Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Canberra Contractors

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Canberra Contractors [2023] FedCFamC2G 754

File number(s): CAG 43 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE W J NEVILLE
Date of judgment: 24 August 2023
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Application for contraventions under Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and under the Work, Health and Safety Act  2011 (ACT), while on site Union officials inspecting one suspected breach of WHS standards form reasonable suspicion of another, different suspected breach, the issue in the case was whether the Union officials were entitled under the WHS Act to inspect the second suspected contravention or whether they were required to leave the site and prepare a further Right of Entry Notice, facts strongly support both breaches and Court determines that the WHS Act plainly authorises inspection of other suspected breaches while a permit holder is already on site, contraventions established, declarations to be mad and matter fixed for penalty hearing.
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.140

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss. 502 – 503, 793

Work Health & Safety Act 2011 (ACT), ss. 19, 117 – 118, 118A

Work Health & Safety Regulations 2011 (ACT), rr. 34 – 36

Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union(The Laverton North and Cheltenham Premises Case) (2018) 262 FCR 473

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Gava [2018[ FCA 1480.

Australian Building and Construction Commission v Powell (2017) 251 FCR 470

Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation v Kaizen Hospitals (Essendon) Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 225

Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345

Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

BGC POS Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime and Energy Union (2019) 285 IR 43

Bragdon v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2016) 242 FCR 46

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (2017) 251 FCR 528

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Decmil Engineering Pty Ltd (No.2) [2017] FCA 1237

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining, and Energy Union v Fair Work Ombudsman [2023] FCA 202

Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Robinson (2016) 241 FCR 338

George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104

Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2008) 73 NSWLR 653

Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563

Leotta v Public Transport Commission of New South Wales (1976) 50 ALJR 666

Qantas Airways v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537

Ramsay v Sunbuild Pty Ltd (2014) 221 FCR 315

Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612

Setka v Gregor (No.2) (2011) 195 FCR 203

Thoms v Commonwealth of Australia (2022) 96 ALJR 635; 401 ALR 529

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 175
Date of last submission/s: 6 April 2023
Date of hearing: 30 –…
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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 754
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Canberra Contractors was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary dispute involved allegations of breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by the respondents, Canberra Contractors and Mr Graham. The Union sought declarations and penalties for the alleged breaches. The court was tasked with determining whether the evidence provided by the Union officials, Messrs Poskus and Maher, was more credible than that of the respondents' witnesses, specifically Mr Cerullo and Mr Graham. Additionally, the court had to assess whether the Union's pleadings were sufficient to support the evidence presented at trial.

The court's analysis focused on the credibility of the evidence and the impact of the respondents' failure to provide robust counter-evidence. The court found that the evidence of the Union officials was clear, consistent, and corroborated by video footage, whereas the respondents' evidence was either contradictory or significantly undermined by the video evidence. The court drew adverse inferences against Mr Graham due to his non-attendance and the inconsistency of his affidavit evidence with the accepted evidence of the Union officials. The court concluded that the evidence of the Union officials regarding the alleged contraventions stood unchallenged and was therefore accepted as credible. The court also found that the Union's pleadings, while not perfect, were sufficiently broad to encompass the evidence presented at trial.

The court ultimately decided in favour of the Union, finding that the contraventions alleged were proven. The court accepted the submissions of the Union regarding the factual findings and the legal consequences of the established contraventions. The court ordered that the declarations sought by the Union be granted and found that the pleading points raised by the respondents were without merit.

The court's decision was based on the strength of the Union's evidence, the lack of credible counter-evidence from the respondents, and the broad scope of the Union's pleadings. The court's findings on the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence led to the conclusion that the Union's case was well-supported, and the contraventions were established as pleaded.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In any situation where there is (or was) any conflict between the evidence of the Union officials, on the one hand, and the sole witness for the Respondents (Mr Cerullo), on the other, I strongly prefer that of the Union officials.Matters concerning the evidence (and contraventions) of Mr Graham Also for reasons given above, the late non-appearance of Mr Graham to give evidence added to the significantly compromised evidence on behalf of the Respondents generally. Such evidence from his Affidavit, which I allowed in part on the Applicant’s oral motion in the light of Mr Graham’s non-attendance, was also at odds with the consistent and accepted evidence on behalf of the Applicants. I also recall the inference, pursuant to the principles set out in Jones v Dunkel, which the Court draws in the exercise of its discretion in the light of the facts and circumstances relevantly found that his evidence would not have assisted his case, or that of the Respondents more generally.[66][66] See also the High Court’s discussion about the operation of the inference that may be drawn from Jones v Dunkel in Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [167] and [169]. Also in relation to Mr Graham, given that (a) he gave no oral evidence, (b) the adverse inference drawn against him regarding his non-attendance to give evidence, (c) the clear and consistent evidence of the Union officials accepted by the Court, and (d) the evidence of the Union officials being supported by the video footage of one kind or another, in my view, it is apposite to conclude that the evidence of the Union officials regarding the contraventions involving Mr Graham stands unchallenged. As such, in accordance with long-standing Full Court authority, “as a general proposition, evidence which is not inherently incredible and which is unchallenged, ought to be accepted.”[67][67] See Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322 at [77] (Mansfield and Gilmour JJ). In my view, it follows from what has just been set out that the contraventions alleged against Mr Graham must succeed. Inevitably, it must also follow that, pursuant to s.793 of the FW Act, the contraventions alleged against the First Respondent that are consequential upon the establishment of the contraventions against Mr Graham, are also made out.General observations In short, (a) the clear, firm and accepted evidence of Messrs Poskus and Maher, (b) the significant CCTV and other recorded material, and (c) the significantly compromised evidence on behalf of the Respondents, in my view, plainly establish – factually – the contraventions as pleaded, including the reasonable forming by the Union officials of relevant suspicions regarding the alleged contraventions before going on to the site, and whilst on site on the day. Otherwise, and in addition to the reasons here, I accept the submissions of the Applicant regarding the evidence of the witnesses at trial. I also accept and adopt the Applicant’s submissions regarding the “salient factual findings” set out in the Applicant’s Closing Submissions (filed 28th February 2023) at pars.12 (a) – (k).

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reason given, the declarations sought by the Applicant should be made.Miscellaneous & conclusion Before concluding, two other matters need to be addressed. First, the Respondents regularly raised in written submissions what are generally described as “pleading points.” To speak generally, they contend that (a) the Applicant is bound by its pleading (a generally uncontentious proposition), and (b) certain matters were not relevantly pleaded in relation to one or more of the Respondents. Apart from the Applicant refuting the latter contention, I need only note the following:(a)It is undeniable that pleadings serve the multiple goals of (i) giving notice to the other party of the case that is to be met at trial, and equally (ii) they outline the issues to be addressed at trial;[70](b)At the same time, the High Court has also determined that pleadings may be amended, especially where “amendment would not raise a fresh issue based upon a different cause of action or particulars”, and which would only amend the expression of the course of events so that the “facts pleaded would conform to the evidence given”;[71](c)Accepting the almost eye-glazing multiple iterations of the Statement of Claim, over a significant period of time, the Respondents properly and fairly raised a number of pleading points. That said, in my view, any fair reading of any of the versions of the Statement of Claim, in the light of the Affidavits of Mr Poskus and Mr Maher relied upon (and their oral evidence), and the issues joined at trial, there can be no doubt that anyone, including the Respondents, could not know the precise details of the case being run, the evidence relied upon, and the issues to be determined by the Court. Further, the versions of various events deposed to by Mr Cerullo and Mr Graham likewise make plain that the Respondents knew precisely the nature and content of the contraventions alleged against them by the Applicant.(d)In my view, for the reasons noted, together with the evidence of the witnesses and the Court’s findings in relation to them, any of the pleading points propounded by the Respondents in their submissions have no substance.[70] Among many places, see the High Court’s comments in Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279.[71] See Leotta v Public Transport Commission of New South Wales (1976) 50 ALJR 666 at 668 – 669 (Stephen, Mason and Jacobs JJ). To similar, broad effect where the focus was more upon the evidence rather than using the pleadings, in a sense, to straight-jacket the evidence, and where the Court allowed amendment and/or where there was no objection to the evidence, see other High Court decisions such as Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563, and Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658. More recently, see the summary of principle by Ipp J in Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2008) 73 NSWLR 653 at [424]. His Honour’s comments refer, among other things, to the way the matter was run at trial and any direct or indirect acquiescence in the evidence led at, and conduct of the, trial. Among other things, his Honour also observed that, ultimately, cases are determined on the evidence, not the pleadings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is admitted in the Respondents’ Defence (at pars.2 and 3) that Mr Cerullo and Mr Graham were relevantly acting within their apparent or actual authority in relation to the incidents in question here.Consideration and Disposition Given the comments already made earlier in these reasons regarding the evidence given at trial (the comments above regarding that evidence should be taken as formal findings of the Court), I need only note the following here, with such comments also being taken as formal findings. For the reasons given earlier, I prefer and accept the evidence of Mr Poskus and Mr Maher on behalf of the Applicant to the evidence of Mr Cerullo. The evidence of the Union officials was clear, cogent, and unvarnished. Further, as already noted, their accounts of events on the day in question were firmly supported by the contemporaneous CCTV and other recordings. Any minor inaccuracies were acknowledged and accepted by the Applicant’s witnesses. Conversely, those recordings, significantly undercut the evidence of Mr Cerullo, who was, unfortunately, otherwise an ill-prepared, and generally unreliable witness for the reasons given earlier, including that he was a poor historian of relevant events, where his account(s) were usually contradicted both by the evidence of the Union officials but also by the video footage. In any situation where there is (or was) any conflict between the evidence of the Union officials, on the one hand, and the sole witness for the Respondents (Mr Cerullo), on the other, I strongly prefer that of the Union officials.Matters concerning the evidence (and contraventions) of Mr Graham Also for reasons given above, the late non-appearance of Mr Graham to give evidence added to the significantly compromised evidence on behalf of the Respondents generally. Such evidence from his Affidavit, which I allowed in part on the Applicant’s oral motion in the light of Mr Graham’s non-attendance, was also at odds with the consistent and accepted evidence on behalf of the Applicants. I also recall the inference, pursuant to the principles set out in Jones v Dunkel, which the Court draws in the exercise of its discretion in the light of the facts and circumstances relevantly found that his evidence would not have assisted his case, or that of the Respondents more generally.[66][66] See also the High Court’s discussion about the operation of the inference that may be drawn from Jones v Dunkel in Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [167] and [169]. Also in relation to Mr Graham, given that (a) he gave no oral evidence, (b) the adverse inference drawn against him regarding his non-attendance to give evidence, (c) the clear and consistent evidence of the Union officials accepted by the Court, and (d) the evidence of the Union officials being supported by the video footage of one kind or another, in my view, it is apposite to conclude that the evidence of the Union officials regarding the contraventions involving Mr Graham stands unchallenged. As such, in accordance with long-standing Full Court authority, “as a general proposition, evidence which is not inherently incredible and which is unchallenged, ought to be accepted.”[67][67] See Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322 at [77] (Mansfield and Gilmour JJ).