Commonwealth v Nelson

Case [2001] NSWCA 443


CITATION: Commonwealth of Australia v William Richard Nelson [2001] NSWCA 443
FILE NUMBER(S): CA 41062/00
HEARING DATE(S): 16 November 2001
JUDGMENT DATE:
30 November 2001

PARTIES :


Commonwealth of Australia
v
William Richard Nelson
JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA at 1; Hodgson JA at 2; Rolfe AJA at 3
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION : District Court
LOWER COURT
FILE NUMBER(S) :
8272/98; 7684/99
LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :
Robison DCJ
COUNSEL: Appellant - C R R Hoeben SC
Respondent - J A Loxton
SOLICITORS: Appellant - Australian Government Solicitor
Respondent - Low Doherty & Stratford Blacktown
CATCHWORDS: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - postponement of bar - appeal against grant of extension of time under s 60G Limitation Act 1969 - cause of action to recover damages for post traumatic stress disorder - whether applicant was aware, or ought to have been aware, of "nature [and] extent of injury" more than 3 years before making application to extend time - aware of symptoms but not aware of diagnosis as post traumatic stress disorder - s 60I(1)(a)(ii), s 60I(1)(b) - exercise of discretion under s 60G(2) - relevant considerations - what applicant knew or ought to have known about nature and extent of injury
LEGISLATION CITED: Limitation Act 1969
CASES CITED:
CRA v Martignago & Anor [1996] 39 NSWLR 13
Harris v Commercial Minerals Limited & Ors (1996) 186 CLR 1
Commonwealth of Australia v Dinnison (1995) 56 FCR 389
Drayton Coal Pty Limited v Drain (C/A 22/8/95 unrep)
DECISION: That the Application for Leave to Appeal be granted; That the appeal be allowed ; That the orders made by Robison DCJ on 15 December 1999 be set aside, and in lieu thereof that the opponent's Notice of Motion be dismissed with costs; That the opponent pay the claimant's costs of the application for leave and the appeal, and have a certificate if otherwise qualified.





                          CA 41062/00
                          DC 8272/98
                          SHELLER JA
                          HODGSON JA
                          ROLFE AJA

                          30 November 2001

Commonweath of Australia v William Richard Nelson

Judgment

1 Sheller JA: I agree with Rolfe AJA.

2 Hodgson JA: I agree with Rolfe AJA.

3 Rolfe AJA:


      The General Nature Of The Proceedings


      The claimant, Commonwealth of Australia, (“the Commonwealth”), for which Mr C R R Hoeben of Queen’s Counsel appeared, has sought leave to appeal against orders made by Robison DCJ on 15 December 1999, pursuant to a Notice of Motion, which, it was conceded for the purposes of this application, was filed on 6 November 1998, extending the limitation period within which the opponent, Mr William Richard Nelson, for whom Mr J A Loxton of Counsel appeared, might sue it. Mr Nelson opposed the grant of such leave, but the parties agreed that if leave is granted this Court should determine the appeal and, if it is of the opinion that the appeal should be allowed, re-exercise the trial Judge’s discretion, rather than remitting the matter to him.

      The Factual Background

4 Mr Nelson was born on 27 December 1960 and joined the Royal…

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AGLC
Commonwealth v Nelson [2001] NSWCA 443
Case
[2001] NSWCA 443
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in *Commonwealth v Nelson* concerned an application for an extension of time under section 60G of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW). The applicant sought to bring a claim for damages for post-traumatic stress disorder. The central dispute revolved around whether the applicant was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the "nature and extent of the injury" more than three years prior to making the application to extend time.

The court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the applicant's awareness of certain symptoms constituted awareness of the "nature and extent of the injury" for the purposes of the limitation period, even in the absence of a formal diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. Secondly, the court had to consider the proper exercise of the discretion granted under section 60G(2) of the *Limitation Act*, including what factors were relevant to the applicant's knowledge or constructive knowledge regarding the nature and extent of their injury.

The court reasoned that mere awareness of symptoms, without an understanding of their nature and extent as constituting a specific injury like post-traumatic stress disorder, was insufficient to trigger the limitation period. The principles applied focused on the applicant's subjective and objective knowledge of the injury's character and impact. The court found that the primary judge had erred in exercising the discretion under section 60G(2). Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the District Court granting the extension of time were set aside, with the opponent's notice of motion being dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

That the Application for Leave to Appeal be granted; That the appeal be allowed ; That the orders made by Robison DCJ on 15 December 1999 be set aside, and in lieu thereof that the opponent's Notice of Motion be dismissed with costs; That the opponent pay the claimant's costs of the application for leave and the appeal, and have a certificate if otherwise qualified.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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