Culloton v Rowe Bristol Lawyers Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   CULLOTON -v- ROWE BRISTOL LAWYERS PTY LTD [2017] WASC 153

CORAM:   ACTING MASTER STRK

HEARD:   11 JANUARY 2017

DELIVERED          :   6 JUNE 2017

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2790 of 2016

BETWEEN:   JEFFREY MICHAEL CULLOTON

Plaintiff

AND

ROWE BRISTOL LAWYERS PTY LTD
Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application by a defendant to set aside an originating process where the originating process concerns an application to set aside costs agreements - Plaintiff an undischarged bankrupt - Plaintiff not a party to one of the costs agreements - No consent by the bankruptcy trustee to the proceedings - No financial interest in the outcome - Abuse of process

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)

Result:

Application granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr J G Kitto

Defendant:     Mr M Mirzai

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Kitto & Kitto

Defendant:     Rowe Bristol Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd [1993] HCA 15; (1993) 177 CLR 485

Cooper v Moloney (No 5) [2012] SASC 211

Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL [1996] HCA 19; (1996) 185 CLR 124

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; (2007) 230 CLR 89

Geia v Palm Island Aboriginal Council [2001] QCA 389; [2001] 1 Qd R 245

Macchia v The Public Trustee [2008] WASCA 241

Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2008] FCAFC 172; (2008) 171 FCR 380

Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 89 ACSR 1

  1. ACTING MASTER STRK: By chamber summons and pursuant to O 12 r 7 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), the defendant applies to set aside the originating summons filed by the plaintiff on 14 October 2016.

  2. The originating summons was lodged by the plaintiff Mr Jeffrey Michael Culloton against the defendant, Rowe Bristol Lawyers Pty Ltd (Rowe Bristol), by which Mr Culloton seeks the following relief:[1]

    1.An order that the cost agreement between the plaintiff and defendant (undated and bearing the practitioner's reference number AGR:MM:1852:002:001) be set aside pursuant to s.288 (2) Legal Profession Act.

    2.An order that the purported cost agreement between Mrs Cherylle Kaye Culloton, Screenlink Pty Ltd and the defendant (signed on or about 29 June 2015 and bearing the practitioner's reference number AGR:MM:1852:002:001A) be set aside pursuant to s.288 (2) Legal Profession Act.

    3.A declaration that the document referred to in order 2 is a nullity.

    4.An order that any monies paid to the defendant pursuant to the document referred to in order 2 above be repaid to Mrs Culloton and Screenlink Pty Ltd.

    5.The defendant pay the plaintiffs costs of the application.

    [1] Originating summons dated 14 October 2016 [1] ‑ [15].

Background

  1. The background to the chamber summons is conveniently set out in Rowe Bristol's submissions and list of authorities filed…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASC 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Culloton v Rowe Bristol Lawyers Pty Ltd, the court was asked to determine whether an undischarged bankrupt could initiate proceedings to set aside costs agreements without the consent of their bankruptcy trustee. The dispute arose out of an application to set aside costs agreements between the plaintiff and the defendant, Rowe Bristol Lawyers Pty Ltd. The plaintiff, Mr Culloton, was an undischarged bankrupt who was not a party to one of the costs agreements. The trustee in bankruptcy did not consent to the proceedings, and the plaintiff had no financial interest in the outcome. The defendant sought to set aside the originating process on the grounds of an abuse of process.

The court had to decide whether a chose in action, such as the contractual rights under the Culloton Agreement, constituted property that vested in the trustee in bankruptcy. The court also had to consider whether statutory rights, such as the right to commence an action under s 288 of the Legal Profession Act, constituted property that vested in the trustee in bankruptcy. The court referred to the decision in Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] to define a chose in action as a species of property. The court also referred to the decision in Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL to determine whether the statutory right to appeal constituted property. The court found that a right to appeal did not constitute property.

The court held that the contractual rights under the Culloton Agreement constituted a chose in action that vested in Mr Culloton's trustee in bankruptcy. The court also held that any statutory rights that supplemented or affected the exercise of those contractual rights must also vest in the trustee in bankruptcy. The court held that the statutory right to commence an action under s 288 of the Legal Profession Act was not proprietary in nature and did not vest in the trustee in bankruptcy. The court found that the plaintiff's proceedings amounted to an abuse of process.

The court set aside the originating process and ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A chose in action is property for the purposes of s 5 and s 116 of the Bankruptcy Act. The definition of a chose in action was discussed by Lee, Drummond and Carr AJJA in Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3],[24] as being property:'A chose in action is a species of property': Spellman v Spellman [1961] 2 All ER 498, 501 (Danckwerts LJ). 'The meaning of the expression "chose in action" or "thing in action" has expanded over time, and is now used to describe all personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action and not by taking physical possession': 13 Halsbury's Laws of England (5th ed) [1]. Choses in action include rights arising under contracts and the benefits of contracts: Halsbury [4] and [6].[24] Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 89 ACSR 1, 2157. Further, some rights created by statute can constitute property.[25][25] Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL [1996] HCA 19; (1996) 185 CLR 124, 6, although their Honours did not consider the right of appeal under consideration constituted property. In these proceedings, Rowe Bristol contends that the contractual rights under the Culloton Agreement constitute a chose in action that vests in Mr Culloton's trustee in bankruptcy. Further, any statutory rights that supplement or affect the exercise of those contractual rights must also vest in the trustee, as to hold otherwise would mean that a bankrupt would be able to disgorge his trustee from the contractual rights that have vested in the trustee without the trustee's consent. It is Rowe Bristol's position that the statutory right to commence an action under s 288 of the Legal Profession Act must be proprietary in nature and vests with the trustee in bankruptcy due to its connection and effects on the rights in choses of action available to the trustee under the relevant costs agreements. Neither party were able to refer to an authority that considered a bankrupt's standing under s 288 of the Legal Profession Act. However, the standing of a bankrupt to exercise a statutory right was considered by the High Court in Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL - where a bankrupt appellant sought to appeal an adverse decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court pursuant to s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The decision of the Full Court had been reserved before he had become bankrupt and subsequently delivered against him after his bankruptcy had commenced. The respondents to the bankrupt's appeal applied for orders that the notices of appeal be set aside or dismissed. In the Full Court by majority (Gummow & Whitlam JJ, Hill J dissenting) dismissed the appeals as incompetent. On appeal, the High Court in the majority judgment of Brennan CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, held that the statutory right of appeal against a liability created by a judgment did not constitute property. Their Honour's stated:[26]A right to appeal may be a substantive right, but it is another question whether such a right has the character of property. Some rights created by statute can constitute property, but a right to appeal does not have the character of property merely because it is the creature of statute. A chose in action may be the property of the person entitled to enforce it, but a liability to satisfy a judgment enforcing a chose in action is not property of the person against whom the judgment is entered. A liability is not property of the person liable. Nor is a right to appeal against a money judgment property of the judgment debtor. Nor does such a right to appeal answer the description of property divisible among creditors defined by s116(1)(b), namely, 'the capacity to exercise, and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in, over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit'. The powers referred to are powers 'which are familiar to all conveyancers and are powers properly so called', as Farwell J pointed out in In re Rose; Trustee of the Property of E T Rose v Rose. In other words, the powers referred to are authorities to dispose of property or interests in property for the benefit of the donee of the power or of some other person. In this case, there is no property 'over or in respect of' which the bankrupt is or would have been capable of exercising a power. As a matter of ordinary language, a judgment debtor's right to appeal against the judgment is not property.[26] Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (6).