FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CSL Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Infrastructure and Transport
[2014] FCA 1160
Citation: CSL Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Infrastructure and Transport [2014] FCA 1160 Parties: CSL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v MINISTER FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT and BRAEMAR SEASCOPE PTY LTD File number: NSD 1585 of 2013 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 3 November 2014 Catchwords: ADMIRALTY – Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012 (Cth) prescribed mandatory status for person making application for a temporary licence where applicant for licence not an owner, charterer, master or agent of a vessel or a shipper – where applications for licence and subsequent variations specified fictitious voyages that the licence would authorise – where applicant for licence intended to and did apply later for licence variations to amend fictitious voyages to actual voyages – where applications for licence variation varied number and substantive nature of voyages – whether use of licence circumvented purpose of general licence provisions or object of the Act – whether variation of number and substantive nature of voyages fell within matters “authorised by a temporary licence” in s 43 of Act or rather required variation under s 51 of Act for matters “not already authorised by the licence”
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – declarations – whether licence of applicant for temporary licence’s status under s 28(1) of Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012 (Cth) a jurisdictional fact – whether temporary licence held by person who did not have status to apply for it invalid for jurisdictional error
Held: temporary licence and variations invalid for jurisdictional error – second respondent circumvented purpose of general licence provisions or object of the Act
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth)
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth)
Coastal Shipping (Revitalising Australian Shipping) (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act 2012 (Cth)
Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth)Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (20th ed; Sweet & Maxwell, 1996)
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by SeaCases cited: Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297
City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 applied
Cosmar Compania Naviera SA v Total Transport Corporation (The “Isabelle”) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 81 applied
Cosmar Compania Naviera SA v Total Transport Corporation (The “Isabelle”) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 366 referred to
CSL Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Infrastructure and Transport (2014) 221 FCR 165 applied
CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440 applied
FCT v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503 applied
Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v BPS Shipping Ltd (1997) 190 CLR 181 applied
Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 applied
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144 applied
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 applied
Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612 applied
Shagang Shipping Co…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the temporary licence and its variations were invalid because the applicant did not possess the required status under the Act. The statutory provisions stipulated that only certain categories of persons, specifically those connected to a vessel as owner, charterer, master, or agent, or shippers, could apply for a temporary licence. Braemar's initial application for the licence and the subsequent variations specified fictitious voyages, which did not align with the purpose of the general licence provisions. The court found that the use of the licence in this manner circumvented the intent of the Act, leading to the conclusion that the licence was invalid for jurisdictional error.
The court's reasoning emphasised that the statutory criteria for eligibility were mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirement for an applicant to identify their status was not merely procedural but integral to the grant of the licence. The court rejected arguments suggesting that the identification of the status involved substantive issues of fact and degree. Instead, it held that the statutory definitions of terms such as "owner" and "master" were sufficiently clear and practical to be applied by the Minister, who was presumed to be familiar with maritime trade. The court concluded that Braemar's actions constituted a misuse of the temporary licence, leading to an invalid grant that circumvented the purpose of the Act.
The court ordered that the respondents, the Minister and Braemar, pay the applicant's costs. This decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory criteria and the consequences of failing to do so, highlighting the necessity for precise compliance with legislative provisions in the maritime industry.
Orders
Orders of the court
5. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is a question of statutory construction whether the decision-maker has power to decide if he, she or it thinks that the criterion exists so that he, she or it may then exercise the power or if the criterion must, in fact, exist, as Lord Atkin famously explained in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 245; see Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (the Malaysian Declaration case) (2011) 244 CLR 144 at 194 [109] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ. I reject the arguments of the Minister and Braemar that a person’s status was not a jurisdictional fact for the grant of a temporary licence within the meaning of s 28(1). The question whether a person answers a criterion of having a status stipulated in s 28(1) is not one that involves, in the ordinary course, any, let alone any substantive, issues of fact and degree of the kind considered in cases such as Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297, see at 301 and 306 per Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. Section 28(1)(a) identified four categories of person, each of whom had to be connected to an actual vessel. A person cannot be the owner of an unknown vessel. Importantly, the expressions “owner” and “master” as defined in s 6(1) of the Coastal Trading Act applied specifically in relation to a particular vessel or vessels. The argument that some difficulty would exist in the Minister determining whether that a person was the owner, charterer, master or agent of a vessel is without substance. In the ordinary course, a person who sought a temporary licence because he, she or it had one of the four statuses in s 28(1)(a) could readily satisfy any enquiry about that status. Very similar criteria of status applied to an applicant for the grant of a general licence under s 13(1)(b)(i) in respect of a particular identified vessel being “the owner, charterer, master or agent of the vessel”. The express words of s 28(1)(a) made the identification of an actual vessel or vessels a necessary element that the applicant had to possess. A person with overall general control and management of a fleet of vessels is an “owner” of each of them within the meaning of par (b) in the definition of “owner”. The purpose of the phrase “(if known)”, when used in relation to a vessel in s 28(2)(e) and (ea), was to deal with the position of a shipper who applied under s 28(1)(b) and may have had a need for the temporary licence but had not then contractually committed to a fixture or fixtures. A shipper of cargo is in a very different position, in relation to the identity of a vessel or vessels, from an owner, charterer, master or agent of an identified vessel or vessels. An owner of a ship ordinarily could be expected to establish the fact that he, she or it is its “owner” within the meaning of s 6(1) without difficulty. The criteria in the definition of “owner” had a purpose of specifying what relationship a person had to have with a particular vessel to be able to exercise the right to make an application for a licence under the Coastal Trading Act in the capacity of “owner”. The parties did not identify any other purpose for the Parliament having chosen to define “owner”. The definition was sufficiently broad and practical to allow charterers, frequently called “disponent owners” because of their control of the commercial operation of a ship (see Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v BPS Shipping Ltd (1997) 190 CLR 181 at 198 n53 per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ) and shipping lines with fleets in which ships were owned by one ship companies, to make applications in respect of such ships as owners. The definition was a practical one that could readily be applied by a Minister responsible for, and whom the Parliament assumed would be familiar with, the day to day incidents of Australia’s very large national and international maritime trade.