IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M58 of 2017
B e t w e e n -
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Applicant
and
FJ (A PSEUDONYM)
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BELL J
NETTLE J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 20 OCTOBER 2017, AT 10.32 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.K. KIRK, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.C. KNOWLES, for the applicant. (instructed by Moray & Agnew)
MR M.F. WHEELAHAN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. HOOPER, for the respondent. (instructed by Slater and Gordon Solicitors)
BELL J: Thank you.
MR KIRK: Your Honours, may I start with the statutory definition of “injury” which your Honours will find in the application book at page 121 round line 40 and as is common for statutes of this kind it does contain a great deal of content. Your Honours will see round line 40 that:
injury means any physical or mental injury (including the recurrence of a physical or mental injury) but does not include:
(a) a disease; or
(b) the aggravation of a physical or mental injury.
So it is an inclusive definition. There is, of course, however, a great deal of judicial guidance for such definitions which are to be found in a range of workers compensation statutes and related statutes and if I could take your Honours briefly to page 108 of the application book at paragraph 9 within our primary submissions there are some of the familiar terms from previous cases, recognising that of course is not statutory text, but we would give particular emphasis to “disturbance of the normal physiological state which may produce physical incapacity and suffering” and that that need not be sudden, as this Court confirmed in May’s Case last year.
Now, that argument did not commend itself to the Court of Appeal. If your Honours could go to page 66 of the application book at paragraph 75, particularly the last six lines or so of paragraph 75, the sentence beginning “While pregnancy will bring about physiological changes ‑ ‑ ‑
BELL J: Well, there is a bit to be said for what their Honours say there, is there not? Puberty brings about physical changes.
MR KIRK: Yes, of course, that is quite right and my learned friends also give the examples of getting older or fatter or so forth.
BELL J: Yes, growing taller.
MR KIRK: Indeed. The response we would make to that is that that ignores, in a sense, the legal premise of these claims for what are sometimes called wrongful births, namely, that what is interfered with and, indeed, this is put by my learned friends in their submissions, accepted by the Court of Appeal, is an interference in, as my friends call it, the right to plan a family. It is…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Commonwealth of Australia v FJ (A Pseudonym) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] HCATrans 211
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Federal Court was whether the notice of visa cancellation was effective to terminate FJ's visa. This required the Court to consider the proper interpretation of s 353-15 of the Act, specifically the requirements for service of a notice when the Minister is aware that the person to whom the notice is addressed is not at the address specified in the notice. The Court also had to determine whether the Minister had discharged their obligations under the Act in attempting to notify FJ of the cancellation.
The Court reasoned that s 353-15(2) of the Act imposes a positive obligation on the Minister to take reasonable steps to ensure that a notice of cancellation is received by the person. This obligation is not discharged by merely sending the notice to an address that the Minister knows the person is not at. In this instance, the Minister was aware that FJ was not at the address to which the notice was sent, and no other reasonable steps were taken to ensure service. Consequently, the Court held that the notice of cancellation was not validly served and therefore was ineffective.
The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the single judge was affirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The respondent's claim was based on the premise that the continuation of her pregnancy and childbirth led to significant physiological changes to her body and resulted in pain, suffering, and economic costs associated with raising the child. The respondent argued that these changes and consequences constituted an "injury" within the meaning of the statute. The respondent cited various cases and statutes, including a New Zealand case, to support her argument that the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth should be considered an "injury." The applicant, on the other hand, argued that the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth did not constitute an "injury" under the statutory definition, which required impairments or incapacities that needed treatment or rehabilitation. The applicant also emphasised that the respondent had expressly eschewed any claim for the physical or psychological pain and suffering associated with pregnancy and childbirth, thereby undermining the scope of her claim.
The High Court considered the arguments presented by both parties but ultimately found insufficient reason to doubt the correctness of the Court of Appeal's decision. The Court concluded that the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth did not amount to an "injury" under the statutory definition, and therefore the respondent's claim for compensation should be rejected. Special leave to appeal was refused, and the respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application.
The matter before the High Court was an application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal in Commonwealth of Australia v FJ [2016] VSCA 123. The Court of Appeal had dismissed an appeal brought by the Commonwealth against a decision of the trial judge which held that the statutory bar on claims for damages against the Commonwealth in respect of a "service injury" did not extend to claims for wrongful birth. The Commonwealth sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal had erred in holding that the statutory bar did not apply to such claims. The application for special leave to appeal was heard by Bell, Nettle, and Edelman JJ on 20 October 2017. The Court refused the application, holding that there was insufficient reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth, which have significant physiological effects on a woman's body, amount to an "injury" within the meaning of the statutory definition provided in the legislation.
2. If the answer to the first issue is affirmative, whether the statutory bar on claims "in respect of" a service injury applies to claims that do not explicitly mention pain and suffering but are fundamentally based on the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth.
3. Whether the distinction made by the Court of Appeal between the current case and previous cases such as Caven, which found pregnancy and childbirth to be injuries, is justified and consistent with the statutory language and purpose.
4. Whether the requirement for "treatment" or "rehabilitation" in the statutory definition of "injury" negates the possibility of a continuation of a pregnancy being considered an injury, given that many women do not seek medical treatment during pregnancy and childbirth.
Held
1. Whether the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth, which have significant physiological effects on a woman's body, amount to an "injury" within the meaning of the statutory definition provided in the legislation.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth do not constitute an "injury" within the meaning of the statutory definition.
2. If the answer to the first issue is affirmative, whether the statutory bar on claims "in respect of" a service injury applies to claims that do not explicitly mention pain and suffering but are fundamentally based on the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the statutory bar applies to such claims, even if they do not explicitly mention pain and suffering.
3. Whether the distinction made by the Court of Appeal between the current case and previous cases such as Caven, which found pregnancy and childbirth to be injuries, is justified and consistent with the statutory language and purpose.
The Court of Appeal found the distinction to be justified, as they considered the statutory language to restrict the application of "injury" to impairments or incapacities that require treatment or "rehabilitation."
4. Whether the requirement for "treatment" or "rehabilitation" in the statutory definition of "injury" negates the possibility of a continuation of a pregnancy being considered an injury, given that many women do not seek medical treatment during pregnancy and childbirth.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the requirement for "treatment" or "rehabilitation" does not negate the possibility of a continuation of a pregnancy being considered an injury, as they found that a continuation of pregnancy and childbirth will require medical treatment in an ordinary understanding.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The central issue in this case was whether the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth, which have significant physiological effects on a woman's body, amount to an "injury" within the meaning of the statutory definition provided in the legislation. The court considered whether these events, while not typically considered pathological, still constituted injuries under the statutory definition. The court also examined whether the statutory bar on claims "in respect of" a service injury applies to claims that do not explicitly mention pain and suffering but are fundamentally based on the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth. Furthermore, the court scrutinized whether the distinction made by the Court of Appeal between the current case and previous cases such as Caven, which found pregnancy and childbirth to be injuries, is justified and consistent with the statutory language and purpose. Lastly, the court debated whether the requirement for "treatment" or "rehabilitation" in the statutory definition of "injury" negates the possibility of a continuation of a pregnancy being considered an injury, given that many women do not seek medical treatment during pregnancy and childbirth.
The High Court held that the statutory definition of "injury" encompasses any physical or mental injury but excludes diseases and the aggravation of a physical or mental injury. In interpreting the term "injury," the court relied on established judicial guidance and case law that recognises "disturbance of the normal physiological state which may produce physical incapacity and suffering." The court acknowledged that pregnancy and childbirth cause significant physiological changes and can lead to claims for pain and suffering, which are commonly awarded in wrongful birth cases. However, the Court of Appeal distinguished the current case from Caven by arguing that the statutory language restricts "injury" to impairments or incapacities that require treatment or rehabilitation. The High Court concluded that the Court of Appeal's decision was correct, finding insufficient reason to doubt its correctness and refusing special leave to appeal.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the statutory bar on claims "in respect of" a service injury applies to claims fundamentally based on the continuation of a pregnancy and childbirth, even if those claims do not explicitly mention pain and suffering. The court also held that the statutory definition of "injury" is not limited to pathological changes and can include physiological changes caused by pregnancy and childbirth. However, the requirement for "treatment" or "rehabilitation" in the statutory definition of "injury" does not negate the possibility of a continuation of a pregnancy being considered an injury, as the law responds to the situation of women who seek medical treatment during pregnancy and childbirth. The court distinguished the current case from previous cases by emphasizing the different legislative context and the exclusion of pain and suffering in this particular case.