Coregas Pty Ltd v Penford Australia Pty Ltd

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Court of Appeal

New South Wales

Case Title: Coregas Pty Limited v Penford Australia Pty Limited
Medium Neutral Citation: [2012] NSWCA 350
Hearing Date(s): 18 September 2012
Decision Date: 01 November 2012
Jurisdiction:
Before: MEAGHER JA at [1]
HOEBEN JA at [2]
BERGIN CJ in EQ at [137]
Decision:

(1) The appeal is allowed in part.
(2) The judgment that the respondent is entitled to contribution of 50 percent of the amount paid to the worker is set aside.
(3) In lieu thereof, there should be judgment that the respondent is entitled to contribution of 25 percent of the amount paid by it to the worker.
(4) The respondent is to pay 50 percent of the appellant's costs of the appeal.
(5) Otherwise the orders made by his Honour are confirmed.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords: TORT - negligence - employee injured manoeuvring a large gas cylinder down a ramp - employee successful in claim against employer - claim for contribution by employer against supplier of gas cylinders - gas cylinders supplied in cage with ramp - whether duty of care owed by supplier of gas cylinders to employee - risk of injury reasonably foreseeable - integrated purpose built ramp invited particular method of unloading which was hazardous - duty of care found to exist - apportionment of liability between employer and supplier of gas cylinders - primary judge took into account factually incorrect consideration and failed to take into account relevant matters - need to re-assess apportionment - breach of duty of care - causation - application of "but for" test - EVIDENCE - admissibility of expert evidence - relevance of evidence - compliance with s 79(1) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) - necessary expertise established.
Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002, s 5B
Evidence Act 1995, s 79(1)
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5
Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s 19
Workers Compensation Act, 1987 (NSW) -
s 151Z(1)(d))
Cases Cited: A V Jennings Pty Ltd v Maumill (1956) 30 ALJR 100 at 101
Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258; 75 NSWLR 649 at [103]
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; 243 CLR 588 at [32]
Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins [2003] HCA 51; 215 CLR 315
Hamilton v Nuroof (WA) Pty Ltd [1956] HCA 42; 96 CLR 18 at 24
Indigo Mist Pty Ltd v Palmer [2012] NSWCA 239
Kondis v State Transport Authority [984] HCA 61; 154 CLR 672
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11; 243 CLR 361
McPherson's Limited v Eaton and Ors…
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Details
Case
[2012] NSWCA 350
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Coregas Pty Ltd (the appellant) appealed a decision of the primary judge who found it liable to contribute to damages paid by Penford Australia Pty Ltd (the respondent) to an injured worker. The worker was injured while manoeuvring a large gas cylinder down a ramp as part of the respondent's dextrin production process. The gas cylinders were supplied by the appellant in a cage that included a ramp. The respondent had successfully claimed contribution from the appellant, arguing the appellant owed a duty of care to the worker.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the supplier of the gas cylinders owed a duty of care to the respondent's employee, whether that duty was breached, and whether the supplier's actions caused the worker's injury. The court also considered whether the primary judge had erred in the apportionment of liability between the parties, specifically by taking into account a factually incorrect consideration and failing to consider relevant matters. The admissibility and relevance of expert evidence concerning slips, falls, and the safety of the unloading system were also pertinent.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal in part, found that the supplier did owe a duty of care to the employee. This duty arose because the integrated, purpose-built ramp, supplied with the gas cylinders, invited a particular method of unloading that was found to be hazardous. The court rejected the appellant's argument that factual causation was not established. However, the court determined that the primary judge had erred in the apportionment of liability, having relied on an incorrect factual premise and failed to consider relevant factors. Consequently, the court varied the contribution order.

The orders of the Court of Appeal were that the appeal be allowed in part, setting aside the judgment for 50 percent contribution and substituting it with a judgment for 25 percent contribution. The respondent was ordered to pay 50 percent of the appellant's costs of the appeal, with other orders of the primary judge being confirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) The appeal is allowed in part.

(2) The judgment that the respondent is entitled to contribution of 50 percent of the amount paid to the worker is set aside.

(3) In lieu thereof, there should be judgment that the respondent is entitled to contribution of 25 percent of the amount paid by it to the worker.

(4) The respondent is to pay 50 percent of the appellant's costs of the appeal.

(5) Otherwise the orders made by his Honour are confirmed.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent also brought proceedings pursuant to s 19 of the Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) and for an indemnity pursuant to s 151Z(1)(d) of the Workers Compensation Act, 1987 (NSW). His Honour dismissed the claim under the Sale of Goods Act 1923. He suggested that the claim to an indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 be dealt with consistently with his conclusion as to contribution. That claim was not addressed in the short minutes of order agreed by the parties and is not the subject of any relief sought by the notice of appeal.Factual background With the exception of two matters, the parties were in agreement as to his Honour's findings of fact. The respondent's premises where the accident occurred operated as a dextrin plant. The process involved taking starch and by a chemical reaction, converting it into dextrin. Dextrin is a dry product which is used as an ingredient in the confectionary industry and as a flocculant in the mining industry to separate ore. The hydrochloric gas/liquid supplied by the appellant was injected into a dextrin reactor and blended with the product. The reactors in the plant were supplied by a German company and the gas installation was set up by a predecessor to the appellant. The gas installation comprised a mechanical connection through the building involving pipe work from gas cylinders to the dextrin reactors. The gas cylinders were stored in the cage in which they were delivered in an area outside the factory in the open air. This was done for safety reasons because they contained a dangerous toxin that needed ventilation. In due course, the cylinders were transferred from that location to another open area which had a roof over it on the outside of the building. It was there that the cylinders were connected to the pipe work. The agreement for the supply of gas by the appellant to the respondent was in evidence (Blue 2). In that agreement, the appellant undertook to:"Supply materials and services to specification subject to agreed lead times." The appellant called no oral evidence. Mr Segerius, the Operations Manager of the respondent in 2005, gave this evidence. "Q. Does that help you to recall that when you inspected the area shortly after the accident, you observed that the cages were marked with the brand name "BASF"?A. Yes.Q. And the gas bottles were similarly marked?A. Yes.Q. May I have that document back please. And to your knowledge BASF was the manufacturer of the gas that you used, is that so?A. I don't know.Q. Do the cages as they now present themselves ---...Q. Do they have a BASF marking on them or not?A. I don't know." (Blue 39D-N) On the basis of that evidence, the trial judge was asked to infer that the appellant did not manufacture the gas and did not manufacture the cages, but that both these items were manufactured and provided to the appellant by another entity, BASF. There was no evidence as to the relationship between the appellant and BASF. While he was not prepared to draw that inference, his Honour approached the claim on the assumption that this proposition was correct.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The second factual issue which was not agreed between the parties was whether the ramp on which the worker slipped was of the longer or shorter kind. Although the evidence is not clear on this issue, what is clear from an exchange between counsel for the parties and his Honour at Black 80F - N, is that at the trial both parties proceeded on the basis that the worker had slipped on the longer ramp. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the appeal should proceed on that basis.The expert evidence There was evidence from three experts - Mr Dohrmann and Dr Cooke (for the respondent) and Mr Horrigan (for the appellant). Only Dr Cooke was required for cross-examination. There was little, if any, disagreement between those experts. Mr Dohrmann was a professional consulting engineer, with expertise in slips and falls, who was commissioned by the worker to provide expert evidence in his claim against the respondent. The focus of his report of September 2007 was on the liability of the respondent. Mr Dohrmann did not inspect the respondent's premises nor a similar cage and ramp. Mr Dohrmann found that there was insufficient room on the ramp to use the supplied trolley and as a result, there was no option but that the worker manhandle the unstable, heavy metal cylinder down a slope. He considered that this task was made more difficult because the sloping metal surface was wet. He concluded that the worker slipped partly due to the lack of traction underfoot and partly due to the posture which he adopted while manhandling the cylinder. Mr Dohrmann characterised the system of work as "a recipe for an accident". (Blue 32W) Mr Dohrmann concluded that the respondent could have taken the following measures to prevent exposing the worker to such a risk of injury:Carrying out a safety audit.Providing effective training in safe lifting techniques.Providing a wider platform at the front of the cage to enable a trolley to be used on the horizontal surface.Providing a slip-resistant surface on the ramp.Providing a roof over the cage and storing the bottles level with the ground on a concrete pad. In relation to the respondent's "Incident Report" (Blue 21) which asserted that "it is standard practice around Australia to manhandle cylinders in this way", Mr Dohrmann said:"I would agree that the practice of rolling and manoeuvring gas cylinders onto flat platforms on trolleys (at ground level) is common; however, the practice of requiring people to manoeuvre a heavy cylinder down a wet (and assumed slippery) surface certainly is not, and ought not be regarded as "standard practice"." (Blue 39L - M) Dr Cooke was a consulting architect and a member of the Standards of Australia Sub-committee of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects. He also was an expert on slips and falls. As indicated, he inspected cylinder cages at the respondent's site in June 2009 and conducted co-efficient of friction tests on a similar kind of ramp. His Honour was satisfied that the cage and ramp tested in 2009 by Dr Cooke were sufficiently similar to yield results which were indicative of slip resistance of the ramp involved in the accident in 2005 (Red 27G).

Decision

Reasons for decision

BERGIN CJ
For these reasons, the appellant's argument that his Honour erred in finding factual causation is rejected. This ground of appeal has not been made out.Conclusion It follows from the above that the appellant has been partially successful in the appeal in that I have found error in his Honour's apportionment of liability. Otherwise, the appellant's challenge to his Honour's finding of liability against it has failed. Since most of the appeal was devoted to the appellant's challenge to liability, the appellant should not have the whole of its costs of the appeal, even though it has been partially successful. In the circumstances of this appeal, it is reasonable that the appellant recover 50 percent of its costs. The situation is different in relation to the trial. Except for brief submissions as to apportionment, the trial focused entirely upon liability. Since the respondent was successful on that issue, the appellant should pay the costs of the trial. The orders which I propose are as follows:(1) The appeal is allowed in part.(2) The judgment that the respondent is entitled to contribution of 50 percent of the amount paid to the worker is set aside.(3) In lieu thereof, there should be judgment that the respondent is entitled to contribution of 25 percent of the amount paid by it to the worker.(4) The respondent is to pay 50 percent of the appellant's costs of the appeal.(5) Otherwise the orders made by his Honour are confirmed. in EQ: I agree with Hoeben JA.**********

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BERGIN CJ

Full text does not contain this section.