Daddow v Ipswich City Council - [2004] QPEC 87

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT
COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Daddow & Anor v Ipswich City Council & Ors [2004] QPEC 087

PARTIES:
GRAEME STEPHEN GEORGE DADDOW
and
ALEXIA MARGARET STRONG

Appellants

and

IPSWICH CITY COUNCIL

Respondent

and
PETER JOHN ADAMS
and
MARIE REES

Co-respondents

FILE NO: 2245/2004

PROCEEDING: Application

ORIGINATING COURT:
Planning and Environment Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON: 17 December 2004

DELIVERED AT: Southport

HEARING DATE: 3 December 2004

JUDGE: Newton DCJ

ORDER:
Appellants’ Application filed 29 September 2004:
Declarations that:

(a)     Development application 4891/03 was not a piecemeal application and the respondent’s approval was not ultra vires;

(b) Development application 4891/03 was a properly made application under s 3.2.1 of IPA;

(c) Development application 4891/03 did conform to s 3.2.8 of IPA in relation to the provision of supporting material;

(d) The notification stage for development application 4891/03 did conform to Part 4 Divisions 1 and 2 of IPA;

(e)     Whether development application 3900/03 in which the respondent approved the easements incidental to development application 4891/03 in a separate development application without notification should be set aside is not within the jurisdiction of this court to determine in terms of the present application;

(f)   Whether development application 3275/03, in which the respondent approved without notification a change to an existing approval so that a parking lot (a condition of an existing approval that was never met) could be relocated to the same location as the parking lot proposed in development application 4891/03, should be set aside is not within the jurisdiction of this court to determine in terms of the present application.

Co-respondents’ Application filed 23 November 2004:
It is ordered that the disputed issues in the appeal be identified as, and limited to, the following grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal:

(a)        paragraph 1;

(b)        paragraph 4(a) limited to:

“The change in the location of the parking lot and the additional parking spaces required in the Development Application Decision Notice that is the subject of this appeal, means that up to fifteen vehicles will utilise the current driveway at 9A Salisbury Road, which is a 650 square metre allotment with a 16.6 metre frontage. This will cause the appellants on the adjoining allotment significant loss of amenity and will interfere with their right to quiet enjoyment of their property.”;

(c)        paragraph 6;

(d)        paragraph 9;

(e)        paragraph 10;

(f)        paragraph 11;

(g)        paragraph 13;

(h)        paragraph 14.

CATCHWORDS:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT – Town planning – statutes – interpretation – development application – material change of use – construction of two detached dwellings at rear of existing dwelling for use in student accommodation business – whether application piecemeal and whether respondent’s approval was ultra vires – whether application was a properly made application under s 3.2.1 of Integrated Planning Act 1997 – whether application conformed to s 3.2.8 of Integrated Planning Act 1997 in relation to provision of supporting material – whether notification stage conformed to Part 4 Divisions 1 and 2 of Integrated Planning Act 1997 –…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2004] QPEC 87
Decision Date: 17 December 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Daddow v Ipswich City Council, the applicants sought judicial review of decisions made by the Ipswich City Council in relation to a development application. The primary dispute was whether the Council's approval of the development application for the construction of two detached dwellings for student accommodation was lawful and correctly processed. The applicants argued that the application was piecemeal and that the Council's approval was beyond its statutory authority.

The legal issues before the court included whether the development application was properly made under the Integrated Planning Act 1997, whether it conformed to the statutory requirements regarding the provision of supporting material, and whether the notification process complied with the Act. Additionally, the court needed to determine if it had the jurisdiction to set aside other development applications that were incidental to the primary application under review. The applicants also challenged specific aspects of the development approval, such as the change in the location of a parking lot and the additional parking spaces.

The court found that the development application was not piecemeal and that the Council's approval was within its statutory powers. It held that the application was properly made under the Act and that it conformed to the requirements for supporting material. The notification stage was also found to comply with the relevant provisions of the Act. However, the court ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to set aside other development applications that were separate from the primary application under review. The disputed issues in the appeal were limited to specific grounds outlined in the Notice of Appeal, focusing on the impact of the development on neighbouring properties and other specified aspects of the approval process.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appellants’ Application filed 29 September 2004:

Declarations that:

(a) Development application 4891/03 was not a piecemeal application and the respondent’s approval was not ultra vires;

(b) Development application 4891/03 was a properly made application under s 3.2.1 of IPA;

(d) The notification stage for development application 4891/03 did conform to Part 4 Divisions 1 and 2 of IPA;

(e) Whether development application 3900/03 in which the respondent approved the easements incidental to development application 4891/03 in a separate development application without notification should be set aside is not within the jurisdiction of this court to determine in terms of the present application;

(f) Whether development application 3275/03, in which the respondent approved without notification a change to an existing approval so that a parking lot (a condition of an existing approval that was never met) could be relocated to the same location as the parking lot proposed in development application 4891/03, should be set aside is not within the jurisdiction of this court to determine in terms of the present application.

Co-respondents’ Application filed 23 November 2004:

It is ordered that the disputed issues in the appeal be identified as, and limited to, the following grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal:

(a) paragraph 1;

(b) paragraph 4(a) limited to:

“The change in the location of the parking lot and the additional parking spaces required in the Development Application Decision Notice that is the subject of this appeal, means that up to fifteen vehicles will utilise the current driveway at 9A Salisbury Road, which is a 650 square metre allotment with a 16.6 metre frontage. This will cause the appellants on the adjoining allotment significant loss of amenity and will interfere with their right to quiet enjoyment of their property.”;

(d) paragraph 9;

(e) paragraph 10;

(f) paragraph 11;

(g) paragraph 13;

(h) paragraph 14.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.

CITATION:	*Daddow & Anor v Ipswich City Council & Ors* [2004] QPEC 087
PARTIES:	GRAEME STEPHEN GEORGE DADDOW and ALEXIA MARGARET STRONG Appellants and IPSWICH CITY COUNCIL Respondent and PETER JOHN ADAMS and MARIE REES Co-respondents
FILE NO:	2245/2004
PROCEEDING:	Application
ORIGINATING COURT:	Planning and Environment Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:	17 December 2004
DELIVERED AT:	Southport
HEARING DATE:	3 December 2004
JUDGE:	Newton DCJ
ORDER:	Appellants’ Application filed 29 September 2004: Declarations that: (a) Development application 4891/03 was not a piecemeal application and the respondent’s approval was not ultra vires; (b) Development application 4891/03 was a properly made application under s 3.2.1 of IPA; (c) Development application 4891/03 did conform to s 3.2.8 of IPA in relation to the provision of supporting material; (d) The notification stage for development application 4891/03 did conform to Part 4 Divisions 1 and 2 of IPA; (e) Whether development application 3900/03 in which the respondent approved the easements incidental to development application 4891/03 in a separate development application without notification should be set aside is not within the jurisdiction of this court to determine in terms of the present application; (f) Whether development application 3275/03, in which the respondent approved without notification a change to an existing approval so that a parking lot (a condition of an existing approval that was never met) could be relocated to the same location as the parking lot proposed in development application 4891/03, should be set aside is not within the jurisdiction of this court to determine in terms of the present application. Co-respondents’ Application filed 23 November 2004: It is ordered that the disputed issues in the appeal be identified as, and limited to, the following grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal: (a) paragraph 1; (b) paragraph 4(a) limited to: “The change in the location of the parking lot and the additional parking spaces required in the Development Application Decision Notice that is the subject of this appeal, means that up to fifteen vehicles will utilise the current driveway at 9A Salisbury Road, which is a 650 square metre allotment with a 16.6 metre frontage. This will cause the appellants on the adjoining allotment significant loss of amenity and will interfere with their right to quiet enjoyment of their property.”; (c) paragraph 6; (d) paragraph 9; (e) paragraph 10; (f) paragraph 11; (g) paragraph 13; (h) paragraph 14.
CATCHWORDS:	LOCAL GOVERNMENT – Town planning – statutes – interpretation – development application – material change of use – construction of two detached dwellings at rear of existing dwelling for use in student accommodation business – whether application piecemeal and whether respondent’s approval was ultra vires – whether application was a properly made application under s 3.2.1 of Integrated Planning Act 1997 – whether application conformed to s 3.2.8 of Integrated Planning Act 1997 in relation to provision of supporting material – whether notification stage conformed to Part 4 Divisions 1 and 2 of Integrated Planning Act 1997 –…