FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CRP15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1484
Appeal from: CRP15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2018] FCCA 431 File number(s): VID 253 of 2018 Judge(s): BURLEY J Date of judgment: 2 October 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – refusal of a protection visa application – whether the Tribunal acted illogically or irrationally – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36 and 65 Cases cited: CRP15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 431
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Date of hearing: 22 August 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 21 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: N Rogers, Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 253 of 2018 BETWEEN: CRP15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BURLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURLEY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity, who arrived in Australia by boat as an irregular maritime arrival in June 2012. On 6 November 2012, the appellant’s lawyers lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa (Visa). He claimed that he met the refugee or complementary protection criterion pursuant to s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) based on fears of persecution by reason of his ethnicity, occupation, the actions of a particular naval officer, his actual or imputed political opinions, and his status as a failed Tamil asylum seeker who had departed Sri Lanka illegally.
A delegate of the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection was not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Act, and refused to grant the Visa. The appellant then applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. On 27 November 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.
The appellant then applied to the FCCA, which dismissed his application for judicial review on 1 March 2018; CRP15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 431. The appellant then filed a Notice of Appeal in this court. The grounds of appeal articulated in his…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1484
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in its decision that the Full Federal Court Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error when it rejected the appellant’s claims. The appellant contended that the Tribunal's reasons were irrational or illogical. However, the court found that the Tribunal's reasons were rational and logical, particularly given the inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence and the country information available to the Tribunal. The Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's claims was based on credible findings and supported by the available information.
The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court applied the correct legal test and did not err in its decision. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge then observed that in [12] of the Tribunal’s reasons, at the conclusion of an introductory section to the reasons, the Tribunal states that it has concluded that the matter “should be remitted for reconsideration”. The primary judge observes that this statement is inconsistent with the balance of the reasons, which plainly express the view that the appellant’s claims are not well founded. The primary judge concludes those words in [12] were in error, and that otherwise there is no content in the Tribunal’s reasons that warrant a finding that it fell into jurisdictional error. 3.2 Consideration The single ground of appeal advanced by the appellant before this court is that there is jurisdictional error in the FCCA decision. No particulars of the basis for the alleged error are supplied. It may be inferred that the appellant contends that the FCCA fell into error for failing to find that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error because its reasons were irrational or illogical, that being the basis for the appellant’s application for review before the primary judge. However, I can see no basis upon which this court would reach the conclusion that the Tribunal’s reasons were irrational or illogical, or for concluding that the primary judge erred in failing to find that this was so. In my view the primary judge applied the correct legal test to the consideration of the reasons of the Tribunal. Having regard to the reasons of the Tribunal, it is my view that those reasons reflect no lack of rationality or logic, having regard to the principles set out in SZMDS. I have set out the primary judge’s summary of the conclusions reached by the Tribunal in some detail above. The conclusions reached by the Tribunal in relation to the appellant’s first claim (alleged fear of harm arising from his Tamil ethnicity) were rejected on the basis of country information available to the Tribunal, and were rationally supported by that information. The conclusion based on his second claim (of racial persecution arising from the appellant’s profile as a Tamil fisherman) took into account country information that the system of fishing restrictions has been lifted and that the navy pass system had ended. It was not irrational or illogical to rely on that information in concluding that the claim to persecution on this basis was not sustained. The Tribunal’s rejection of the third claim (fear of harm as a result of the actions of the naval officer) turned on the rejection of the appellant’s evidence that his father had been beaten by that officer in 2010, and the rejection that the applicant had been beaten or persecuted by the same naval officer thereafter. The Tribunal made these findings on the basis of a conclusion that the appellant’s testimony as to these events was not credible. That conclusion was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the basis of the inconsistencies that it had observed in the appellant’s evidence. Similarly, the Tribunal rejected the more recent (fourth) claim advanced by the appellant that by reason of his father’s association with the LTTE, there was a real chance that the appellant would be exposed to persecution on the basis of an imputed political opinion. The Tribunal found, again based on what it considered to be the vague and inconsistent testimony of the appellant, that the appellant had fabricated this claim after his application was refused by the delegate. Finally, the Tribunal’s rejection of the fifth claim (based on the fact that he is a failed asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally) was rationally based on country information that was available to it, especially given the Tribunal’s conclusions rejecting the other claims that might otherwise have suggested that the appellant had a profile that might warrant additional attention from the Sri Lankan authorities upon his return to Sri Lanka.