FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commission [2012] FCAFC 44
Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commission [2012] FCAFC 44 Appeal from: Australian Building & Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2011] FCA 810 Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER File number: WAD 338 of 2011 Judges: KEANE CJ, RARES & BARKER JJ Date of judgment: 27 March 2012 Catchwords: COMPENSATION – whether actual damages suffered by conduct of another person as a result of the contravention – causation – whether mitigation of losses – quantum of damage – object of statute Legislation: Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)Cases cited: Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons Ltd [1932] AC 452 followed
Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and New Zealand Ltd v Murphy (1973) 47 ALJR 122 referred to
King v Yurisich (2006) 153 FCR 78 followed
March v E & HM Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 followed
Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 referred to
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 followedDate of hearing: 9 March 2012 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 72 Solicitor for the Appellant: Slater & Gordon Counsel for the Appellant: Ms K A Vernon Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J L Bourke Mr M Felman Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 338 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Appellant
AND: AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
JUDGES:
KEANE CJ, RARES & BARKER JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
27 MARCH 2012
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed and that the CFMEU pay the ABCC’s costs of the appeal to be taxed if not earlier agreed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 338 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Appellant
AND: AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
JUDGES:
KEANE CJ, RARES & BARKER JJ
DATE:
27 MARCH 2012
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
In June 2009 the appellant, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (the CFMEU), engaged in unlawful industrial action in contravention of s 38 of the Building andConstruction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) (the BCII Act). The unlawful action occurred over five days at a construction site where Diploma Constructions (WA) Pty Ltd (Diploma) was engaged in a building project.
The respondent, the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (the ABCC) applied for an order for civil penalties and for an order that the CFMEU pay damages to…
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- Case
- [2012] FCAFC 44
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the CFMEU's industrial action had indeed caused a delay in the completion of the project. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the industrial action disrupted critical path work and caused a delay equivalent to the five days of industrial action. The court held that the CFMEU was liable for the damages resulting from this delay, as the primary judge had correctly found that the CFMEU's conduct had caused the delay and that the CFMEU had failed to mitigate its losses.
In light of this finding, the court rejected the CFMEU's appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed. The CFMEU was also ordered to pay the ABCC's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
This case highlights the importance of ensuring that building industry participants are held accountable for their unlawful conduct, and that the courts will uphold the statutory purpose of the Building and Construction Industry Improvements Act 2005 (Cth) in this regard. The court's decision also emphasises the need for parties to provide clear and compelling evidence in support of their claims, particularly where factual findings are at issue.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed and that the CFMEU pay the ABCC’s costs of the appeal to be taxed if not earlier agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
We propose to consider, in turn, the arguments advanced in relation to these grounds.CONSIDERATIONGround 1: delay in completion of the project The CFMEU argues that s 49(1)(b) of the BCII Act requires a causal connection between the actual damage suffered by Diploma and the contraventions by ABCC. It contends that the primary judge erred in finding that Diploma would have completed the project five days earlier than it did had the industrial action not occurred. It is common ground that whether conduct is a cause of damage is a question of fact to be resolved by a value judgement involving ordinary notions of language and commonsense: March v E & HM Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506. The ABCC contends that this question of fact is to be approached bearing in mind the statutory purpose of s 49(1)(b) of the BCII Act. In light of the main statutory objects of the BCII Act contained in s 3(2), it contends that the Court should favour an application of s 49(1)(b) which “ensur[es] that building industry participants are accountable for their unlawful conduct”. The CFMEU argues that the primary judge’s conclusion as to delay to the completion of the project was based on the “theoretical” evidence of Mr Schober unsupported by facts. In response, the ABCC contends that Mr Schober’s opinion was based on his professional experience and knowledge of the project including Diploma’s documents such as work diaries. It is also supported by the evidence of Mr Day and Mr Buchan. The CFMEU argues that it was unclear from their evidence which workers on the site were performing “critical path” works on the days of the industrial action or which “critical path” works were delayed. The ABCC responds that it is sufficient to sustain his Honour’s findings that only some of the workers who took industrial action were doing “critical path” works; that it was unnecessary to reconstruct the project by identifying the specific tasks involved in the “critical path” and which of those tasks caused further delay; and that the quality of the ABCC’s evidence was a question of weight for the primary judge. The CFMEU continues to urge the point that the project finished twelve months earlier than the initial date for practical completion and 35 days earlier than even the varied date for practical completion. The ABCC contends, in response, that this submission is misconceived; the fact that Diploma finished early does not meet the point that the project could have finished an additional five days earlier but for the industrial action. In this regard, the CFMEU argues that the only way to know whether the project would have finished five days earlier but for the industrial action was to review the construction program and ascertain whether time was, or could have been, made up. In the course of argument, counsel for the CFMEU accepted that there was evidence of disruption to critical path work. She agreed with the proposition put to her that, on her argument, the real issue was whether there was evidence to support the primary judge’s finding that the delay caused to the work program was of an equivalent duration to the five days industrial action, rather than some lesser period. The difficulty for the CFMEU is that there was clear evidence of disruption to critical path work, and, in light of the manner in which the CFMEU chose to run its case before the primary judge, the evidence as to the duration of the delay in completion was largely one way.