Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union v AMK Imaging Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union v AMK Imaging Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 361

File number(s): CAG 37 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE W J NEVILLE
Date of judgment: 20 March 2024 (oral reasons)
24 April 2024 (provision of written reasons)
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – parties agreed in relation to liability of the Respondents regarding contraventions of the Fair Work Act  2009 (Cth) – considerations regarding appropriate penalty in the light of the High Court decision in ABCC v Pattinson – particular regard to “first time offender” here and “inadvertence” and “ignorance of the law” as opposed to concerted strategy of “deliberate recalcitrance” – in such cases, according to the High Court, a “modest penalty, if any” may be appropriate to achieve the principle of deterrence – modest penalties imposed.
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss.45, 323, 536, 550
Cases cited:

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson (2022) 274 CLR 450

Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560

Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1365

Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 38
Date of hearing: 20 March 2024
Place: Canberra
Counsel for the Applicant Ms Erian of Counsel
Solicitors for the Applicant Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union
Counsel for the Respondents Ms Costin of Counsel
Solicitors for the Respondents Mills Oakley

ORDERS

CAG 37 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY AND MARITIME EMPLOYEES UNION
Applicant

AND:

AMK IMAGING PTY LTD
Second Respondent

ANTHONY GAVRAN
Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE W J NEVILLE

DATE OF ORDER:

20 MARCH 2024

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.The parties resolved matters of liability in principle on the first day of the Final Hearing;

B.The matter returned Court to determine matters of penalty, with oral reasons being delivered on 20th March 2024; accordingly,

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.By consent and pursuant to Part 13.3 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021, orders are made in terms of the attached document entitled “Proposed Orders” signed by the parties’ respective lawyers and placed with the Court record as attached hereto.

2.The Second Respondent is to pay a total penalty for the five contraventions of s.45 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in the sum of $6,500.

3.The Second Respondent is to pay a penalty for the contravention of s.323 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in the sum of $1,000.

4.The Second Respondent is to pay a penalty for the contravention of s.536 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in the sum of $1,500.

5.Pursuant to s.550 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the Third Respondent is to pay a total penalty for the admitted contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in the sum of $3,500.

6.The penalties ordered in Orders…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 361
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union v AMK Imaging Pty Ltd, the Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union (the Applicant) brought an action against AMK Imaging Pty Ltd (the Second Respondent) and its director (the Third Respondent) for breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and associated awards. The parties agreed on the liability of the Second and Third Respondents, and the matter before the court was the determination of an appropriate penalty for the breaches. The Applicant argued for a penalty that would deter future contraventions, while the Respondents, particularly the Third Respondent, highlighted their good character and lack of a deliberate strategy behind the contraventions. The Respondents also submitted that the agreed payments to be made to the employee should not be considered in the penalty assessment.

The court had to determine the appropriate penalty for the breaches of the Fair Work Act and awards, considering the recent High Court decision in ABCC v Pattinson. The principles established in that case were crucial, particularly the emphasis on deterrence as the primary purpose of civil penalties. The court needed to ensure that the penalty imposed would reasonably deter future contraventions without being disproportionate or excessively punitive, especially given the Respondents' status as first-time offenders with no evidence of deliberate recalcitrance.

The court concluded that the Respondents, being first-time offenders, should be subject to modest penalties if any, to achieve the deterrence principle. It acknowledged the inadvertent nature of the contraventions and the lack of a concerted strategy of deliberate non-compliance. The court also noted that the agreed payments to the employee should not be considered in the penalty assessment. The Respondents’ good character and the absence of a deliberate strategy were factors that warranted a more lenient penalty. The court imposed penalties that reflected these considerations, aiming to balance the need for deterrence with the equitable treatment of the Respondents.

The final orders included the imposition of modest penalties on the Second and Third Respondents, with specific directions regarding the payment of the agreed amounts to the employee, excluding these from the penalty calculation. The Respondents were also directed to comply with all relevant provisions of the Fair Work Act and awards moving forward.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Statement of Agreed Facts, dated 19th March 2023, was as follows:Background 1.This statement of agreed facts (SOAF) is made for the purposes for s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and any admissions made are only for the purposes of these proceedings. 2.This SOAF sets out the facts that the Applicant and the Second and Third Respondents have agreed for the purpose of these proceedings. Agreed Facts 3.Between 2 January 2019 and 23 September 2022 (the Relevant Period), the Second Respondent was the employer of Jayson Cruz Cocos. 4.Mr Cocos performed work as a painter under a contract of employment with the Second Respondent and was eligible to be a member of the Applicant during some or all of his employment by the Second Respondent. 5.The Third Respondent was the Director of the Second Respondent and had active managerial control of the Second Respondent during the Relevant Period. The Third Respondent knew that an award applied to Mr Cocos’ employment but did not know the contents of the specific award. Mr Cocos advised the Third Respondent of the hours he was working, and the Third Respondent knew the amount that Mr Cocos was being remunerated. 6.Between 2 January 2019 and 28 February 2021, Mr Cocos’ employment was covered by the Building and Construction General On-Site Award 2010 (the 2010 Award). Between 1 March 2021 and 23 September 2022, Mr Cocos’ employment was covered by the Building and Construction General On-Site Award 2020 (the 2020 Award). 7.The Second Respondent employed Mr Cocos on a full-time basis. Mr Cocos was classified as a CW3 worker under the Award. 8.During his employment, Mr Cocos (a) started and finished work each day on job sites; and (b) frequently worked more than 38 hours per week. 9. During the Relevant Period, the Second Respondent: (a)did not provide Mr Cocos with copies of the National Employment Standards or the Award, as required by clause 5 of the 2010 Award and clause 3.3 of the 2020 Award; and(b)did not pay meal allowances to Mr Cocos, as required by clause 20.2 of the 2010 Award and clause 21.2 of the 2020 Award;(c) did not pay Mr Cocos’s wages on a regular, weekly schedule, as required by clause 31.3 of the 2010 Award and 20.3 of the 2020 Award;(d)did not provide Mr Cocos with payslips, as required by s 536 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act). 10.Between 1 July 2021 and 23 September 2022, the Second Respondent did not pay travel allowances to Mr Cocos, as required by clause 26.1 of the 2020 Award. 11.Between 21 January 2022 and 30 September 2022, the Second Respondent made deductions to Mr Cocos’ wages for rental accommodation which were not agreed to in writing, as required by 324 of the Act. 12.On termination of his employment, the Second Respondent did not make a redundancy payment to Mr Cocos, as required by clause 41.3 of the 2020 Award.Oral submissions on behalf of the Applicant At the outset of what I will call the “penalty hearing” on 20th March 2024, and in the light of what had been earlier advised to the Court, the Court sought to clarify with Counsel for the Applicant that in relation to penalties, (a) an Affidavit would be provided by Mr Anthony Gavran (the Third Respondent), (b) there would be no Affidavit provided by the Applicant, and (c) there would be no opposition from the Applicant to the Respondents’ submissions regarding the penalty “range”. It was confirmed that there would indeed be no opposition from the Applicant in respect of the penalty range, however, the Applicant intended to make brief submissions on relevant matters for the Court to consider regarding the determination of penalties. The exchange was as follows (emphasis added):[1]… I had understood that there would be no argument regarding range of penalty, and perhaps I had misunderstood Ms Costin, but I had understood her to suggest that whatever submissions she would be making on behalf of the respondents, that there was not going to be any opposition to whatever the submission was in relation to penalties. Have I misunderstood that?MS ERIAN: There would be no opposition from the applicant – or rather there would be no response from the applicant – in respect of the penalty range, but we do intend to make fairly brief submissions on relevant factors that your Honour would have consideration of when determining an appropriate penalty.[1] T 19. For completeness, and in no way critical of Counsel for either party, in oral submissions there was little or no reference to citations of authorities. Written submissions were provided but only regarding liability. Further, the Lists of Authorities provided by each party related solely to those concerning liability, not penalty. I have provided the citations of cases referred to regarding penalty in these revised reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In reply, it was submitted that the monies to be paid to Mr Cocos should not be considered in the assessment of penalties as those funds are agreed to be owing to Mr Cocos from the course of his employment with the Second Respondent. Secondly, although no issue was taken to the submissions on Mr Gavran’s good character, it was highlighted that these do not mitigate penalties in respect of the Second Respondent.[21][21] T 34Consideration & disposition Earlier in these reasons I noted that there is now a Statement of Agreed Facts, which is of significant assistance. Likewise, there is an agreed set of declarations and Orders to be made. Those declarations and Orders were made by consent, which include provision for a further payment to be made to the Applicant. The only remaining issue for the Court to determine relates to the appropriate penalty for the breaches of the Act, and certain awards. There is no dispute that relevant principles regarding making such a determination was recently confirmed by the High Court in ABCC v Pattinson.[22] From that case, it is sufficient, and important, to note the following principles, beginning with the plurality’s comments at [9] and [10] (internal citations omitted; emphasis added):[9] The Commissioner's contentions should be accepted and the appeal allowed. Under the civil penalty regime provided by the Act, the purpose of a civil penalty is primarily, if not solely, the promotion of the public interest in compliance with the provisions of the Act by the deterrence of further contraventions of the Act. In that context, the penalties fixed by the primary judge were appropriate because they were no more than might be considered to be reasonably necessary to deter further contraventions of a like kind by Mr Pattinson, the CFMMEU or others. They represented a reasonable assessment of what was necessary to make the continuation of the CFMMEU's non‑compliance with the law, amply demonstrated by the history of its contraventions, too expensive to maintain.[10] The Full Court's critical error was that it was distracted by a concern, drawn from the criminal law, that a penalty must be proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct that constituted the contravention. The power conferred by s.546 of the Act is not subject to constraints drawn from the criminal law and there is no place for a "notion of proportionality", in the sense in which the Full Court used that term, in a civil penalty regime. Further, and relatedly, their Honours were misled by the view that the Act required that the maximum penalty be reserved for only the most serious examples of the offending comprehended by s.349(1), and that this principle could prevent the court from imposing the maximum penalty even though a penalty in that amount might reasonably be considered to be necessary to deter future contraventions of a like kind. Nothing in the text, contextor purpose of s.546 requires that the maximum penalty be reserved for the most serious examples of misconduct within s.349(1). What is required is that there be "some reasonable relationship between the theoretical maximum and the final penalty imposed". That relationship is established where the maximum penalty does not exceed what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the deterrence of future contraventions of a like kind by the contravenor and by others.[22] (2022) 274 CLR 450.