Crawley v Vero Insurance Ltd
[2012] NSWSC 593
•14 June 2012
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: CRAWLEY v VERO INSURANCE LTD & ORS [2012] NSWSC 593 Hearing dates: 1 June 2012 Decision date: 14 June 2012 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: BEECH-JONES J Decision: (1) Pursuant to rule 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, that the following question be decided separately after the trial of all other issues in the proceedings, namely: "what amount, if any, of the items specified in sub-paragraphs 10(t) and 10(u) of the Amended Statement of Claim can the plaintiff or the cross-claimant recover?"
(2) The defendant's notice of motion filed 26 March 2012 be otherwise dismissed.
(3) The matter be listed for further directions on 12 July 2012 at 9.30am before me.
(4) Any party seeking a different form of cost order to that foreshadowed in [44] of this judgment, to file and serve written submissions not exceeding two pages on or before 23 June 2012.
(5) Any reply to any written submissions referred to in order (4) to not exceed two pages and to be filed and served on or before 1 July 2012.
Catchwords: Procedure - separate question Legislation Cited: Legal Profession Act 2004
Civil Procedure Act s 56
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
rule 28.2Cases Cited: Bailey v Director-General, Department of Energy Climate Change and Water [2010] NSWSC 979
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clune [2008] NSWSC 1125
Crawley v Short [2009] NSWCA 410
(2009) 262 ALR 654
Crawley v Short (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 97
Short v Crawley (No 30) [2007] NSWSC 1322
Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215;
Intergral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1464
Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372
Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 697
Tepko Pty Ltd v The Water Board [2001] HCA 19; (2001) 206 CLR 1
Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 66Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Christopher William Crawley (Plaintiff)
Vero Insurance Ltd (Defendant)Representation: Mr MLD Einfeld QC with Mr AC Harding (Plaintiff)
Mr DL Williams SC with Ms LW Chan (Defendant)
Bruce Stewart Dimarco Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Colin Biggers & Paisley (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2010/397627
Judgment
In these proceedings, the plaintiff sues to enforce his rights of indemnity under an insurance policy providing professional indemnity cover in respect of his practice as a solicitor. By a notice of motion filed on 26 March 2012 the defendants seek an order pursuant to rule 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 to the effect that all issues as to liability be determined separately from, and in advance of, all issues as to quantum.
Background
The plaintiff is a solicitor who carried on practice as the principal of Aubrey F Crawley & Co. In his Amended Statement of Claim ("ASOC"), he pleads that for the period 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 the first to fifth defendants along with HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd ("HIH") and FAI General Insurance Company Ltd ("FAI") were the insurers under a policy of insurance issued to him "in respect of any civil liability whatsoever incurred in connection 'with his legal practice'". He further pleads by the operation of certain provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2004 the sixth defendant, LawCover, was liable to meet FAI and HIH's obligations. For ease of reference I will refer to the policy as the LawCover policy and the defendants collectively as "LawCover".
On 16 June 1998 proceedings were commenced against the plaintiff and others by Warwick Short and Nabatu Pty Ltd (the "claimants") in the Equity Division of this court (the "Equity Division proceedings"). At least some of the claims made against the plaintiff in those proceedings included allegations of what was said to be oppressive conduct by him and others in the conduct of the affairs of J & J O'Brien Pty Ltd and Marsico Pty Ltd.
The hearing of at least the first part of the Equity Division proceedings occupied in excess of 3 months. On 26 November 2007 White J published a 1330 paragraph judgment (Short v Crawley (No 30) [2007] NSWSC 1322). The claimants achieved a great deal of success against the plaintiff in these proceedings. There were a number of further hearings that followed which addressed, amongst other matters, the form of relief and the valuation of certain shares that were the subject of an order for transfer. The matter went on appeal on a number of issues: (Crawley v Short [2009] NSWCA 410; (2009) 262 ALR 654; Crawley v Short (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 97).
Some time around the time of the commencement of the Equity Division proceedings, the plaintiff notified LawCover and sought indemnity under the LawCover policy. The parties entered into a deed which provided for the payment of a portion of the plaintiff's costs of those proceedings by LawCover. LawCover contends that it paid all of his costs. LawCover also contends that the terms of the deed were such that it reserved its right to argue that the claim(s) made in the Equity Division proceedings were not covered by the LawCover policy and to otherwise deny indemnity on the basis of various exclusions. Whether the deed operated in that manner is not an issue I have to determine at this point.
The Pleadings
Paragraph 9 of the ASOC identifies what the plaintiff asserts were twenty-five "claims" made against him in connection with his legal practice by the claimant in the Equity Division proceedings. The particulars to that paragraph cross refer to paragraphs of the claimant's pleading. It seems that there is an advantage to the plaintiff if he can characterise the allegations made against him as involving more than one "claim" in that LawCover pleads that the policy limit was $1.5 million for each and every "claim".
Paragraph 10 of the ASOC pleads that the outcome of the proceedings was, amongst other things, that the plaintiff was ordered to pay the claimants various amounts. They are defined as the "Amounts Payable". Twenty-one amounts are identified. The first nineteen of those are pleaded in sub-paragraphs 10(a) to (s) of the ASOC. Each of those sub-paragraphs particularises a specific sum and then cross refers to a particular order or orders made in the Equity Division proceedings. I understand that these nineteen amounts are said by the plaintiff to correspond with nineteen of the twenty-five "claims" pleaded in paragraph 9 of the ASOC.
Sub-paragraphs 10(t) and (u) of the ASOC plead:-
"By reason of the claims made and the judgment delivered on 26 November 2007 in the [Equity division proceedings], the plaintiff became liable to pay the following:-
..........
(t)Certain portions of the claimant's legal costs and disbursements pursuant to orders made in the proceedings;
[particulars omitted]
(u)Amounts on account of legal costs and disbursements incurred by the plaintiff in the proceedings."
At the hearing of the motion I was advised that the claimant's legal costs and disbursements have not yet been assessed but that one side or another has nominated a figure of approximately $8 million. The particulars to sub-paragraph 10(u) break the costs paid or payable by the plaintiff into four time periods covering the period of the Equity division proceedings.
In the ASOC the plaintiff claims indemnity from LawCover for the Amounts Payable up to an amount of $1.5m in respect of each "claim". In the alternative, he pleads that LawCover is estopped from denying indemnity and that, if LawCover is correct in contending the LawCover policy does not respond, that it has engaged in misleading conduct. There is also a cause of action pleaded in respect of the Solicitors' Mutual Indemnity Fund which I need not discuss.
In its defence LawCover denies that all but two of the Amounts Payable arose out of the plaintiff's practice as a solicitor and deny that any of them fell within the insuring clause for a variety of reasons. It does not admit that there was more than one claim made against the plaintiff within the meaning of the LawCover policy. Further it pleads that the entirety of the plaintiff's claim for indemnity fails by the operation of either an exclusion for dishonest acts and omissions or that the Amounts Payable in substance constitute a recovery of money charged as fees and disbursements or both. The estoppels and misrepresentation claims are denied.
LawCover has also filed a cross-claim seeking recovery of the amounts it paid for the plaintiff's costs of defending the Equity Division proceedings.
Separate question - Principles
Pursuant to rule 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules the Court may order the separate determination of any question at any stage of the proceedings. Rule 28.2 provides:
"The court may make orders for the decision of any question separately from any other question, whether before, at or after any trial or further trial in the proceedings."
Rule 28.1 defines a "question" as follows:
"In this Part, question includes any question or issue in any proceedings, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise."
The parties referred me to a number of decisions which identified the relevant principles governing the exercise of the power conferred by rule 28.2 including Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215; Bailey v Director-General, Department of Energy Climate Change and Water [2010] NSWSC 979 and Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372. I do not propose to recite those principles. I gratefully adopt the distillation of them provided by Hallen AsJ in Southwell at [15]. I make five further points.
First it is trite to observe that the power conferred by rule 28.2 is to be exercised by reference to the overriding purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 "to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the dispute or proceedings" (s 56). One aspect of that command which my analysis below seeks to emphasise is the desirability of the proceedings being "cheap". I am under no illusion that these proceedings will be anything other than expensive for the parties, but that is not an excuse to let considerations of cost fall away. The system of litigation in this State expects that counsel appearing will be across all issues in the case and that the legal representatives will marshall all relevant evidence concerning those issues. Experience demonstrates that those steps in turn require a much larger body of material to be considered. All of this effort involves cost. Sometimes it is rendered futile because the focus of all this attention is rendered otiose by the Courts' determination of some other issue.
Second, an interlocutory order for the separate determination of issues is an exceptional measure, distinct from the ordinary course taken of determining the issues in their totality: Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 697 at [5]. Consequently, the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of the order, but it may be appropriate for the judge to take a more "interventionist role" in crafting the precise scope of the question: Intergral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1464 per Brereton J at [6]; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Clune [2008] NSWSC 1125. The counter to the observations in [16] is that sometimes issues are separated in the expectation that their resolution will determine the balance of the proceedings but that proves illusory. On other occasions a matter determinative of, and fatal to, the proceedings is decided but then appealed and overturned with the outcome that the parties find themselves back in the same position they were prior to a trial but with years having passed. Kirby and Callinan JJ noted in Tepko Pty Ltd v The Water Board [2001] HCA 19; (2001) 206 CLR 1 at [168] that the benefits of a separate question order "are often more chimerical than real. Common experience demonstrates that savings in time and expense are often illusory..." .
Third, one real problem with ordering separate hearings is the potential for credibility findings to be made in one hearing in respect of a witness who may have to give evidence at the second hearing. This can create significant difficulties including, but not restricted to, the potential for the trial judge to disqualify themselves (see Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 66 at [10] to [14] per Harrison J).
Fourth, the power conferred by rule 28.2 is not one that enables the severing of "issues" but instead the isolation of "questions". The question needs to be identified with precision. One advantage of doing that in advance of hearing a motion such as this one is that the various considerations for and against exercising the power can be considered against the precise question that is proposed to be determined separately. Many of the cases involving applications of this kind involve attempts to undertake a Solomon style severing of all issues of liability and quantum without any precise identification of what the "question" to be determined separately is. For the reasons discussed below I reject that approach here although I consider it appropriate to sever a relatively narrow question of quantum which might occupy a disproportionately large portion of the litigation battlefield.
Fifth, one aspect of rule 28.2 that is not discussed in many of the cases is that it includes the power to order a question be decided after all other issues in the proceedings. Many of the cases where severance is sought involve an attempt to isolate some preliminary question which one of the parties hopes will give them a Hail Mary pass to the end zone of success. This approach runs the risk of promoting delay because of the potential for appeals from any adverse preliminary determination and the difficulties in isolating some discrete facts that enable the preliminary question to be resolved without overlapping with the balance of the proceedings. These adverse consequences are less likely where the separate question is relatively narrow and will be decided after all other issues in the proceedings. In addition it is always to be borne in mind that an order under rule 28.2 can be revoked if appropriate (see Warragamba). Thus if it appears to a trial judge who is completely cognisant of all the issues and the material that a hearing of the separate question is not warranted they may revoke it or, if appropriate, hear and determine it immediately. There is far less scope to change course for a trial judge who embarks upon a hearing of a question posed prior to the hearing of all other issues in the proceedings.
Separate question - Consideration
The arguments for and against making an order separating "quantum" from "liability" turned upon the potential difficulties that it was said by LawCover will arise if the Court's determination of the issues raised by the pleadings requires any apportionment of the Amounts Payable. Mr Williams SC for LawCover contends that, because of the numerous permutations that may result from any conclusion that the Court may come to in respect of each such amount, then the task of preparing and then submitting on the potential application of those permutations in advance was likely to lead to a significant waste of time and resources either because the claim may wholly fail or the Court may determine that apportionment is warranted but on a different basis to that submitted upon. Mr Einfeld QC for the plaintiff contends that it is too early to make any such assessment and it would unduly limit the flexibility of the trial judge in managing the hearing to make such an order now.
These competing positions are best considered by addressing the twenty-one liabilities pleaded in paragraph 10 of the ASOC. It is convenient to consider them in two groups. The first group is the nineteen fixed monetary liabilities of the plaintiff pleaded in sub-paragraphs 10(a)-(s) of the ASOC. As I have stated, those liabilities are said to flow from particular orders made in the Equity Division proceedings which in turn are said to be referable to various pleaded allegations.
For each of these liabilities a number of issues will arise which include but are not restricted to: (i) whether they arise out of a "claim" that has a sufficient connection with the plaintiff's legal practice?; (ii) are they otherwise covered by the insuring clause?; (iii)does the liability arise in respect of one "claim" or only when considered with one or more of the other liabilities pleaded in paragraph 10?; and (iv) is cover excluded by the operation of the various exclusion clauses?
Leaving aside the exclusion clauses, I would expect of that most of these issues will fall to be considered by construing the LawCover policy and then considering the pleadings in the Equity Division proceedings and such other material which may mould or assist in identifying a "claim" (which may include the various judgments) so as to enable the allegation to be characterised, its connection to the plaintiff's legal practice to be ascertained and the amount payable in respect of it to be considered against the terms of the LawCover policy. The litigation of the exemption clauses would require a hearing of a number of matters of fact de novo.
The suggested difficulty with these liabilities which is said to warrant an order for a separate question was the potential that might arise, mostly on LawCover's case, for an apportionment of some or all of the Amounts Payable between that part which might be found to be covered by the LawCover policy (and not excluded) and so much that might not. For each of these monetary amounts the outcome may be that they are either wholly covered, not covered, or wholly excluded, or that only parts of each head are covered. It was argued that, unless and until it was known what that the basis for any partial allowance was, then the parties would be hampered in the preparation of the hearing and the making of submissions which would enable the Court to move from a partial allowance for each amount to fixing a dollar amount. Thus, for example, it may be that the trial judge might find that only some part of the amounts pleaded in sub-paragraph 10(a) ($11,000,088.95) was referable to the plaintiff's practice as a solicitor and/or that some part of another amount was excluded in that it, in substance, represented the recovery of amounts paid to the plaintiff for fees and disbursements.
I do not consider that this concern warrants an order at this point providing for the hearing of any separate questions in respect of sub-paragraphs 10(a)-(s) of the ASOC. It is not apparent to me that there is a real likelihood of a necessity to sub-divide or apportion the amounts to be paid under these heads. Even if there was, I do not see any advantage in ordering a separate hearing on what amounts, if any, the plaintiff could recover in respect of these liabilities. Such an order might frustrate the trial judge's ability to apply their conclusions about the construction of the policy and the characterisation of the "claims" and the plaintiff's liability.
Further, I cannot see at this point that the parties' preparation for a hearing is hampered by any potential difficulties that might arise in apportioning these amounts. Unlike sub-paragraphs 10(t) and 10(u) I am not aware of any body of evidence that might need only be considered at a later hearing on apportionment. To the contrary, as far as I can ascertain at this point, in litigating all questions of entitlement in respect of sub-paragraphs 10(a) to (s), I would expect that the parties would bring forth all material that would or might need to be considered if any question of apportionment arises.
Of course, this assessment may be proved wrong but if it became apparent during the hearing or submissions that there was a need to interrogate or apportion one of the amounts pleaded in sub-paragraphs 10(a) to 10(s), the basis for that apportionment was not known or that further evidence was necessary to undertake it then that it is a matter the trial judge can consider at that time. In my view the countervailing risk of unduly limiting the trial judge's conduct of the hearing should not be assumed at this point.
The second group of liabilities are those identified in sub-paragraphs 10(t) and (u) of the ASOC that I have extracted above. In contrast to sub-paragraphs 10(a)-(s) the potential need for there to be an apportionment of these amounts seems to me substantial. Further, I accept that there are real difficulties for the parties in preparing for a case where there is such a potential and when the parameters upon which any such apportionment may occur are not yet known.
As I have noted, the plaintiff has formulated his case in a manner which legitimately seeks to maximise the number of "claims" that were made against him in accordance with the policy so as to avoid or minimise the operation of the pleaded policy limit of $1.5 million in the policy for each and every claim. It follows from that approach that there is a real potential for him to succeed in obtaining indemnity in respect of some "claims" but not succeed on others either because they do not arise out of his practice, they are not otherwise within the insuring clause or one or more the exclusions may apply.
This raises the real prospect of there being a need to undertake an apportionment of the costs referred to in sub-paragraph 10(t) and 10(u) of the ASOC. Without descending into the detail of the LawCover policy it seems to me be at least reasonably arguable that, accepting there were 25 claims made against the plaintiff, then if he was only entitled to indemnity in respect of say three claims then he does not recover for so much of the costs order that concerns the other twenty-two. Further LawCover has pleaded that the limit of $1.5million for each and every claim includes the claimant's costs and the plaintiff's costs of the Equity Division proceedings. If that is right it would mean that in the example I have given there may only be a limited amount of cover left for items 10(t) and 10(u) depending on the amount of costs paid and incurred for the relevant "claim" and whether any of the Amounts Payable in sub-paragraphs 10(a) to (s) are referable to that "claim".
If apportionment of items 10(t) and 10(u) was to be required the question would then arise as to how it is to occur and, if so, when it is to be undertaken. In my view one very real possibility is that an apportionment might have to occur in a manner similar to a costs assessment. This might involve an estimation of the time taken at the hearing of the Equity Division proceedings in respect of certain issues and the costs incurred in preparation for them. If that were the right approach then the evidence necessary to support any argument about apportionment would be considerable. As I have stated, the hearing before White J occupied some 3 months and there were further substantial hearings after his Honour published reasons on 26 November 2007.
Another possibility that was raised during argument was that an apportionment might occur by reference to the value of the claims that were upheld or denied. I am not in a position to comment as to whether this is appropriate but it would be a brave litigant who did not prepare for the contingency that the Court might consider the appropriate method was to apportion by reference to the time involved in litigating a claim. This all takes place against the background that, subject to some very limited exceptions, lawyers and experts charge by reference to time rather than results.
In my view, the parties should not be placed in the position of having to prepare for the hearing of this matter on the basis that they may have to conduct a exercise similar to a taxation at the hearing before the trial judge. Such an exercise would most likely require substantial extra evidence to be tendered and submitted upon. Any such submissions would have to address numerous permutations not just about the methodology of apportionment but about the outcome. All this effort may be rendered futile in the event that LawCover succeeds entirely. It may be rendered futile if the plaintiff succeeds because the basis of its "success" may render the question of recovery of costs otiose. For example, he may have otherwise demonstrated an entitlement to recover up to the limit of $1.5 million in respect of the "claim" or claims in question.
I expect that the necessity for and scope of any such apportionment exercise will only truly be ascertainable once the trial judge's determination of all the other issues in the proceedings is known. If it is required then the parties and the Court will be in a position to undertake the process more efficiently. It might warrant a referral to an expert.
The potential avoidance of wasted cost and expense to the parties as well as to court time warrants that there be a separate hearing on the quantification of the plaintiff's entitlements to the amounts particularised in sub-paragraph 10(t) and (u). It should also extend to any cross-claim that addresses those questions. It is possible that the need for apportionment might arise on the cross-claim.
It is appropriate that I address a number of arguments put by Mr Einfeld QC against this course of action. In doing so, however, I will address it by reference to the form of order that I propose to make that will provide for a separate hearing of the following question after the trial of all other issues in the proceedings, namely: "what amount, if any, of the items specified in sub-paragraphs 10(t) and 10(u) of the Amended Statement of Claim can the plaintiff or the cross-claimant recover?"
In seeking to resist an order concerning sub-paragraphs 10(t) and (u) Mr Einfeld QC repeated his submission that it was premature to make such an application and it would unduly hamper the trial Judge in the hearing of the proceedings. I can see the force in that, however, it does not persuade me against making the order. There are differences between the two sets of liabilities. With the sub-paragraphs 10(t) and 10(u) I consider there is a real likelihood that an apportionment of costs may need to be undertaken, that extensive evidence may need to be filed to undertake that process and there will be substantial difficulties in making submissions as to the approach that is to be adopted. With sub-paragraphs 10(a) to (s) the likelihood that an apportionment may need to be undertaken is in my view much lesser and it is not apparent at this stage that extra evidence would be required to support the process of apportionment.
Mr Einfeld QC also sought to resist the order on the basis that to make it may hamper the trial judge in laying down principles upon which an apportionment would occur. The form of order that I propose will not prevent that occurring. To the contrary, it will enable the trial Judge to specify the approach to be adopted in relation to apportionment but leave the determination of that issue to a time after the hearing. It may be that no such apportionment is required. In that event the hearing and determination of the separate question will be very short.
Mr Einfeld QC also indicated that to make such an order might give rise to an overlap with the potential for cross-examination of the same witnesses, including the plaintiff, at both hearings. I see some potential for this to occur but it does not outweigh the factors in favour of making the form of order that I have identified. I accept that there is the potential for Mr Crawley to give evidence as to what particular items of expenditure were incurred. I would, however, expect that to be supported by other documentation given that he was legally represented throughout the Equity Division proceedings.
Mr Einfeld QC also submitted that, if the parties and the Court were required to undertake any apportionment exercise with sub paragraphs 10(a)-(s) of the ASOC and litigate the exclusion clauses, then it would be considering the same material and matters that might arise under sub-paragraphs 10(t) and 10(u). He contended that it followed that time and expense would not be saved by excluding the latter from any hearing. I do not accept this contention.
Without being exhaustive, I have described some of the material that I would expect needs to be considered if any issue of apportionment were to arise in respect of the amounts payable in sub-paragraphs 10(a)-(s) of the ASOC. I accept that this may require some consideration of the evidentiary material that was placed before White J. I also appreciate that the litigation of the exclusion clauses pleaded by LawCover could also involve a consideration of some of the evidence before White J. However, that would be a qualitatively different exercise to a quasi costs assessment of the liabilities identified in sub-paragraphs 10(t) and (u) of the ASOC.
Further conduct and costs
I will make an order for a separate hearing in the form that I have identified above. I note that the parties resolved a motion for discovery that was before me after some further argument. I also note that the plaintiff foreshadowed the possibility of seeking to amend his Statement of Claim in one respect. I will list the matter for further directions before me on 12 July 2012 at 9.30am. At that time I expect to be advised of any further steps necessary to have the matter ready for hearing on all issues other than the question, the subject of the order I am about to make.
In relation to the costs of this motion, my present view is that the costs of this motion will be each party's costs in the cause. The form of order for a separate hearing that I will make represents something of a midway position between the parties. On an application such as this, the question of whether it is correct to order that part of the case be separated from the balance will only be able to definitively answered with the benefit of hindsight. If either party seeks any different form of costs order then they can file and serve any brief submission in support on or before 23 June 2012 with any reply by 1 July 2012. I will consider them on the papers. I will make a costs order concerning the motion at the directions hearing on 12 July 2012.
Orders
Accordingly, the Court orders:-
(1)Pursuant to rule 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, that the following question be decided separately after the trial of all other issues in the proceedings, namely: "what amount, if any, of the items specified in sub-paragraphs 10(t) and 10(u) of the Amended Statement of Claim can the plaintiff or the cross-claimant recover?"
(2)The defendant's notice of motion filed 26 March 2012 be otherwise dismissed.
(3)The matter be listed for further directions on 12 July 2012 at 9.30am before me.
(4)Any party seeking a different form of cost order to that foreshadowed in [44] of this judgment, to file and serve written submissions not exceeding two pages on or before 23 June 2012.
(5)Any reply to any written submissions referred to in order (4) to not exceed two pages and to be filed and served on or before 1 July 2012.
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Decision last updated: 14 June 2012
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