IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLANDBrisbane No.1321 of 1994
Before the Hon. Mr Justice Mackenzie
[Coomera Resort P/L v Kolback Securities Ltd & Ors]
BETWEEN:
COOMERA RESORT PTY LTD
ACN 050 911 156
Plaintiff
AND:
KOLBACK SECURITIES LIMITED
ACN 010 560 586
First Defendant
AND:
KOLBACK GROUP LIMITED
ACN 003 190 501
Second Defendant
AND:
PAUL LEVINSON BOND
Third Defendant
AND:
LANDBASE HOLDINGS LIMITED
Fourth Defendant
AND:
YUZO NAGANO
Fifth Defendant
AND:
ROBERT ADRIAN PITT
Sixth Defendant
AND:
P.R.D. REALTY PTY LTD
ACN 009 954 956
Seventh Defendant
AND:
DONALD DIETZ
Eighth Defendant
CATCHWORDS: DAMAGES - whether the necessary elements of tortious conspiracy have been proved - whether expenses incurred are recoverable as damages or costs.
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No.2) 1990 2 VR 636
British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori (1949) 1 Ch.556
Counsel:Mr S Doyle SC with him Mr L Kelly for the plaintiff
Mr J Sheahan for the 7th & 8th defendants
Solicitors: Clayton Utz for the plaintiff
Thynne & Macartney for the 7th & 8th defendants
Hearing date: 31 August 1998
FURTHER REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - MACKENZIE J.
Judgment delivered 2 October 1998
These reasons address the question whether a necessary element of tortious conspiracy, that damage be proved, has been established in this case. The original judgment delivered on 20 February 1998 left this issue to be resolved after further submissions on the evidence relating to the issues. The relevant passage in the original judgment is as follows:-
“... in some circumstances costs of unravelling the conspiracy which are not recoverable as costs of the action may be recovered as damages for conspiracy. The statement relied on by Coomera is in British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori (1949) 1 Ch 556, 569. ..... Speaking in the context of conspiracy to procure breach of contract, Roxburgh J said the following:
‘ ... To resist such a counter-attack and also counter-attacks from various other directions, the plaintiffs maintain, and must maintain, a large investigation department, and the money actually expended in unravelling and detecting the unlawful machinations of the defendants which have been proved in this case before any proceedings could be taken must have been considerable. I can see no reason for not treating the expenses so incurred which could not be recovered as part of the costs of the action as directly attributable to their tort or torts. That these expenses cannot be precisely quantified is true, but it is also immaterial. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have proved the damage which is essential to the tort of conspiracy.’
The focus in that passage is evidence that expenses could not be recovered as part of the costs of the action. It is by no means clear, since the question of quantum was not developed at this stage of proceedings, whether there are damages in this category. Further, the facts in Salvadori, where protective measures were necessary, are rather…
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- Case
- [1998] QSC 216
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court were whether damages were at large in cases involving conspiracy and whether certain expenditures incurred by Coomera in investigating the Landbase issue were recoverable as damages. The court needed to determine whether these expenditures, which were incurred in the context of an investigation into the alleged conspiracy, were reasonably foreseeable and therefore recoverable.
In its reasoning, the court referred to the principle that damages are at large in conspiracy cases, as articulated in several precedent cases. The court held that while all damages foreseeable at the time of the tort are recoverable, there is a duty to mitigate. The court further held that certain costs incurred by Coomera in investigating the Landbase issue were reasonably foreseeable and thus recoverable, provided they were related to the investigation itself and not to constructing a theory that ultimately failed. However, the court noted that costs which were recoverable as costs were not also recoverable as damages.
Ultimately, the court determined that the plaintiff could recover certain expenditures incurred in investigating the Landbase issue, subject to the duty to mitigate. However, it clarified that any costs that were recoverable as costs could not also be claimed as damages. The court's decision underscored the importance of distinguishing between costs and damages in the context of conspiracy cases.
The final orders of the court would reflect the determination of the recoverable damages, ensuring that Coomera was compensated for the foreseeable expenses incurred in investigating the Landbase issue, while also making clear that certain costs were not to be double-counted as both costs and damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Damages are at large in this kind of case. As Brooking J said in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No.2) (1990) 2 VR 636, 645:-“Damage is the gist of the action with ..... conspiracy. But the plaintiff is not obliged to prove what is sometimes called specific and sometimes called special damage. He will establish his cause of action if he induces the tribunal of fact to infer from the tendency of the defendant’s act in all the circumstances, that the act caused him some damage: Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. v Gregory and Co. [1896] 1 Q.B.147; Goldsoll v Goldman [1914] 2 Ch.603; Pratt v British Medical Association [1919] 1 K.B. 244; British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson [1938] 4 All E.R. 504, at p.511; Bents Brewery Co. Ltd. v Hogan [1945] 2 All E.R. 570, at p.578 and British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori [1949] Ch.556, at pp.566-7. It has often been said in these and other reported cases that damages are at large: see, for example, in addition to the decisions just cited, G.W.K. Co Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 T.L.R. 376, at p.377 and Coal Miners Industrial Union of Workers of Western Australia, Collie v True (1959) 33 A.L.J.R. 224, at p.228.” In principle, all damages foreseeable at the time of the tort are recoverable subject to the duty to mitigate. Evidence relied on by the plaintiff to establish loss relates to various expenditures which, it is submitted, were incurred in attempting to investigate and unravel the Landbase issue. As a matter of broad general principle, once the issue of Landbase’s entitlement to commission was opened up, it would be reasonably foreseeable that there may be an investigation on Coomera’s behalf whether a conspiracy existed between Bond and Dietz, and that making the investigation would involve perusal of documentation which might tend to prove its existence and interviewing people who may reveal facts of which they were aware with a view to establishing what had happened. In principle, if the exercise extended to constructing a theory (which, by reason of the findings in the principal judgment, failed) that Pitt was involved in the arrangement between Bond and Dietz, there is no reason why PRD should bear the costs of that aspect of the investigation. It follows from Salvadori that anything recoverable as costs is not recoverable as damages. The writ in the present case was issued on 26 August 1994. There had been a formal demand by PRD’s solicitors for payment of the first instalment of commission in November 1992, but that had gone quiescent following correspondence entered into after the decision at an MCM that Pitt should write to PRD about it. By August 1993, at the latest, the stance being taken by Coomera was that PRD would be paid no commission until the Landbase matter was resolved. The immediate stimulus for the investigation was that Bond had lost Omura’s confidence and had started proceedings by issuing a writ on 20 November 1992 in respect of breach of his agreement with Coomera. His appointment as Coomera’s alternate delegate for the purpose of attending MCM’s had been terminated at an MCM on 25 November 1992. The role that he had previously performed was given at that meeting to Mr Ikeda, who had commenced an involvement with the affairs of Coomera in relation to the venture agreement in the early days of that month.