SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
D & H INVESTMENTS PTY LTD & ANOR v WAGNER & ANOR
[2008] SASC 233
Judgment of Judge Lunn a Master of the Supreme Court
22 August 2008
EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Application by 1st defendant to vary a Mareva order over part of his assets to raise legal expenses - history of breaches of the undertaking which preceded the order - held onus on 1st defendant to show he could not raise the necessary money without resort to the land covered by the Mareva order - held onus not discharged - application dismissed.
D & H INVESTMENTS PTY LTD & ANOR v WAGNER & ANOR
[2008] SASC 233Reasons on 1st defendant’s application to vary the Mareva Order and for an adjournment of the trial
In this action the plaintiffs sue the defendants for damages in excess of $1 million in relation to the first defendant’s construction of a boat for the plaintiffs. The action has a long history, having been originally commenced in the District Court in 1999. As a result of delays caused by the first defendant I directed on 14 January 2008 that a trial date be fixed even though the action had not been referred for trial. That trial date is now fixed for 27 October 2008 for four to five weeks. As yet the action has not been referred for trial.
By a Notice for Directions issued on 15 July 2008 the first defendant sought orders for the variation of a Mareva Order and that the trial of the action be adjourned. The variation sought was that he be permitted to borrow $200,000 for his legal expenses of the trial. It was not disputed that such an amount would be properly payable for such legal expenses. The second defendant has elected to take no part in the argument on this application which has been strenuously opposed by the plaintiffs.
History of the Mareva Order
Prior to 2000 the first defendant owned a number of blocks of land on Kangaroo Island which are on separate titles (“ the Kangaroo Island land”). On 29 February 2000 he gave a mortgage to secure a loan from his father-in-law of $200,000 over part of that land being CT5661/473. On the documents in evidence it is unclear what happened to this $200,000, but the first defendant claims it was put into his business as working capital. If that is so it is not apparent on the financial records of the business which have been put before me.
On 9 May 2000 the plaintiff applied in the District Court for a Mareva Order against the first defendant restraining him from dealing with the Kangaroo Island land pending the outcome of this action. On 5 June 2000 the first defendant by his then counsel gave an undertaking to Judge David that he would not deal with the Kangaroo Island land until judgment in the action. On the recording…
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- Case
- [2008] SASC 233
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Wagner had discharged the onus of proving that he could not raise the necessary funds for his legal expenses without accessing the assets subject to the Mareva order. This involved determining whether the court should exercise its discretion to permit Wagner to use those assets to fund his legal costs, or whether it should instead insist that he exhaust all other available resources first.
The court found that Wagner had not discharged the onus of proving that he could not raise the necessary funds from his other assets. It noted that Wagner was not an impressive witness and was unable to adequately explain inconsistencies in his financial statements. The court held that, given the history of breaches of the Mareva order by Wagner, he should have satisfied the court that he had no other means to fund his legal costs. As Wagner failed to do so, the application to vary the Mareva order was dismissed.
The court concluded that the onus was on Wagner to demonstrate that he had exhausted all other means of funding his legal costs before accessing the assets covered by the Mareva order. As he did not meet this onus, the application was properly refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Wagner, who sufficiently controlled Wagner Marine and Trust No 3, was examined regarding his affidavits and financial statements. During his cross-examination, Wagner appeared unconvincing, evading several questions and attributing his lack of understanding to his accountants. He failed to clarify numerous inconsistencies and anomalies highlighted during the examination. Although an adjournment was made for further re-examination, it did not proceed. The court acknowledged that Wagner needed to prove he had no alternative means of funding his legal costs.
The court balanced the risk of Wagner dissipating other available assets against the need to ensure that the plaintiffs could recover their judgment. The principle established in Mayne Market Pty Ltd v Temple guided the court, emphasizing that the onus was on Wagner to demonstrate his inability to fund his legal costs from non-restricted assets. Given Wagner's failure to provide satisfactory evidence of his financial situation, the court dismissed the application. The decision underscored the importance of the defendant's responsibility to demonstrate the necessity of accessing restricted assets for legal expenses, a burden Wagner could not meet.
The matter of D & H Investments Pty Ltd v Thomas Paul Wagner originated as an application by the first defendant, Wagner, to vary a Mareva order in order to raise funds for legal expenses from assets covered by the order. This application followed a history of breaches of the undertaking associated with the Mareva order. The court held that the onus was on Wagner to demonstrate that he could not raise the necessary money without resorting to the land covered by the Mareva order. In assessing Wagner's application, the court considered his control over Wagner Marine and Trust No 3, and the financial statements provided by Wagner. The cross-examination of Wagner revealed inconsistencies and omissions, leading to concerns about his credibility and understanding of his financial affairs. The court adjourned the re-examination to allow Wagner's counsel to obtain further instructions but no further re-examination took place. The court emphasised the importance of preventing dissipation of assets before final judgment to protect the plaintiffs from being prejudiced. Given the partial Mareva order, the court had discretion to refuse Wagner access to the assets under the order unless he proved he had no other means to fund his legal costs. The court balanced the risk of depriving the plaintiffs of assets against the risk of Wagner diminishing the effectiveness of the Mareva order by using other assets for costs.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the first defendant has discharged the onus of proof to demonstrate he cannot raise the necessary funds for his legal expenses without resorting to the land covered by the Mareva order?
2. Can the Court exercise its discretion to permit the first defendant to use the assets covered by the Mareva order to meet his legal expenses, given the history of breaches of the undertaking which preceded the order?
3. Should the Court balance the risk of the plaintiff being deprived of the benefit of assets against which its judgment can be satisfied against the defendant's ability to diminish the effectiveness of the Mareva order by using those assets for costs while dissipating other available assets not subject to the Mareva order?
4. How should the Court weigh the first defendant's credibility and reliability in light of his conduct during cross-examination and his failure to address inconsistencies, anomalies, and omissions in his financial statements and affidavits?
Held
1. The court concluded that the first defendant had not discharged the onus of proof to demonstrate that he could not raise the necessary funds for his legal expenses without resorting to the land covered by the Mareva order. As a result, the application was dismissed.
2. The court held that it would not exercise its discretion to permit the first defendant to use the assets covered by the Mareva order to meet his legal expenses, given the history of breaches of the undertaking which preceded the order.
3. The court concluded that it should balance the risk of the plaintiff being deprived of the benefit of assets against which its judgment can be satisfied against the defendant's ability to diminish the effectiveness of the Mareva order by using those assets for costs while dissipating other available assets not subject to the Mareva order.
4. The court weighed the first defendant's credibility and reliability in light of his conduct during cross-examination and his failure to address inconsistencies, anomalies, and omissions in his financial statements and affidavits, finding him to be an unimpressive witness who avoided answering questions and was unable to explain apparent inconsistencies.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's reasoning in the case of D & H Investments Pty Ltd v Thomas Paul Wagner centred on the application by the first defendant to vary a Mareva order over part of his assets to raise legal expenses. The first defendant's application hinged on his ability to demonstrate that he could not raise the necessary funds for his legal expenses without resorting to the land covered by the Mareva order. The court examined whether the onus of proof had been discharged by the first defendant.
In addressing the first issue, the court relied on the established principle that the onus lies on the defendant to demonstrate that they cannot raise the necessary funds for their legal expenses without resorting to the assets covered by the Mareva order. This principle was applied by considering the first defendant's conduct during cross-examination, his failure to address inconsistencies, anomalies, and omissions in his financial statements and affidavits, and his inability to explain certain matters that he had left to his accountants. The court held that the first defendant did not sufficiently discharge the onus of proof, as he was not an impressive witness and failed to provide satisfactory explanations regarding his financial position.
Moving to the second issue, the court considered whether it should exercise its discretion to permit the first defendant to use the assets covered by the Mareva order to meet his legal expenses, given the history of breaches of the undertaking which preceded the order. The court noted that the purpose of a Mareva Order is to prevent a defendant from dissipating their assets before final judgment, ensuring that the plaintiff is not prejudiced in the recovery of its judgment if successful. The court balanced the risk of the plaintiff being deprived of the benefit of assets against which its judgment can be satisfied against the defendant's ability to diminish the effectiveness of the Mareva order by using those assets for costs while dissipating other available assets not subject to the Mareva order.
In the third issue, the court weighed the first defendant's credibility and reliability in light of his conduct during cross-examination and his failure to address inconsistencies, anomalies, and omissions in his financial statements and affidavits. The court found that the first defendant was not an impressive witness and failed to provide satisfactory explanations regarding his financial position. This conduct and the first defendant's failure to address inconsistencies in his evidence diminished his credibility and reliability, further supporting the court's decision not to vary the Mareva order.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the onus lies on the defendant to demonstrate that they cannot raise the necessary funds for their legal expenses without resorting to the assets covered by the Mareva order. If the defendant fails to discharge this onus, the court will not vary the Mareva order to permit the defendant to use the assets covered by the order to meet their legal expenses, especially in light of a history of breaches of the undertaking which preceded the order. The court will also consider the risk of the plaintiff being deprived of the benefit of assets against which its judgment can be satisfied against the defendant's ability to diminish the effectiveness of the Mareva order by using those assets for costs while dissipating other available assets not subject to the Mareva order.