Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Montenegro

[2016] NSWCA 211

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Montenegro [2016] NSWCA 211
Hearing dates:	On the papers
Decision date:	16 August 2016
Before:	Meagher JA; Leeming JA
Decision:	1.   Leave to appeal dismissed. 2.   No order as to costs.
Catchwords:	APPEAL – application for leave – where question proposed in appeal whether respondent a “fit and proper” person – where same question addressed by this court in its original jurisdiction and decided adversely to respondent – whether any utility in public interest in appeal proceeding – leave to appeal refused
Legislation Cited:	Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 108 Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), Pt 2.2 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 48(2)(k), 101(2)(r) Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), Pt 65A, r 2
Cases Cited:	Coles v Wood [1981] 1 NSWLR 723 Re Lonhro PLC [1990] 2 AC 154 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Montenegro [2015] NSWCA 409 Montenegro v Law Society of NSW [2015] NSWSC 867 Montenegro v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [2016] HCASL 36 Wenkart v Pantzer (No 3) (2004) 135 FCR 422
Category:	Procedural and other rulings
Parties:	Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Applicant) Cesar Dario Montenegro (Respondent)
Representation:	Counsel: C A Webster SC with P A Maddigan (Applicant) Cesar Dario Montenegro (self represented) (Respondent)   Solicitors: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Applicant)
File Number(s):	2015/221614

Judgment

1. THE COURT: The applicant Council of the Law Society requires and seeks leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of Campbell J of 2 July 2015: Montenegro v Law Society of NSW [2015] NSWSC 867. Leave is required by s 101(2)(r) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) because those orders did not involve a matter at issue of the value of $100,000 or more.

2. The proceeding before the primary judge was an appeal by the respondent under s 108 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) from the Council’s decision refusing his application for a practising certificate for the year ending 30 June 2015. The primary judge allowed that appeal, set aside the decision of the Council and made a declaration that:

… as at 15th January 2015, notwithstanding that the plaintiff was a person within s 42(2)(a) Legal Profession Act 2004, circumstances warrant a determination that he is a fit and proper person to hold a restricted local practising certificate for the purpose of s 48(3)(b) of the Act subject to the imposition of the following additional conditions …

3. Although not spelt out, the “circumstances” referred to in that declaration, as is apparent from [92] of his Honour’s reasons, are those relied upon by the Council and the subject of findings made by his Honour.

4. In the light of this Court’s subsequent decision in Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Montenegro [2015] NSWCA 409, whether the leave sought should be granted directs attention to whether there is any utility in doing so, either as between the parties or in the public interest: Coles v Wood [1981] 1 NSWLR 723 at 727.

5. In Prothonotary v Montenegro on 18 December 2015 this Court made the following declarations and order:

1.   Declare that Cesar Dario Montenegro is not a person of good fame and character.

2.    Declare that Cesar Dario Montenegro is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Local Roll of Lawyers of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

3.   Order that the name of Cesar Dario Montenegro be removed from the Local Roll of Lawyers of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

6. An application for special leave to appeal from that judgment was dismissed: Montenegrov Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [2016] HCASL 36.

7. By its proposed notice of appeal, the Council seeks orders reinstating its decision made on 15 January 2015 to refuse the respondent a local practising certificate (for the year ending 30 June 2015) and setting aside the declaration made by the primary judge.

8. The Council does not maintain that there is any utility between the parties in having the declaration and orders made by the primary judge set aside. The local practising certificate which the Council refused to issue is no longer of any relevance. It would have expired on 30 June 2015. More significantly, any question as to the issue of a further practising certificate can only arise if the respondent applies to be and is admitted to the Local Roll of Lawyers of this Court.

9. In accordance with the provisions of Pt 2.2 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), a prerequisite for such admission remains that the applicant be a “fit and proper person”. The respects in which Mr Montenegro did not answer that description as at December 2015 are the subject of this Court’s decision, which is later in time than the decision of the primary judge.

10. That decision is a decision of the Court of Appeal, constituted by three judges and exercising its original jurisdiction under s 48(2)(k) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). See also Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), Pt 65A, r 2(1). (Whether it is binding in the same way as a decision of this Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction need not be considered: cf Re Lonhro PLC [1990] 2 AC 154 at 201; Wenkart v Pantzer (No 3) (2004) 135 FCR 422 at [94]).

11. The Council submits that there remains utility, in the public interest, in the setting aside of the declaration made by the primary judge. That declaration is said to be inconsistent with the declarations made by this Court “after consideration of essentially the same circumstances as those found by the primary judge”.

12. It is also said that an outcome of the setting aside of that declaration would be that “important issues of principle regarding adequate disclosure by an applicant for a practising certificate, and whether an apparent failure to understand proper professional conduct and the obligations of candour means that the applicant for a practising certificate is not a proper person, would be harmonised”.

13. The first of these submissions is not correct and the second does not identify any respect in which, following the decision of this Court, there is said to be any uncertainty or controversy in relation to the so called issues of principle referred to.

14. Whilst the declaration as to fitness made by the primary judge, albeit as at an earlier point in time, is inconsistent with the declarations made by this Court, it is not correct to say that this Court’s declarations were made “after consideration of essentially the same circumstances as those found by the primary judge”. As this Court pointed out in its judgment at [25]:

… in the proceedings before Campbell J, the Law Society’s argument that the respondent was not a fit and proper person was put on a narrower basis than the argument now made on behalf of the Prothonotary. Specifically, the Law Society did not contend that the respondent’s criminal conduct was “necessarily incompatible with good character”. Nor did it contend that his failures to make full and frank disclosure were deliberate, or reckless in the sense referred to earlier …

15. The Prothonotary’s case before this Court, as summarised at [4], was as follows:

… It is said that his conduct was dishonest and reveals little or no respect for the law and the need for compliance with it. It is also submitted that his failures to make full and frank disclosure of that conduct were themselves dishonest, either because he deliberately withheld information or because he was recklessly indifferent as to whether the information provided was truthful and complete. In this context, the recklessness referred to involves the relevant person having no real belief as to the truth or completeness of what is disclosed: ... Finally, the Prothonotary submits that those repeated failures also reveal a lack of insight as to the significance of his past misconduct for his application to be admitted and no real appreciation of the nature of his obligation of candour, when dealing with the courts, admitting authorities and professional bodies. This last matter is said to further confirm that he is not a fit and proper person to practise as a lawyer.

16. Thus the declarations and orders made by this Court take into account a broader range of considerations than those relied on before the primary judge. That being the position, it is to be expected that if at some point in time in the future Mr Montenegro seeks to be admitted to the Australian legal profession, regard would be had to the decision of this Court, as the decision of an intermediate appellate court addressing a broader range of considerations than those addressed by the primary judge. There is no need, in the public interest, that the judgment of the primary judge be set aside to make that plain.

17. To the extent that consideration of Mr Montenegro’s position is said to have raised “important issues” of principle regarding disclosure and the obligation of candour, those principles are not controversial and have been considered and applied by this Court to the facts which it found.

18. We conclude that there is no utility between the parties or in the public interest in granting the leave sought. Accordingly leave is refused.

19. As this application has been dealt with on the papers and Mr Montenegro was not represented, no order is made as to the payment of his costs.

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Decision last updated: 16 August 2016