Crocker v Toys ‘R' Us (Australia) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1103

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 727
File number: QUD 643 of 2016
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 9 September 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal costs order – applicant bankrupt – proceedings under sequestration order previously stayed – whether bankrupt can bring application for extension of time and leave to appeal from costs order – relevant principles in applications for extension of time and leave to appeal – whether sufficient reason for delay – whether respondents would suffer prejudice if extension of time granted – party affected not named as respondent – prospects of success of the appeal – application dismissed
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 37, 58

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) Pt V

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.12(7)

Cases cited:

Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 588 related

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

De Robillard v Carver (2007) 159 FCR 38

Endresz v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2014] FCA 1139

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Date of hearing: 5 September 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Copyright and Industrial Designs
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First and Third Respondents: Mr NH Ferrett
Solicitor for the First and Third Respondents: Chrysiliou Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondents: The Second Respondents did not appear

ORDERS

QUD 643 of 2016
BETWEEN:

DEBRA ANN CROCKER

Applicant

AND:

TOYS R‘ US (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD’

First Respondent

BABY ZONE (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD

Second Respondent

THE BABY PROJECT PARTNERSHIP LIMITED LP

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 SEPTEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application for extension of time and leave to appeal filed on 18 August 2016 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLLIER J:

  1. This is an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal filed on 18 August 2016 from a decision of a Judge of this Court in Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 727 dated 11 June 2015.

    Background

  2. Some history to this application can be seen in the decision of the primary Judge in a related judgment, Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 588 which was also delivered on 11 June 2015. Relevantly, it appears from that judgment that:

    ·Ms Crocker claimed to have designed a device used to secure children’s car seats, prams, high chairs, swings and strollers. She had a registered business…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1103
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd involves an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal filed by Ms Crocker on 18 August 2016, stemming from a decision of a Judge of the Court dated 11 June 2015. Ms Crocker had previously filed proceedings against several respondents, including Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd, and Infa-Secure Pty Ltd, among others, in relation to alleged infringements of her intellectual property rights. The application in question is seeking relief from a costs order made in the primary proceedings. The legal issues before the Court revolve around whether Ms Crocker, who has since become bankrupt, is competent to bring the application, the principles guiding applications for extension of time and leave to appeal, and whether there is a sufficient reason for the delay in filing the application, the potential prejudice to the respondents if the extension is granted, and the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal.

The Court found that the application was incompetent as Ms Crocker, being bankrupt, could not bring the application without her trustee in bankruptcy. Even if this were not the case, the Court would have dismissed the application due to the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing, the potential prejudice to the respondents, and the lack of merit in the proposed grounds of appeal. The Court noted that Ms Crocker had been active in pursuing her claims in other proceedings since the primary judgment, which undermined her claim of health conditions as the reason for the delay. Furthermore, the Court found that the respondents would suffer prejudice if the extension was granted, and there was no merit in the proposed grounds of appeal. The Court also highlighted the principles relevant to applications for extension of time and leave to appeal, emphasizing the importance of the merits of the substantive application.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the application for extension of time and leave to appeal filed by Ms Crocker. The Court found that Ms Crocker was not competent to bring the application due to her bankruptcy, and even if this were not the case, the application would have been dismissed on the grounds of the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the potential prejudice to the respondents, and the lack of merit in the proposed grounds of appeal. The Court emphasized the importance of the principles guiding applications for extension of time and leave to appeal, and the need for the merits of the substantive application to be considered in deciding whether to exercise the Court's discretion in the applicant’s favour.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for extension of time and leave to appeal filed on 18 August 2016 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal filed on 18 August 2016 from a decision of a Judge of this Court in Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 727 dated 11 June 2015.Background Some history to this application can be seen in the decision of the primary Judge in a related judgment, Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 588 which was also delivered on 11 June 2015. Relevantly, it appears from that judgment that:·Ms Crocker claimed to have designed a device used to secure children’s car seats, prams, high chairs, swings and strollers. She had a registered business “Securap Child Accessories” in Queensland in 1991. She claimed to hold copyright in relation to the instructions for the use and marketing packaging in which the product was offered for sale. Finally Ms Crocker claimed that the respondents had variously infringed her registered trade mark, infringed her common law trade mark and infringed her copyright, by, inter alia, reverse engineering her invention.·In December 2010 Ms Crocker applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks for registration of a trade mark in respect of her product. The application was accepted by the Registrar of Trade Marks in December 2010. Opposition proceedings in question were commenced by Infa-Secure Pty Ltd under Pt V of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) on 21 June 2011.·On 8 November 2012, the Delegate of the Registrar upheld Infa-Secure Pty Ltd’s opposition to Ms Crocker’s application and refused to register her trade mark.·On 1 December 2014 Ms Crocker filed an originating application commencing proceedings against Infa-Secure Pty Ltd and the three respondents to this application.·On 30 December 2014, Ms Crocker discontinued the proceeding against Infa-Secure Pty Ltd. On 25 May 2015 Ms Crocker filed an application in the Federal Court in QUD 647/2014seeking the following relief:I am seeking leave of the court to address the following matter as a matter of urgency.I received this email from Chrysiliou Lawyers today as dated asking that I pay a sum of $40,942.22 being a bill of costs prepared allegedly for the discontinuance against Infa Secure Pty Ltd.I remind the court that this company was never served any document and discontinuance was filed prior to any attempt to serve any Infa Secure Pty Ltd company.I do not know if this is the right company of Infa Secure Pty Ltd that I intended to serve but could not locate as they are unable to be identified on the opposition notice to IP Australia and finally.This bill does not give me any information regarding what the costs are for and to whom I owe this money when the Infa Secure Pty Ltd opposing me in the Federal Court of Australia is not the company I intended serving as the opponent to my trademark application to IP Australia.Would the court, at its own discretion, please make orders in relation to this bill urgently and determine if this company has any lawful right to seek monies from me in relation to this proceeding or if they are in fact the wrong company seeking monies from me under fraudulent pretences to be the right company.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The fact remains that Ms Crocker commenced proceedings against Infa-Secure Pty Ltd, and subsequently discontinued them. Costs were incurred by Infa-Secure Pty Ltd during that time. Ms Crocker’s allegation of improper “exploitation” of that order by other parties simply makes no sense.Conclusion I am satisfied that the application for extension of time and leave to appeal before the Court is incompetent. In any event, the application for extension of time should be dismissed because of the absence of satisfactory explanation for lateness in filing, the prejudice to the respondents and Infa-Secure Pty Ltd should the Court be minded to grant the extension, and the lack of merit in the proposed grounds of appeal. At the hearing I raised with both parties the question of costs. Counsel for the respondents submitted that it was unlikely his clients could recover costs from Ms Crocker. The respondents sought no order as to costs in the circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I also note the observation of the Full Court in De Robillard v Carver (2007) 159 FCR 38 that:Subject to the outcome of the appeal the appellant became bankrupt upon the making of the sequestration order by the primary judge (see definition of ‘bankruptcy’ in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act, s 43(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and Cavanagh v Bank of New Zealand (1990) 22 FCR 124 at 128). Neither the filing of an appeal, nor a stay upon proceedings in relation to the sequestration order changed that circumstance.(Emphasis added.) In the circumstances it is clear that only Ms Crocker’s trustee in bankruptcy has power to litigate this matter, and that the application is incompetent: s 58 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).Relevant principles However even were this not the case I consider that it would be appropriate to dismiss the application currently before the Court. I take this view for the following reasons. In determining whether to grant an extension of time for leave to appeal, as explained in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 key questions for consideration by the Court are:·whether the applicant has provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in seeking leave to appeal;·whether the respondent would experience prejudice were an extension of time granted; and·whether the proposed grounds of appeal have merit. A comparison may be drawn with principles relevant to applications for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision, explained in Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 as:·whether in all the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and·whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong. Clearly in both types of application the merits of the substantive application constitute a crucial consideration for the Court in deciding whether the Court should exercise its discretion in the applicant’s favour. Turning to the application for extension of time, I do not consider that Ms Crocker’s explanation for her late filing of the application for leave is satisfactory. In essence, Ms Crocker attributes the lateness to the condition of her health, and stress she has experienced. While health conditions can, in appropriate cases, be the cause of a litigant failing to comply with a statutory deadline, as the respondents have correctly pointed out Ms Crocker has continued to pursue her claimed rights since the delivery of the primary judgment. So, for example, Mr Van Der Westhuizen gives evidence that:·Between 11 June 2015 and 15 May 2016 in QUD 647/2014 Ms Crocker has filed an amended statement of claim of 24 pages (on 29 April 2016), several affidavits (including one affidavit of 81 pages) and several interlocutory applications.·In the proceeding QUD 647/2014 until it was stayed, Ms Crocker appeared at every hearing or directions date, relevantly on 30 July 2015, 13 August 2015, 13 November 2015, 4 March 2016, 5 May 2016 and 19 May 2016.·Ms Crocker has been very active in QUD 9/2015, filing submissions, affidavits, two interlocutory applications, a defence and an amended defence between 11 June 2015 and 12 May 2016. Ms Crocker also appeared at every hearing or directions date in this proceeding, relevantly on 13 August 2015, 21 August 2015, 13 November 2015, 4 February 2016, 25 February 2016, 4 March 2016, 14 April 2016, 5 May 2016 and 19 May 2016.·Ms Crocker commenced action in proceeding QUD 865/2015 by filing an originating application and affidavit on 18 September 2015.·In proceeding QUD 345/2016 between 11 June 2015 and 5 August 2016 Ms Crocker has filed numerous affidavits, an interim application, several sets of submissions, a notice of opposition, an application for review and an interlocutory application.·Ms Crocker has appeared at every hearing and directions date in QUD 345/2016, relevantly on 6 July 2016, 22 July 2016 and 12 August 2016.·Since 11 June 2015 Ms Crocker has addressed in excess of 500 emails to his firm, many of substantial length.