D'Ortenzio v Charles Parletta Real Estate Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Civil)

D'ORTENZIO v CHARLES PARLETTA REAL ESTATE PTY LTD

[2020] SASC 9

Judgment of Judge Bochner a Master of the Supreme Court

31 January 2020

CORPORATIONS

Leave to bring proceedings on behalf of company.

Held: Plaintiff granted leave to commence the proposed proceedings on behalf of the company.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), referred to.
Maria D’Ortenzio v Charles Parletta Real Estate Pty Ltd [2018] FWC 1002; Maria Teresa D'Ortenzio v Charles Parletta Real Estate Pty Ltd [2019] SAET 2; O’Meara v FWV Starke Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] SASC 305; Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 52; Re Karinya Haulage Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 888; Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 859; Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313; Vicad Pty Ltd; Pottie v Dunkley [2011] NSWSC 166; Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 732; Re Sirrah Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1802, considered.

D'ORTENZIO v CHARLES PARLETTA REAL ESTATE PTY LTD
[2020] SASC 9

  1. The plaintiff seeks leave to bring proceedings (“the proposed action”) on behalf of Charles Parletta Real Estate Pty Ltd (“the company”) against its directors, Charles Salvatore Parletta (“Mr Parletta”) and Pauline Parletta (“Mrs Parletta”). The relevant provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”) provide:

    236    Bringing, or intervening in, proceedings on behalf of a company

    (1)A person may bring proceedings on behalf of a company, or intervene in any proceedings to which the company is a party for the purpose of taking responsibility on behalf of the company for those proceedings, or for a particular step in those proceedings (for example, compromising or settling them), if:

    (a)     the person is:

    (i)a member, former member, or person entitled to be registered as a member, of the company or of a related body corporate; or

    (ii)    an officer or former officer of the company; and

    (b)     the person is acting with leave granted under section 237.

    (2)Proceedings brought on behalf of a company must be brought in the company's name.

    (3)The right of a person at general law to bring, or intervene in, proceedings on behalf of a company is abolished.

    Note 1:      For the right to inspect company books, see subsections 247A(3) to (6).

    Note 2:      For the requirements to disclose proceedings and leave applications in the annual directors' report, see subsections 300(14) and (15).

    Note 3:      This section does not prevent a person bringing, or intervening in, proceedings on their own behalf in respect of a personal right.

    237    Applying for and granting leave

    (1)A person referred to in paragraph 236(1)(a) may apply to the Court for leave to bring, or to intervene in, proceedings.

    (2)     The Court must grant the application if it is satisfied that:

    (a)     it is probable that the company will not itself bring the proceedings, or properly take responsibility for them, or for the steps in them; and

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Details
Case
[2020] SASC 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of D'Ortenzio v Charles Parletta Real Estate Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, an employee and shareholder of the defendant company, sought leave to commence proceedings on behalf of the company against the directors for alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties. The case was brought under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), specifically section 236, which allows a member to seek relief for oppression or unfair prejudice. The defendant opposed the application on the basis that the plaintiff had not provided adequate notice of the proposed proceedings.

The primary legal issue was whether the plaintiff had complied with the notice requirements set out in section 237(2) of the Corporations Act, which mandates that a member must give notice of the proceedings to the company and the directors. The court had to determine if the notice provided by the plaintiff was sufficient and if the plaintiff had established a serious question to be tried.

The court found that the plaintiff had met all the criteria under section 237(2) of the Act. The plaintiff had provided an amended draft statement of claim with significantly more particularity, more than twelve months before the defendant was required to make its submissions. The court concluded that the defendant did not receive adequate notice. Consequently, the court had no discretion but to grant the plaintiff leave to commence the proposed proceedings on behalf of the company.

The court will hear the parties on the terms of the orders and on the question of costs. The decision underscores the importance of providing adequate notice to the company and its directors when seeking leave to commence proceedings under the Corporations Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff, as a member of the company, falls within s 236 as an eligible applicant. The application is opposed by the defendant. Background The company was established in 1977 by Mr and Mrs Parletta as the vehicle through which Mr Parletta ran his real estate business. After some years, the company became a franchisee of L J Hooker Ltd, trading under the business name, L J Hooker – Glynde. Initially, Mr and Mrs Parletta were the only shareholders of the company. Throughout, they were (and are) the only directors. The plaintiff commenced employment with the company in 1990, as a salesperson. Over the years, her responsibilities changed; as well as handling sales, she became a property manager, and by about 1999 - 2000, she was the office manager. Her responsibilities included human resources and payroll. It seems that the plaintiff and Mr Parletta had a good, albeit somewhat volatile relationship throughout the time that the plaintiff worked for the company. The nature of that relationship has been discussed in proceedings in other courts, and I do not explore it here. In 2007, Mr Parletta gave the plaintiff 10% of the shares in the company. In 2015, he gave her a further 5%. Thus, she holds 15% of the company’s shares. From about 2015, the relationship between Mr Parletta and the plaintiff began to deteriorate. The causes for that deterioration have been ventilated elsewhere, and I will not discuss them except in so far as is necessary. In May 2017, the plaintiff was suspended from her employment, with pay, while an investigation into her conduct was carried out. Following the investigation, she was dismissed. The plaintiff says that there is a serious question to be tried as to the liability of Mr and Mrs Parletta for breaches of their fiduciary duties to the company. The evidence The plaintiff and Mr Parletta filed a series of affidavits. Each sought to answer the allegations made by the other, or to refute the explanations given. In her first affidavit, the plaintiff relied on an independent auditor’s report of the company’s 2016 accounts, which was prepared following a direction from the plaintiff pursuant to s 293 of the Act. The report was prepared by HLB Mann Judd (“the auditor’s report).[1] Relevantly, the auditor’s report states:We have identified certain matters which we consider warrant the attention of the Directors and these have been detailed above at section 2. The results of our testing leave us with no alternative but to disclaim out opinion on the financial statements.The company does not readily differentiate between private and business expenditure. In our view, the financial report may not represent or disclose the underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation.Given the pervasive nature of the issues identified, we were unable to determine the likely financial impact on the financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2016.[2][1] FDN 2-MD-4.[2] FDN 1-MD4 at 24. Section 2 of the auditor’s report set out the problems identified by the auditors which fell into four categories: Management over-ride of controls – expenses of a private nature being put through the company; Overstatement of revenue and expenses – Transactions not related to the company are not recorded; Credit card expenses – Credit cards used for private expenditure; and Classification errors for expenses – Transactions contained in the general leger not representative of the nature.[3] Under the category, “Management over-ride of controls”, the auditor’s report “identified many examples of expenses which appeared to have no relationship with the carrying on of a business”, and then provided nine examples.[4] [3] FDN 1-MD4 at 22 – 23.[4] FDN 1-MD4 at 22.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The plaintiff says that there is a serious question to be tried as to the liability of Mr and Mrs Parletta for breaches of their fiduciary duties to the company. The evidence The plaintiff and Mr Parletta filed a series of affidavits. Each sought to answer the allegations made by the other, or to refute the explanations given. In her first affidavit, the plaintiff relied on an independent auditor’s report of the company’s 2016 accounts, which was prepared following a direction from the plaintiff pursuant to s 293 of the Act. The report was prepared by HLB Mann Judd (“the auditor’s report).[1] Relevantly, the auditor’s report states:We have identified certain matters which we consider warrant the attention of the Directors and these have been detailed above at section 2. The results of our testing leave us with no alternative but to disclaim out opinion on the financial statements.The company does not readily differentiate between private and business expenditure. In our view, the financial report may not represent or disclose the underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation.Given the pervasive nature of the issues identified, we were unable to determine the likely financial impact on the financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2016.[2][1] FDN 2-MD-4.[2] FDN 1-MD4 at 24. Section 2 of the auditor’s report set out the problems identified by the auditors which fell into four categories: Management over-ride of controls – expenses of a private nature being put through the company; Overstatement of revenue and expenses – Transactions not related to the company are not recorded; Credit card expenses – Credit cards used for private expenditure; and Classification errors for expenses – Transactions contained in the general leger not representative of the nature.[3] Under the category, “Management over-ride of controls”, the auditor’s report “identified many examples of expenses which appeared to have no relationship with the carrying on of a business”, and then provided nine examples.[4] [3] FDN 1-MD4 at 22 – 23.[4] FDN 1-MD4 at 22. It is the plaintiff’s position that the concerns expressed by the auditors are sufficiently serious to warrant leave being granted. In Mr Parletta’s first affidavit,[5] he sought to explain the anomalies identified in the auditor’s report. In particular, he focused on the nine items identified by the auditors under the heading “Management over-ride of controls”, and sought to explain those transactions. He deposed that of the nine items, five had been purchased using the company credit card issued to the plaintiff, and one of the items, to the value of $2000 was a gift for the plaintiff.[6] The inference was that the plaintiff herself was responsible for five of the nine items complained of, and benefitted from a sixth. He deposed that after receiving the auditor’s report, he instructed the company’s accountant to examine the company’s books and records and make any adjustments that were required.[7] [5] FDN 5.[6] FDN 5 at [15] – [16].[7] FDN 5 at [19].

Decision

Reasons for decision

I note, further, that at the first hearing of this application in August 2018, the plaintiff provided to the defendant an amended draft statement of claim, with significantly more particularity. This was provided more than twelve months before the defendant was required to make its submissions. There can be no question, given the length of time between receiving the amended draft and being required to make submissions that the defendant did not receive adequate notice. Conclusion All of the criteria set out in s 237(2) of the Act have been made out. Consequently, I have no discretion but to grant the plaintiff leave to commence the proposed proceedings on behalf of the company. I will hear the parties on the terms of the orders, and on the question of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

While the company concedes that notice of a sort was given, Mr Bullock submitted that the notice fell short of the requirements of the Act. The matters set out in the notice did not contain any substance, other than the issues raised in the auditor’s report, which the company maintains are business related expenses. The matters raised in the plaintiff’s subsequent affidavits were not addressed in the notice; given the changing nature of the plaintiff’s case, the notice given by her should not be regarded as adequate.ConsiderationPreliminary matters Before I turn to the issues addressed by the parties, it is necessary to mention briefly the timing of the hearing of this application. The application first came on for hearing on 21 August 2018, at which time Mr Wells made submissions on behalf of the plaintiff. At that time, the plaintiff’s unfair dismissal claim had been heard and judgment delivered. The plaintiff’s claim for underpayment of wages had been heard, but judgment had not been delivered. Following argument on 21 August 2018, the parties agreed to enter into mediation. The mediation lasted for a period of about twelve months; it was ultimately unsuccessful. The defendant’s submissions and the plaintiff’s reply took place on 4 September 2019, more than a year later. At this hearing, Mr Ross-Smith appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. By this time, the Tribunal decision had been delivered. I agreed to the parties’ providing written submissions on the use that might be made of the Tribunal decision, noting that the defendant had relied extensively on the findings in the Fair Work Commission in support of his case. Those submissions were provided a short time after the oral arguments were completed. In addition, shortly after the completion of the argument in this matter, the company was joined as a defendant in the oppression action, the defendants to that claim previously being only Mr and Mrs Parletta. I allowed the parties to provide further written submissions on the question of conflict of interest, which I will also address in due course. The proceedings in the Tribunal and the Commission Before dealing with the criteria prescribed by the Act, I turn first to the decision of the Commission and the Tribunal, and the use that may be made of them. This is important, because each body reached very different conclusions on the evidence relied on by the parties, which evidence is very much that relied on by the parties in this matter. I note that Mr Ardlie referred to the proceedings in the Commission,[83] but did not address his very different assessment of credibility of the plaintiff and Mr Parletta and the fact that some of his factual findings, on several pivotal matters, were inconsistent with those made in the Commission.[83] See for example [2019] SAET 2 at [56], [71] and [83]. Without intending to be exhaustive, it is necessary to outline the different findings made by the Commission and the Tribunal. This is because the evidence relied on by the parties in this matter overlaps to a significant extent with the evidence relied on in those proceedings. In addition, important findings of credit were made in each of them.