Cormie v Orchard

Case [2001] QCA 546


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Cormie v Orchard & Anor [2001] QCA 546
PARTIES: ANNETTE CHRISTINE CORMIE
(plaintiff/appellant)
v
MARK RAYMOND ORCHARD
(first defendant/first respondent)
EBSWORTH & EBSWORTH (a firm)
(second defendant/second respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 7419 of 2001
SC No 12033 of 1998
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON: 30 November 2001
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 27 November 2001
JUDGES: McMurdo P, Thomas JA and Atkinson J
Judgment of the Court
ORDER:

1.   Allow the appeal.

2.   The respondent Orchard to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed.

3.   The order of 20 July 2001 be set aside and replaced with an order granting leave to bring the amended application but dismissing the first defendant’s application to amend his defence and further ordering the first defendant to pay the costs of the plaintiff and of the second defendant of that application to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PRACTICE UNDER RULES OF COURT – PLEADING – AMENDMENT – DISCONTINUANCE - first solicitor failed to plead limitation defence – where plaintiff accordingly discontinued alternative claim against second solicitor – after matter set down for trial first solicitor granted leave to plead a limitation defence – where order also permitted plaintiff to re-join the second solicitor – where trial judge considered limitation period for the plaintiff’s claim against the second solicitor not expired –whether order ought to have been made – whether plaintiff prejudiced by order – discretion to permit late amendments to pleadings miscarried

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE – COUNTER OFFER - whether promisee’s description of offer as ‘offer to settle’ converted his acceptance into a counter offer – agreement to discontinue action – whether plaintiff’s right of action destroyed

Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s 99(2)
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 69(2), 74(4), r 74(5), r 304(2), r 310(1)

The Owners of the Cargo of the Kronprinz v The Owners of the Cargo of the Kronprinz (1887) 12 App Cas 256, considered

COUNSEL: P A Keane QC with G R Mullins for the appellant
H B Fraser QC with J A McDougal for the first respondent
SOLICITORS: Quinn & Scattini for the appellant
Quinlan Miller & Treston for the first respondent
  1. THE COURT: This is a plaintiff’s appeal against an order granting leave to a defendant to amend his defence so as to raise a defence under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The order also permits the plaintiff to proceed to join a second defendant to the action, in respect of whom the plaintiff had previously filed a notice of discontinuance. The making of such an order was opposed by the plaintiff and the second defendant.

  1. The appellant (“the plaintiff”) was injured in a workplace incident in Moree in July 1985.  It is common ground that legal proceedings for damages…

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AGLC
Cormie v Orchard [2001] QCA 546
Case
[2001] QCA 546
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cormie v Orchard involved a dispute concerning the validity of a limitation defence in a professional negligence claim. The plaintiff, Cormie, sought to hold two defendants, Orchard and another solicitor, liable for negligence in the handling of a legal matter. After the first solicitor, Orchard, failed to plead a limitation defence, Cormie discontinued an alternative claim against the second solicitor. When the matter was set down for trial, the first solicitor, Orchard, was granted leave to plead the limitation defence. The order also permitted Cormie to re-join the second solicitor. The trial judge found that the limitation period for Cormie’s claim against the second solicitor had not expired. Cormie appealed, arguing that the order permitting the amendment of the pleadings and the re-joining of the second solicitor was improper and prejudicial.

The court was required to determine whether the trial judge correctly exercised the discretion to permit the late amendment of pleadings. It was also necessary to assess whether Cormie was prejudiced by the trial judge's order and whether the acceptance of Orchard's offer to settle constituted a counter-offer. Furthermore, the court needed to decide whether the agreement to discontinue the action against the second solicitor resulted in the destruction of Cormie's right of action against that party.

The court found that the trial judge miscarried in the exercise of the discretion to permit late amendments to pleadings. The court held that the order permitting Orchard to plead the limitation defence and the re-joining of the second solicitor was not appropriate. The court found that Cormie was prejudiced by the order, as it allowed Orchard to raise a limitation defence that should not have been entertained at that stage of the proceedings. Additionally, the court held that the description of the offer as an "offer to settle" did not convert Cormie's acceptance into a counter-offer. The court concluded that the agreement to discontinue the action against the second solicitor did not result in the destruction of Cormie's right of action against that party. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the order of 20 July 2001 was set aside and replaced with an order granting leave to bring the amended application but dismissing Orchard's application to amend his defence. Orchard was further ordered to pay the costs of the plaintiff and of the second defendant of that application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Allow the appeal.

2. The respondent Orchard to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed.

3. The order of 20 July 2001 be set aside and replaced with an order granting leave to bring the amended application but dismissing the first defendant’s application to amend his defence and further ordering the first defendant to pay the costs of the plaintiff and of the second defendant of that application to be assessed on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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