Dansie v The King

Case [2024] SASCA 26


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

DANSIE v THE KING

[2024] SASCA 26

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David)

21 March 2024

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED

The appellant, Peter Rex Dansie, was tried by judge alone in the Supreme Court of South Australia for the murder of his wheelchair-dependent wife, Mrs Dansie.

On 16 April 2017, the appellant and his wife visited Veale Gardens in the South Parklands of Adelaide. There, the appellant positioned his wife in her wheelchair on a rock near the northern edge of a pond. He admitted pushing the wheelchair into the pond. The appellant subsequently entered the pond himself but was unable to rescue her. It was common ground during the trial, and on appeal, that Mrs Dansie died by drowning.

The prosecution case was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wife into the pond with the intention to kill her. The defence case was that the appellant’s actions were either accidental or, at the very least, there existed a reasonable possibility that they were accidental. The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial. The appellant did not give evidence and relied on his version of events given to emergency services personnel and during police interviews in the aftermath of his wife’s death.

The trial Judge found the appellant guilty of murder, convicted him, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 25 years.

This appeal was remitted to the Court of Appeal following a successful appeal to the High Court against the majority judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103; Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651). The sole ground of appeal before this Court is that the verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

Held, by the Court, dismissing the appeal:

1.  After conducting an independent review of all the evidence presented at trial, and after considering the submissions put forward by both parties, this Court is satisfied that the evidence was sufficient in nature and quality to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder.  It was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed Mrs Dansie, seated in her wheelchair, into the pond with an intention to kill her; and to reject beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s account of having accidentally pushed her wheelchair into the pond.

2.  Observations as to the correct approach by an appellate court on an unreasonable verdict ground to viewing a video recording of a defendant's police interview.

M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487,…

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Dansie v The King [2024] SASCA 26
Case
[2024] SASCA 26
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia concerned the conviction of the appellant, Mr Dansie, for the murder of his wife. The prosecution's case at trial was entirely circumstantial, with the defence challenging the inferences sought to be drawn from the evidence rather than disputing the factual findings themselves. The appellant accepted the trial judge's factual findings but argued that the incriminatory inferences drawn were not open to this Court upon an independent review of the evidence.

The central legal issue was whether the circumstantial evidence, when considered as a whole, was sufficient to satisfy the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of murder. This required the Court to independently review all the evidence and determine if there was any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, or if the only rational inference to be drawn was that the appellant deliberately caused his wife's death with the intention to kill.

The Court conducted an independent review of all the evidence, including the appellant's denials and his version of events. It considered the submissions of both parties and concluded that the evidence was of sufficient quality and quantity to eliminate any reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt. The Court found that the only rational inference available from the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wife's wheelchair into a pond with the intention to kill her.

Permission to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial and, for the most part, the evidence was not in dispute at trial; rather, defence counsel challenged the inferences sought to be drawn from the evidence. The appellant largely accepted the factual findings made by the trial Judge but contended that the incriminatory inferences drawn by the trial Judge should not be made by this Court upon an independent review of all the evidence. This Court is entitled to treat findings of fact made by the trial Judge about which no issue is taken in the appeal as an accurate reflection of so much of the evidence as bore on those findings.[11][11] Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [16] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ. General background The appellant and his wife married in 1973 and, at the time of her death, had been married for about 44 years. They jointly owned a home at Waterfall Gully and two commercial rural properties in the South-East of South Australia. Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke in 1995, resulting in various physical and cognitive disabilities that required the use of a wheelchair. Subsequently, the Public Advocate, along with the appellant, became her joint guardian and administrator. In his reasons for verdict, the trial Judge outlined the largely unchallenged evidence as to a dispute regarding the most appropriate place of residence for Mrs Dansie after her stroke, heard before the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). His Honour said:[12] [12] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [26]-[32] per Lovell J.In 1995, Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke. A lengthy stay in hospital was followed by many months of rehabilitation. Unfortunately, Mrs Dansie did not make a full recovery and was left with permanent cognitive deficits and weakness in her right leg. Her permanent disabilities meant she could not return to work. Mrs Dansie’s contributory superannuation policy entitled her to access a defined benefit pension for life. Mr Dansie became the full-time carer for Mrs Dansie. They lived in the Waterfall Gully residence built by Mr Dansie. Statements by Mr Dansie to the police suggest that he continued to work for at least part of the time he was caring for Mrs Dansie.Due to her cognitive problems, the Public Advocate was, in 2004, made a limited and joint guardian with Mr Dansie. They were to make decisions about her residential and care requirements. The joint guardianship ceased in 2009; Mr Dansie again became her sole carer. In 2015, Mrs Dansie contracted a serious illness (E. coli infection), requiring admission to the Royal Adelaide Hospital and then the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. On discharge in September 2015, Mrs Dansie was admitted to the Nursing Home in respite care. In November 2015, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were again appointed joint guardians. Mr Dansie wanted her to return to the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate considered that the premises were unsuitable. The dispute was to be determined in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). In September 2016, Mr Dansie conceded that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home. Mrs Dansie’s status at the Nursing Home then changed from being in respite care to becoming a permanent resident. This change had financial ramifications for Mr Dansie.For reasons not fully explained, Mr Dansie and his son Grant became estranged not long after Mrs Dansie returned home after completing her rehabilitation in 1996. In 2000, Grant left home while in his final year at school. After finishing school, Grant studied at Griffith University in Brisbane and then in Copenhagen. Since 2001, he has lived overseas and currently lives in Norway. Grant always attempted to maintain a loving and caring relationship with his mother despite that, after her stroke in 1995, she was a “different person”.Grant considered that Mr Dansie deliberately obstructed him from having access to, and contact with, his mother. He also became concerned that Mr Dansie was not providing Mrs Dansie with adequate or appropriate care. Grant was not able to ascertain how his mother’s finances were organised. Ms Ginny Giorgio, a neighbour and friend of Mrs Dansie, had similar concerns. It appears that Mr Dansie, from 1995, controlled Mrs Dansie’s finances. Mr Dansie always denied suggestions that he did not appropriately care for his wife or that he did not look after her finances properly.The relevance of the evidence, whether the allegations be right or wrong, is that the concerns of Grant and Ms Giorgio led to a number of contested applications before the Guardianship Board (later the SACAT) commencing in December 2005. The applications and decisions are summarised in Exhibit P39. I discuss the relevance of the applications later in these reasons. By way of agreed background, I note the following:·On 9 December 2005, the Guardianship Board ordered that the Public Advocate be appointed “limited guardian” for Mrs Dansie in relation to whom Mrs Dansie had contact. Grant’s application for an administration order was dismissed. Mr Dansie continued to look after the finances without supervision.·On 24 October 2007, Mr Dansie was formally appointed administrator; this required him to file a yearly financial report of Mrs Dansie’s finances.·On 14 May 2009, the Office of the Public Advocate ceased acting as a limited guardian for Mrs Dansie.·Mrs Dansie inherited $46,686.00 following the death of an uncle. After deducting approximately $7,000 (being a deficit in her accounts), Mr Dansie invested the remaining amount in the home.·Between 2010 and 2014, the financial examiner at the Public Trustee examined the financial reports filed by Mr Dansie and found them to be satisfactory.·On 20 November 2015, SACAT appointed Mr Dansie and the Public Advocate (represented by David Cripps) as joint guardians for Mrs Dansie. The SACAT also made a finding that Mrs Dansie had a “mental incapacity”.·Between January 2016 through to June 2016, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were in dispute as to whether Mrs Dansie should return to live at the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate had concerns about the suitability of the premises.·On 20 June 2016, the Public Advocate applied to review the Guardianship Order as the joint guardians were “unable to act jointly” about the suitability of the premises.·On 5 September 2016, the Public Advocate withdrew the application for sole guardianship as Mr Dansie had agreed that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home rather than reside at the Waterfall Gully residence.·On 1 March 2017, Suzanne Rozman replaced David Cripps as the Public Advocate.·On 6 March 2017, Ms Rozman raised with Mr Dansie the possibility of a review of the administration order and an investigation into Mrs Dansie’s finances.·On 27 March 2017, Grant Dansie and Ms Giorgio filed applications to review the appointment of Mr Dansie as administrator and joint guardian. The application was listed for hearing in July 2017.In general terms, at the time of Mrs Dansie’s death, Mr Dansie remained in sole control of Mrs Dansie’s finances and was a joint guardian with the Public Advocate; applications to review both matters were before the SACAT. I deal in more detail, later in these reasons, with the Public Advocate’s contact with Mr Dansie leading up to the death of Mrs Dansie.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On the other hand, the respondent contended that when the prosecution case is considered as a whole, including the appellant’s version of events and denials, this Court can be satisfied that there is no reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence and it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.The evidence adduced on the prosecution case The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial and, for the most part, the evidence was not in dispute at trial; rather, defence counsel challenged the inferences sought to be drawn from the evidence. The appellant largely accepted the factual findings made by the trial Judge but contended that the incriminatory inferences drawn by the trial Judge should not be made by this Court upon an independent review of all the evidence. This Court is entitled to treat findings of fact made by the trial Judge about which no issue is taken in the appeal as an accurate reflection of so much of the evidence as bore on those findings.[11][11] Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [16] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ. General background The appellant and his wife married in 1973 and, at the time of her death, had been married for about 44 years. They jointly owned a home at Waterfall Gully and two commercial rural properties in the South-East of South Australia. Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke in 1995, resulting in various physical and cognitive disabilities that required the use of a wheelchair. Subsequently, the Public Advocate, along with the appellant, became her joint guardian and administrator. In his reasons for verdict, the trial Judge outlined the largely unchallenged evidence as to a dispute regarding the most appropriate place of residence for Mrs Dansie after her stroke, heard before the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). His Honour said:[12] [12] R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [26]-[32] per Lovell J.In 1995, Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke. A lengthy stay in hospital was followed by many months of rehabilitation. Unfortunately, Mrs Dansie did not make a full recovery and was left with permanent cognitive deficits and weakness in her right leg. Her permanent disabilities meant she could not return to work. Mrs Dansie’s contributory superannuation policy entitled her to access a defined benefit pension for life. Mr Dansie became the full-time carer for Mrs Dansie. They lived in the Waterfall Gully residence built by Mr Dansie. Statements by Mr Dansie to the police suggest that he continued to work for at least part of the time he was caring for Mrs Dansie.Due to her cognitive problems, the Public Advocate was, in 2004, made a limited and joint guardian with Mr Dansie. They were to make decisions about her residential and care requirements. The joint guardianship ceased in 2009; Mr Dansie again became her sole carer. In 2015, Mrs Dansie contracted a serious illness (E. coli infection), requiring admission to the Royal Adelaide Hospital and then the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. On discharge in September 2015, Mrs Dansie was admitted to the Nursing Home in respite care. In November 2015, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were again appointed joint guardians. Mr Dansie wanted her to return to the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate considered that the premises were unsuitable. The dispute was to be determined in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). In September 2016, Mr Dansie conceded that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home. Mrs Dansie’s status at the Nursing Home then changed from being in respite care to becoming a permanent resident. This change had financial ramifications for Mr Dansie.For reasons not fully explained, Mr Dansie and his son Grant became estranged not long after Mrs Dansie returned home after completing her rehabilitation in 1996. In 2000, Grant left home while in his final year at school. After finishing school, Grant studied at Griffith University in Brisbane and then in Copenhagen. Since 2001, he has lived overseas and currently lives in Norway. Grant always attempted to maintain a loving and caring relationship with his mother despite that, after her stroke in 1995, she was a “different person”.Grant considered that Mr Dansie deliberately obstructed him from having access to, and contact with, his mother. He also became concerned that Mr Dansie was not providing Mrs Dansie with adequate or appropriate care. Grant was not able to ascertain how his mother’s finances were organised. Ms Ginny Giorgio, a neighbour and friend of Mrs Dansie, had similar concerns. It appears that Mr Dansie, from 1995, controlled Mrs Dansie’s finances. Mr Dansie always denied suggestions that he did not appropriately care for his wife or that he did not look after her finances properly.The relevance of the evidence, whether the allegations be right or wrong, is that the concerns of Grant and Ms Giorgio led to a number of contested applications before the Guardianship Board (later the SACAT) commencing in December 2005. The applications and decisions are summarised in Exhibit P39. I discuss the relevance of the applications later in these reasons. By way of agreed background, I note the following:·On 9 December 2005, the Guardianship Board ordered that the Public Advocate be appointed “limited guardian” for Mrs Dansie in relation to whom Mrs Dansie had contact. Grant’s application for an administration order was dismissed. Mr Dansie continued to look after the finances without supervision.·On 24 October 2007, Mr Dansie was formally appointed administrator; this required him to file a yearly financial report of Mrs Dansie’s finances.·On 14 May 2009, the Office of the Public Advocate ceased acting as a limited guardian for Mrs Dansie.·Mrs Dansie inherited $46,686.00 following the death of an uncle. After deducting approximately $7,000 (being a deficit in her accounts), Mr Dansie invested the remaining amount in the home.·Between 2010 and 2014, the financial examiner at the Public Trustee examined the financial reports filed by Mr Dansie and found them to be satisfactory.·On 20 November 2015, SACAT appointed Mr Dansie and the Public Advocate (represented by David Cripps) as joint guardians for Mrs Dansie. The SACAT also made a finding that Mrs Dansie had a “mental incapacity”.·Between January 2016 through to June 2016, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were in dispute as to whether Mrs Dansie should return to live at the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate had concerns about the suitability of the premises.·On 20 June 2016, the Public Advocate applied to review the Guardianship Order as the joint guardians were “unable to act jointly” about the suitability of the premises.·On 5 September 2016, the Public Advocate withdrew the application for sole guardianship as Mr Dansie had agreed that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home rather than reside at the Waterfall Gully residence.·On 1 March 2017, Suzanne Rozman replaced David Cripps as the Public Advocate.·On 6 March 2017, Ms Rozman raised with Mr Dansie the possibility of a review of the administration order and an investigation into Mrs Dansie’s finances.·On 27 March 2017, Grant Dansie and Ms Giorgio filed applications to review the appointment of Mr Dansie as administrator and joint guardian. The application was listed for hearing in July 2017.In general terms, at the time of Mrs Dansie’s death, Mr Dansie remained in sole control of Mrs Dansie’s finances and was a joint guardian with the Public Advocate; applications to review both matters were before the SACAT. I deal in more detail, later in these reasons, with the Public Advocate’s contact with Mr Dansie leading up to the death of Mrs Dansie.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Following our independent review of all the evidence, including the appellant’s denials and version of events provided to emergency services personnel and during the police interviews, and after having regard to the submissions of both parties, we are satisfied the evidence was sufficient in nature and quality to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder. We are satisfied as a result of our own assessment of the whole of the evidence adduced at trial that the only rational inference available on the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with an intention to kill his wife.Conclusion1. We grant permission to appeal but dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.