CVO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CVO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1612

Appeal from: CVO17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 2025
File number: NSD 1415 of 2018
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 27 September 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review – Federal Circuit Court affirmed Tribunal’s decision not to grant a protection visa – whether appellant is a vulnerable person – whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to allow support person to attend hearing – where Tribunal rejected the underlying basis of the claim – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7, ss 420, 425
Cases cited:

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; (1949) 78 CLR 353

CVO17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 2025

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41; (2010) 183 FCR 575

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12

Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82

Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 75 ALJR 982

Date of hearing: 24 July 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Categories: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms B Tronson with Mr B Dean
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr H P T Bevan with Ms M Evetts
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting notice save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 1415 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CVO17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEE J:

A        INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1. By an amended notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court dated 8 May 2019, the appellant has been granted leave to raise an issue not advanced in the Court below. The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review on 25 July 2018: see CVO17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 2025.

  2. Given the way the appeal has developed, it is unnecessary to deal substantively with the judgment below. The circumstances in which this leave was granted arose following an initial hearing on 6 February 2019, at which time the appellant was unrepresented. At that time I was…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1612
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of CVO17, an individual seeking asylum in Australia, the case was brought against the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The primary dispute centred around the denial of a protection visa by the Migration Review Tribunal, a decision that was upheld by the Federal Circuit Court. The applicant, CVO17, sought a judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, arguing that it was unreasonable and that the Tribunal had made jurisdictional errors, including not allowing a support person to attend the hearing. The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in its handling of the support person and whether the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's claims was unreasonable.

The court meticulously examined the arguments presented by CVO17, focusing on the Tribunal's handling of the support person and the broader exercise of discretion in the review process. It was found that while the Tribunal had requested the support person to leave, there was no conclusive evidence that this was intended to exclude him from the remainder of the hearing. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the Tribunal, as a fact-finding inquisitorial body, enjoys significant latitude in determining what is fair and reasonable. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error and that its rejection of the applicant's claims was not unreasonable, given the evidence and the broad discretion afforded to the Tribunal in such matters.

In light of the findings, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The court emphasised that it would not lightly interfere with the Tribunal's exercise of discretion, especially in the context of an inquisitorial review process. The stringent test of unreasonableness was not met, and the applicant's claims did not establish a basis for overturning the Tribunal's decision. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the fourth submission, counsel for the Minister took me to a number of authorities during oral submissions in order to emphasise the nature of the Tribunal’s role as a fact-finding inquisitorial process, and the consequent degree of latitude the Tribunal enjoys in its decisional freedom as to what is fair and reasonable in each given case. E CONSIDERATION Insofar as I am required to make factual findings as to the exercise of the discretion, it is clear that the Tribunal member requested Mr Hudson to leave the hearing. It is equally clear that both Mr Hudson and the appellant indicated that this course was acceptable when asked. It is important to bear in mind that shortly after this, the appellant became ill and the Second Tribunal Hearing was adjourned. It is not possible to speculate either way as to whether Mr Hudson would have been invited back into the hearing had it continued, or whether the Tribunal would have allowed him to return had the appellant requested that he do so. I accept the affidavit evidence of the appellant and Mr Hudson, that given the request that Mr Hudson leave the room during the Second Tribunal Hearing, they genuinely formed the view that Mr Hudson would most likely not be allowed to stay in the room for the Resumed Hearing. This evidence was not inherently improbable and counsel for the Minister elected not to cross-examine either Mr Hudson or the appellant on it. I do not, however, find that the Tribunal’s decision in asking to interview the appellant on his own, amounted to a constructive exclusion of Mr Hudson from the remainder of the hearing. The view which the appellant subjectively formed is understandable, however, in circumstances where: (a) the Tribunal was never asked whether Mr Hudson could return; (b) the transcript demonstrates that the Tribunal Member did not say anything further about Mr Hudson other than requesting he leave and indicating that “it could be that we go the whole hearing”; and (c) the hearing was aborted, I am not satisfied that the decision was that Mr Hudson was to be excluded for the remainder of the hearing no matter how the rest of the hearing transpired. Further, while I accept that the appellant formed the view he did, I am not satisfied that based upon what transpired, a fair understanding of the situation is that Mr Hudson was constructively excluded. In any event, given my findings below as to unreasonableness, nothing turns upon this finding. Where, as is the case here, a court is asked to consider a Tribunal’s exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion, it is important to remember that courts will not lightly interfere in such circumstances: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at 376 [108]. The test of unreasonableness is necessarily stringent, and the possibility that a different Tribunal may have adopted a different course is not determinative. This notion is reinforced by an understanding that the Tribunal is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence, but must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) s 420. Bearing in mind that in conducting a review of a Part 7-reviewable decision, the Tribunal conducts an inquisitorial proceeding, it is unsurprising that in order for the Tribunal to conduct such a review effectively, it must have a degree of latitude in determining what is fair and just in a given case in the conduct of the review: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713 at 720 [13] per Kiefel CJ.