Cva18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CVA18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS [2018] FCCA 2512

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Migration Act1958 (Cth) – second application for a Protection visa by Applicant – effect of s.48A of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) – none of the grounds of asserted jurisdictional error affected validity of the decision of the Delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs that the second application for a Protection visa was invalid by force of s.48A of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) – no jurisdictional error identified – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 48A, 474, 476

Cases cited:

AZABFv Minister for Immigration (2015) 235 FCR 150

Edward v Santos Ltd (2011) 242 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration vSZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235

SZVTK v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1416

Wang v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 3510

Applicant: CVA18
Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
File Number: SYG 1513 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Dowdy
Hearing date: 31 August 2018
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 31 August 2018

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared
in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms A. Nanson
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

  1. The Application filed in this Court on 1 June 2018 is dismissed.

  2. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of the proceeding in the sum of $4,000.   

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1513 of 2018

CVA18

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

EX TEMPORE


(Revised from Transcript)

  1. The Applicant is a male citizen of China aged 29 years, having been born on 18 October 1988. 

  2. By Application filed in this Court on 1 June 2018 he seeks to quash and impliedly have re-determined in accordance with law a decision of an officer of the Department of Home Affairs (Department) dated 30 May 2018, to the effect that the application for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (Protection visa) which was lodged by the Applicant on 24 May 2018 (present Protection visa application) was an invalid application by force of s.48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

  3. I note that a mistaken denial of jurisdiction by a Court is a jurisdictional error attracting a writ of certiorari: Edward v Santos Ltd (2011) 242 CLR 421 at 439 [46] per Heydon J. In my view, in the present circumstances the officer of the Department was in an analogous position to a Court. Further and in any event, the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 (SZGIZ), in the exercise of judicial review, made a declaration that an application for a Protection visa lodged by the appellant in that case was not invalid under s.48A of the Act, so as to rectify the circumstances where an officer of the Department…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2512
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Dowdy J of the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs concerning a protection visa application. The applicant raised two grounds for review: a data breach and the validity of his second protection visa application.

The court was required to determine whether the delegate's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court considered whether a data breach, which disclosed the identities of protection visa applicants, was a relevant consideration for the delegate when assessing the applicant's current protection visa application. The court also had to determine if the applicant was lawfully entitled to make a second protection visa application, given that his earlier application had been considered and rejected by the Refugee Review Tribunal.

Dowdy J found that the data breach was irrelevant to the delegate's assessment of the applicant's current protection visa application, as the delegate was only entitled to consider the statutory validity of that application. Regarding the second ground, the court noted the applicant's concession that Australian law generally prohibits a second protection visa application after an earlier one has been rejected. The court held that section 48A(1) of the relevant Act precluded the applicant from making his present application, as his earlier application had been merits reviewed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The court further noted that section 48A(1C) reinforced this preclusion.

Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 2 relates to what is called commonly the “data breach”. It was described by the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration vSZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180 at 187[3] and 188[5] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ as follows:[3] The Data Breach occurred on 10 February 2014. The Department routinely publishes statistics on its website. This time the particular electronic form of the document in which the statistics were published included embedded information which disclosed the identities of 9,258 applicants for protection visas who were then in immigration detention. The document containing the embedded information remained on the website until 24 February 2014.…[5] …during the fourteen days in which the document disclosing the identities of the visa applicants had remained on the website, the document had been accessed 123 times and that the access had originated from 104 unique internet protocol (IP) addresses. The data breach was irrelevant to the present Protection visa application because the Delegate was not entitled to consider anything at all about the data breach but was only entitled to consider the statutory validity of the present Protection visa application. Ground 3 also fails to establish that the decision of the Delegate is affected by jurisdictional error. The Applicant at the hearing has conceded that he is well aware that Australian law does not permit a second Protection visa application when an earlier Protection visa application has been considered and rejected. He has not advanced any reason why I should find that the Delegate’s decision is invalid and I am not entitled to take into account, nor was the Delegate, matters of fairness such as are invoked in Ground 3. Accordingly, Ground 3 fails to establish jurisdictional error. Regrettably for the Applicant, the simple fact of the matter is that s.48A(1) of the Act precluded him from making his present Protection visa application in circumstances where the RRT in its decision record of 7 November 2014 had considered his earlier Protection visa application for merits review from the earlier adverse decision of the Delegate under both the Refugee Convention criterion and the complementary protection criterion. In such circumstances, he was never going to be able to avail himself of the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZGIZ. The effect of sub-s.(1C) of s.48A of the Act was merely to make even more emphatic the preclusion and bar to the Applicant’s lodgement of his present Protection visa application effected by s.48A(1). Accordingly, unfortunately for the Applicant his application to this Court for judicial review must be dismissed.