CRL18 v Minister for Immigration

[2019] FCCA 2315

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CRL18 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 2315

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority’s findings were illogical and/ or irrational – whether the Authority failed to give real, genuine and proper consideration to relevant material – whether the Authority’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – no jurisdictional error made out – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5J, 36, 473CA, 473CB

Cases cited:

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZDMS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516
SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451
SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51

Applicant: CRL18

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

File Number: SYG 1447 of 2018

Judgment of: Judge Humphreys

Hearing date: 21 August 2019

Date of Last Submission: 21 August 2019

Delivered at: Parramatta

Delivered on: 21 August 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr McDonald-Norman

Solicitors for the Applicant: Westside Legal

Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Johnson

Solicitors for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

(1)The name of the first respondent be changed to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs.

(2)The application is dismissed.

(3)The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $6000.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PARRAMATTA

SYG 1447 of 2018

CRL18

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

(Revised from Transcript)

Introduction

1.The applicant is a citizen of Lebanon and he is a Sunni Muslim. The applicant left Lebanon in May 2013 as he claimed Hezbollah came to his family home looking for him. The applicant legally left from Beirut International Airport using his own passport.

2.On 22 September 2016, the applicant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. On 6 July 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused the visa application. The applicant was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘the Authority”) for merits review. In a decision dated 23 April 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision. The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Authority’s decision in this Court.

The Authority’s Decision

3.At paragraph 2, the Authority notes it has had regard to the information that was provided to it by the Secretary under the provisions of s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). On 1 August 2017, the applicant provided to the Authority a submission and a new statement. The submission refers, in part, to evidence that was before the delegate, aspects of the protection visa interview and the delegate’s decision. The Authority considered this not to be new information and had regard to it.

4.Paragraphs 5 to 9 of the Authority’s decision deals with the new information in the submission provided by the applicant that was not originally before the delegate. The Authority concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify considering that new information.

5.Paragraphs 10 to 19 of the Authority’s decision, deal with new information contained within the applicant’s statutory declaration or statement. The Authority concluded that the information was not credible and that there were not exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new claims raised within that material.

6.Paragraph 20 of the Authority’s decision notes that the applicant requested a second interview. The Authority noted its review is a “fast-track” review and should proceed generally on the papers without accepting or requesting new information or interviewing the applicant (see s 473CA and s 473CB of the Act).The Authority was not satisfied that an interview was required or necessary.

7.Paragraph 21 of the Authority’s decision sets out the applicant’s claims. They may be summarised as follows:

·    He is a citizen of Lebanon and is a Sunni Muslim born in 1981.

·    He moved to Beirut in 2008 and worked as a chef in two different hotels.

·    In 2012 he was expelled from the last hotel he was employed at because he was Sunni.

·    He started a charcoal shop in 2012 with his family.

·    Hezbollah found out he was a Sunni. They raided the shop, took goods and told him not to come back to the area. Police were called but did nothing.

·    The applicant went to see his landlord of the shop. The landlord slapped the applicant in the face and accused him of opening the shop to spy on the Hezbollah.

·    The applicant went back to his family’s home area, which is near the Syrian border.

·    After he returned, unidentified people came to the family home looking for him.

·    He left Lebanon in May 2013 legally by air from the Beirut International Airport.

8.At paragraph 22, the Authority accepted the applicant’s identity, that he is a Sunni Muslim and a citizen of Lebanon. At paragraph 23, the Authority noted that the applicant’s claim of being expelled from his last job as a chef for sectarian reasons was at odds with his arrival interview where he said he was retrenched after another company took over the management of the hotel.

9.Paragraphs 23 to 33 of the Authority’s decision deal with a number of factual findings. At paragraph 26, the Authority noted inconsistencies between the applicant’s evidence and that of his brother M which it considered were not minor and had caused doubts as to the credibility of the applicant’s claims. At paragraph 27, the Authority found evidence of what had happened to his family since leaving Lebanon difficult to believe. In particular, the Authority had issues with a claim that his father was assaulted during an attack on the shop as it was vague, unconvincing and inconsistent.

10.At paragraph 29, the Authority found the applicant’s claims unsupported by country information that was available, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) reports. In particular, country information indicated that Hezbollah controls the Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport. The Authority found that the applicant’s claims to have left via this facility using his passport and that he did not come to the attention of Hezbollah upon departure difficult.

11.At paragraph 31 of the Authority’s decision, the Authority rejects claims that the applicant’s cousin was kidnapped. At paragraph 32, the Authority rejects claims about a wife still in Lebanon and is not even satisfied that the applicant has remained married to her. The Authority also made reference to claims about a wife in Singapore, whom the applicant claimed to have married in 2016. At paragraph 33, the Authority found that if returned, the applicant will go to Kabit where his family are from.

12.At paragraph 36, the Authority summarised its findings. The Authority did not accept that the applicant was asked to join Hezbollah or that he was targeted or attacked by them. The Authority did not accept the applicant has been or is currently of adverse interest to Hezbollah and that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon if he was returned.

13.Paragraphs 37 to 41 of the Authority’s decision deals with risks associated with a return to Kabit. The Authority accepts that the applicant may struggle to find work but was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real chance of significant economic hardship or be denied the chance to earn a living or otherwise suffer serious harm for the reasons stipulated in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act and thus the requirements of s 36(2)(a) of the Act were not met. Paragraphs 42 to 47 of the Authority’s decision deal with the complementary protection considerations. For similar reasons, the Authority found no grounds under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act are met and there was no real risk of harm if the applicant were returned to Lebanon.

Grounds of Appeal

14.The grounds of appeal are set out in an amended application filed on 24 July 2019. To the extent that leave was required to rely upon them, such leave was granted. The grounds are set out as follows as they appeared in the application:

1(a) In the decision, the second respondent, the Authority, materially relied upon findings of fact and/or reasonings which were irrational, illogical and/or

b) failed to give a real and genuine proper consideration to the relevant material.

Particulars:

(a) The Authority did not accept the applicant and his family had been pressured to join Hezbollah, that they were threatened or that money was demanded from them, or that their shop was attacked.

(b)     The adverse credibility finding was material to the Authority’s conclusion that the applicant did not face a real chance of persecution or a real risk of significant harm if removed to Lebanon.

(c) In reaching the adverse credibility finding, the Authority relied materially upon premises which included the following:

(i) the premise of the applicant’s evidence was internally inconsistent in respect of when the attack on the shop occurred in that he had claimed that:

(1) he opened the shop in 2012;

(2) his shop had been attacked in March/April 2013, and

(3) “during his Protection visa interview, he claimed the attack        occurred several months after they opened the shop which would have been in 2012” (timing premise).

(ii)     the premise that the applicant and his brother M had given inconsistent evidence as to whether their brother A had been attacked after the attack on the shop in Lebanon (subsequent attacks premise);

(iii)    the premise that the applicant and his brother M had given inconsistent accounts of whether they had family between Tripoli and Akkar (the Tripoli family premise), and

(iv)    the premise that the applicant’s brother M claimed that his father had not experienced issues after the applicant and M had left Lebanon was not credible because the claim that the attackers were “mainly trying to attack the sons because they were younger” was inconsistent with their “claim that his father was assaulted during the attack in the shop” (the targeting of the father premise).

(d)     In reaching the timing premise,

(i) the reasoning of the Authority was irrational and/or illogical, in that there was no logical basis on which to assert that an attack ‘several months’ after the applicant opened his shop would have been in 2012, not 2013.

(ii)     The Authority failed to give real, genuine and proper consideration to the applicant’s evidence. He had opened the shop in 2012 and hence there was no contradiction in stating that the shop had been attacked “several months” later in March/April 2013.

(e)     In reaching the subsequent attacks premise,

(i) the reasoning of the Authority was irrational or illogical and the evidence of the applicant was not capable of supporting a finding that the applicant and M had given inconsistent accounts as to whether A had been attacked after the attack on the shop;

(ii) the Authority failed to give real, genuine and proper consideration to the applicant’s evidence in that such evidence did not support a finding that the applicant and M had given an inconsistent account as to whether A had been attacked after the attack on their shop.

(f)     In reaching the Tripoli family premise:

(i) The reasoning of the Authority was irrational or illogical in that

(1) the applicant restricted his answers to whether he had family “in” Tripoli not “around” Tripoli; and/or

(2) the applicant’s answers were inconsistent with having family in “an area between Tripoli and Akkar; and/or

(ii) the Authority failed to give a real, genuine and proper consideration to the applicant’s evidence in that such evidence did not support the finding that there was a material inconsistency between the applicant and “M”.

(g)     In reaching the targeting of a father premise, the reasoning of the Authority is irrational and/or illogical, in that:

(i) The attack on the father had occurred in the course of an attack on the applicant and his brothers.

(ii)     There was hence no inconsistency between the attack and the claim. The attackers were “mainly trying to attack their sons”.

(h)     In the premises, the Timing Premise, the Subsequent Attacks Premises, the Tripoli Family Premise and/or the Targeting of the Father Premise were not open to the Authority.

(i)     In reaching the adverse credibility finding:

(i) the Authority relied upon a series of adverse findings, including but not limited to the timing premise, the subsequent attacks premise, the Tripoli family premise and the targeting the father premise;

(ii)     no single finding was relied upon by the Authority in reaching the adverse credibility finding, and

(iii)    the Authority hence relied upon intermingled findings or premises in reaching the adverse credibility finding, see CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46 at 61.

(j) The Authority’s adverse findings other than the timing premise, the subsequent attacks premise, the Tripoli family premise and/or the targeting of the father premise cannot be inferred to have provided the sufficient or independent basis in their own right to support the adverse credibility finding, see ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 at [74] and CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs. In the premises, the decision was affected by jurisdictional error.

The Applicant’s Submissions

15.The applicant submitted that the Authority reached an adverse credibility finding at paragraphs 26 to 29 but none was dispositive, that is, individually capable of supporting the adverse credibility finding. The four matters were considered by the Authority and were described as follows: the timing premise, the subsequent attacks premise, the Tripoli family premise and the targeting the father premise. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the above premises were intermingled and are flawed as regards to the adverse credibility finding.

The Timing Premise

16.This presumes an attack several months after the applicant and his family opened the charcoal shop. The Authority asserts that the applicant has not provided an internally consistent account of when the attack occurred. At paragraph 28, the Authority noted the applicant claimed in his protection interview that he opened the shop in 2012 and the attack occurred a few months later. At the applicant’s arrival interview, the applicant stated that the attack occurred in March or April 2013. The Authority concluded that “a few months later” meant that the attack would have occurred in 2012.

17.The applicant submitted that it is illogical and irrational to conclude that a shop opened in September 2012 and that the attack must have occurred in 2012 being “a few months later” and not in March or April of 2013. Counsel submitted the finding was underpinned by an unwarranted and incorrect assumption that may be characterised as illogical, irrational or not founded on any probative evidence and relied on DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175. Second, the reasoning process was indicative of a failure to give a real, genuine and proper consideration to the material before the Authority, given it made reference to the opening of a shop in September 2012 at paragraph 21.

18.Finally, it was submitted by the applicant that this finding was evidence of a failure to give an active intellectual consideration of the evidence or was an unwarranted assumption (see SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451).

Subsequent Attacks Premise

19.This assumes the existence of an inconsistency between the evidence of the applicant and his brother M about whether his other brother, A, had been attacked after the attack on the charcoal shop. In interview, the applicant was asked if A had encountered problems since the attack at the charcoal shop. The applicant answered:

He had – not all the time, but yes, he did.

When asked what problems, he said:

Too many, like, in, he cannot go into Beirut.

20.Counsel for the applicant says that it is first irrational or illogical, based on the above answers, to rule out the possibility that A had been attacked in the manner described by M. It was submitted that the finding of divergent accounts supports an adverse credit finding was not open on the evidence. Secondly, it was submitted that the reason is again indicative of a failure to give a real, genuine and proper consideration to the matter.

21.This presumes the existence of an inconsistency between M’s evidence, that:

After the attack, his family moved to an area between Tripoli and Aceh to stay with family.

And that of the applicant that:

They did not have family around Tripoli.

22.Counsel for the applicant pointed to the following in the transcript of the applicant’s interview.

Question:

Do you have family near Tripoli?

Answer:

Do I have family in?

Question:

Or around Tripoli.

Answer:

In Tripoli? No, no, no.

23.It was submitted that it is illogical and irrational to conclude that the answer is at odds with the evidence of M and A. The applicant restricted his answer to, “In Tripoli,” and this cannot be taken as negative to “around Tripoli.” Second, the reasoning process indicates that the Authority failed to give a real, genuine and proper consideration to the evidence that was before it.

The Targeting of the Father Premise

24.This presumes the existence of an inconsistency between the claim that:

(The brother’s attackers) are mainly trying to attack the sons because they are younger compared to [their] father and [their] father does not show up and appear in front of these groups most of the time.

And the claim that:

[Their] father was assaulted during the attack on the shop.

25.It was submitted by the applicant that the reasoning that this is an inconsistency is irrational or illogical. There is no contradiction in that while the attack may have primarily targeted the sons, it does not exclude the possibility that the father was also attacked. Counsel for the applicant noted that each of the above premises formed part, but not all, of the conclusion made by the Authority that:

There are a number of inconsistencies

26.That led to the adverse credit finding. It is submitted that none of itself is dispositive. They were material both individually and cumulatively to the exercise of power. None can easily be severed from the others. It was submitted that the test for materiality is not high. An error will be material to the exercise of power if there is a realistic possibility that had the error not occurred, it would have changed the exercise of power (see Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34).

The First Respondent’s Submissions

The Timing Premise

27.The first respondent was open to the fact that there may have been no inconsistency between the accounts given by the applicant and M. However, it was noted that the use of the word “few” was the applicant’s use of words rather than “several” which is recorded in the Authority’s decision.

28.Counsel for the first respondent said that it was open to the Authority to conclude that based on the use of the word “few,” this would have meant that the attack would have occurred in 2012 rather than in March or April of 2013, which in fact was six months later. It was submitted, however, that even if there was a factual error, it does not of itself undermine the Authority’s ultimate conclusion and that the rejection of the claim did not hinge upon this inconsistency.

The Subsequent Attacks Premise

29.At paragraph 26, M claimed that agents, and I assume they are from Hezbollah, clashed with A a further five times after the attack on the shop. However, when the delegate asked A, he gave a relatively vague response, saying he experienced many problems, including that he cannot go into Beirut and did not refer to the specific incidents raised by M.

30.The first respondent submits that one would have expected the applicant to have relayed some detailed account of the attacks M said that he had suffered. In these circumstances, the Authority’s findings, when open to it, were not illogical, irrational and further, that they were given proper and realistic consideration. It was submitted that the Authority did not fail to give proper consideration to the material that was before it.

The Tripoli Family Premise

31.This issue relates to M’s statement and A’s statement. It was conceded that the applicant confirmed that he had no family “in Tripoli” despite having been asked if he had family “around Tripoli.” M confirmed he had family around Tripoli. In the context of the interview, it was submitted it was not unreasonable to interpret the statement “in Tripoli, no, no, no” as being negative to the question that was asked of family “around Tripoli.”

32.It was submitted by the first respondent that it was open to the Authority to interpret the answer in the way that it did and that it was not irrational, illogical or unreasonable to have done so and further that the matter was given proper consideration by the Authority.

Targeting of the Father Premise

33.Counsel for the first respondent submitted that it was open to the Authority to find inconsistent the applicant’s claim that the attack upon his shop, at which the father was present and seriously injured and M’s evidence that it was mainly the sons being targeted. The Authority found M’s explanation vague and unconvincing. It was up to the Authority to examine M’s statement:

I’ve seen my dad being assaulted in front of my eyes.

And the applicant’s statement and the claim that:

They shot at the shop and everywhere. We were inside but my father at that time stand in front of them and they start to hit, and just to protect us at that time.

It was submitted the evidence was at least capable of being found to be inconsistent with M’s statement at interview:

My father is an old person and he doesn’t appear very much in front of them.

34.Counsel on for the first respondent submitted it was open to find the accounts are inconsistent. The Authority did not fail to give proper consideration and that the conclusions that were made were not unreasonable, illogical or irrational. It was finally submitted that it was not a permissible to assert jurisdictional error on the basis that one or even all of the impugned findings culminating in the conclusion at paragraph 30 was illogical or irrational or otherwise affected by error.

35.Reliance was placed on the judgment of Wigney J in SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51 at paragraph [64]:

Whilst the inquiry may not be limited to the question of whether the end result is irrational or illogical, it does not follow the ultimate decision will be found to have been affected by jurisdictional error. If it can be shown that any finding made or any reasoning employed by the decision-maker on the way to that ultimate decision may have been illogical or irrational, if the impugned finding or reasoning was immaterial to the ultimate decision, it’s difficult to see how the decision could be said to be affected by jurisdictional error. Compare with SZRKT at [158] and SZOCT per Nicholas J at [83] to [84].

His Honour then goes on to say:

Likewise, if the ultimate decision was supported by other findings that were open on the evidence and the other reasoning that was logical and rational, there may be no proper basis for concluding that the ultimate decision was so infected by the impugned finding or reasoning as to involve jurisdictional error.

36.There is also reliance on Wigney J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 at paragraphs [52] to [55]. I quote here from paragraph 55:

The overarching question as to whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error: SZRKT at [151]. Even if an aspect of reasoning or a particular factual finding is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical, to the ultimate conclusion or end result: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 57.

37.Counsel for the first respondent submitted that there may be one finding that may not be supportable, but the ultimate decision will not be so infected as to constitute jurisdictional error. It was noted at paragraph 29 that country information did not support the applicant’s claims as to the ease by which he had left Lebanon, given his claims of being of adverse interest to Hezbollah. There were also other adverse credit findings that I have referred to, in particular the finding that the applicant had fabricated the claim that he had been retrenched from the hotel where he was last employed for sectarian reasons, when in fact he had also said it was because another company had taken over the hotel. There were also adverse credit findings in relation to the relationship he had with his wife, purportedly in Lebanon and a woman in Singapore.

38.The fact that the Authorities findings were intermingled, it was submitted by the first respondent, was not critical. It was submitted by the first respondent that even if there is an error in relation to one of the matters, and in this case it may well be the attack targeting of the father premise, this was not sufficient to impugn the ultimate conclusion.

Consideration

39.CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496 at paragraphs 36 to 34, it was stated that adverse credit findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as:

a)   Failure to afford procedural fairness.

b)   Reaching a finding without a logical or probative basis

c)    Unreasonableness: and/ or

d)   Jurisdictional error as discussed by Flick J in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015)233 FCR 451

40.Insufficient for a conclusion to be illogical or irrational, if different minds might reach different conclusions on a reasoning process and the conclusions then to be drawn (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZDMS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 131.

41.Bearing in mind these principles, I now turn to the four premises which the first respondent takes issue with.

The Timing Premise

42.This revolves around the use of the word “several” and/or “few”. I am of the view that it was open to the Authority to conclude that the use of the word “a few” as compared – or even the use of the word “several” meant that the attack would have occurred in 2012, rather than March or April in 2013, bearing in mind that was some six months after the attack. The word used by the applicant was “a few”. To my mind, that is less, much less than six months. Even if this is a wrong conclusion on my part, I am not convinced that it was dispositive of the applicant’s claims.

The Subsequent Attacks Premise

43.I accept the first respondent’s submissions that it was open to the Authority that the applicant’s brother A had been attacked in the manner described by his brother M. One might have expected, however, that the applicant would be able to give more detail that he experienced many problems and could not go into Beirut. I am satisfied that the adverse credit conclusion was not to a level that would amount to extreme illogicality or irrationality and, indeed, it was reasonably open to the Authority. Even if it is a mistake of fact, again, it was not, of itself, dispositive of the applicant’s claim.

The Tripoli Family Premise

44.This concerns the issue of the applicant having family either in or around Tripoli. The applicant confirmed he had no family in Tripoli. I do not consider the interpretation that the answer the applicant gave to the question, “Or around Tripoli?” with the answer being “In Tripoli, no, no, no”, as being firmly that he had no family around Tripoli. Again, I do not see the reasoning of the Authority, in arriving at the conclusion that it did, as being extreme illogical or irrational. Even if the conclusion the Authority came to was a mistake of fact. I do not believe even if this was a mistake of fact, that it was dispositive of the applicant’s claims.

The Targeting of the Father Premise

45.I accept that the evidence of the applicant does not exclude the possibility that the father was also attacked. The words “he does not show up and appear in front of the group most of the time”, in my view, is capable of being interpreted that the father was attacked once when compared to the other available evidence which includes, “But my father at the time stand in front of them and they start to hit” and “I’ve seen my dad being assaulted in front of my eyes”. I am of the view that the evidence is capable of being interpreted that, in fact, the father was attacked on one occasion when he stood in front of the group and protected his sons and the shop.

46.In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that the applicant claimed they were targeted on five occasions. I am not convinced that the findings, although they are not to my mind, factually correct, reach the stage of being irrational or illogical. I am mindful that a finding of fact, that is in fact wrong, does not of itself mean that the ultimate conclusion is irrational or illogical or did not involve a proper consideration of the material before it.

47.There were other adverse findings of fact. The Authority expressed considerable doubt as to the applicant’s evidence he had a wife in Lebanon and a woman he married in Singapore in 2016 as per paragraph 32 of the Authority’s decision. The Authority noted the inconsistency in evidence regarding the reasons why he left his job as a chef. The applicant said in his protection interview it was for sectarian reasons. In the applicant’s arrival interview, he said he was retrenched due to another company taking over the hotel as per paragraph 23 of the Authority’s decision. The Authority had issues in relation to, and I emphasise, the totality of the applicant’s claims given he confirmed he left legally on his passport via the Beirut International Airport which was confirmed in country information, was controlled by Hezbollah. Again, given the fact that the applicant had said that he was of adverse interest to Hezbollah, I again find that it was open to the Authority to draw an adverse credit finding in relation to that unchallenged statement.

Conclusion

48.While the findings of the Authority were intermingled, I am not satisfied that the issue that I identified as being an error, that being the targeting of the father premise, was dispositive of the applicant’s claim. I am satisfied that the three other findings that were challenged were reasonably open to the Authority and that the conclusions were not of such irrationality or illogicality to meet the definition of being extreme. I am not satisfied that the factual error identified, brings the whole of the Authority’s decision into disrepute as being of extreme illogicality or irrationality and that the Authority did not properly understand or give weight to the evidence that was before it.

49.Accordingly I find no jurisdictional error in the Authority’s decision and I dismiss the application.

I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Humphreys

Deputy Associate: 

Date:  15 October 2019