Cotterell v Jones
[2019] WASC 354
•2 OCTOBER 2019
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: COTTERELL -v- JONES [2019] WASC 354
CORAM: JENKINS J
HEARD: 19 SEPTEMBER 2019
DELIVERED : 2 OCTOBER 2019
FILE NO/S: SJA 1112 of 2019
BETWEEN: JOSEPH BENJAMIN COTTERELL
Appellant
AND
DYLAN JONES
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE E SHACKLETON
File Number : BU 2022/2019
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Failing to comply with an order of a police officer - Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive - Whether the magistrate failed to take into account mental illness - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 41(4)
Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 153(1)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA)
Result:
Extension of time within which to appeal is granted
Leave to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 granted
Leave to appeal on ground 3 refused
Appeal against sentence allowed
Sentence is set aside and remitted to the Perth Magistrates Court for re-sentencing
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Ms N R Sinton |
| Respondent | : | Mr G J Stockton |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Legal Aid (WA) |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Bropho v Harrison [2013] WASC 250
Durward v Belton [2012] WASC 479
Hayward v Martin [2014] WASC 309
Krencej v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 82
Mason v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 43
JENKINS J:
This is an appeal from the sentence imposed on the appellant in the Bunbury Magistrates Court on 29 April 2019 for the offence of failing to comply with an order given by a police officer.
The appellant was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment. The sentence was suspended for 7 months with supervision and programme requirements.
Grounds of appeal
The appellant relies on three grounds of appeal:
1.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant to imprisonment, albeit suspended, when in all of the circumstances a sentence of last resort was not open.
2.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances.
3.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred [in] failing to take into account the appellant's mental illness as a mitigating factor.
Application for an extension of time
The appellant requires an extension of time within which to appeal as the appeal was filed on 30 August 2019. The last date for appealing within time was 27 May 2019.
Ms Sinton's affidavit in support of an extension of time within which to appeal contains the following reasons for not commencing the appeal within time:
(1)The appellant instructs her that he did not receive a letter sent to him after sentencing by duty counsel, which advised him to lodge an appeal against sentence.
(2)The appellant did not discuss a possible appeal with a lawyer until he appeared in the Rockingham Magistrates Court on 17 June 2019 in relation to a new charge.
(3)It was not until the appellant appeared in the START Court on 14 August 2019 that the appellant completed an application for Legal Aid for an appeal.
(4)Legal Aid was granted on 15 August 2019.
(5)On 29 August 2019, the appellant instructed Ms Sinton to file an appeal notice.
Ms Sinton provided the following information from the bar table:
(a)The duty lawyer wrote to the appellant on 1 May 2019.
(b)On 19 May 2019, the appellant was detained under the Mental Health Act 2014 (WA) and taken by police to hospital. That is when he was charged with the offence of being in possession of a smoking implement.
(c)He remained in hospital for a month.
(d)After the duty lawyer saw the appellant on 17 June 2019, Legal Aid ordered a transcript of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court but did not organise for the appellant to sign an application for legal aid for an appeal.
The respondent submits that, other than beyond a hearsay assertion in Ms Sinton's affidavit, there is no proof that the appellant did not receive duty counsel's letter. Neither is there any explanation for the delay between 17 June and 14 August 2019.
The respondent submits further that it is open for me to conclude that the only reason why the appellant has lodged the appeal is to try and avoid being ordered to serve all or part of the sentence of imprisonment which was suspended if he is found guilty of being in possession of a smoking implement. The respondent submits that to grant an extension of time within which to appeal would undermine the statutory purpose of time limits.
The respondent concedes however that if I conclude that a ground of appeal has merit, that is a powerful factor weighing in favour of the grant of an extension of time within which to appeal.
In the circumstances, an extension of time ought to be granted only if the merits of the appeal are such that there would be a miscarriage of justice if the appeal was not heard on its merits and the sentence was allowed to stand.
After considering the merits of the appeal, I have determined that there should be a grant of an extension of time within which to appeal.
The charge and proceedings related to it
The appellant was charged that on 1 April 2019 at South Bunbury he without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with an order given by Senior Constable Campbell, a police officer, contrary to the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) (the CIA) s 153(1).
The CIA s 153(1) states:
A person who, without reasonable excuse, does not comply with an order given by an officer under this Act commits an offence.
Penalty: a fine of $12 000 and imprisonment for 12 months.
The appellant was arrested on the same day. The charge was mentioned in the Bunbury Magistrates Court later that morning. The appellant was not in court due to his condition. Duty counsel told the magistrate that it was difficult to obtain instructions from the appellant and she had concerns that he had some 'serious mental health issues'. She requested a mental health assessment. The magistrate stood the matter down to after lunch so that could be conducted.[1]
[1] ts 2, 1 April 2019.
After a short adjournment the charge was mentioned again. The magistrate determined, with the consent of duty counsel, that the matter be mentioned in the appellant's absence. The magistrate stated that if required to appear in court, the appellant may appear clothed or unclothed and may or may not proposition someone in court. His Honour also advised the parties that the appellant had refused to be assessed. The magistrate remanded the appellant in custody until the following day.
On 2 April 2019, the appellant appeared before the same magistrate. The magistrate placed on the record that on the previous day the appellant had not appeared in court because security had advised him that the appellant was naked, behaving inappropriately towards staff and was aggressive. The matter was stood own until the afternoon so that a mental health assessment could be made.
After lunch, duty counsel advised that he had taken instructions from his client who wanted to plead guilty to the charge. The plea of guilty was then taken. The prosecutor read the following facts:
6.40 am 1 April this year the accused was issued a move on order covering the streets of Ocean Drive, Hastie Street, Ramillies Street and Mangles Street. The order the accused received was in effect till 6 am 2 April. Those conditions were explained to him by the issuing officer. 8.20 am on that same morning, the 1st, the accused was located on the corner of Ocean Drive and Hastie Street.
Just prior to this, the accused was located inside a residence in the vicinity and was measuring up the inside of the house. The resident of the house did not know who the accused was or why he was there. The accused left the residence and subsequently spoke with the police. The accused was arrested for breaching the order and conveyed back to Bunbury Police Station. Part explanation given, 'I'm just looking for some work.'[2]
[2] ts 5 – 6, 2 April 2019.
A move on order is an order made under the CIA s 27 which relevantly provides that a police officer may order a person who is in a public place to leave it, if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has or intends to commit an offence of any kind, including a breach of the peace, in the area.
At his own instigation, the magistrate ordered a pre-sentence report so that he could find out more about the appellant's background and remanded the appellant in custody for sentencing on 29 April 2019.
The sentencing hearing
On 29 April 2019, duty counsel presented a plea in mitigation which contained the following information:
(1)The appellant travelled to Western Australia from Queensland in mid-December 2018 to spend time with his parents in Rockingham.
(2)As a result of having his wallet and driver's licence stolen he had been unable to return to Queensland.
(3)The appellant intended to return to Queensland as soon as possible, hopefully within 3 ‑ 4 weeks, because he had a job with a house painter, but he did not have proof of the availability of the job.
(4)At the time of the offence the appellant was under the influence of a crystallite substance which he had consumed. He was not sure of the nature of the substance because of its effect on him.
(5)The appellant had a past methamphetamine problem but it was the first time in a long time that he had consumed a prohibited drug.
(6)The appellant was single and had an 11 year old daughter from a previous marriage. His daughter lived in the United States of America.
(7)The appellant was willing to comply with a community based order and the duty lawyer had advised the appellant that he could apply to have its obligations transferred to Queensland. His preference was to pay a fine.
(8)The appellant had spent 29 days in custody.[3]
[3] ts 7, 29 April 2019.
The pre-sentence report contained the following additional information:
(1)The appellant was 34 years old. In Queensland he was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and placed on a community treatment order (CTO). However, he had not been compliant with his medication. His last depot injection was given in October 2018.
(2)The appellant admitted to having mental health issues such as depression, anxiety and a drug induced psychosis but denied any other diagnoses or have current mental health issues. He said he was not medicated and that he refused to be so.
(3)Although he was polite during the interview with the author, he was evasive in relation to questions about his mental health diagnoses and his offence history.
(4)The appellant had been assessed by mental health practitioners after he arrived in Western Australia but a full assessment was unable to be completed because the appellant failed to cooperate. The Western Australian mental health authorities had not raised concerns about the appellant being an 'immediate risk'.
(5)If the court chose to impose a community based order, the author requested that it include supervision and programme requirements, as well as a requirement for random urinalysis.
(6)The appellant admitted responsibility for the offence. The appellant said that he had consumed an unknown substance to which he had an adverse reaction and that he had a past methamphetamine problem but it was the first time in a long time that he had consumed a prohibited drug.
(7)The appellant said that he had commenced using methamphetamine when he was 28 years old to assist with motivation due to the side effects of his depot medication.
(8)The appellant was on a disability support pension but had multiple private debts. His daughter lived in the United States of America.
(9)The appellant was concerned about having to remain in Western Australia and the author questioned his ability to comply with a community based order given his non‑compliance with his CTO and his untruthfulness surrounding his mental health issues.
(10)The appellant's mother advised the author of the report that his parents were prepared to have the appellant live with them. She said that she had noted a deterioration in the appellant's mental health in the week prior to him committing this offence. She told the author of the report that the appellant's delusions caused him to remove his clothes.
The appellant has no prior convictions in Western Australia but he has an extensive Queensland criminal history. It contains at least 10 convictions between 2002 and 2017 for relatively minor examples of drug possession and drug use related offences. Additionally, he has numerous convictions for breaching community based orders of various sorts, including suspended imprisonment orders, probation, bail conditions, bail undertakings to appear in court and a domestic violence order.
Relevant to the offence under appeal, the appellant has five convictions for obstructing police and one for trespass by entering into or remaining in a dwelling or yard. He also has a spattering of other convictions for dishonesty and violence offences. He had received short sentences of imprisonment for some of his more recent offences. He was last convicted in Queensland on 31 August 2017 for failing to appear in court in accordance with a bail undertaking, stealing, possession of drug, utensils, and possession of drugs. He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and made eligible for release on parole on the date of sentencing.
Magistrate's sentencing remarks
At the conclusion of defence counsel's submissions, the magistrate referred to the maximum penalty for the offence. His Honour said:
It's not necessarily the most serious offence that anyone has ever committed in terms of maximum penalties. But your record and your situation, in my view, mean that in its context it's a serious example of that offence and, in particular, the facts themselves. You went into somebody's house.[4]
[4] ts 8, 29 April 2019.
After an exchange with counsel, the magistrate took into account the followed matters:
(1)The appellant had entered a plea of guilty at the earliest opportunity and he would be given the full 25% discount even though the prosecution case was strong.
(2)The appellant's mental illness was a mitigating factor 'potentially'. His Honour qualified that statement by saying that it was not so mitigating because the appellant had taken an unknown drug which was likely to result in offending.
(3)Other than the plea of guilty and time spent in custody there was not much that could be said in mitigation.
(4)On the basis of the appellant's Queensland criminal record, personal deterrence and protection of the community were the dominant sentencing factors.
(5)That a more serious sentencing option could not be imposed unless it was inappropriate to use a less serious option.
(6)That imprisonment could not be imposed unless a sentence of only imprisonment could be justified or the protection of the community justified it. Imprisonment was a sentence of last resort.
His Honour then determined that 7 months' imprisonment ought to be imposed, after taking into account time spent in custody.
His Honour concluded that a suspended or partially suspended sentence would not be appropriate because they would not, in effect, protect the community by requiring the appellant to address his drug abuse or mental health issues.
His Honour said that he was concerned as to whether the appellant would comply with the conditions of conditionally suspended sentence but taking into account that he had been in custody for some time and he had family support in Western Australia, he was not satisfied that was inappropriate to impose a 7 month sentence conditionally suspended for 12 months.
Ground 3
Ground 3 complains that the magistrate made an express error in failing to taking into account the appellant's mental illness as a mitigating factor.
I find that the magistrate did not make the alleged error. His Honour had before him a pre-sentence report which referred extensively to various matters relating to the appellant's mental health. His Honour specifically referred to the appellant's mental illness as being a mitigating factor. His Honour's comment that mental illness 'was not so much' mitigating when the offender had voluntarily consumed an unknown drug and had offended whilst under the influence of it, is consistent with authority that the mitigating effect of mental illness is counterbalanced against the need to protect the community from the risk of future offending, particularly where the offender has a history of offending and voluntarily consuming drugs.[5]
[5] Mason v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 43 [64] and the cases referred to therein.
There was no necessity for the magistrate to say more about the mitigatory effects of the appellant's mental illness given that the appellant told the author of the pre‑sentence report that he committed the offence whilst under the influence of drugs, that he had a full memory of the events, and that he was not then suffering from any mental health issues. The plea in mitigation was to the same effect. I also note that the author of the pre‑sentence report did not record in the report that at interview she noted the presence of any symptoms of mental illness.
In short, the appellant did not attempt to prove at sentencing or on appeal that there was a causal connection between his mental illness and his offending. If he had done so his mental illness would have been a more significant mitigating factor. To the contrary, before the magistrate, he sought to minimise the effect of his mental illness on his offending and life, in general. In those circumstances, the appellant's mental illness was one matter for the magistrate to take into account in mitigation of sentence and this he did.
Grounds 1 and 2
At the hearing of the appeal the appellant's counsel acknowledged that grounds 1 and 2 raise the same issue which is that in all the circumstances the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Recently, in Krencej v The State of Western Australia,[6] the Court of Appeal said the following about the principles to be applied in determining a ground of appeal which alleges manifest excess:
The ground of appeal asserts implied rather than express error. The general principles governing appeals contending that error should be inferred on the basis that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, or that a total effective sentence infringes the totality principle, are well established:
(1)Sentencing is a discretionary exercise. An appellate court can intervene only if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. … Implied error arises where the end result is so unreasonable or unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. Thus, an appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised a sentencing discretion differently.
(2)In order to determine whether a sentence for an individual offence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, the offence should be viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law for the crime, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of crimes of that type, and the offender's personal circumstances.
(3)…
(4)The range of sentences customarily imposed for a crime does not establish the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. Sentences customarily imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors, and that there is no single correct sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which sentences imposed in comparable cases reveal and reflect.
(5)When this court dismisses an appeal against sentence and when it resentences on a successful appeal, its decision does not fix the upper or lower limit of the range.
(6)...
[6] Krencej v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 82 [55].
It is common ground that the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 86 provides that it was not open for the magistrate to impose a sentence of 6 months' imprisonment or less. Further, before the magistrate could suspend any sentence of imprisonment, he had to be satisfied that a sentence of more than 6 months' imprisonment to be immediately served was the only appropriate sentence to be imposed.[7]
[7] Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 76(2).
I do not underestimate the frustration for magistrates who must commonly sentence offenders for whom, absent these statutory provisions, they would conclude that a sentence of 6 months' imprisonment or less, suspended or not, would be an appropriate penalty. However, Parliament has provided that such offenders must not be sentenced to imprisonment or suspended imprisonment. That is the law which must be applied in this appeal.
I turn now to consider the issues identified as being relevant to an assessment of whether a sentence is manifestly excessive.
Maximum penalty
The maximum penalty for an offence under the CIA s 153(1) is a fine of $12,000 and 12 months' imprisonment. A sentence of 7 months' imprisonment is 58% of the maximum penalty of 12 months' imprisonment. However, it is relevant that theoretically both 12 months' imprisonment and a fine could be imposed.
In order to view the sentence in light of the offence's maximum penalty, it is also necessary to take into account that as the magistrate determined that the appellant ought to be given 25% discount for his plea of guilty, the maximum penalty taking into that discount that the magistrate could have imposed was 9 months' imprisonment; 7 months' imprisonment is 77% of 9 months' imprisonment.
It is also necessary to take into account that the appellant had spent 29 days in custody. Thus, as the respondent accepts, the appellant was sentenced close to the maximum penalty that could have been imposed given those circumstances.
Standard of sentencing
There have been an insufficient number of offences against the CIA s 153(1) which have been the subject of appeal from which to discern sentencing standards, established on appeal, for such an offence. It is not in dispute from the submissions of the parties and what I have observed on the records of many offenders over many years that most offences under s 153(1) result in fines of less than $1,000.
This position is confirmed by the appeal cases which have considered the penalties for offences against the CIA s 153(1). In Durward v Belton,[8] an appeal against a sentence of 6 months 1 day imprisonment suspended for 12 months was successful. The matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for resentencing. Pritchard J (as she then was) also noted that Mr Durward had received modest fines of less than $300 for previous offences against the CIA s 153(1).
[8] Durward v Belton [2012] WASC 479.
In Bropho v Harrison,[9] the appellant was charged with failing to comply with a move on order which she had been given in relation to an area within the Perth CBD. Two days later, she was in a nearby area and charged with carrying an item with intent to cause fear that someone would be injured. Over five months later, she was again charged with failing to comply with a move on order given in relation to a nearby area. The appellant pleaded guilty to all three offences and was sentenced to 1 month imprisonment for each offence of the failing to comply with an order of a police officer and 6 months' imprisonment for the carrying offence. The magistrate ordered that the sentence for the first offence of failing to comply with an order of a police officer be served concurrently with the sentence for the carrying offence but that the sentence for the second offence of failing to comply with an order of a police officer be served cumulatively on those two sentences. The total sentence was 7 months' imprisonment.
[9] Bropho v Harrison [2013] WASC 250.
Hall J found that the sentences imposed for the offences of the failing to comply with an order of a police officer were manifestly excessive. His Honour said that Durward v Belton was indicative that the sentences were excessive. He also noted that there were no circumstances of aggravation and that given the offender's personal circumstances, there were some matters in mitigation. He concluded that there was nothing about the move on order offences which justified a conclusion that imprisonment was the only appropriate penalty. The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for resentencing.
In Hayward v Martin,[10] I allowed an appeal against a sentence of a 12 month community based order imposed for three minor offence of failing to comply with move on orders. I said that given the 7 months which the appellant had spent on the programme in the Intellectual Disability Diversion Court for those and other offences, the appellant's personal circumstances and the minor nature of the offences it was appropriate that no penalty be imposed for them.
[10] Hayward v Martin [2014] WASC 309.
Seriousness of offence
Next, I turn to consider the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of offences of failing to comply with a police order. As Pritchard J noted in Durward v Belton,[11] an offence under the CIA s 153(1) may be committed by breaching orders other than a move on order. For example, by breaching an order not to enter the place where a search warrant is being executed.
[11] Durward v Belton [2012] WASC 479 [13].
Pritchard J concluded that an offence under the CIA s 153(1) committed as a result of a failure to comply with a move on order is very much likely to be at the lesser end of the spectrum of seriousness of offences under that section.[12] I do not disagree with this assessment.
[12] Durward v Belton [2012] WASC 479 [19].
In the end though, the circumstances of each offence have to be judged. The fact that the appellant's offence was associated with the appellant being found in the vicinity in another person's home[13] puts the facts of it at middle to above middle of the scale of seriousness of offences under the CIA s 153(1). However it was equally important to ensure that the appellant was not sentenced for an offence with which he was not charged. He was not charged with burglary or trespass and he should not have been sentenced on the basis that he had committed either such offence.
[13] The statement of facts read by the prosecutor are ambiguous as to whether the home was within the exclusion area or not. However, Ms Sinton conceded that the proceedings in the Magistrates Court were conducted on the basis that the home was in or very close to the exclusion zone. This factual assumption was not never questioned by the duty lawyer, therefore, the appeal should be determined on the basis that it is correct.
Appellant's personal circumstances
Lastly, it is necessary to consider the appellant's personal circumstances of which the magistrate was aware at the time of sentencing.
As discussed earlier in these reasons, there were matters personal to the appellant which mitigated sentence. The appellant's mental illness and his early plea of guilty were the most relevant matters. However, the magistrate had to weigh those matters in light of the need for a generally and personally deterrent penalty given the facts of the offence. It also had to be taken into account that the appellant did not receive credit for other common mitigating circumstances such as youth and prior good character. Further, his prior offences of obstructing police meant that he could not be given credit for this being conduct that was out of character.
However, a very relevant sentencing factor was that the appellant had, by the time he came to be sentenced, spent 29 days in custody for this offence. That in itself was a significant personal and general deterrent.
Conclusion
Taking into account all these matters, I find that it was not open to the magistrate to conclude that a sentence of 7 months' imprisonment, albeit suspended, was the only appropriate penalty for the offence. The maximum sentence for the offence, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the offence occupies in the scale of seriousness of offences of breaching police order, and the appellant's personal circumstances as known to the magistrate did not warrant this conclusion.
Given this conclusion, the sentence ought to be set aside and the appellant resentenced for the offence.
The appellant submits that he should have received a fine for the offence. I do not agree that was the only appropriate type of penalty to be imposed. It would have been open to the magistrate to impose a community based order or an intensive supervision order.
There are changes which have occurred to the appellant's circumstances which should be taken into account in resentencing.[14] Ms Sinton advised me from the bar table that in June 2019 the appellant spent approximately 1 month as an involuntary patient in a hospital. Since then, he had been complying with the conditions of his conditionally suspended imprisonment order. His only new charge being possession of smoking implement had been referred to the START Court.[15] He is next to appear on 9 October 2019 in the START Court.
[14] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 41(4).
[15] I understand that the START Court is a Magistrates Court which specialises in dealing with offenders who have mental health issues.
In light these circumstances, it would not be appropriate for me to resentence the appellant without receiving a presentence report to confirm these events, the reasons for them and to ascertain the appellant's progress. All of these matters would be known to the START Court.
Rather than me running a concurrent sentencing process, it would be most efficient for the START Court to resentence the appellant for this offence at the time as it deals with the appellant for the other matters.
I will remit it to the Magistrates Court for that purpose.
I also heard submissions from Ms Sinton as to whether, if the appeal was determined in the appellant's favour, the sentence ought to be set aside from the date it was imposed or some later date. Quite properly, Ms Sinton submits that as the sentence was lawful, she is not asking that it be set aside from any date other than the date on which I make the order. She acknowledges that this means that the appellant if he has been or is convicted of the offence of possession of a smoking implement will still be in breach of the magistrate's sentence. However, the appellant's counsel will ask the START court to take into account the outcome of this appeal in determining whether the appellant ought to be ordered to serve any part of the sentence. Clearly, in light of these reasons, it would not be just to order him to do so. However, that is a matter which must be dealt with by the Magistrates Court.
Orders
For the above reasons, the orders of the court are:
(1)an extension of time within which to appeal is granted;
(2)leave to appeal on ground 3 is refused;
(3)leave to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 is granted;
(4)the appeal against sentence is allowed;
(5)the sentence is set aside from today;
(6)the charge is remitted to the Perth Magistrates Court on 9 October 2019 for resentencing by any magistrate; and
(7)the parties have leave to apply in respect to the precise orders.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
LW
Associate to the Honourable Justice Jenkins2 OCTOBER 2019
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