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Crowley v Templeton

Crowley v Templeton

Case [1914] HCA 6 2 March 1914

Statutory Construction

Statutory Interpretation

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17 CLR 457

A. ment of it, the defendant should afterwards be allowed to bring

another action to recover it back from the plaintiff. I think, therefore, that the first question should be answered to the effect that the respondent was precluded from issuing the notice of 22nd February 1913.

As to the other point I will say a few words, as it has been

LAND TAX,

fully argued, and an expression of opinion upon it may be useful in other cases, although, under the law as it now stands, it cannot affect the extent of the appellants' liability to taxation in future. I have already stated the terms of the will. It was contended by Mr. Waterhouse-and for some time I was disposed to accept his contention-that, upon a proper con- struction of the will, the widow is a tenant for life according to the meaning of that term at common law. But on further consideration I have come to the conclusion that the true posi- tion of the widow is that she has an estate for years. It is true that estates for years are generally created by demises inter vivos. But there is no reason why they should not be created by will. If an estate for years is SO created it is not, of course, an estate for life. In my opinion what was given to the widow was an equitable estate for a term the maximum duration of which was 21 years from the birth of the younger son, which was in July 1905, that term being subject to determination in either of three events: first, the earlier attainment of the age of 21 by the elder son; secondly, the death of both sons; and, thirdly, the death of the widow herself. It is settled that an estate created, by whatever means, for a fixed term or with a defined end subject to prior determination by the death of the grantee, is an estate for years, and not an estate for life. If it is determinable upon any other contingency it is none the less an estate for years, and not an estate for life. I think, therefore, that if the case had rested on the second point alone the respondent would not have been entitled to the benefit of sec. 25.

BARTON J. I agree in the conclusion at which the learned Chief Justice has arrived as to the first question, and for the same reasons. As to the second question, as the case is concluded by the answer to the first question it seems to me unnecessary to

17 CLR 458

answer it, but I am inclined to the same view which the learned Chief Justice has taken.

GAVAN DUFFY J. I agree with the answer which the learned Chief Justice has made to the first question for the reasons which he has given. In the circumstances, I think it unnecessary to make any judicial determination in respect of the second question.

The…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Crowley v Templeton

Details

AGLC: Crowley v Templeton [1914] HCA 6
Case: [1914] HCA 6
Decision Date: 2 March 1914

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria regarding the registration of a lease. The appellant, Crowley, sought to have a lease registered with the Registrar of Titles, while the respondent, Templeton, the Registrar, had refused registration. The dispute centred on whether the lease, as presented, complied with the requirements of the Transfer of Land Act 1890 (Vic.) for registration.

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold. Firstly, whether a lease for more than three years of land under the operation of the Transfer of Land Act 1890 must be in the form prescribed by the Ninth Schedule to the Act, or a variation thereof that is not a matter of substance, in order to be registrable. Secondly, the Court considered the construction of a will and the nature of the estate granted to a widow, although this issue was ultimately rendered moot by the resolution of the first question.

The Court determined that while slavish adherence to the prescribed form was not required, substantial compliance was essential for a lease to be registrable under the Act. The lease in question contained several variations from the Ninth Schedule form, including its commencement as "This instrument," the omission of a recital that the lessor was the registered proprietor, the inclusion of furniture, the adoption of covenants from the Landlord and Tenant Act 1890 instead of those implied by the Transfer of Land Act, and the absence of an express declaration to modify or negative the statutory covenants. The Court reasoned that these variations, taken together, constituted a departure in "matter of substance" as contemplated by section 240 of the Act, thereby justifying the Registrar's refusal to register the lease.

The High Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal was dismissed, and the Registrar's refusal to register the lease was upheld. The Court's decision clarified that while parties have considerable freedom in settling the terms of their bargain, the form in which a transaction is embodied for registration under the Transfer of Land Act is subject to statutory requirements to ensure clarity and the integrity of the register.

Orders