CUU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CUU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1464

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: CUU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 69
File number(s): TAD 6 of 2018
Judge(s): O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 27 September 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time in which to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – where applicant claims Tribunal failed to consider a claim – where applicant claims Tribunal failed to make a finding on a substantial, clearly articulated argument that violence was politically motivated because it occurred around election time – finding that the Tribunal did understand that political violence could happen during elections – finding that applicant had not clearly articulated the argument – finding that Tribunal properly considered claims relating to applicant’s father – application refused  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 65
Cases cited:

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 4 September 2018
Registry: Tasmania
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Krohn
Solicitor for the Applicant: Vrachnas and Co
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

TAD 6 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CUU17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 25 January 2018 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

Introduction

  1. The applicant applies for an extension of time in which to appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa (the visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act).

  2. The applicant seeks to rely on a proposed notice of appeal, which contains one ground with two particulars. The ground sought to be relied on is that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal “failed to consider relevant considerations including claims, integers of claims or material question[s] of fact or information before the Tribunal”. The particulars to that proposed ground are:

    (1)The Tribunal accepted the claims…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1464
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CUU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an application by the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, for an extension of time in which to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The applicant had applied for a visa in 2012, claiming that he would face significant harm if he returned to Sri Lanka due to his support for the United National Party. The delegate of the Minister refused the visa, a decision that was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant sought judicial review of this decision in the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed the application. The applicant then applied to the High Court for an extension of time to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The central issues in the case were whether the Tribunal had failed to consider the applicant's claims and whether it had failed to make a finding on a substantial, clearly articulated argument that the 2009 attack on the applicant and his father was politically motivated because it occurred around election time. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the applicant's claims and that there was no merit to the contention that the Tribunal had failed to consider the timing of the 2009 attack in relation to the elections. The court held that the applicant had not clearly articulated the argument that the attack was politically motivated because it occurred around election time, and that the Tribunal had properly considered the claims relating to the applicant's father. The court refused the application for an extension of time, with costs.

The High Court dismissed the application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the applicant's claims and that there was no merit to the contention that the Tribunal had failed to consider the timing of the 2009 attack in relation to the elections. The court held that the applicant had not clearly articulated the argument that the attack was politically motivated because it occurred around election time, and that the Tribunal had properly considered the claims relating to the applicant's father. The court refused the application for an extension of time, with costs. The orders of the court were that the application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court be dismissed and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 25 January 2018 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, neither of those contentions is arguable. The primary judge was correct to find that the Tribunal considered and dealt with the case properly before it and, in particular, the applicant’s claims about the motivation for an attack on him and his father in 2009. It follows that the application for an extension of time will be refused with costs. Background The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He applied for the visa in 2012, claiming that, on any return to Sri Lanka, he would face a real chance of serious or significant harm at the hands of political opponents due to his actual or imputed support for the UNP. Among other things, he claimed that he and his father had been attacked by men with machetes in 2009 and his father had disappeared around six months after that attack. On 10 December 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa. On 17 December 2013, the applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (as it then was) for review of the delegate’s decision. On 7 September 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the applicant the visa. Among other things, the Tribunal was not satisfied that, on any return to Sri Lanka, the applicant would face a real chance of serious or significant harm at the hands of political opponents or others. The Tribunal was prepared to accept that the applicant’s family had traditionally supported the UNP; found that the applicant’s father was involved with the UNP but did not have any official position or role; accepted that, in 2005, a group of supporters of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party, (or SLFP), came to the home of the applicant's father and threatened his father; accepted that, from 2005, the applicant accompanied his father when his father undertook activities for the UNP; and accepted that, in 2009, men with machetes came to the applicant’s home while his father was there and, although his father escaped unharmed, the applicant was attacked and injured before he too managed to escape. The Tribunal did not accept that the 2009 attack was carried out by SLFP supporters or was otherwise politically motivated; that the applicant’s father disappeared or was killed either six months after the 2009 attack or at any other time; or that after 2005, the applicant or his father had experienced any threats or harm from political opponents.The Federal Circuit Court The applicant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. Relevantly, the primary judge (who also rejected various grounds of appeal not pursued in this court) held as follows with respect to the first particular of the proposed ground (at [52]-[53]):The Tribunal’s reasons at [51] disclose:Firstly, prior to this, the last incident of politically-motivated threats or violence against the applicant’s father was in 2005, some four years prior to the 2009 attack. The Tribunal notes that the applicant has made vague references to his father facing many threats and problems but his evidence at hearing is that no other incidents occurred between 2005 and 2010 except the two 2005 incidents previously described in the 2009 machete attack (and his father's disappearance, discussed below). The applicant did not indicate that he faced any problems while accompanying his father on election campaigns in either 2006 or 2008. At the hearing, it was put to him that this was surprising given information indicating that most political violence happens during election time. The applicant did not indicate that the 2009 attack took place during election time or that he and his father were involved in election campaigning at that time. The applicant's evidence has not indicated any particular political event or dispute with SLFP supporters precipitated such a violent attack.I am satisfied that the Tribunal did raise the relevant issue with the applicant. The applicant himself did not specifically claim a nexus between the 2009 attack and election time or election campaigning by himself or his family. As such, this was not an integer of a claim requiring further attention. Although the notion of onus of proof is not strictly applicable to administrative enquiries, the applicant must supply the relevant facts in sufficient detail or particularity to enable the Tribunal to establish the veracity of the claim. The Tribunal is not required to make the applicant's case for him. I find no merit in this particular.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

That submission is, with respect, irresistible.Conclusion The application for an extension of time in which to appeal will be refused with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 28 February 2018, the applicant applied to this court for an extension of time in which to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court. Consideration In all the circumstances of this case, and despite there being no adequate explanation for the delay, the Minister is content for the court to proceed on the basis that whether an extension of time ought to be granted principally depends upon the merits of the proposed appeal (cf VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588). The applicant relies on the principle summarised in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [55]:Where the Tribunal fails to make a finding on ‘... a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts’ that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 77 ALJR 1088 at [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, Hayne J agreeing at [95]. Although not expressly so identified in that case, the constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction may be seen as a failure to carry out the review required by the Act. The joint judgment of Gummow and Callinan JJ in Dranichnikov described the task of the Tribunal where the applicant relied upon membership of a particular social group. Their Honours said (at [26]): ... the task of the tribunal involves a number of steps. First the tribunal needs to determine whether the group or class to which an applicant claims to belong is capable of constituting a social group for the purposes of the Convention. That determination in part at least involves a question of law. If that question is answered affirmatively, the next question, one of fact, is whether the applicant is a member of that class. There then follow the questions whether the applicant has a fear, whether the fear is well-founded, and if it is, whether it is for a Convention reason. This is not the occasion to explore the metes and bounds of the undoubted general proposition that where a tribunal fails to make a finding on substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts, that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. See the discussion in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [56]-[62]. In this case, it is in my view abundantly clear that no case can be made that the Tribunal erred for the reasons particularised in the proposed notice of appeal. Taking particular 1 first. It says that the Tribunal “failed to have regard to the question whether the attack in 2009 was in the period of preparation for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in January 2010 and April 2010, and to the evidence that this was so”. The particular is founded on a false premise, at least in part. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that the attack in the middle of 2009 was in the period for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in January 2010 and April 2010. That evidence was first adduced before the primary judge in the form of exhibits to an affidavit of the applicant sworn 10 October 2016.