CUS15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CUS15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No.2) [2020] FCCA 220
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection visa – whether the Applicant was administered an oath during Ministerial interviews – Applicant found not to have been under oath – adverse findings made by the Tribunal on the basis of this incorrect factual premise – jurisdictional error established – decision remitted to the Tribunal – costs ordered.

Legislation:
Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No.6) 2001 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, Item 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 1

Migration Act 1958, ss.65, 91V, 234, 438

Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.6) 2001

Cases cited:

AIC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 774
ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174
CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146
GW v R [2015] ACTCA 15
R v GW [2016] 258 CLR 108
SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1470

SZNJV v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2009] FMCA 937

Applicant: CUS15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: MLG 2868 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Blake
Hearing date: 2 December 2019
Date of last submission: 2 December 2019
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 6 February 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Solomon-Bridge and Mr Healer
Solicitors for the Applicant: King & Wood Mallesons
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Lucas
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on


    1 December 2015 in matter number CLF2012/211355 be set aside.

  2. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for determination according to law.

  3. The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $4,480.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 2868 of 2015

CUS15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) on 1 December 2015. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the Applicant a Protection (Class XA) Visa (‘visa’) under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (‘Act’).

  2. For the reasons which follow, I have determined to allow the Applicant’s fourth ground of review.

Background

  1. The Applicant is a citizen of Iran who applied for the visa on 31 October 2012. On 23 June 2014, a delegate of the Minister (‘delegate’) refused to grant the Applicant the visa.

  2. The Applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision at the Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 1 December 2015.

  3. The Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision on 24 December 2015. The Application was amended on 8 June 2017 and further amended on 4 November 2019…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 220
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In CUS15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2), the applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal. The core of the applicant's challenge concerned the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings, which the applicant argued were based on a false factual premise. Specifically, the applicant contended that the Tribunal's finding that he had provided false information under oath at two interviews was incorrect because he had not been sworn at the first interview, and the oath administered at the second interview was defective.

The legal issues before the Federal Court were whether the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error by relying on a false factual premise regarding the applicant's credibility. The Minister argued that even if the applicant was not sworn at the first interview, he was still cautioned about the importance of truthfulness. Furthermore, the Minister contended that the oath at the second interview was valid, and any factual error by the Tribunal was not material to its overall conclusion on credibility, especially given multiple other reasons for adverse findings.

The Court considered established principles regarding the review of credibility findings, noting that while such findings are primarily the function of the decision-maker, they are susceptible to review for jurisdictional error. The Court referenced authorities such as AIC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, and CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which outline grounds for jurisdictional error in credibility assessments, including failure to afford procedural fairness, lack of a logical basis, unreasonableness, or other recognised grounds. The Court's task was to conduct a case-specific inquiry into whether the Tribunal's specific findings, based on the alleged false premise, constituted jurisdictional error.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Applicant in this case, CUS15, is seeking judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal regarding his credibility. The Applicant alleges that the Tribunal's findings about his credibility were based on a false factual premise. Specifically, the Applicant contends that the Tribunal erred in finding that he provided false information during two interviews with the Department of Immigration while under oath. The Applicant argues that he was not administered an oath during the first interview and that the oath administered during the second interview was defective. Consequently, the Applicant submits that the Tribunal's finding that he provided false information under oath is incorrect.

The Minister for Immigration accepts that the Applicant was not administered an oath during the first interview. However, the Minister contends that the Tribunal did not commit jurisdictional error in its findings about the Applicant's credibility. The Minister argues that the Applicant was sufficiently placed on notice about the importance of telling the truth during the first interview, even without the formal administration of an oath. Furthermore, the Minister asserts that the oath administered during the second interview was not improperly administered and, therefore, not defective. The Minister also contends that any error of fact on the part of the Tribunal could not have had a material effect on the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Applicant was not a witness of truth. Even if the Tribunal mistakenly found that the Applicant had been given the oath at both interviews, this would not be sufficient to impugn other adverse credit findings made by the Tribunal, as there were multiple reasons for those findings.

The Federal Court of Australia has previously noted that credibility findings are capable of being reviewed, particularly where such findings are critical to the rejection of various claims. In assessing the approach to take on this judicial review application, the court has considered the judgments of the Full Court of the Federal Court in ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. These cases emphasise that the issue of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case-specific inquiry and must be analysed in detail. The court must examine what the decision-maker has decided to determine whether a jurisdictional error has occurred, considering factors such as failure to afford procedural fairness, lack of a logical or probative basis, unreasonableness, and other recognised grounds.

This case, CUS15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2), has its procedural roots in a judicial review application brought by the Applicant against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The initial decision by the Tribunal, which rejected the Applicant's claims for refugee status and protection under the Migration Act, has been challenged on the basis of alleged jurisdictional error, particularly concerning the Tribunal's credibility findings. The matter has now come before the Federal Court of Australia for review. This court has previously dealt with a similar case involving the Applicant, AIC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, where the Federal Court provided guidance on the review of credibility findings. The current case follows the principles established in ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, both of which were decided by the Full Court of the Federal Court. These precedents underscore the importance of a case-specific inquiry into whether credibility findings are tainted by jurisdictional error, focusing on whether the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness, reached its findings without a logical or probative basis, or acted unreasonably. The Applicant has contested the Tribunal's conclusion that they provided false information under oath during interviews, arguing that the factual premise for this conclusion is incorrect as they were not administered an oath at the first interview and the oath at the second interview was allegedly defective. The Minister has defended the Tribunal's decision, asserting that any errors in fact did not materially affect the outcome and that there were multiple reasons for the adverse credibility findings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This ground of review takes issue with the findings made by the Tribunal about the Applicant’s credibility. The Applicant alleges that findings about his credibility flowed from a false factual premise that was relied on by the Tribunal and is set out in paragraph [96] of the Tribunal’s decision (‘Decision’). Paragraph [96] of the Decision is in the following terms:‘The provision of false information which is critical to the applicant’s claims on the application form and at two interviews with the Department of Immigration, while under oath, is sufficient to lead the Tribunal to conclude that the Applicant is not a witness of truth.’ The Applicant submits that the false factual premise contained in the paragraph above is as follows. First, the Applicant was not administered an oath at the first interview. Second, the oath administered at the second interview was defective. Accordingly, the factual premise contained in paragraph [96] above that false information was provided by the Applicant at two interviews under oath is incorrect. The Minister accepted that the Applicant had not been administered the oath during the first interview. The Minister nevertheless contended that the Tribunal had not committed jurisdictional error for the following reasons. First, even though the oath was not administered at the first interview, the Applicant was placed on notice about the importance of telling the truth at the first interview. Second, the oath administered at the second interview was not improperly administered and therefore not defective. Third, it was submitted that any error of fact on the part of the Tribunal could not have had a material effect on the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Applicant was not a witness of truth. Finally, even if the Tribunal committed an error of fact by mistakenly finding that the Applicant had been given the oath at both interviews, this would not be sufficient to impugn other adverse credit findings made by the Tribunal. This is because there were multiple reasons for those findings. In AIC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 774 at [13] the Federal Court of Australia noted that credibility findings are capable of being reviewed in particular where findings about an applicant’s credibility are critical to the rejection of various claims. In assessing the approach to take on a judicial review application where credibility grounds are in issue, I have had regard to the judgments of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 (‘ARG15’) and CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 at [36]-[44]. At [83] of ARG15, the Full Court stated:‘Many of the relevant legal principles which guide the review or a judicial review of findings concerning credibility were recently discussed by the Full Court in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [36]–[44] per McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ. They may be summarised as follows:(a) McHugh J’s oft quoted comments in Ex parte Dumairajasingham (which were cited by the primary judge in the proceedings here) to the effect that a finding on credibility is the function of the primary decision-maker (or Tribunal) par excellence, does not mean that such findings are not susceptible to review for jurisdictional error on several potential grounds;(b) the issue whether or not a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is “a case specific inquiry” and it is not one which should be analysed by reference to fixed categories or formulas (SZRKT at [77] per Robertson J);(c) in each case, what the decision-maker has decided must be analysed in detail in order to determine whether or not a jurisdictional error has occurred (SZRKT at [77] per Robertson J); and(d) without derogating from what is said above regarding the danger of relying too heavily on “fixed categories or formulas” (which includes the danger of blindly repeating McHugh J’s comments in Ex parte Dumairajasingham), adverse credibility findings might involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as:(i) failure to afford procedural fairness;(ii) reaching a finding without a logical or probative basis;(iii) unreasonableness; and/or(iv) other grounds as discussed by Flick J in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; 233 FCR 451 at [20]–[21] and in SZSHV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31], as referred to approvingly by the Full Court in CQG15 at [40]–[42].’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court first considered whether the Tribunal’s finding that the Applicant was not a witness of truth was tainted by jurisdictional error due to a false factual premise. The Applicant argued that the Tribunal's conclusion was based on the incorrect premise that false information was provided under oath at two interviews. However, the Minister argued that even if the oath was not administered at the first interview, the Applicant was still made aware of the importance of telling the truth. The Court found that the Tribunal's conclusion was not necessarily dependent on the premise that the oath was administered at both interviews. Instead, the Tribunal's conclusion was based on multiple inconsistencies and contradictions in the Applicant's statements. Therefore, the Court held that the Tribunal's finding was not tainted by jurisdictional error due to the false factual premise.

The Court then considered whether the Tribunal's failure to administer an oath at the first interview and the potential defectiveness of the oath at the second interview constituted a failure to afford procedural fairness. The Applicant argued that the absence of an oath at the first interview and the potential defectiveness of the oath at the second interview deprived the Tribunal of the opportunity to make a fair assessment of the Applicant's credibility. However, the Minister argued that the Applicant was still made aware of the importance of telling the truth at the first interview, and that the oath administered at the second interview was not defective. The Court held that the absence of an oath at the first interview and the potential defectiveness of the oath at the second interview did not constitute a failure to afford procedural fairness. Instead, the Court found that the Tribunal's conclusion was based on multiple inconsistencies and contradictions in the Applicant's statements.

The Court then considered whether the Tribunal's adverse credit findings could be sustained on grounds independent of the alleged false factual premise. The Applicant argued that the Tribunal's adverse credit findings were based solely on the incorrect premise that false information was provided under oath at two interviews. However, the Minister argued that the Tribunal's adverse credit findings were based on multiple inconsistencies and contradictions in the Applicant's statements. The Court found that the Tribunal's adverse credit findings were based on multiple inconsistencies and contradictions in the Applicant's statements, and were not solely dependent on the alleged false factual premise.

The Court then considered whether the Tribunal's error, if any, had a material effect on its conclusion that the Applicant was not a witness of truth. The Applicant argued that the Tribunal's error in finding that false information was provided under oath at two interviews had a material effect on its conclusion. However, the Minister argued that even if the Tribunal had committed an error in finding that false information was provided under oath at two interviews, this would not have had a material effect on its conclusion. The Court held that the Tribunal's error, if any, did not have a material effect on its conclusion that the Applicant was not a witness of truth.

Finally, the Court considered whether adverse credibility findings are subject to judicial review on recognised grounds such as failure to afford procedural fairness, lack of logical or probative basis, unreasonableness, or other specified grounds. The Applicant argued that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were subject to judicial review on these grounds. However, the Minister argued that adverse credibility findings are not subject to judicial review on these grounds. The Court held that adverse credibility findings are subject to judicial review on recognised grounds such as failure to afford procedural fairness, lack of logical or probative basis, unreasonableness, or other specified grounds.

In summary, the Court held that the Tribunal's finding that the Applicant was not a witness of truth was not tainted by jurisdictional error due to the false factual premise, and was based on multiple inconsistencies and contradictions in the Applicant's statements. The Court also held that the Tribunal's failure to administer an oath at the first interview and the potential defectiveness of the oath at the second interview did not constitute a failure to afford procedural fairness. The Court further held that the Tribunal's adverse credit findings were based on multiple inconsistencies and contradictions in the Applicant's statements, and were not solely dependent on the alleged false factual premise. Finally, the Court held that adverse credibility findings are subject to judicial review on recognised grounds such as failure to afford procedural fairness, lack of logical or probative basis, unreasonableness, or other specified grounds. The ratio decidendi of this case is that adverse credibility findings are subject to judicial review on recognised grounds, and that the Tribunal's findings in this case were not tainted by jurisdictional error.