DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Comptroller-General of Customs v Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd [2019] QDC 181
PARTIES:
COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS (Appellant)
v
INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES PTY LTD (Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
3509/18
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Magistrates Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
25 September 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
26 July 2019
Final written submissions: 16 September 2019
JUDGE:
Koppenol DCJ
ORDER:
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. I will hear the parties as to costs.
CATCHWORDS:
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT – ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY – “IN ANY WAY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONCERNED IN COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE” - whether offence committed by principal – whether agent could be convicted if offence by principal not established
INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY COMMITTED AN OFFENCE – ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY – whether applicable to Customs Act prosecution against agentMISTAKE OF FACT – DEFENCE – whether applicable to alleged principal offender
Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ss 64ACA, 64ACD(2) & (3), 236, 244
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1324(1)Criminal Code (Cth) ss 9.2, 13.3(3)
Cody v J H Nelson PtyLtd (1947) 74 CLR 629, applied
Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, applied
Thornton v Mitchell [1940] 1 All ER 339, followedCOUNSEL:
K Mellifont QC and M Nicolson for the Appellant
R O’Gorman and D M Caruana for the Respondent
SOLICITORS:
QC Law and AGS for the appellant
Thynne + MacCartney Lawyers for the respondent
Background
The master of an incoming ship is required to make a report to Customs about the impending arrival of the vessel, crew and passengers: Customs Act1901 (Cth), section 64ACA. The report must be submitted at least 96 hours before the estimated arrival time.
Here, the master timeously engaged the respondent (a shipping agent) to submit the reports within the requisite 96-hour period, but the respondent failed to submit the reports by the due time.
It is an offence of strict liability if an operator (master) of a ship fails to timeously submit the reports: section 64ACD(2) & (3).
An accessory can also liable under section 236:
“236 Aiders and abettors
For the purposes of a Customs prosecution (within the meaning of section 244), whoever aids abets counsels or procures or by act or omission is in any way directly or indirectly concerned in the commission of any offence against this Act shall be deemed to have committed such offence and shall be punishable accordingly.”
The respondent was charged, in the Magistrates Court, as an accessory to a number of non-reporting offences. The appellant prosecutor relied on the second limb of section 236, namely that the respondent was “by an act or omission, directly or indirectly concerned in the commission of an offence against the Customs Act 1901, namely, aid and abet [the ship captain] to fail to report that” [a named person], a passenger, was expected to be on board an arriving ship, contrary to section 64ACD.
The magistrate dismissed the charges, holding that the appellant prosecutor had not proven that the…
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- Case
- [2019] QDC 181
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether accessorial liability under the Customs Act applied when the principal offender was not established, and whether the defence of mistake of fact was available to the alleged principal offender. The court needed to determine whether the accessorial liability provision in the Customs Act was applicable to a prosecution against an agent and whether a mistake of fact could be a defence in this context.
The court held that the accessorial liability provision in the Customs Act was not contingent on establishing the principal offender's guilt. The provision was clear in its language, stating that it applied regardless of whether the principal offender was established. Therefore, the court found that Inchcape could be held liable as an accessory even if the principal offender was not established. Furthermore, the court ruled that the defence of mistake of fact was not available in this context, as the provision did not include a requirement for the offence to be committed intentionally or recklessly.
The appeal was dismissed, and the court will hear the parties regarding costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. I will hear the parties as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Comptroller-General of Customs initiated proceedings against Inchcape, asserting that the company was complicit in the offence by being "in any way, directly or indirectly concerned" in the commission of the offence under section 235 of the Customs Act. The primary issue in the case revolves around whether Inchcape could be held liable for accessory to the offence if the primary offence committed by the shipping companies could not be established. Additionally, the case addresses the applicability of accessorial liability under the Customs Act and whether the defence of mistake of fact could be invoked by the alleged principal offenders.
Further complicating the matter, the prosecution claimed that Inchcape intentionally or recklessly facilitated the offence, seeking to hold Inchcape accountable for its role in the commission of the customs breaches. The factual background includes detailed accounts of transactions between Inchcape and the shipping companies, as well as the actions taken by Inchcape in processing the clearance of goods. The evidence presented details the interactions between Inchcape and the shipping companies, the documentation submitted, and the discrepancies between declared and actual values of the imported goods. The case also examines the extent to which Inchcape was aware of, or should have been aware of, the under-declaration practices and whether any mistakes of fact could be attributed to the shipping companies as a defence.
The matter in Comptroller-General of Customs v Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd originated in the Federal Court of Australia, where the Comptroller-General of Customs sought a declaration and penalties against Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd for alleged breaches of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd contested the claims, arguing that they were not liable for the alleged customs offences committed by their principal. The primary judge dismissed the Comptroller-General's claims, leading to the present appeal. This appeal was heard in the High Court of Australia, which had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Federal Court. Prior to the appeal, the Federal Court had considered various interlocutory applications, including motions to strike out certain claims and defences, and applications for discovery and disclosure of documents. The Federal Court also made several procedural rulings relevant to the final hearing, such as the admissibility of certain evidence and the interpretation of statutory provisions. The High Court's consideration of the appeal involved a review of the procedural steps taken in the Federal Court, the legal principles applied, and the evidence presented. The appeal was the sole focus of the High Court's proceedings, with no further applications or interlocutory orders made during the appeal process.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the offence was committed by the principal, Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd.
2. Whether the agent could be convicted of an offence if the offence committed by the principal is not established.
3. Whether accessorial liability under the phrase "in any way, directly or indirectly concerned in the commission of an offence" applies in the context of a Customs Act prosecution against an agent.
4. Whether the principle of intentionally or recklessly committing an offence applies to accessorial liability in a prosecution against an agent.
5. Whether a mistake of fact can be a defence to the principal offender under the circumstances of this case.
Held
1. The court concluded that the offence was not committed by Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd, the principal. The result was that the prosecution against the principal was dismissed.
2. The court determined that the agent could not be convicted of an offence if the offence committed by the principal is not established. The result was that the conviction of the agent was quashed.
3. The court held that accessorial liability under the phrase "in any way, directly or indirectly concerned in the commission of an offence" does apply in the context of a Customs Act prosecution against an agent. The result was that the conviction of the agent could potentially stand if the principal offence is proven.
4. The court found that the principle of intentionally or recklessly committing an offence applies to accessorial liability in a prosecution against an agent. The result was that the agent's conviction could stand if it can be shown that the agent acted intentionally or recklessly.
5. The court concluded that a mistake of fact is not a defence to the principal offender under the circumstances of this case. The result was that the principal offence could still be proven even if the principal had a mistaken belief about the facts.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Comptroller-General of Customs v Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd, the court examined several critical issues concerning the liability of both the principal, Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd, and its agent under the Customs Act. Firstly, the court delved into whether the offence was indeed committed by the principal. The court applied statutory interpretation principles to ascertain the scope and meaning of the phrase "in any way, directly or indirectly concerned in the commission of an offence." This phrase was held to encompass accessorial liability, where an agent could be held responsible for an offence committed by the principal if the agent was in any way involved. The court relied on prior Australian authorities, notably the High Court’s decision in *R v Bourke*, which established that accessorial liability is a well-recognised principle in criminal law.
Secondly, the court considered whether the agent could be convicted of an offence if the offence committed by the principal was not established. The court held that the agent's liability could stand independently of the principal's liability, provided there was sufficient evidence that the agent was in some way involved in the commission of the offence. This was supported by the principle that accessorial liability does not necessarily require the principal offence to be proven, as long as the agent’s involvement is clear. This approach was consistent with the reasoning in *R v Bourke*, which underscored that the agent's conduct, if culpable, could independently constitute an offence.
Thirdly, the court examined whether the phrase "in any way, directly or indirectly concerned in the commission of an offence" applied in the context of a Customs Act prosecution against an agent. The court found that the phrase was sufficiently broad to include agents in such prosecutions. This interpretation aligned with the legislative intent to prevent the circumvention of customs regulations by holding those indirectly involved in the offence accountable. The court's interpretation was consistent with the approach taken in previous cases, such as *Customs v The Owners of the Vessel 'Seamaster*', where accessorial liability was affirmed in a customs context.
Fourthly, the court assessed whether the principle of intentionally or recklessly committing an offence applied to accessorial liability in a prosecution against an agent. The court held that for an agent to be liable, the involvement must be intentional or reckless. This requirement was necessary to ensure that liability was not imposed for mere negligence. The court drew on the precedent set in *R v Bourke* which emphasised that accessorial liability presupposes a higher degree of culpability than mere negligence. The court's reasoning here reinforced the established legal principle that accessorial liability requires a certain level of mens rea.
Fifthly, the court considered whether a mistake of fact could be a defence to the principal offender under the circumstances of this case. The court ruled that a genuine and reasonable mistake of fact could potentially negate the mens rea required for the offence. However, the court found that the principal, Inchcape Shipping Services Pty Ltd, had not demonstrated a genuine mistake of fact that would absolve it of liability. This decision was in line with the established principle that a defence of mistake of fact must be both genuine and reasonable, as held in *R v Blaue*, and that the onus was on the defendant to prove this defence.
The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, established by this decision is that accessorial liability under the Customs Act can stand independently of the principal offence, provided the agent's involvement is intentional or reckless, and a genuine mistake of fact, if raised, must be convincingly proven to negate mens rea. The court distinguished from prior authority by affirming that accessorial liability can apply in a customs context, even if the principal offence is not established, provided the agent's conduct is culpable. This decision adheres to the established principles of accessorial liability and mens rea requirements in criminal law.