SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2019 0118
S APCR 2019 0108
| DAMIEN AUBREY PLATT | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Appellant |
| v | |
| DAMIEN AUBREY PLATT | Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | PRIEST, BEACH and McLEISH JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 21 May 2020 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 21 May 2020 |
| DATE OF REASONS: | 22 May 2020 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSCA 130 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v Platt (unreported, County Court of Victoria, 13 February 2019, Judge Gucciardo (Conviction)) |
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CRIMINAL LAW — Appeal — Conviction — Rape — Applicant gave evidence at trial — Trial judge’s directions on applicant’s evidence apt to reverse onus of proof — Whether trial judge erred in failing to permit cross-examination on sexual relationship — Whether wrong directions on consent and belief in consent — Whether judge erred in failing to give directions on complainant’s absence of motive to lie — Whether verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory — Appeal allowed — New trial ordered.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Mr B Kissane QC with Mr B Johnston | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Applicant/Respondent | Ms N Karapanagiotidis (Conviction); Mr J Dickinson QC with Ms N Karapanagiotidis (DPP appeal) | Leanne Warren & Associates |
PRIEST JA
BEACH JA
McLEISH JA:
Overview
An indictment filed in the County Court alleged that Damien Aubrey Platt (for convenience, ‘the applicant’) had raped ‘HRS’ on two occasions between 1 November and 31 December 2012 (Rape[1] – charges 1 and 2).
[1]Crimes Act 1858, s 38(1) (as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Rape) Act 2007). The maximum penalty is 25 years’ imprisonment.
After a trial in which the applicant gave evidence in his own defence, on 13 February 2019 the jury empanelled to try him found the applicant guilty of both charges.[2]
[2]On 2 May 2019, following a plea conducted on 1 April 2019, the trial judge sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment on each charge. The judge ordered that 18 months of the sentence on charge 1 be served cumulatively with the sentence on charge 2, leading to a total effective sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment.
The applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction, relying on five grounds of appeal, each accompanied by detailed particulars, as follows:
1. The learned trial judge erred in failing to rule on the applicant’s section 342 [of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009] application and/or in not permitting the applicant to cross examine the complainant as to the previous ‘unconventional’ aspects of her sexual relationship with the applicant.
1. An application was made pursuant to s 342 of the Criminal Procedure Act to cross examine the complainant as to her previous sexual relationship with the applicant.
2. The application was not formally ruled upon.
3. The prosecution lead [scil, led] evidence as to the previous sexual relationship, including evidence of violence and the applicant was prevented from cross examining the complainant about this.
4. The previous sexual…
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- Case
- [2020] VSCA 130
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issue before the court was whether the trial judge's failure to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship, the alleged errors in the directions on consent and the belief in consent, and the omission to direct the jury about the complainant's lack of motive to lie, amounted to errors that could undermine the safety and satisfaction of the verdict. The court examined the trial judge's directions and considered whether they appropriately guided the jury in assessing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. The court also scrutinised the evidence and the context in which it was presented, including the prosecution's attempt to introduce evidence about the complainant's prior sexual activities with the appellant. The High Court found that the trial judge's omissions and errors in the directions did indeed compromise the safety and satisfaction of the verdict.
In light of the findings, the High Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. The court determined that the trial judge's failure to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship and the errors in the directions on consent and belief in consent were significant enough to potentially affect the outcome of the trial. Additionally, the court held that the trial judge should have directed the jury regarding the complainant's absence of motive to lie, which further contributed to the unreliability of the verdict. Consequently, the appellant's conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered to ensure a fair and accurate determination of the charges.
Background
Background to the litigation
The prosecution sought leave to adduce evidence of the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant. This evidence was intended to provide context for the charges. The trial judge directed the jury on the relevance of the relationship evidence and its potential impact on the applicant's defence. The applicant's legal team sought to cross-examine the complainant on her prior sexual history but did not formally file a notice under s 342 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Despite this oversight, the court considered the issue during the trial.
The case came before the court on appeal against the applicant's conviction. The appeal focused on several alleged errors during the trial. The applicant argued that the trial judge’s directions to the jury regarding his evidence were inappropriate and may have reversed the onus of proof. He also contended that the trial judge erred in not allowing cross-examination on the nature of his relationship with the complainant. Additionally, the applicant claimed that the judge gave incorrect directions on the concept of consent and belief in consent. Furthermore, it was argued that the judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the complainant’s potential lack of motive to lie. The applicant sought to have the conviction set aside and a new trial ordered on the grounds that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the trial judge err in his directions to the jury on the applicant’s evidence, potentially reversing the onus of proof?
2. Did the trial judge err in failing to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant?
3. Did the trial judge give incorrect directions on consent and belief in consent?
4. Did the trial judge err in failing to give directions on the complainant’s absence of motive to lie?
5. Is the verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory, warranting a new trial?
Held
1. The trial judge erred in his directions to the jury on the applicant’s evidence, potentially reversing the onus of proof.
2. The trial judge erred in failing to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant.
3. The trial judge gave incorrect directions on consent and belief in consent.
4. The trial judge erred in failing to give directions on the complainant’s absence of motive to lie.
5. The verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory, warranting a new trial.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In assessing the appeal, the court first examined whether the trial judge erred in his directions to the jury on the applicant’s evidence. The court concluded that the judge’s directions may have inadvertently reversed the onus of proof, which is impermissible. The court emphasised that the onus of proof always lies on the prosecution, and any suggestion to the contrary can compromise the fairness of the trial. The incorrect directions led to a miscarriage of justice, necessitating the allowance of the appeal and ordering a new trial.
Secondly, the court considered whether the trial judge erred in failing to permit cross-examination on the sexual relationship between the applicant and the complainant. The court noted that the prosecution had applied for leave to admit evidence of the sexual relationship under ss 342 and 344 of the CPA. Although the formal written notice was not filed, the intent to cross-examine was evident from the Defence Response. The trial judge’s refusal to permit this cross-examination was deemed an error, as it deprived the defence of the opportunity to challenge the credibility of the complainant's account and to explore the context of the alleged offence.
Thirdly, the court examined whether the trial judge gave incorrect directions on consent and belief in consent. The court found that the judge’s directions did not adequately reflect the legal principles surrounding consent, which are critical in determining the nature of the sexual interaction. The court held that the trial judge's misunderstanding of these principles contributed to a flawed understanding of the evidence by the jury, further necessitating a new trial.
Fourthly, the court reviewed whether the trial judge erred in failing to give directions on the complainant’s absence of motive to lie. The court determined that the judge’s omission to address this aspect in his directions was a significant oversight. The absence of motive to lie is an important factor in assessing the credibility of a witness, and the judge’s failure to highlight this contributed to the potential for an unsafe verdict.
Lastly, the court considered whether the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory. Given the cumulative errors in the trial judge's directions and omissions, the court concluded that the verdict was indeed unsafe and unsatisfactory. These errors collectively compromised the fairness of the trial, leading to the court’s decision to allow the appeal and order a new trial. The court found that the errors identified were material and substantial, such that they likely influenced the outcome of the trial.