograms seated in it, topple over in the opposite direction from his intended direction of travel and into the pond. There were also the adverse inferences to be drawn from the appellant’s decision to place the wheelchair on Rock B, perilously close to the water’s edge, despite there being safer spots available from which Mrs Dansie could have viewed ducks. Moreover, he purportedly left the pond and Rock B by pushing the wheelchair in a west-east direction across the gap between Rock B and Rock C, when a simpler alternative would have been to pull the wheelchair back and move it east (or left). The scenarios also had to be considered in light of the appellant’s subsequent failure to save his wife from drowning, which we turn to next, along with other evidence adduced on the prosecution case.
It is important to recognise that that the evidence as to how the wheelchair entered the pond was but one body of evidence put against the appellant. The evidence was not to be considered in a piecemeal fashion; rather, it was necessary for this Court to consider all the evidence presented by both the prosecution and defence. This includes, of course, the appellant’s denials, innocent explanations, and any submissions put forward on behalf of the appellant as to a hypothesis consistent with innocence.
It is difficult to give the appellant’s exculpatory account to police of his conduct after entering the pond, and his attempts to save his wife from drowning any weight. The appellant explained that he was in the water for 20 minutes ‘trying to get her out’ of the pond. Yet, he is unable to account for much of the time he spent in the water. Some allowance must be made for panic, and it is feasible that, in the aftermath of such an event, he may have struggled to articulate his actions with any specificity. However, he does not account during the 000 call or police interviews for much of the 20 minutes he says he spent trying to rescue his wife from drowning.
As for the factors the appellant said precluded him from saving Mrs Dansie from drowning, his explanations were directly contradicted or undermined by other objective evidence. He said that the ‘biggest struggle’ was the ‘cold and depth’ and mentioned that he dragged Mrs Dansie to the side but it ‘wasn’t any shallower’. He described facing jets of water, noting that every time he would ‘try and do something’, he was met with ‘getting hit by jets of water. They were bloody cold’. There was uncontested evidence that the pond’s depth at its deepest point ranged from 1.1 metres to 1.15 meters. Mr Giles, the ambulance officer, observed the appellant, measuring between 182 centimetres and 185 centimetres in height, and noted that he was only wet up to ‘about his belly button’. Considering the water temperature on the following day was about 18 degrees Celsius, it was unlikely to be ‘freezing’ or extremely cold. Additionally, the water from the jets landed in a small and confined area, some distance from Rock C, near where the appellant said he tried to save Mrs Dansie.
The appellant also said that his ‘first thought’ and primary concern was to get Mrs Dansie out of the pond, and this was the central focus of his efforts to save her. He said he was trying to ‘move her over to where I could get her out and in fact I couldn’t I had trouble getting out of there’. Although he acknowledged he could have supported her head to keep it above water, he explained that he was concentrating on getting her out of the pond.
The appellant told police that he did not remain in the pond attempting to keep her face out of the water because he thought Mrs Dansie would not ‘last very long in that sort of climate’. According to the appellant, Mrs Dansie was ‘too heavy’ to get out of the pond.
Mrs Dansie was not completely physically incapacitated; she could stand with assistance. Further, the appellant had experience assisting her, as seen in the CCTV footage taken at the nursing home earlier that day depicting the appellant getting her out of her wheelchair and into his vehicle. While the evidence from the CCTV footage revealed the physical capabilities of Mrs Dansie and the appellant, in the context of a ‘controlled situation’ on land without any of the attending elements of panic or stress, the evidence still undermined the cogency of the appellant’s account. Mrs Dansie was physically capable, with assistance, of bearing weight, and the appellant was aware of that fact.
Moreover, the bottom of the pond was concrete, albeit with some ‘silty mud covering it’. It did not provide a particularly unstable platform for the appellant or Mrs Dansie to stand. The pond’s small circumference meant that the appellant did not need to move Mrs Dansie far, wherever she was positioned in the pond, to place her near its edge. According to the unchallenged evidence of the pathologist, she would have also been more buoyant in the water. The water lapped at the edge of the pond meaning it would not have been difficult to roll or lift Mrs Dansie from the water over the edge of the pond once at its edge.
More significantly, it was not necessary for the appellant to get Mrs Dansie out of the pond to prevent her from drowning. There were other options readily available to the appellant, and to our minds, obvious to any person faced with his situation. Those options included keeping her head above water, while he pulled her the short distance to the edge of the pond where she could hold onto the edge while he exited the pond and called emergency services. Importantly, the appellant did not give an account of attempting to hold his wife on her back so that her mouth and nose were above the water. It can be inferred that he did not do so, from his statements that he did not remember seeing his wife face up and that it did not occur to him to give his wife CPR. His failure to do so stands in stark contrast with his claims to police to have the capacity to act decisively in emergencies, which he attributed to his training as a commercial pilot.
The pond was not deep, and there was no reason Mrs Dansie could not stand in it while holding onto the edge. The bottom of the pond was a stable concrete platform, and she was not out of her depth or completely physically incapacitated.
Notwithstanding the appellant’s explanations, his failure to save his wife from drowning supported the prosecution case that he had deliberately pushed her wheelchair into the pond with the intention of killing her. Otherwise, why not save her? In reaching that conclusion, we have not overlooked the appellant’s submissions on this topic that he was obese and unfit and had difficulty himself getting in and out of the pond. Notwithstanding those submissions, we consider his poor physical condition would not have significantly undermined his ability to enter the water, move his wife to the side of the pond, or keep her head above water. Furthermore, it was a small pond; the water, even with knees flexed, would not have been above his shoulders, and the floor of the pond was made of concrete. Additionally, while Mrs Dansie was a heavy woman, she would, in fact, be more buoyant in water.
We have also considered the appellant’s submission that if Mrs Dansie’s entry into the pond and subsequent death was an accident, it followed that the appellant would likely experience a degree of panic. This panic may lend itself to illogical or less than rational reactions by the appellant, such as not having the presence of mind to keep her head out of the water. It might also impair his ability to later give a complete or coherent account of events. That may be so, but what was required from the appellant to save his wife involved rudimentary actions that would not demand a high level of ‘presence of mind’ from someone familiar with her physical capabilities.
We have also considered the appellant’s submission that whether there was more that could objectively have been done by him to save his wife is not to the point, except insofar as it bears on his intention. So much is true, however, as discussed above, the appellant’s explanations for why he did not do more to save his wife from drowning are undermined by other objective evidence. Further, his failure to take obvious and straightforward actions which would have saved his wife from drowning reflects adversely on his state of mind and the question of whether he deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with the requisite specific intention to kill his wife.
Lies
Upon our independent review of the recordings of the police interviews, we are satisfied that the appellant told several false statements that were deliberate untruths or lies. First, he lied about the circumstances in which he left his Armani wrist watch in the vehicle. The appellant said during his interview with Munn that he took off his watch to work on his vehicle. Later, during his interview at the Gardens with Newbury, he said that ‘today I got replacement belts … I was going to fix those before I picked Helen up so I took my watch off and put it in the car’. While it is true that earlier that morning, on 16 April 2017 at 11:49am, the appellant purchased two fanbelts at Supercheap Auto, the CCTV from the nursing home showed that he was wearing a watch when he collected Mrs Dansie from the nursing home on the afternoon of 16 April 2017. Additionally, CCTV footage from the OTR store at Woodville from 3:39pm on that day showed the appellant wearing a watch. We are satisfied that the appellant’s untrue statements about his watch were deliberate given he provided essentially the same false explanation to two police officers during separate interviews. Moreover, he was being questioned about an event that had only recently occurred, which makes it unlikely that he simply forgot he removed his watch after collecting Mrs Dansie or was confused about when he took it off. The appellant’s lie about his watch and the method and timing of its telling, immediately after describing that he had left his watch in the car, combine to deny his exculpatory accounts of any appreciable weight.
The appellant also told a deliberate untruth as to being treated poorly by police when speaking with Ms Monfries. As much was conceded at trial, and his account of his poor treatment by police was detailed and contradicted by the evidence of his police interviews.
The evidence that the appellant deliberately minimised his relationship with ‘Sophia’ was also convincing. Initially, he said that she was ‘an interesting person and by interesting I mean ... not to get into bed with’. This statement was contradicted by the QQ messages between the appellant and Sophia, as well as his travel arrangements which indicated he intended to meet up with her after Mrs Dansie’s death, and his travel bags which contained items indicating he intended to pursue an intimate relationship with her. The appellant’s latter concession that some of his conversations with Sophia were ‘steamy’ or ‘risqué’ was not made until after police told him they intended to search his home for items including his computers. By this stage, it must have been obvious to him that an examination of his computers by police would inevitably reveal the content of the messages between himself and Sophia.
Furthermore, the appellant told police that Sophia was ‘the only one’ he was speaking with, yet he was also communicating with someone named ‘Rose’. To that extent, the appellant understated his interest in pursuing other sexual relationships. The fact that the appellant lied to police and minimised his relationship with Sophia, as well as his interest in pursuing other relationships, also deny his exculpatory accounts any material weight.
It was not suggested at trial, nor on appeal, that the appellant’s lies were evidence of his guilt and we have not used the evidence for this purpose.
The appellant’s demeanour
We have listened to the recording of the 000 call and watched the video recordings of all the police interviews in their entirety. It was common ground at trial, and during this appeal hearing, that the appellant was largely unemotional during the police interviews and displayed an absence of distress about Mrs Dansie’s death and his role in it. That much is clear from the recordings. The stark nature of his failure to display any genuine emotion was compounded by his lengthy discussions of various extraneous matters, which often seemed tangential or entirely irrelevant to the questions asked by police.
The prosecution alleged that the appellant’s demeanour during the police interviews was ‘unusual’ and was not what might normally be expected from a person who had accidentally caused the death of his wife; and to that extent it supports the case of murder. Upon our independent review of the evidence, we are not prepared to draw any adverse inference against the appellant from his demeanour during the 000 call or the police interviews; that is, from the absence of any distress or by his discussion of various extraneous matters in the aftermath of his wife’s death. There exists a broad spectrum of human responses to the death of a family member or spouse, making it impossible to define what reaction is ‘unusual’ or to be ‘expected’. Some persons reveal their emotions more readily than others. Some persons may also have a delayed reaction to a traumatic event. There may be a vast array of different responses to any one traumatic event. We do not think the appellant’s lack of distress is a matter which supports the prosecution case, even when viewed collectively as part of a broader body of evidence adduced to show the deterioration in the appellant’s relationship with his wife. It is simply too difficult to determine how a person would normally react in these unusual circumstances to draw any adverse inference from the appellant’s lack of emotion or discussion of various extraneous matters in the aftermath of his wife’s death.
Anticipatory Conduct
There was a significant body of evidence of the appellant’s conduct leading up to April 2017 which suggests that the appellant had anticipated the death of his wife.
First, the unchallenged evidence that the appellant searched the internet seven times on 12 March 2017 and once on 18 March 2017 about funerals[76] was of some significance. This occurred about one month prior to Mrs Dansie’s death, and when she was in relatively good health. This was not a single internet search but numerous searches on the internet, relatively close in time to her death and undertaken during a period when the appellant was under pressure from the Public Advocate, and at a time when he was searching the internet for items associated with a new sexual relationship. We do not consider persuasive the defence submission at trial, reiterated on appeal, that only weeks before the searches there had been two deaths and funerals in Mrs Dansie’s wider family, and that this provided an explanation for the appellant’s interest in funerals. Nor do we consider that this fact alone, or in combination with the appellant and Mrs Dansie’s respective ages and infirmities, might naturally invoke an interest by the appellant in funeral arrangements.
[76] See Trial Exhibit P41; Trial Exhibit P42.
The timing of the internet searches is important. On 18 March 2017, the appellant searched for ‘sexy 6-inch stiletto heel shoes for sale’ about one minute before searching for ‘blackwell funerals glenside.’ The searches were in relatively quick succession suggesting both matters were on his mind at relatively the same time indicating there was a connection between the two topics.
The evidence of the appellant’s searches for ‘funerals’ shows that in the month preceding Mrs Dansie’s drowning, the appellant was contemplating her death at a time when there was no medical reason to do so. It supports the prosecution case that the appellant’s actions in pushing the wheelchair into the pond were deliberate.
Second, the evidence that after leaving the OTR convenience store and entering the Gardens with Mrs Dansie, the appellant removed his watch and left it in the car along with his wallet containing about $400 must also be given weight in support of the prosecution case. He also had a change of clothes in his car for himself but not Mrs Dansie. The appellant gave no explanation for why he left his watch in the car. As to his clothes, he said that he left his home early that day in shorts and a T-shirt, expecting to stay out until evening. He said that keeping a change of clothes (long trousers and a jumper) in the car was a regular practice for him. Notwithstanding this explanation, the finding of all the items in his vehicle, with no explanation for why he left his watch in the vehicle, suggests that the appellant believed he was going to get wet while in the Gardens.
Third, there was evidence that the appellant had tested the water depth of all other rockpools in the Gardens; it was only the water depth of the pond that he had not tested. The water in the pond in which Mrs Dansie drowned was of the greatest depth of all rockpools in the Gardens. Additionally, there was evidence that from 17 March 2017, the appellant took his wife out more regularly than during the corresponding period in the previous year. This body of evidence supports the inference that he was considering a location and opportunities to kill his wife prior to 16 April 2017. We have not overlooked the appellant’s submission that if he was taking his wife on outings for this purpose, he would hardly make a record of it. However, countering that submission is the fact that the nursing home strictly enforced a requirement for outings be recorded in a written log, and the appellant may well not have given sufficient thought to how these records might be perceived later.
As to the appellant’s submission that the absence of a pre-planned explanation for his wife’s death, in which he would have feigned distress, pointed towards accident and is inconsistent with the prosecution case of a planned, premeditated murder, we do not consider this submission persuasive. It is important to recognise that the appellant did provide an explanation for his wife’s drowning; it was simply that police challenged the details of his account whereupon it became increasingly apparent to both police and the appellant himself that his version of events did not withstand scrutiny. For example, he acknowledged the difficulties with his explanation of how he pushed the wheelchair into the pond, admitting, ‘I see the problem’.
To our minds, the fact the appellant gave a flawed explanation to police in which he displayed limited emotion and ultimately failed to provide a coherent or convincing explanation does not undermine the prosecution case of a premeditated murder. Instead, it is equally consistent with a person who, due to an arrogant disposition or an unfounded confidence in his own ability to deceive, did not fully appreciate the difficulties with his version of events until it was tested by police during numerous interviews.
Motive

The appellant had two clear motives to commit the offence. First, the appellant had a financial motive to kill his wife. The evidence on this topic needs to be viewed in the context of his increasingly strained relationship with the Public Advocate. By mid-March 2017, the Public Advocate had advised him that she may review the administration order and undertake an investigation into Mrs Dansie’s finances. An application was filed with SACAT to vary the Guardianship Order to make the Public Advocate the sole guardian and have the Public Trustee appointed to manage her finances on 28 March 2017, listed for hearing in July 2017. Additionally, the appellant was aware by mid-March that the Public Advocate was considering moving Mrs Dansie into a different nursing home, at increased cost.
After Ms Rozman assumed the position of Public Advocate, there was increased focus on the appellant’s treatment of his wife. He was challenged by the Public Advocate about his refusal to pay for the cost of her attending the funerals of her brother and cousin. Additionally, her need for eyeglasses and physiotherapy were raised with him. The Public Advocate was giving consideration to moving her to a more comfortable nursing home at an additional cost. Furthermore, there was the prospect, if unsuccessful in the SACAT proceedings, that he would lose sole control of her finances to the Public Trustee.
While it is to be accepted that there was no evidence that the appellant did not provide an adequate level of care to his wife, there was evidence that there was an increasing level of scrutiny of Mrs Dansie’s care and living conditions in the months and weeks preceding her death. The matter was to be the subject of litigation, which would have cost implications for the appellant and could result in him losing control of her finances. Moreover, if moved to another nursing home, there would be additional costs.
The appellant was preoccupied with his dispute with the Public Advocate (whom he referred to as the ‘new girl’), as shown in his ongoing discussion of the topic during the police interviews. He repeatedly returned to the issue, often in a non-responsive way to the questions asked of him. Mrs Dansie’s death put an end to his dispute with the Public Advocate and removed the cost of legal proceedings in SACAT, as well as the potentially adverse financial implications of an unsuccessful result.
The appellant also stood to receive significant financial benefits upon Mrs Dansie’s accidental death. These included: being able to claim $15,000 from Freedom Insurance; receiving a pension for the term of his life equivalent to two‑thirds of that payable to his wife had she lived; and the three properties held in joint names would revert to him. We have not overlooked the submissions that the appellant considered himself a ‘wealthy man’ and had no obvious need for an injection of money. However, the financial benefits he stood to receive upon his wife’s death were relatively significant. Furthermore, her death put an end to SACAT proceedings, which would have potentially resulted in additional costs and a loss of his control over her finances.
The appellant also had a relationship motive to commit the offence; that is, his interest in pursuing a sexual relationship with other women, in particular ‘Sophia’. The content of the messages between the appellant and Sophia, combined with his internet searches for ‘sexy heels’, revealed the intimate nature of their association. Furthermore, the appellant had his sister maintain contact with Sophia after his wife’s death, and he arranged to travel to China to meet up with her. The contents of his travel suitcase support the inference that his interest in Sophia was sexual. As to the appellant’s submission that he did not need to kill his wife to pursue extra-marital affairs, and many persons conduct such liaisons without resorting to murder, so much is true, but it would have been difficult for the appellant to pursue a sexual relationship with a woman who lived in China while remaining the husband, carer, and legal guardian of his wife. Moreover, divorcing his wife would have had financial implications, and to that extent, the financial and relationship motives are interconnected.
We have considered the appellant’s submission that if he was subjectively motivated to commit the offence for financial and personal reasons, he would not have engaged in post-offence conduct which drew attention to those motives. However, contrary to this submission the appellant’s post offence conduct in making his insurance claims and arranging to travel to China in fact underscored his motives to commit the offence.
Following our independent review of all the evidence, including the appellant’s denials and version of events provided to emergency services personnel and during the police interviews, and after having regard to the submissions of both parties, we are satisfied the evidence was sufficient in nature and quality to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder. We are satisfied as a result of our own assessment of the whole of the evidence adduced at trial that the only rational inference available on the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with an intention to kill his wife.
Conclusion
1. We grant permission to appeal but dismiss the appeal.