FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CUU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1464
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: CUU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 69 File number(s): TAD 6 of 2018 Judge(s): O'CALLAGHAN J Date of judgment: 27 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time in which to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – where applicant claims Tribunal failed to consider a claim – where applicant claims Tribunal failed to make a finding on a substantial, clearly articulated argument that violence was politically motivated because it occurred around election time – finding that the Tribunal did understand that political violence could happen during elections – finding that applicant had not clearly articulated the argument – finding that Tribunal properly considered claims relating to applicant’s father – application refused Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 65 Cases cited: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 4 September 2018 Registry: Tasmania Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Krohn Solicitor for the Applicant: Vrachnas and Co Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
TAD 6 of 2018 BETWEEN: CUU17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 25 January 2018 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’CALLAGHAN J:
Introduction
The applicant applies for an extension of time in which to appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa (the visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act).
The applicant seeks to rely on a proposed notice of appeal, which contains one ground with two particulars. The ground sought to be relied on is that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal “failed to consider relevant considerations including claims, integers of claims or material question[s] of fact or information before the Tribunal”. The particulars to that proposed ground are:
(1)The Tribunal accepted the claims…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1464
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court dismissed the application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the applicant's claims and that there was no merit to the contention that the Tribunal had failed to consider the timing of the 2009 attack in relation to the elections. The court held that the applicant had not clearly articulated the argument that the attack was politically motivated because it occurred around election time, and that the Tribunal had properly considered the claims relating to the applicant's father. The court refused the application for an extension of time, with costs. The orders of the court were that the application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court be dismissed and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 25 January 2018 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 28 February 2018, the applicant applied to this court for an extension of time in which to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court. Consideration In all the circumstances of this case, and despite there being no adequate explanation for the delay, the Minister is content for the court to proceed on the basis that whether an extension of time ought to be granted principally depends upon the merits of the proposed appeal (cf VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588). The applicant relies on the principle summarised in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [55]:Where the Tribunal fails to make a finding on ‘... a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts’ that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 77 ALJR 1088 at [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, Hayne J agreeing at [95]. Although not expressly so identified in that case, the constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction may be seen as a failure to carry out the review required by the Act. The joint judgment of Gummow and Callinan JJ in Dranichnikov described the task of the Tribunal where the applicant relied upon membership of a particular social group. Their Honours said (at [26]): ... the task of the tribunal involves a number of steps. First the tribunal needs to determine whether the group or class to which an applicant claims to belong is capable of constituting a social group for the purposes of the Convention. That determination in part at least involves a question of law. If that question is answered affirmatively, the next question, one of fact, is whether the applicant is a member of that class. There then follow the questions whether the applicant has a fear, whether the fear is well-founded, and if it is, whether it is for a Convention reason. This is not the occasion to explore the metes and bounds of the undoubted general proposition that where a tribunal fails to make a finding on substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts, that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. See the discussion in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [56]-[62]. In this case, it is in my view abundantly clear that no case can be made that the Tribunal erred for the reasons particularised in the proposed notice of appeal. Taking particular 1 first. It says that the Tribunal “failed to have regard to the question whether the attack in 2009 was in the period of preparation for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in January 2010 and April 2010, and to the evidence that this was so”. The particular is founded on a false premise, at least in part. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that the attack in the middle of 2009 was in the period for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in January 2010 and April 2010. That evidence was first adduced before the primary judge in the form of exhibits to an affidavit of the applicant sworn 10 October 2016.