Cox and Comcare
[2004] AATA 191
•27 February 2004
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2004] AATA 191
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2003/625
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re ALBERT COX Applicant
And
COMCARE
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr RG Kenny, Member Date27 February 2004
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review. ..................(Sgd)....................
RG Kenny
Member
CATCHWORDS
WORKERS COMPENSATION – injuries occurring prior to commencement of Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 – transitional provisions – recovery of common law damages for hearing loss precluding claim for compensation – notice of shoulder and back injury not given as soon as practicable under Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930 – Commonwealth prejudiced by want of notice – want of notice due to ignorance - failure to make claim within specified period due to ignorance
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 124
Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930 ss 9, 16, 17Re Siemsen and Comcare [1999] AATA 871
Re Muras and Department of Defence (1988) 52 ALD 579
Comcare v Luck (1999) 29 AAR 403
Re Buttfield and Comcare [2001] AATA 335
Re McCarthy and Comcare [2002] AATA 5
Re Tierney and Reserve Bank of Australia (1988) 15 ALD 534
Telstra Corporation v Roycroft [1997] FCA 774
Commonwealth v Connors (1989) 86 ALR 247REASONS FOR DECISION
27 February 2004 Mr RG Kenny, Member Background
1. On 30 May 2002, Albert Cox (the applicant) lodged a “Claim for Rehabilitation and Compensation” in relation to “profound deafness right ear”, “lumbosacral disc degeneration” and “recurrent shoulder dislocation” (T23). He contended that the conditions had developed as a result of injuries incurred in a motor vehicle accident which happened whilst he was a member of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), in which he enlisted in 1961 and from which he was medically discharged on 11 May 1962.
2. On 20 May 2003 (T21), a delegate with the Military Compensation and Rehabilitation Service (MCRS) determined that the claim should be disallowed on the basis that there was no evidence that the applicant was on, or reporting for, duty at the time of the accident. On 9 July 2003 (T36), another MCRS delegate made a reviewable decision which affirmed that determination on different grounds. In relation to the claim for profound deafness in the right ear, the decision was on the basis that the applicant had recovered damages as the result of a common law claim made against the driver of the vehicle with which his vehicle had collided. In relation to the claim for the back and shoulder conditions, the decision was on the basis that notice of the injury and lodgement of the claim had occurred outside of the time-frame provided for under the relevant legislation.
3. On 21 July 2003, an application for review of that decision was received by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the matter is to be determined under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act).
Appearances
4. The applicant was not represented at the hearing. Comcare (the respondent) was represented by Mr D Rangiah of Counsel.
5. The following material was tendered and taken into evidence:
§Exhibit 1 The documents prepared in accordance with section 37 of the AAT Act (“T” Documents – T1 to T36);
§Exhibit 2 An affidavit, with annexures, completed by Paul Ontong; and
§Exhibit 3 A statement, dated 18 September 2003, by the applicant.
Issues and Legislation
6. The Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the 1988 Act) makes provision for compensation to be paid by the Commonwealth in relation to work-related injuries or diseases for nominated classes of Commonwealth employees, including those who served in the RAAF, where the injury occurred after 1 December 1988, the date of commencement of the 1988 Act. The 1988 Act also contains transitional provisions which pertain to injuries or diseases which are claimed to be associated with periods of employment prior to that date. In that regard, section 124 of the 1988 Act, insofar as relevant, reads:
“124 Application of Act to pre-existing injuries
(1) Subject to this Part, this Act applies in relation to an injury, loss or damage suffered by an employee, whether before or after the commencing day.
(1A) Subject to this Part, a person is entitled to compensation under this Act in respect of an injury, loss or damage suffered before the commencing day if compensation was, or would have been, payable to the person in respect of that injury, loss or damage under the 1912 Act, the 1930 Act or the 1971 Act.
(2) A person is not entitled to compensation under this Act in respect of an injury, loss or damage suffered before the commencing day if compensation was not payable in respect of that injury, loss or damage:
(a) ….;
(b) where the injury, loss or damage was suffered after the commencement of the 1930 Act but before the commencement of the 1971 Act - under the 1930 Act as in force when the injury, loss or damage was suffered; or
(c) ….
….
(10) Where:
(a) ….;
(b) a claim for compensation by a person under the 1930 Act, in respect of an injury suffered after the commencement of the 1930 Act but before the commencement of the 1971 Act, was not admissible because of section 16 of the 1930 Act; or
(c) ….;
that person is not entitled to compensation under this Act in respect of that injury”.
7. The 1930 Act, as referred to in that provision, is the Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930 (the 1930 Act). The applicant claimed that his injuries occurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident during his service in the RAAF and that period is embraced by the 1930 Act.
8. Under the 1930 Act, in order for the Commonwealth to be liable to pay compensation to the applicant, the injury or disease must have arisen out of, or occurred in the course of employment with the Commonwealth. Section 10 of the 1930 Act reads:
“10(1) Where
(a) an employee is suffering from a disease is thereby incapacitated for work; or
(b) ….
and the disease is due to the nature of the employment in which the employee was engaged by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Act, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act as if the disease were a personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment”.
9. A time-frame for giving notice of and for making claim for the injury or disease is set down in section 16 of the 1930 Act which, in so far as relevant, reads:
“16(1) The Commissioner shall not admit a claim for compensation under this Act for an injury unless notice of the accident has been served upon him as soon as practicable after it has happened, and before the employee has voluntarily left the employment of the Commonwealth and unless the claim for compensation has been made –
(a) within six months from the occurrence of the accident; or
(b) ….;
Provided always that –
(i) the want of or any defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall not prevent consideration of the claim by the Commissioner if he finds that the Commonwealth is not prejudiced by the want, defect or inaccuracy, or that the want, defect or inaccuracy was occasioned by mistake, absence from Australia or other reasonable cause; and
(ii) the failure to make a claim within the period above specified shall not prevent consideration of the claim by the Commissioner if he finds that the failure was occasioned by mistake, absence from Australia or other reasonable cause.
(2) Notice in respect of any injury to which this Act applies shall contain the name and address of the person injured, and a statement in ordinary language of the cause of the injury and the date at which the accident happened”.
10. A further limitation in relation to making a claim for compensation is found in section 17 of the 1930 Act. It reads:
“17. Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the Commonwealth to pay damages in respect thereof –
(a) the employee may take proceedings against that person to recover damages and may also make a claim against the Commonwealth for such compensation, but shall not be entitled to recover both damages and compensation;
…”
11. In this case, the issues for resolution are whether, as provided for in section 17 of the 1930 Act, the applicant recovered damages against a person in respect of any injury he received in the motor vehicle accident he had whilst serving in the RAAF and also whether the circumstances of the applicant meet the requirements of section 16 of the 1930 Act in relation to the timeliness of the notice and claim. In the event that these provisions are not satisfied, the applicant’s claim will not be considered under the Commonwealth compensation legislation.
Applicant’s Evidence
12. The applicant said he was medically discharged from the RAAF because of the hearing loss that he sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident which occurred on 5 November 1961 and that he had incorrectly nominated 1962 as the year of the accident in his claim form. He said that the accident occurred late at night when he was returning to his base after weekend leave and that he was injured from "head to toe" with the worst of his injuries being a depressed fracture near his ear which caused his hearing problem. He said he was hospitalised for two days in a civilian hospital at Yass, then for two days in the hospital at Wagga and then was transferred to the RAAF hospital at Richmond where he underwent surgery in respect of his head injury.
13. The applicant said that, prior to lodging his claim on 30 May 2002, he had not previously made any claim for compensation from the Commonwealth in relation to any service-related injuries. He said that, in making his claim in 2002, he believed that he was seeking to have paid to him a service pension which he had recently heard about through contact with members of a branch of the Returned and Services League of Australia. He said that he was currently in receipt of a disability support pension from the Commonwealth and believed that a service pension was more appropriate to him because he had served in the RAAF. He said that he had not been aware of any compensation scheme available to him under Commonwealth legislation until this was explained to him at the hearing. Nevertheless, he conceded that he had signed a document on 12 September 1961 (T6/137) in which he acknowledged that he was provided information about the Commonwealth employee's compensation scheme.
14. The applicant said that, shortly after the accident, he had contacted a solicitor in Sydney, Robert Starkey, who referred him to another solicitor in Wagga, Mr J Denniston, who acted for him in a civil claim against the driver of the vehicle with which he collided. He said that, in those proceedings, he was seeking to recover his medical expenses as well as damages for his lost opportunity to continue serving in the RAAF. In relation to the outcome of that claim, he said that he thought that the matter had been dealt with by a judge and jury, that the jury had found in his favour although it had not awarded any damages and that the judge ordered that an amount of 800 pounds be paid to him to cover his costs. He said that it was well known in the district where the matter was heard that public sentiment was against servicemen and he believed that this was the reason that the jury had failed to award damages to him. He agreed that the service documents revealed that he had incurred medical expenses in the order of 23 pounds but said that he believed that these expenses were much higher than this amount. He said that he had no record of what his legal costs were but recalled that they were high because he had utilized the services of a Queen’s Counsel in the proceedings. He said that he believed that the whole of the sum that he received was taken up by his costs.
15. The applicant said that he had always been aware of problems with his shoulders and lower back from the time of the accident but that his main focus at the time was in relation to his ear damage. He said that he had always believed that the shoulder and back conditions were related to the accident and that he had made reference to these problems in medical examinations conducted after the accident but said that they had not been a priority for him or for those examining him. He agreed that there was no reference to these conditions in his discharge medical documentation. He also agreed that his medical expenses had been taken care of by the RAAF while he continued to serve.
16. The applicant said that he had undergone surgical procedures by Dr. Peter Black for his ear problem in the 1980s at Greenslopes Repatriation Hospital in Brisbane and that he believed that this was because the Commonwealth had recognized that the condition was related to service in the RAAF.
Paul Ontong’s evidence
17. In his affidavit (Exhibit 2), Mr Ontong described himself as the Director of Appeals with MCRS and said that the only service medical records concerning the applicant which were held by the Commonwealth were those which had been provided to the Tribunal (T5/80-136). He said that these did not support any connection between the applicant's service and his shoulder and back conditions. He said that, because of the delay by the applicant in making his claim, the Commonwealth had lost the opportunity to speak to relevant officers who completed treatment records, including the discharge medical documents, and that, even if they were to be examined, it was highly unlikely that they would recall specific information about the applicant over a period of more than 30 years. He said there was an absence of contemporaneous medical documentation to support the applicant's claim and he also said that the applicant's own recollection of the incident was likely to have deteriorated over the years and that there might have been other intervening events which have impacted upon his conditions.
18. In relation to the solicitors who acted for the applicant in his civil claim, Mr. Ontong said:
“I am advised by my solicitors and verily believe that they telephoned the New South Wales Law Society on 2 September 2003 seeking contact details for the solicitors referred to by the applicant in his letter to the respondent dated 9 June 2003 (T35, page 185) Mr Robert Starkey and Mr Denniston. I am advised by my solicitor and verily believe that the New South Wales Law Society representative advised that the Law Society has no current record of Mr Robert Starkey or Mr Denniston”.
19. Mr. Ontong also referred to unsuccessful attempts by his solicitor to obtain records relating to any treatment of the applicant at Greenslopes Hospital in the 1980s.
Applicant’s Submission
20. The applicant submitted that his claim was not made earlier than 2002 because he had not been aware of his right to make a claim and that, even when he did so, he was still not aware of the prospect of getting compensation from the Commonwealth for his injuries. He submitted that, after the accident, his main concern had been with his loss of hearing and his head injury rather than the problems relating to his shoulders or his back. He submitted that he had not received payment of damages from the civil claim which he initiated in relation to his head injury because all of the money was taken up by the costs associated with the legal proceedings.
21. The applicant referred to his service medical documents and to the record of treatment for a shoulder problem only a month after the accident. He also referred to a note (Exhibit 3) from Colin Brewer, Information and Communication Support Officer with the Department of Veterans Affairs which advised that a community patient file record had been created for him in the Department but which had been destroyed in a culling project in 2002. He said that this may have indicated that the Commonwealth had accepted that his hearing loss had been related to his service although he conceded that he had no recollection of lodging a claim in relation to this.
Respondent's submission
22. Mr Rangiah submitted that no claim for compensation had been lodged by the applicant under the 1930 Act because the first such claim was not made until 2002. He submitted that this was consistent with the applicant’s evidence that he had not been aware that he was entitled to make such make a claim until the day of the hearing. He also submitted that the claim had been made outside of the time-frame provided for in section 16 of that Act and that the respondent would be prejudiced if the claim were to be heard. He submitted that the making of the claim was not occasioned by mistake, absence from Australia or other reasonable cause and that ignorance of the right to make a claim was not a matter which could be taken into account under the 1930 Act.
23. Mr. Rangiah noted that, in the decision under review, the delegate had conceded that a claim had been made under the 1930 Act in relation to the applicant's hearing loss and that this was based on a letter written by an Area Finance Officer on 2 April 1962 (T5/129). He submitted that this had been done in error by the delegate because of confusion with the civil claim for damages and that the Tribunal was not precluded from considering that matter.
24. Mr. Rangiah submitted that the only explanation that could be given in relation to the civil claim which the applicant made was that damages had been awarded because it was improbable that the entire amount of 800 pounds had been taken up by the costs of the proceedings. He referred to a letter, dated 20 March 1962, written by the applicant's solicitor, Mr.Denniston (T10), to the applicant's Commanding Officer in relation to a civil claim in which information was sought about medical treatment he had received and for clinical treatment that had been provided.
Consideration
25. Section 16 of the 1930 Act makes provision for the time-frames within which steps must be taken in order to trigger the operation of the Commonwealth compensation scheme. Sub-section 16(1) of the 1930 Act makes a distinction between the giving of a notice of an accident which gave rise to an injury and the making of a claim for compensation in respect of that injury. The provision requires, first, that notice of an accident be given as soon as practicable after it has happened and before the employee left the employment of the Commonwealth and, secondly, for a claim for compensation to be made within six months of the occurrence of the accident.
Giving Notice
26. In relation to giving notice, sub-section 16(1) of the 1930 Act requires notice of the accident. It does not refer to notice of the injury. However, that provision must be read with the requirements of the notice as set out in sub-section 16(2) thereof. This provides that the notice in respect of any injury requires particulars of the person to be included as well as particulars, in ordinary language, of the cause of the injury and the time when it happened. The purpose of that provision is to ensure that, not only is the Commonwealth made aware of the fact of the injury, but also of the background to it so that some investigations might be undertaken and, as I read it, an injury would need to be nominated or described in some manner in order to meet the requirement of giving a statement of the cause of the injury.
27. The Commonwealth was made aware of the accident in which the applicant was involved immediately after it happened and his medical records show that he was treated in RAAF hospitals during his service. His records show that this treatment related to his head injuries and they also make reference to hearing loss in his right ear. He was seen by a specialist, Dr Peter Black, who is reported as having noted that the hearing loss had been worsened in the accident (see T5/103). It was because of this condition that he was discharged from the RAAF. I am satisfied that the applicant gave the Commonwealth notice in relation to this condition during his service.
28. The documentation prepared after the applicant's motor vehicle accident makes no reference to any shoulder injury or lower back injury. An entry in service medical records may constitute notice of an injury under the 1930 Act where those records disclose the information required by sub-section 16(2) of the 1930 Act: see Re Siemsen and Comcare [1999] AATA 871 and Re Muras and Department of Defence (1988) 52 ALD 579 at 582. On 11 December 1961 (T5/117), an entry in an Attendance and Treatment Card makes reference to pain in the applicant’s left shoulder but it implicates firing practice during that afternoon as the source of the problem. Subsequent records over the next five months make no further reference to a shoulder problem. The medical examination which was completed prior to discharge (T5/126) also contain no reference to a shoulder or lower back problem. I am satisfied that the document completed by the applicant on 30 May 2002 was the first occasion that he gave notice to the Commonwealth in respect of his shoulder and lower back problems.
Making a Claim
29. In relation to his hearing loss, the letter dated 2 April 1962 by the Area Finance Officer (T5/129) described the applicant as having “lodged a claim under the Compensation Act for deafness in the right ear sustained in a motor accident” and requested that medical documents be provided to obtain an opinion on the disability. Shortly before this, by letter dated 20 March 1962, the applicant's solicitor wrote to the RAAF requesting information in respect of a “civil claim” (T10/148). On 24 April 1962, an Officer with Headquarters Support Command prepared a letter for the applicant's solicitor in which he detailed the injuries that the applicant suffered, namely extensive bruising and swelling around the right eye and fracture of right zygomatic arch with depression, advised of the surgical procedure that he underwent to elevate the depressed fracture and described medical expenses as being incurred in the amount of 23 pounds 3 shillings and 6 pence (T15/154). In further correspondence between the applicant's solicitor and RAAF authorities, information was sought and provided in relation to the extent that these head injuries impacted upon his future prospects of service in the RAAF. This information was contained in various Minute Papers prepared in August 1963 (T4/72-78).
30. I am satisfied that this material was prepared in relation to the applicant’s civil claim but I do not accept that they preclude the prospect that the matter of the applicant's compensation was also under consideration. The document noted above from the Area Finance Officer makes specific reference to a “claim under the Compensation Act” and, in another document (T16/156) dated 19 July (year obscured) and addressed to “HQ Support Command (Medical Records)” from the “Dept of Air Canberra”, the following appears:
“Please forward the above named ex-member’s medical documents for perusal of the Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation”.
31. The applicant gave evidence that he had not lodged a claim for compensation and there is no record of the processing of any compensation claim beyond that which appears above in his records. However, the note prepared by Colin Brewer, Information and Communication Support Officer with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs indicates that a file had been raised in relation to the applicant but that it had sine been destroyed (see Exhibit 3). I am satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, a claim was made by the applicant although the evidence is unclear as to the outcome of that claim process.
32. In relation to his shoulders and lower back, I am satisfied that the document completed by the applicant on 30 May 2002 was the first occasion that he made a claim against the Commonwealth in respect of his shoulder and lower back problems and, in that regard, it constitutes both a notice and a claim for the purposes of section 16 of the 1930 Act: see Comcare v Luck (1999) 29 AAR 403 at 417, Re Buttfield and Comcare [2001] AATA 335 and Re McCarthy and Comcare [2002] AATA 5.
Profound Deafness Right Ear
33. Despite the finding that notice was given and a claim made in relation to his deafness within the time-frames required by section 16 of the 1930 Act, the applicant can not be paid compensation in relation to any such claim if he recovered damages as a result of a civil claim in relation to hearing loss. This is because of the terms of section 17 of the 1930 Act (see above).
34. The applicant had a very unclear recollection of the events surrounding the civil claim in which he was involved and that was also the situation with his understanding of the compensation claims process, generally. However, in the request, dated 20 March 1962 (T10), by his solicitor, Mr Denniston, to the RAAF for information in relation to that civil claim, reference is made to the nature of the claim as being in “connection with his injuries which have resulted in an impairment of his hearing”.. I am satisfied that, the civil claim related, at least in part, to deafness in the right ear. The information provided to the solicitor related to his employment prospects as well as medical costs and I am satisfied that the monies he received which, on his evidence totalled a significantly large amount of 800 pounds, were not related solely to the costs of the action but comprised a component for damages for his deafness. Because I am satisfied that he recovered damages in relation to that condition, he is precluded, by section 17 of the Act, from recovering compensation in relation to any claim against the Commonwealth for that injury.
Lumbosacral Disc Degeneration/ Recurrent Shoulder Dislocation
35. While the lodgement of claim form on 30 May 2002 was outside of the time-frame referred to in sub-section 16(1) of the 1930 Act, that, alone, does not preclude a consideration of the claim under that provision. It may still be considered if the terms of subsection 16(4) are met. This provision deems the notice to have been made in a timely manner if it was served as soon as practicable after the applicant first became aware he was suffering from the claimed injury and, further, it deems the claim for compensation to have been made in a timely manner if it was made within six months after the applicant first became aware that he was suffering from the injury. In this case, the applicant gave evidence that he had suffered from shoulder and lower back problems for many years and, in that situation, I am satisfied that the lodgement of the document in 2002 does not meet those requirements. Nevertheless, the matter may still be considered if the want of timely notice does not prejudice the respondent or if it was occasioned by mistake, absence from Australia or other reasonable cause.
36. In relation to the issue of prejudice to the respondent, I note the decision of the Tribunal in Re Tierney and Reserve Bank of Australia (1988) 15 ALD 534 where, at 535, the following reference is made to the purpose of the notice requirement as it appears in sub-section 53(1) of the 1988 Act which is not materially different from the provision under consideration in the 1930 Act:
“Section 53 is clearly intended to protect the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities from being placed in a situation where they are unable to disprove an employee’s assertion of an injury alleged to have occurred on some specific occasion in the course of the employee’s work or of a disease contracted because of some brief and transient situation. Some such provision is clearly needed to prevent abuse of the Act.”
37. The statement by Mr Ontong refers to the difficulties associated with attempting to investigate a matter which occurred more than thirty years ago. In this case, while there is evidence in relation to the applicant's claim for deafness, that is not the case in relation to the shoulder or lower back problems. The respondent has not been given the opportunity to investigate the matter in a timely manner and I am satisfied that it would be prejudiced if it were required to do so more than 30 years after the incidents of causation are alleged to have occurred.
38. In relation to giving a notice or making a claim, Commonwealth compensation legislation distinguishes between ignorance and mistake with only the latter being of relevance under the 1930 Act. The distinction between the two concepts was referred to in Telstra Corporation v Roycroft [1997] FCA 774 by North J who described the relevant authorities as establishing the following propositions:
“1. A person who is not aware of a right to claim compensation at all is not mistaken about the right, but ignorant of it: Roles v Pascall & Sons [1911] 1 of KB 982.
2. A person who knows that he has a right to claim compensation for one sort of injury, but no idea whether or not he has a right to claim for another, is not mistaken as to his right to claim for the second type of injury, but is ignorant of it: Commonwealth of Australia v Connors (1989) 86 ALR 247.
3. A person who knows he has a right to claim compensation for one sort of injury, and wrongly believes that he has no right to claim for another type of injury, is mistaken as to the right to claim for the second type of injury: Stevenson v Metropolitan Meat Industry Commission (1936) 37 SR (NSW) 109.
4. It follows from these authorities that a person who knows he has a right to claim compensation for the particular injury and knows that the time for making the claim is limited, but wrongly believes he has more time to make a claim than the Act allows, is mistaken as to the time for making the claim.”
39. His Honour went on to point out that there was a thin line between mistake and ignorance but said:
“If a person acts on the basis of knowledge of the Act and that knowledge is wrong, or the facts upon which the person relies are wrong, then the person has made a mistake. If a person acts without any knowledge about the Act or an aspect of it, and consequently does not know whether or not it applies, then the person is ignorant.”
40. In this case, the applicant conceded that he had been ignorant of any compensation scheme until the hearing and said that, even when he lodged the claim in 2002, he was not really seeking compensation but, rather, the payment of a service pension which is payable under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 and on specific service-related statutory criteria. On the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant was not mistaken about his capacity to make a claim in relation to compensation against the Commonwealth but ignorant of his right to do so.
41. The issue of the applicant’s absence from Australia does not arise in this case.
42. As to any other reasonable cause for the applicant’s delay in giving notice or making a claim for his injuries, no submissions were made and no evidence was led of any factors which might constitute reasonable cause apart from the applicant's ignorance in relation to the compensation process. However, ignorance cannot constitute a reasonable cause for the purposes of section 16 of the 1930 Act: see Commonwealth of Australia v Connors (1989) 86 ALR 247 at 252 and see also Telstra Corporation v Roycroft (above).
Decision
43. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
I certify that the 43 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr RG Kenny, Member
Signed: K Donnelly
Associate
Date/s of Hearing 16 February 2004 (Bundaberg)
Date of Decision 27 February 2004 (Brisbane)The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent Mr D Rangiah
Solicitor for the Respondent Phillips Fox Lawyers
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