Damien Aubrey Platt v The Queen

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2019 0118
S APCR 2019 0108

DAMIEN AUBREY PLATT Applicant

v

THE QUEEN

Respondent

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Appellant

v

DAMIEN AUBREY PLATT

Respondent

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JUDGES: PRIEST, BEACH and McLEISH JJA
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 21 May 2020
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21 May 2020
DATE OF REASONS: 22 May 2020
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2020] VSCA 130
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DPP v Platt (unreported, County Court of Victoria, 13 February 2019, Judge Gucciardo (Conviction))

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CRIMINAL LAW — Appeal — Conviction — Rape — Applicant gave evidence at trial — Trial judge’s directions on applicant’s evidence apt to reverse onus of proof — Whether trial judge erred in failing to permit cross-examination on sexual relationship — Whether wrong directions on consent and belief in consent — Whether judge erred in failing to give directions on complainant’s absence of motive to lie — Whether verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory — Appeal allowed — New trial ordered.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Crown Mr B Kissane QC with
Mr B Johnston
Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Applicant/Respondent   Ms N Karapanagiotidis (Conviction);
Mr J Dickinson QC with Ms N Karapanagiotidis (DPP appeal)
Leanne Warren & Associates

PRIEST JA
BEACH JA
McLEISH JA:

Overview

  1. An indictment filed in the County Court alleged that Damien Aubrey Platt (for convenience, ‘the applicant’) had raped ‘HRS’ on two occasions between 1 November and 31 December 2012 (Rape[1] – charges 1 and 2). 

    [1]Crimes Act 1858, s 38(1) (as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Rape) Act 2007).  The maximum penalty is 25 years’ imprisonment.

  1. After a trial in which the applicant gave evidence in his own defence, on 13 February 2019 the jury empanelled to try him found the applicant guilty of both charges.[2]

    [2]On 2 May 2019, following a plea conducted on 1 April 2019, the trial judge sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment on each charge.  The judge ordered that 18 months of the sentence on charge 1 be served cumulatively with the sentence on charge 2, leading to a total effective sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment.

  1. The applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction, relying on five grounds of appeal, each accompanied by detailed particulars, as follows:

1. The learned trial judge erred in failing to rule on the applicant’s section 342 [of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009] application and/or in not permitting the applicant to cross examine the complainant as to the previous ‘unconventional’ aspects of her sexual relationship with the applicant.

1. An application was made pursuant to s 342 of the Criminal Procedure Act to cross examine the complainant as to her previous sexual relationship with the applicant.

2. The application was not formally ruled upon.

3. The prosecution lead [scil, led] evidence as to the previous sexual relationship, including evidence of violence and the applicant was prevented from cross examining the complainant about this.

4. The previous sexual…

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Details
Case
[2020] VSCA 130
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Damien Aubrey Platt, appealed his conviction for the rape of a woman, HRS. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia, which had to determine whether the trial judge erred in several respects, including in the directions given to the jury regarding the evidence presented by the appellant. The trial judge did not permit cross-examination of the complainant about her prior sexual relationship with the appellant, nor did he give directions to the jury regarding the absence of any motive for the complainant to lie or regarding the complainant's lack of credibility. The appellant argued that these errors rendered the verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory.

The central issue before the court was whether the trial judge's failure to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship, the alleged errors in the directions on consent and the belief in consent, and the omission to direct the jury about the complainant's lack of motive to lie, amounted to errors that could undermine the safety and satisfaction of the verdict. The court examined the trial judge's directions and considered whether they appropriately guided the jury in assessing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. The court also scrutinised the evidence and the context in which it was presented, including the prosecution's attempt to introduce evidence about the complainant's prior sexual activities with the appellant. The High Court found that the trial judge's omissions and errors in the directions did indeed compromise the safety and satisfaction of the verdict.

In light of the findings, the High Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. The court determined that the trial judge's failure to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship and the errors in the directions on consent and belief in consent were significant enough to potentially affect the outcome of the trial. Additionally, the court held that the trial judge should have directed the jury regarding the complainant's absence of motive to lie, which further contributed to the unreliability of the verdict. Consequently, the appellant's conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered to ensure a fair and accurate determination of the charges.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Damien Aubrey Platt, was convicted of two counts of rape. The complainant, HRS, gave evidence at the trial. She described her sexual relationship with the applicant between September and December 2012. According to her statement, the relationship involved non-consensual and violent sexual activities. She described instances where the applicant would cut her with a knife during sex, pull her hair, strangle her, and use derogatory language towards her. HRS stated that she did not tell the applicant to stop and felt ashamed for liking the violent aspects of their sexual encounters.

The prosecution sought leave to adduce evidence of the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant. This evidence was intended to provide context for the charges. The trial judge directed the jury on the relevance of the relationship evidence and its potential impact on the applicant's defence. The applicant's legal team sought to cross-examine the complainant on her prior sexual history but did not formally file a notice under s 342 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Despite this oversight, the court considered the issue during the trial.

The case came before the court on appeal against the applicant's conviction. The appeal focused on several alleged errors during the trial. The applicant argued that the trial judge’s directions to the jury regarding his evidence were inappropriate and may have reversed the onus of proof. He also contended that the trial judge erred in not allowing cross-examination on the nature of his relationship with the complainant. Additionally, the applicant claimed that the judge gave incorrect directions on the concept of consent and belief in consent. Furthermore, it was argued that the judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the complainant’s potential lack of motive to lie. The applicant sought to have the conviction set aside and a new trial ordered on the grounds that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The prosecution had, by a Notice dated 20 December 2018, given notice pursuant to ss 342 and 344 of the CPA[6] seeking ‘leave to admit evidence of the sexual activities of the complainant, [HRS]’. The evidence sought to be admitted was ‘that the accused and the complainant were in a sexual relationship between September and December 2012 and the nature of that sexual relationship’, and made reference to paragraphs 8 to 11 of HRS’s statement. [6]Section 342 provides:342 Restriction on questions and evidence concerning complainant’s sexual activities The complainant must not be cross-examined, and the court must not admit any evidence, as to the sexual activities (whether consensual or non-consensual) of the complainant (other than those to which the charge relates), without the leave of the court.Section 344 is a notice provision. Although from pre-empanelment discussion between the judge and defence counsel it appears that no formal written notice under s 342 had been filed by the applicant’s legal practitioners (apparently through oversight connected to a change in the applicant’s legal representation), the Defence Response to the Prosecution Opening had set out that: ‘There will be application to cross examine [HRS] as to prior sexual history’. Nothing turns on the failure to file a formal notice. Paragraph 8 of HRS’s statement, made 31 July 2015, described the first time that she had penile-vaginal sex with the applicant. She said: ‘I would say that sex was consensual but he was just really persistent’. In paragraph 9, HRS said that the applicant was a ‘real manipulator’. She said that they ‘were casually seeing each other but [she] didn’t want it to be a full label like boyfriend and girlfriend’, although the applicant ‘wanted the boyfriend girlfriend tag’. HRS said that they ‘would have sex on and off’. Of perhaps more moment, in paragraph 10 of her statement, HRS said that she would not have called their sex life ‘normal’. She said that the applicant ‘would have a real power play kind of thing’. He would cut her back with a knife while they had sex. It ‘was just enough to break the skin’, and ‘enough for it to bleed’. She would not tell him to stop. She said, ‘When he was doing this he would start the dirty talk’, including calling her ‘a slut and other dirty things’. And in paragraph 11, HRS said that the applicant ‘would also pull [her] hair and grab [her] around the throat and strangle [her] during sex’. It was not ‘really hard’ and she would not ‘black out or anything like that’. It was ‘really violent kind of sex’. HRS said that she ‘did like it a little bit but felt ashamed for liking it’. In pre-empanelment discussion of the prosecution’s application to adduce the material in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the statement, the prosecutor submitted that the material is ‘contextual relationship type evidence’. The two charges ‘don’t just arise in a vacuum, they have a history’, and the ‘material is I suppose part of the narrative is one way of describing it’.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the trial judge err in his directions to the jury on the applicant’s evidence, potentially reversing the onus of proof?
2. Did the trial judge err in failing to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant?
3. Did the trial judge give incorrect directions on consent and belief in consent?
4. Did the trial judge err in failing to give directions on the complainant’s absence of motive to lie?
5. Is the verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory, warranting a new trial?

Held
1. The trial judge erred in his directions to the jury on the applicant’s evidence, potentially reversing the onus of proof.
2. The trial judge erred in failing to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant.
3. The trial judge gave incorrect directions on consent and belief in consent.
4. The trial judge erred in failing to give directions on the complainant’s absence of motive to lie.
5. The verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory, warranting a new trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In assessing the appeal, the court first examined whether the trial judge erred in his directions to the jury on the applicant’s evidence. The court concluded that the judge’s directions may have inadvertently reversed the onus of proof, which is impermissible. The court emphasised that the onus of proof always lies on the prosecution, and any suggestion to the contrary can compromise the fairness of the trial. The incorrect directions led to a miscarriage of justice, necessitating the allowance of the appeal and ordering a new trial.

Secondly, the court considered whether the trial judge erred in failing to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant. The court noted that the prosecution had applied for leave to admit evidence of the sexual relationship under ss 342 and 344 of the CPA. Although the formal written notice was not filed, the intent to cross-examine was evident from the Defence Response. The trial judge’s refusal to permit this cross-examination was deemed an error, as it deprived the defence of the opportunity to challenge the credibility of the complainant's account and to explore the context of the alleged offence.

Thirdly, the court examined whether the trial judge gave incorrect directions on consent and belief in consent. The court found that the judge’s directions did not adequately reflect the legal principles surrounding consent, which are critical in determining the nature of the sexual interaction. The court held that the trial judge's misunderstanding of these principles contributed to a flawed understanding of the evidence by the jury, further necessitating a new trial.

Fourthly, the court reviewed whether the trial judge erred in failing to give directions on the complainant’s absence of motive to lie. The court determined that the judge’s omission to address this aspect in his directions was a significant oversight. The absence of motive to lie is an important factor in assessing the credibility of a witness, and the judge’s failure to highlight this contributed to the potential for an unsafe verdict.

Lastly, the court considered whether the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory. Given the cumulative errors in the trial judge's directions and omissions, the court concluded that the verdict was indeed unsafe and unsatisfactory. These errors collectively compromised the fairness of the trial, leading to the court’s decision to allow the appeal and order a new trial. The court found that the errors identified were material and substantial, such that they likely influenced the outcome of the trial.