FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Croker v Commonwealth of Australia; In the Matter of Croker [2010] FCA 1031
Citation: Croker v Commonwealth of Australia; In the Matter of Croker [2010] FCA 1031 Parties: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA; IN THE MATTER OF CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER File number: NSD 911 of 2010 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 22 September 2010 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – application to set aside Bankruptcy Notice on the ground that the debtor has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or greater than the amount claimed in Bankruptcy Notice and on other technical grounds – no evidence of any counter-claim, set-off or cross demand – alleged irregularities in Notice not made out – application refused Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40(1)(g), 41(1)(b), 41(2), 41(3)(a) and 41(7)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 55ZF(1), 55ZG(2), 55ZG(3)
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005 r 3.02Cases cited: Croker v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 452 related
Capsanis v Owners—Strata Plan 11727 [2000] FCA 1262 followed
Glew v Harrowell (2003) 198 ALR 331 applied
Re Mullavey; Ex parte Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (1977) 32 FLR 1 followed
Re Wong; Ex parte Kitson (1979) 38 FLR 207 followedDate of hearing: On the papers Date of last submissions: 30 August 2010 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 29 Solicitor for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms S Marsic of Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 911 of 2010
IN THE MATTER OF CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
BETWEEN: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 SEPTEMBER 2010
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the Application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 911 of 2010
IN THE MATTER OF CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
BETWEEN: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE:
22 SEPTEMBER 2010
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant has applied to the Court to set aside Bankruptcy Notice No NN2706 of 2010 (the Bankruptcy Notice) which was issued by the Official Receiver on 28 June 2010 and served upon the applicant on 2 July 2010. In the Bankruptcy Notice, the total amount alleged to be owing by the applicant to the respondent was $51,705.61. That amount is the total amount due under six separate costs orders relating to various proceedings in this Court, in the Federal Magistrates Court, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and in the District Court of New South Wales. The amount of each individual order for costs exceeds…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 1031
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claims. The court noted that to satisfy the requirement under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, the applicant needed to show that he had a "prima facie case" with a fair chance of success, and that the claim was genuine. The court held that the applicant's references to previous litigation and potential claims were not adequately articulated or supported by evidence. Therefore, the court was not satisfied that the applicant had a valid counter-claim or set-off. Additionally, the court found no merit in the applicant's arguments regarding the lack of interest, the incorrect address, and the failure to act as a Model Litigant. The court concluded that the applicant had failed to make out any case that the Bankruptcy Notice should be set aside, and dismissed the application with costs.
The final orders of the court were that the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice was dismissed with costs to be paid by the applicant to the respondent. The court found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claims and that the Bankruptcy Notice was valid.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent’s evidence also demonstrated to my satisfaction that, even if the pleadings referred to in the applicant’s second affidavit had been filed in this Court at some stage, they related to proceedings which have now been concluded.CONSIDERATION In respect of his contention that he had a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount claimed in the Bankruptcy Notice, the applicant referred to the claims which he made over the years concerning the cuff links which he had purchased from the High Court. He also suggested that he had a claim in tort against the Commissioner of Taxation for “malicious prosecution” and “false swearing” and that he had a claim arising out of administrative decisions made by Centrelink in respect of claims made by him for a disability support pension. These latter claims had been the subject of previous litigation in this Court. These potential claims were not articulated or explained nor were they supported by any evidence or argument. They do not satisfy the statutory criteria specified in s 40(1)(g) of the Act. I shall not consider them further. The applicant did not develop to any meaningful degree the remaining contentions which I have summarised at [4(b)]–[4(d)] above. Ground 1 – Counter-claim, Set-off or Cross Demand In Glew v Harrowell (2003) 198 ALR 331 at [8]–[12] (pp 333–334), Lindgren J said:8In order to avoid committing the act of bankruptcy identified in para (g) of s 40(1) of the Act, Glew and Tresidder must satisfy the court that they have a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand against Hunts of the kind described in that paragraph. What they must do in order to “satisfy the Court” for the purposes of s 40(1)(g) of the Act that they have the asserted counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand has been variously described. The descriptions do not necessarily purport to be comprehensive definitions. To state that a debtor in receipt of a bankruptcy notice must show X does not necessarily imply that he or she need not also show Y, or that he or she will not be defeated if the creditor shows Z.9There are authorities suggesting that Glew and Tresidder must satisfy me of the following interrelated and sometimes overlapping matters:•that they have a “prima facie case”, even if they do not adduce evidence which would be admissible on a final hearing making out that case: Ebert v Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346 (Ebert) at 350; Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 433 at 438–9; 44 FLR 135 at 141 (Brink); Gomez v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [2002] FCAFC 101; BC200201643 at [17], [18];•that they have “a fair chance of success” or are “fairly entitled to litigate” the claim: Brink at ALR 438–9; FLR 141; Gould v Day [1999] FCA 1650; BC9907767 at [27], [28]; Re Capsanis; Capsanis v Owners — Strata Plan 11727 [2000] FCA 1262; BC200005275 at [11]; and•that they are advancing a “genuine” or “bona fide” claim: Re Capsanis; Capsanis v Owners — Strata Plan 11727 [2000] FCA 1262; BC200005275 at [11].It may be that the first and second formulations are intended to cover the same ground. In Brink Lockhart J treated (at ALR 438–9; FLR 141) the reference to a “prima facie case” in Ebert as a reference to “a fair chance of success”.10In Brink Lockhart J said (at ALR 438–9; FLR 141) that the court is not required to “undertake a preliminary trial of the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand”. But, clearly, the application of the criteria above requires the court to make some kind of preliminary assessment, though obviously not to determine the counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand finally. And in Guss v Johnstone (2000) 171 ALR 598, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ stated (at 606):[40]The state of satisfaction referred to in s 40(1)(g), and s 41(7), involves weighing up considerations as to the legal and factual merit of the claim relied upon by the debtor, and the justice of allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go ahead or requiring them to await the determination of the claim.11Plainly, in order to “satisfy” the court for the purposes of s 40(1)(g), the debtor is not required to prove, as on a final hearing, the asserted entitlement to recover from the creditor. Accordingly, evidence tendered on an application to set aside is to be tested for admissibility, not as if the proceeding were one in which the debtor's claim was being finally determined, but by reference to the question whether the court should be satisfied that the debtor has a claim deserving to be finally determined.12Perhaps little more can usefully be said than that a debtor must satisfy the court that there is sufficient substance to the counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand asserted to make it one which the debtor should, in justice, be permitted to have heard and determined in the usual way, rather than be forced to comply with the bankruptcy notice by payment or to commit an act of bankruptcy.