Cross v The Queen - [1996] HCATrans 361

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S59 of 1996

B e t w e e n -
MICHAEL FREDERICK CROSS
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

BRENNAN CJ
TOOHEY J
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 2 DECEMBER 1996, AT 10.45 AM

MR J.C. PAPAYANNI: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR G.D. WENDLER, for the applicant. (instructed by T. Murphy, General Manager, Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales)

MR G.S. HOSKING, SC: May it please, your Honours, I appear for the respondent with my learned fried, MR A.M. BLACKMORE. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (New South Wales))

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, Mr Papayanni?

MR PAPAYANNI: If the Court pleases.The question here is one as to whether the rule as to recent possession as laid down in Trainer v The King in 1906 is still the law in Australia. That, in my submission, is a question which, under section 35A of the Judiciary Act, is one going to the administration of justice throughout Australia and is of importance in the application of it and the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in this matter has undermined the administration of justice in that respect.

If I may just put it this way: the charge in this case, of course, was one of stealing and also receiving under section 188 of the Crimes Act. At the end of the Crown case, the accused or the applicant was acquitted on a charge of larceny, not for the reason as put in the Court of Criminal Appeal judgment, but for another technical reason in relation to the charge under section 154A of the Crimes Act. So at the end of the Crown case the accused had been acquitted of the charge of larceny.

The charge of receiving then - the elements of that are quite simple. One, that you have to prove that the car in this case, or the property, was stolen property. Two, that you have to prove that the applicant obtained possession or received possession of the property, that is the stolen vehicle, and, three, at the time that he received it that he knew that it was stolen property. Two and three in this particular case, there was no direct evidence of the fact that he had obtained possession of the stolen vehicle and, three, that there was any evidence that showed that he knew it was stolen. So, in this particular case the Crown relied on the doctrine or the rule as to recent possession.

Of course, the situation was that on 16 March he was found in possession of a stolen chassis and an engine, which at that time, appeared to be his own engine. He was not found in possession of the stolen vehicle which had been stolen on the 29 January.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Cross v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Cross v The Queen [1996] HCATrans 361
Case: [1996] HCATrans 361
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Cross against a conviction for murder. The dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically a confession made to police. The central question before the Court was whether this confession had been improperly obtained, thereby rendering it inadmissible in the trial proceedings.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the confession was obtained in contravention of the appellant's rights and whether the trial judge erred in admitting the confession into evidence. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the confession was voluntary and if the circumstances under which it was made were such that its admission would be unfair to the appellant.

The Court's reasoning focused on the principles governing the admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings. It was held that a confession must be voluntary, meaning it was not induced by threats, promises, or other improper pressure. Furthermore, even if voluntary, a confession may be excluded if its admission would be unfair to the accused, considering factors such as the circumstances of its making and its probative value. The Court analysed the evidence relating to the interview process and the appellant's state of mind at the time of making the confession.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders