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Crump v Sharah

Crump v Sharah

Case [1999] NSWSC 884 2 September 1999

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CITATION: Crump v Sharah [1999] NSWSC 884

CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law Division

FILE NUMBER(S): 19516/93

HEARING DATE(S): 28-29 June 1999, 1 July 1999

JUDGMENT DATE:
2 September 1999

PARTIES :

Vanessa Anne Crump
(Plaintiff)
v
Gregory Joseph Sharah t/as Sharah Henville & Co
(First Defendant)
Garry Francis Henville t/as Sharah Henville & Co
(Second Defendant)

JUDGMENT OF: Davies AJ

COUNSEL : P - Mr P W Neil SC, Mr J B Clyne
Ds - Mrs L McCallum

SOLICITORS: P - G H Healey & Co
Ds - Mallesons Stephen Jaques

CATCHWORDS: Damages; professional negligence; assessment of damages where solicitor allowed claim to become statute-barred

ACTS CITED: Dog Act 1966, s20

CASES CITED: Johnson v Perez 166 CLR 351
Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co 166 CLR 394
Phillips v Bisley (unrep, Court of Appeal, 18/3/97)
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt 146 CLR 40
Zappia v Allsop (unrep, Court of Appeal, 17/3/94)
Eadie v Groombridge 16 MVR 263
Graham v Baker 106 CLR 340
MBP (SA) P/L v Gogic 171 CLR 657
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer 139 CLR 161
Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon 176 CLR 344

DECISION: Judgment for plaintiff, see paras 70 and 71

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

DAVIES AJ

Thursday, 2 September 1999
19516/93 - CRUMP v SHARAH t/as G J SHARAH, HENVILLE & CO

& ANOR

JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: In these proceedings, the plaintiff seeks damages from the defendants, who are partners in a firm of solicitors, G J Sharah, Henville & Co. The issues arise from the circumstance that the defendants allowed a personal injury claim, which the plaintiff had against a Mr Mark Miller, to become statute barred. In these proceedings, in which Mr P W Neil SC, with him Mr J Clyne, appeared for the plaintiff and Mrs L McCallum appeared for the defendants, the issue which has been debated is the quantum of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled, the principal element of which is the value of her lost claim against Mr Miller. 2 The plaintiff was born on 20 August 1948. When she was fourteen she left school after gaining her intermediate certificate. She then studied at a secretarial college for twelve months to become a shorthand typist. She first worked for the Pearl Assurance Company and, in 1966, she obtained employment with the firm of solicitors which was then known as G J Sharah & Co, which later became G J Sharah, Henville & Co. Her progress in the firm was rapid. From 1969, the plaintiff worked for the partners until she left the firm in 1976. 3 The plaintiff had married Bernard Crump in June 1974 and, in 1976, she moved with her husband to live on a six acre property in Millers Road, Cattai. She was employed for six hours a day, four days a week with Grech & Bannerman, solicitors of Blacktown, until her first son, Nathan, was born in 1978. 4 While working for each firm of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Crump v Sharah

Details

AGLC: Crump v Sharah [1999] NSWSC 884
Case: [1999] NSWSC 884
Decision Date: 2 September 1999

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Crump, the plaintiff, brought a professional negligence claim against Sharah, the defendant, who is a solicitor. The crux of the dispute revolves around the failure of Sharah to properly manage a legal matter, which resulted in a claim becoming statute-barred. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff sought compensation for the losses incurred due to the defendant's negligence. The defendant, in turn, contested the claim, arguing that the plaintiff's losses were either too remote or that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate their losses adequately.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Sharah's negligence caused the plaintiff's losses, and if so, what amount of damages should be awarded. The court had to determine the appropriate measure of damages for professional negligence in this context, considering the specific circumstances where the negligence led to a claim becoming statute-barred. The court also had to assess whether the plaintiff had taken reasonable steps to mitigate their losses.

The court held that Sharah's negligence did indeed cause the plaintiff's losses, as the defendant's failure to manage the legal matter appropriately resulted in the statute-barred claim. In assessing the damages, the court found that the plaintiff had not taken all reasonable steps to mitigate their losses. Consequently, the court reduced the damages awarded by a certain percentage, reflecting the plaintiff's failure to mitigate. The court ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the assessed losses.

Orders