| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPEALS LIST
S CI 2017 02611
BETWEEN
| ANDREW CROWTHER | Plaintiff |
| – and – | |
| WHITEHORSE CITY COUNCIL | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Mukhtar AsJ |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 25 September 2017 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 October 2017 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Crowther v Whitehorse City Council |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2017] VSC 594 |
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ― Judicial review ― Municipal City Council as enforcement agency for infringements of road safety rules ― Issuing of infringement notice to driver and imposition of penalty ― Expiation of offence on payment ― Council’s refusal to withdraw infringement notice ― Driver’s refusal to pay penalty ― Statutory requirement to proceed to Court prosecution ― Prosecution instigated ― Availability of certiorari to quash decision to issue infringement notice ― Availability of prohibition or injunction to prevent prosecution ― Infringements Act 2006 (Vic), Part 2
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| The plaintiff appeared in person | ||
| For the defendant | Mr A Solomon-Bridge | Macquarie Local Government Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
On 11 May 2017 at 5.24 pm in Market Street Nunawading, the plaintiff was given an infringement notice (commonly called a parking ticket) by an issuing officer of the Whitehorse City Council. The penalty shown on the ticket was $93. The infringement was of Rule 200(2) of the Road Safety Road Rules2009 (made under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic)) which states:
The driver of a heavy vehicle, or long vehicle, must not stop on a length of road in a built-up area for longer than 1 hour, unless the information on or with a traffic control device specifically permits the driver of a heavy vehicle, or long vehicle, to stop on the length of the road for longer than 1 hour, or is permitted to do so under subrule (2A) or by the Council.
Penalty: 3 Penalty units
‘Heavy vehicle’ is defined under Road Rule 200(3) to mean ‘a vehicle with a GVM of 4.5 tonnes or more’. GVM means gross vehicle mass, defined under the Road Safety Act to mean the maximum loaded mass of the vehicle as specified by the vehicle’s manufacturer. The reference in the Rule to permission under subrule (2A) is irrelevant. That subrule says that the driver of a heavy or long vehicle can stop for longer than one hour ‘if, throughout the period when the vehicle is stopped on the length of road, the driver is engaged in dropping off, or picking up, goods’. That was not the case here. Furthermore the Dictionary provisions of the Road Rules define ‘Council’ to mean the ‘municipal district within which a road, area, land or place or the relevant part of the road, area, land or place is situated’. The location of the road on which the infringement occurred was within the municipality of Whitehorse City Council.[1]
[1]The permit is exhibit D to his affidavit sworn 4 July 2017.
Mr Crowther’s vehicle is a 6-tonne motorhome. He lives…
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- Case
- [2017] VSC 594
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the Council's decision to issue the infringement notice was subject to judicial review and if so, whether Crowther was entitled to the relief of certiorari. Additionally, the court had to determine whether Crowther was entitled to an injunction to prevent the Council from proceeding with the prosecution. The court had to consider the statutory framework provided by the Infringements Act 2006 (Vic) and the inherent jurisdiction of the court in matters of administrative law.
The court found that the Council's decision to issue the infringement notice was subject to judicial review and that Crowther's application for certiorari was well-founded. The court determined that the Council had failed to consider relevant mitigating factors before issuing the notice, which was a significant error. Consequently, the court granted the writ of certiorari, quashing the decision to issue the infringement notice. Regarding the injunction, the court held that once the statutory requirement to proceed with prosecution had been triggered, the court did not have the jurisdiction to prevent the prosecution through an injunction.
The final orders of the court were that the writ of certiorari be issued to quash the Council’s decision to issue the infringement notice, and that the application for an injunction to prevent the prosecution be dismissed. The decision underscored the importance of adherence to statutory procedures and the limited scope of judicial intervention in administrative decisions that have triggered mandatory legal processes.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi