Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1590

File number: QUD 731 of 2018
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 22 October 2018
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for interlocutory injunction pursuant to s 545 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) and s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – alleged adverse action for a prohibited reason or reasons under the FW Act – prima facie case – balance of convenience

INDUSTRIAL LAW – where a mine worker had previously been reinstated by her employer after successfully unfair dismissal – where the mine worker was informed that she was no longer required at the mine – where on the night prior to being informed that she was no longer needed, the applicant purported to exercise workplace rights – where no reasons were given for the demobilisation of the mine worker – whether the mine worker exercised workplace rights as defined in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) – whether the decision that the mine worker was no longer needed was made prior to the purported exercise of workplace rights – whether adverse action was taken for a prohibited reason or reasons in contravention of s 340 of the FW Act – whether the application is statute barred as a result of s 725 of the FW Act

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 340, 361, 362, 545, 725, 728, 729

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union known as The Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1126; (2012) 64 AILR 101-753

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32; (2012) 248 CLR 500

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 563; (2012) 64 AILR 101-641

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 661

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Eco Recyclers Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 24

Police Federation of Australia v Nixon [2008] FCA 467; (2008) 168 FCR 340

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238

Date of hearing: 19 October 2018
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 21
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H Borenstein QC with Mr C Massy
Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall Payne
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Follett
Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills

ORDERS

QUD 731 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME, MINING AND ENERGY UNION

Applicant

AND:

BM ALLIANCE COAL OPERATIONS PTY LTD

Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1590
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd, the court was presented with an application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent from excluding the applicant from a coal mine. The dispute arose after the respondent, BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd, informed the applicant, Kim Star, that her services were no longer required at the mine. The applicant had previously been reinstated following a successful unfair dismissal claim but was subsequently demobilised without any given reason. The union, on behalf of the applicant, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensation, and pecuniary penalties, alleging that the demobilisation constituted adverse action taken for a prohibited reason under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The court had to decide whether the application was statute-barred, whether the applicant had exercised a workplace right, and if the decision to demobilise was influenced by the purported exercise of such a right.

The court considered the criteria for granting interlocutory relief, including the presence of a serious question to be tried, the likelihood of injury for which damages would not be an adequate remedy, and the balance of convenience. The court noted that the applicant needed to demonstrate a prima facie case for relief, which involves a sufficient likelihood of success to justify preserving the status quo. The court also weighed the respective merits of the parties' cases and the potential consequences of granting or refusing the injunction. The court found that the application was not statute-barred, that the applicant had exercised a workplace right, and that there was a serious question to be tried regarding whether the demobilisation was influenced by the exercise of that right.

The court ultimately concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the applicant, as the injunction was necessary to avoid personal inconvenience to Ms Star pending the trial. The court noted that there was no evidence of financial or other detriment to Ms Star or the union if the injunction was not issued. Conversely, the refusal of the injunction would require the respondent to accept a person to work at the mine that it did not want there. Given these considerations, the court granted the injunction, restraining the respondent from excluding the applicant from the mine until the matter was heard and determined.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to section 545 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and section 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), until the hearing and determination of this matter or further order, the respondent, by itself, its servants or agents, be restrained from excluding or otherwise preventing Kim Star from attending the Goonyella Riverside Mine to perform work there on behalf of WorkPac Pty Ltd pursuant to the labour hire contract between the respondent and WorkPac Pty Ltd.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In its substantive application filed on 8 October 2018, the union seeks declaratory and other relief in respect of alleged contravention of s 340 of the FW Act by BMA because of claimed exercise by Ms Star of workplace rights on or about 9 November 2017. The union seeks related injunctive relief in respect of the conduct of BMA preventing Ms Star attending the mine to perform work on behalf of WorkPac, as well as compensation from BMA and the imposition of pecuniary penalties.BACKGROUND Background facts as claimed by the parties for the purposes of these interlocutory proceedings are set out in affidavits filed by both sides. The union relies on three affidavits, namely:(1)an affidavit sworn 5 October 2018 by Ms Star;(2)an affidavit affirmed 8 October 2018 by Mr Joseph Kennedy of Hall Payne Lawyers, which acts for the union in this matter; and(3)an affidavit affirmed 16 October 2018 by Mr Brett Hazeldine, a worker employed by BHP Coal Pty Ltd (BHP) as an Open Cut Examiner since 2001. BMA relies on the affidavit affirmed 19 October 2018 by Mr Brent Gee, the Manager Production Coal at the mine. In her affidavit sworn 5 October 2018, Ms Star deposed, in summary, as follows:·Ms Star was employed by WorkPac as a machinery operator at the mine from October 2013 until 13 November 2017.·The basis of Ms Star’s employment was casual.·The mine was owned and operated by BMA.·Ms Star was engaged in accordance with a regular roster, and she worked a rotating roster across fourteen days out of a 28 day cycle.·The rotating roster includes night shifts as well as day shifts. On night shifts workers take two 35 minute crib breaks.·Ms Star was usually responsible for driving a dump truck.·During the time Ms Star worked at the mine, no issues were raised in respect of her performance by either BMA or WorkPac.·Ms Star’s partner is employed by BHP at the mine as a machinery operator in the same crew Ms Star worked on. Her personal circumstances are such that it is very convenient for her to work at the mine. ·There was a safety incident during her work at the mine on the night shift of 9 November 2017. In short – Ms Star alleges that she was required to drive a truck on a lamp without lights and then to dump loads of rocks, and because this was hazardous she requested that lights be provided. There was interaction between BHP supervisors and Ms Star in respect of the lights issue, and she assumed it had been resolved. Ms Star was required then to undertake a random mid-shift drug test which had previously been arranged, finished her crib break, and then completed her shift without incident.·On 10 November 2017, WorkPac endeavoured to contact Ms Star, however, Ms Star was out of mobile range at the time. On 13 November 2017, Ms Star spoke with Nicole of WorkPac who told Ms Star that her services were no longer required by BMA and that Ms Star was being “demobilised”. Nicole professed lack of knowledge of why this was the case.·Ms Star was subsequently contacted by Thiess to work at another BMA coal mine. She commenced working in her new role on 27 November 2017. In her new role, however, she rarely sees her partner because of different shifts.·Ms Star filed an unfair dismissal claim against BMA under the FW Act, seeking orders for reinstatement to her job with WorkPac. ·On 17 September 2018 the Fair Work Commissioner issued a reinstatement order. As a result Ms Star resigned her employment with Thiess, finishing on 25 September 2018. WorkPac did not reinstate Ms Star, advising her that BMA would not allow her back into the mine. ·Ms Star has taken up a role with Mackellar Mining, and, although the earning are approximately the same, she will not be able to live in the same house as her partner while she is rostered to work because of the location of her new employment.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent submits, in summary:·This application is statute barred because ss 728 and 729 prevent multiple applications relating to the same dismissal.·The mandatory drug test was not the exercise of a workplace right, because it was not done “under a workplace instrument”. The BMA “Fitness for Work Procedure” is not a “workplace instrument”.·In his affidavit the decision-maker, Mr Gee, denies that any part of his reasons for his decision involving Ms Star concerned either of the alleged reasons. This evidence is consistent with that of Mr Hazeldine, in the sense that Ms Star’s conduct was perfectly acceptable and consistent with her safety obligations, and it would be odd for BMA to take issue with that behaviour in having Ms Star demobilised from the mine because of it.·Even with the assistance of s 361 of the FW Act at the trial, the union has no reasonable prospects of success on these allegations, and therefore no prima facie case.·In respect of the balance of convenience, the highest this matter can be put for the CFMMEU was that the injunction was necessary pending trial to avoid some personal inconvenience to Ms Star. There was no evidence of any financial or other detriment to Ms Star or the union if an injunction was not issued. Measured against this inconvenience were the consequences to BMA, being that it is to accept a person to work at the mine who it did not want there. The effect of an interlocutory injunction would be tantamount to final relief. Further, there had been considerable delay in bringing this proceeding.CONSIDERATION In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [19], Gleeson CJ and Crennan J found that, in circumstances where an applicant seeks interlocutory relief, it is necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that:·there is a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; ·the plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy; and·the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interlocutory injunction. In respect of the issue whether there is a “serious question to be tried”, Gummow and Hayne JJ held at [65]-[72], in summary, that:·it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial;·it is not necessary that the plaintiff demonstrate more than a 50 per cent chance of ultimate success;·the issue may be understood as whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for relief; and·it is relevant to consider practical consequences likely to flow from the interlocutory order sought. Particular considerations arise where the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction in effect would dispose of the action finally in favour of whichever party succeeded on that application. In Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 the Full Court noted at [67] that, in considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, the issue of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima face case and whether the balance of convenience and justice favours the grant of an injunction are related inquiries, and the apparent strength of the parties’ substantive cases will often be an important consideration to be weighed in the balance.