Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commission [2012] FCAFC 44

Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commission [2012] FCAFC 44
Appeal from: Australian Building & Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2011] FCA 810
Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
File number: WAD 338 of 2011
Judges: KEANE CJ, RARES & BARKER JJ
Date of judgment: 27 March 2012
Catchwords: COMPENSATION – whether actual damages suffered by conduct of another person as a result of the contravention – causation – whether mitigation of losses – quantum of damage – object of statute
Legislation: Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Cases cited: Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons Ltd [1932] AC 452 followed
Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and New Zealand Ltd v Murphy (1973) 47 ALJR 122 referred to
King v Yurisich (2006) 153 FCR 78 followed
March v E & HM Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 followed
Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 referred to
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 followed
Date of hearing: 9 March 2012
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 72
Solicitor for the Appellant: Slater & Gordon
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms K A Vernon
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J L Bourke
Mr M Felman
Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 338 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Respondent

JUDGES:

KEANE CJ, RARES & BARKER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MARCH 2012

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed and that the CFMEU pay the ABCC’s costs of the appeal to be taxed if not earlier agreed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 338 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Respondent

JUDGES:

KEANE CJ, RARES & BARKER JJ

DATE:

27 MARCH 2012

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. In June 2009 the appellant, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (the CFMEU), engaged in unlawful industrial action in contravention of s 38 of the Building andConstruction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) (the BCII Act). The unlawful action occurred over five days at a construction site where Diploma Constructions (WA) Pty Ltd (Diploma) was engaged in a building project.

  2. The respondent, the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (the ABCC) applied for an order for civil penalties and for an order that the CFMEU pay damages to…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal brought by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) against a decision of the Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC). The CFMEU argued that the ABCC had erred in its determination that the CFMEU's unlawful industrial action had caused a delay in the completion of a construction project. The court was required to determine whether the CFMEU's industrial action had caused the delay claimed by the ABCC, and if so, whether the CFMEU was liable for the resultant damages.

The court found that the CFMEU's industrial action had indeed caused a delay in the completion of the project. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the industrial action disrupted critical path work and caused a delay equivalent to the five days of industrial action. The court held that the CFMEU was liable for the damages resulting from this delay, as the primary judge had correctly found that the CFMEU's conduct had caused the delay and that the CFMEU had failed to mitigate its losses.

In light of this finding, the court rejected the CFMEU's appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed. The CFMEU was also ordered to pay the ABCC's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

This case highlights the importance of ensuring that building industry participants are held accountable for their unlawful conduct, and that the courts will uphold the statutory purpose of the Building and Construction Industry Improvements Act 2005 (Cth) in this regard. The court's decision also emphasises the need for parties to provide clear and compelling evidence in support of their claims, particularly where factual findings are at issue.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed and that the CFMEU pay the ABCC’s costs of the appeal to be taxed if not earlier agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

We propose now to set out the factual and legislative background to the proceedings. We will then refer to the relevant aspects of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment (Reasons) before turning to address the arguments agitated on appeal.THE FACTS On 1 July 2008, Diploma entered into a contract with Knoxville Group Limited to construct a 14-level commercial office tower project located at 915 Hay Street, Perth (the project). Clause 35.8 of the contract provided relevantly:If the Date of Practical Completion is earlier than the Date for Practical Completion the principal shall pay the Contractor the bonus stated in the Annexure for every day after the Date of Practical Completion to and including the Date for Practical Completion.… The Annexure to the contract provided:Bonus per day for Early Practical Completion $9,000 per dayLimit of Bonus Not applicable The “Date of Practical Completion” was defined under the contract as:[T]he date certified by the Superintendent in a Certificate of Practical Completion issued pursuant to clause 42.5, to be the date upon which Practical Completion was reached. Clause 42.5 provided that the Superintendent must give a Certificate of Practical Completion certifying the Date of Practical Completion to the Contractor and to the Principal. Under the terms of the contract, the original date for Practical Completion was 29 April 2011. On 29 June 2010, the Superintendent issued his Certificate of Practical Completion, certifying that the date of Practical Completion was 15 April 2010. As a result, Diploma was entitled, under cl 35.8 of the Contract, to an early completion bonus of $9,000 for every day in the period from 15 April 2010 to 29 April 2011. At trial the ABCC submitted that, as a result of the five days of unlawful industrial action, the date of Practical Completion was delayed by five days. Extensions of time for practical completion were not available to Diploma for the industrial action in question. Under cl 35.5 of the contract, Diploma bore all risk of delay other than for specified exceptions. The only exception specified in relation to industrial action was:a strike…which concurrently affects the Site and the building industry on a State-wide or nationwide basis and which is not specific to the Contractor, the Contractor's associates or the Site… It is common ground that the industrial action on 5, 6, 8, 24 and 25 June 2009 at the Hay Street site was not a strike of the kind described in cl 35.5 of the contract. It was an agreed fact at the trial that each of the strikes caused a delay of progress in construction of the building. The CFMEU admitted having contravened s 38 of the BCII Act by being involved in unlawful industrial action at the project site on 5, 6, 8, 24 and 25 June 2009. The industrial action involved employees of Diploma who were members of the CFMEU either failing to perform work or failing to attend for work on each of the five days. It is also common ground that the industrial action disrupted work on the project.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, we reject this ground of appeal. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS The CFMEU has failed to make good any of its grounds of challenge to the decision of the primary judge. We order that the appeal be dismissed and that the CFMEU pay the ABCC’s costs of the appeal to be taxed if not earlier agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

We propose to consider, in turn, the arguments advanced in relation to these grounds.CONSIDERATIONGround 1: delay in completion of the project The CFMEU argues that s 49(1)(b) of the BCII Act requires a causal connection between the actual damage suffered by Diploma and the contraventions by ABCC. It contends that the primary judge erred in finding that Diploma would have completed the project five days earlier than it did had the industrial action not occurred. It is common ground that whether conduct is a cause of damage is a question of fact to be resolved by a value judgement involving ordinary notions of language and commonsense: March v E & HM Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506. The ABCC contends that this question of fact is to be approached bearing in mind the statutory purpose of s 49(1)(b) of the BCII Act. In light of the main statutory objects of the BCII Act contained in s 3(2), it contends that the Court should favour an application of s 49(1)(b) which “ensur[es] that building industry participants are accountable for their unlawful conduct”. The CFMEU argues that the primary judge’s conclusion as to delay to the completion of the project was based on the “theoretical” evidence of Mr Schober unsupported by facts. In response, the ABCC contends that Mr Schober’s opinion was based on his professional experience and knowledge of the project including Diploma’s documents such as work diaries. It is also supported by the evidence of Mr Day and Mr Buchan. The CFMEU argues that it was unclear from their evidence which workers on the site were performing “critical path” works on the days of the industrial action or which “critical path” works were delayed. The ABCC responds that it is sufficient to sustain his Honour’s findings that only some of the workers who took industrial action were doing “critical path” works; that it was unnecessary to reconstruct the project by identifying the specific tasks involved in the “critical path” and which of those tasks caused further delay; and that the quality of the ABCC’s evidence was a question of weight for the primary judge. The CFMEU continues to urge the point that the project finished twelve months earlier than the initial date for practical completion and 35 days earlier than even the varied date for practical completion. The ABCC contends, in response, that this submission is misconceived; the fact that Diploma finished early does not meet the point that the project could have finished an additional five days earlier but for the industrial action. In this regard, the CFMEU argues that the only way to know whether the project would have finished five days earlier but for the industrial action was to review the construction program and ascertain whether time was, or could have been, made up. In the course of argument, counsel for the CFMEU accepted that there was evidence of disruption to critical path work. She agreed with the proposition put to her that, on her argument, the real issue was whether there was evidence to support the primary judge’s finding that the delay caused to the work program was of an equivalent duration to the five days industrial action, rather than some lesser period. The difficulty for the CFMEU is that there was clear evidence of disruption to critical path work, and, in light of the manner in which the CFMEU chose to run its case before the primary judge, the evidence as to the duration of the delay in completion was largely one way.