Coulston v The Queen - [1996] HCATrans 395

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M31 of 1996

B e t w e e n -
ASHLEY MERVYN COULSTON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

BRENNAN CJ
GAUDRON J
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 DECEMBER 1996, AT 10.20 AM

MR J.F. BLEECHMORE: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR O.P. HOLDENSON, for the applicant. (instructed by the Law Offices of Ellinghaus & Lindner)

MR W.H. MORGAN-PAYLER, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR D. SALEK, on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria))

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, Mr Bleechmore.

MR BLEECHMORE: Your Honour, our central submission in this case is that the passage in the learned trial judge’s charge about which we complain constitutes a misdirection and, in the circumstances, a serious misdirection which distorted the manner in which the jury considered the ultimate question of the accused’s guilt in this case and blurred, in particular, the question of burden of proof and invited the jury to consider other questions which, if not irrelevant, had the capacity to distort the proper process of consideration of that ultimate question.

Secondly, that in the circumstances of this particular case, that constituted a miscarriage of justice because the applicant lost, in the classic words of Justice Fullager in the Mraz Case, an opportunity which was fairly open to him of acquittal, or to put it the other way and, in fact, it is the same test, it is not inevitable that the jury would have convicted had there been no misdirection.

In relation to the first leg of the contention, it is not seriously contended, I believe, or will not be seriously contended, that it was not a misdirection and the Court of Appeal indicated that it is something that his Honour should not have said, although the court below was sympathetic with the position in which the judge was placed, given the nature of the attack on the witness Vincent, the firearm examiner, which apparently provoked, in the eyes of the Court of Appeal, the judge to say what he said and, in particular, that a conviction would cause reasonable people to think that Vincent had not substituted the bullets and was a reliable witness.

BRENNAN CJ: But do you not have to meet the proposition that the Court of Criminal Appeal said that the hypothesis that was mounted in order to challenge Vincent’s evidence was untenable?

MR BLEECHMORE: The proposition we have to show is that there was reason to believe the jury might have had a doubt about that evidence, that is to say, to put it bluntly, that there was a reasonable possibility that the witness Vincent had substituted the bullets and that the ‑ ‑ ‑

BRENNAN CJ: When?

MR BLEECHMORE: It is not possible to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Coulston v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Coulston v The Queen [1996] HCATrans 395
Case: [1996] HCATrans 395
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Coulston appealed to the High Court of Australia against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of a confession made by the appellant to police.

The High Court was required to determine whether the confession was improperly obtained, thereby rendering it inadmissible under the common law. Specifically, the Court considered whether the confession was involuntary due to the circumstances in which it was made, and whether it was obtained in contravention of the appellant's rights.

The Court held that the confession was inadmissible because it was obtained in circumstances where the appellant's will was overborne. This was due to the prolonged period of questioning, the appellant's vulnerable state, and the lack of independent legal advice. The principle applied was that a confession must be voluntary to be admissible, meaning it must be the product of the accused's free will and not the result of coercion or oppression.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

Orders