Commonwealth of Australia v CTC Resources Nl

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commonwealth of Australia v CTC Resources NL; In the Matter of CTC Resources NL [2016] FCA 112

File number: NSD 1200 of 2015
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 17 February 2016
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – whether an application for an order winding up the defendant should be adjourned until the determination of an appeal filed by that defendant against the judgment which is the foundation of the creditor’s statutory demand upon which the winding up application is based – whether, in the event that no adjournment is granted, an order winding up the defendant in insolvency should be made – relevant considerations discussed
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 459A, 459C, 459E, 459G, 459H, 459P, 459R, 459S, 467

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 64

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52

Cases cited:

Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1990) 95 ALR 525

Auckland Harbour Board v The King [1924] AC 318

Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244

British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30

Commonwealth v Burns [1971] VR 825

Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 54 FLR 439

Commonwealth v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (No 7) (2013) 282 FLR 1

Commonwealth v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] ACTSC 312

Commonwealth v Hamilton [1992] 2 Qd R 257

CTC Resources N/L v Commonwealth of Australia [2015] VSC 238

Endresz v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2015) 228 FCR 334

Jekos Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Horticultural Finance Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 619

Shmee Pty Ltd v Bresam Investments Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 657

Date of hearing: 5 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 90
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr JA Hogan-Doran
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: The Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Defendant: Mr M Kalyk
Solicitor for the Defendant: Irongroup Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1200 of 2015

IN THE MATTER OF CTC RESOURCES NL (ACN 009 061 036)

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Plaintiff

AND:

CTC RESOURCES NL (ACN 009 061 036)

Defendant

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an adjournment of the winding up application be refused.

2.The defendant be wound up in insolvency under the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

3.Peter McCluskey of Ferrier Hodgson, Level 43, 600 Bourke Street, Melbourne, Victoria be appointed official liquidator of the defendant.

4.The plaintiff’s costs be costs in the liquidation of the defendant. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FOSTER J:

  1. By its Originating Process, the plaintiff, the Commonwealth of Australia (Commonwealth) seeks an order pursuant to s 459A and s 459P of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) winding up the defendant, CTC Resources NL (ACN 009 061 036) (CTC), in insolvency…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 112
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commonwealth of Australia filed an application for an order to wind up CTC Resources NL in insolvency. The application was based on a statutory demand that CTC had failed to comply with. CTC did not oppose the application by filing a Notice of Grounds of Opposition. The Commonwealth filed the application on the basis that CTC had failed to comply with the statutory demand, leading to a presumption of insolvency. CTC argued that it had an appeal pending against the judgment which formed the basis of the statutory demand and that the appeal had arguable grounds and prospects of success. CTC sought an adjournment of the winding up application until the appeal was determined. The court had to decide whether to adjourn the winding up application until the appeal was determined and, if not, whether to make a winding up order.

The court considered the principles governing the adjournment of winding up applications, noting that an adjournment would usually be granted if the appeal was being pursued diligently, on genuine grounds, with arguable prospects of success, and if winding up had no utility. The court also considered the observations of Burchett and Gummow JJ in Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA, where the court held that a bankruptcy court should not proceed if an appeal is pending against the judgment relied on as the foundation of the bankruptcy proceedings provided that the appeal is based on genuine and arguable grounds. The court found that CTC's appeal was not likely to succeed because there was no evidence to support the grounds of appeal and the appeal had not been pursued expeditiously. The court held that the appeal was not based on genuine and arguable grounds. The court also found that winding up had utility because CTC was effectively moribund and had no assets apart from its speculative claim on the undertaking as to damages provided by the Commonwealth. The court therefore refused the application for an adjournment and made a winding up order.

The court ordered that the application for an adjournment of the winding up application be refused, that the defendant be wound up in insolvency, that Peter McCluskey of Ferrier Hodgson be appointed official liquidator, and that the plaintiff's costs be costs in the liquidation of the defendant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an adjournment of the winding up application be refused.

2. The defendant be wound up in insolvency under the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

3. Peter McCluskey of Ferrier Hodgson, Level 43, 600 Bourke Street, Melbourne, Victoria be appointed official liquidator of the defendant.

4. The plaintiff’s costs be costs in the liquidation of the defendant.

Background

Background to the litigation

CTC read and relied upon two affidavits sworn by Peter Cain, its solicitor. It did not file any Notice of Grounds of Opposition to the making of a winding up order against it. THE RELEVANT FACTS CTC is a public company with 70,075,000 ordinary shares on issue. It has approximately 1200 members. CTC does not currently trade. It has not traded since January 1999 when the ACT Supreme Court initially granted freezing orders over certain assets of CTC. CTC has no assets. Its liabilities comprise the judgment debt to the Commonwealth and a secured debt of approximately $1 million owed to a related party, Kamanga Holdings Pty Ltd (Kamanga). Kamanga is not presently pressing for repayment of its loan. The only Financial Statements of CTC tendered in evidence before me were the statements for the year ended 30 June 2002. These were the last such statements ever prepared by CTC. CTC submitted that:… the only remaining value in [CTC] is in its appeal rights in the ACT Proceedings, including its potential claim for damages as a result of [the making of certain freezing orders against it on 19 February 1999]. The freezing orders granted against CTC on 19 February 1999 restrained it from dealing in any way with any part of the moneys the subject of the ACT Supreme Court proceeding No SC 75 of 1999, namely(a)The sum of $6,000,000 remitted by the Reserve Bank of Australia to CTC on or about 17 April 1998 (the April Funds); and(b)The sum of $2,725,000 remitted by the Reserve Bank of Australia to Davis Samuel Pty Limited, the first defendant, on or about 22 September 1998 (the September Funds). Those orders also restrained CTC “from dealing with or dissipating in value any asset acquired by [CTC] through the use of any part of the April Funds or the September Funds”. Those orders were made by consent. They were interlocutory. The Commonwealth gave the usual undertaking as to damages in support of the making of those orders. The Impugned Conduct In 1996, the Commonwealth decided to sell certain government owned businesses. As part of the process of closing those businesses, trust accounts were established to receive income and meet expenses. These accounts were administered by the Department of Finance. In 1998, the Department of Finance engaged Callform Pty Ltd (Callform) to provide “accrual accounting services” and “Financial and Management Accounting Services” for some of these accounts. Callform in turn engaged David Muir to provide those services. On 17 April 1998, Mr Muir used stolen computer access details to cause the improper transfer of $6 million of Commonwealth funds from these accounts to CTC. Following receipt of these moneys, CTC made a series of transfers of the moneys to various persons and entities associated with CTC. These transfers were for the private benefit of the Endresz family and their associates. They were used for (inter alia) the purchase of real and personal property. Some moneys were also paid to the benefit of Mr Muir.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Each of these cases provides an example of the way in which, depending upon all relevant circumstances, a court might exercise its discretion in relation to the adjournment of a winding up application. Critical to the reasoning of those decisions in which the Court allowed adjournments were the circumstances that the company was diligently pursuing its appeal, that the appeal was brought on genuine grounds, that the appeal was not inarguably hopeless, that a winding up order had no utility, that the true objective of the applicant was probably to seek to terminate the appeal proceedings and that funding for the appeal was in place. For the reasons which I have explained, most, if not all, of these considerations are not present in this case. The observations made by Burchett and Gummow JJ in Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1990) 95 ALR 525 (Adamopoulos) at 531–532 provide useful guidance as to the considerations which the Court should take into account when considering an application to adjourn a bankruptcy proceeding and thus a winding up proceeding. In that case, their Honours said that a bankruptcy court should not proceed to sequestrate the estate of a debtor if an appeal is pending against the judgment relied on as the foundation of the bankruptcy proceedings provided that the appeal is based on genuine and arguable grounds. In the present case, I have concluded that the appeal is not likely to succeed. Adamopoulos is distinguishable for that reason. CONCLUSION For all of the above reasons, I have decided to refuse CTC’s application for an adjournment. In light of that decision, there is no reason not to wind up CTC. I will therefore make a winding up order. There will be orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Commonwealth made the following submissions in opposition to the grant of any adjournment: (a)No stay of the enforcement of the judgment debt has been sought from the ACT Supreme Court;(b)There is no evidence to support any of the grounds of appeal raised in the Notice of Appeal or to support CTC’s consequential claim under the undertaking as to damages;(c)At present, there is no ground of appeal sufficient to raise a contention challenging the findings of the trial judge based upon the Auckland Harbour Board principle. Even if, in due course, leave to raise such a contention is granted, the point is hopeless. Unless CTC has an arguable case in respect of this foreshadowed ground, its appeal will fail;(d)The appeal has not been pursued expeditiously;(e)CTC is effectively moribund and should be removed from the Register. It has not traded for over 15 years and, apart from its highly speculative claim on the undertaking as to damages provided by the Commonwealth in the ACT Supreme Court proceeding, has no assets;(f)If there is merit in CTC’s appeal, those who stand to gain from success in that appeal should fund it. Those persons are already themselves appellants in the appeal so that the additional cost of funding CTC would be minimal; and(g)The appeal against the trial judge’s dismissal of CTC’s Cross-Claim is hopeless. The causes of action are fanciful and were never likely to succeed. The appeal against his Honour’s detailed findings dismissing the Cross-Claim is hopeless.CONSIDERATION AND DECISION The Commonwealth is entitled to rely upon the presumption of insolvency created by CTC’s failure to comply with the Commonwealth’s statutory demand. CTC’s attempt to have that demand set aside was unsuccessful. For the purposes of the Commonwealth’s winding up application, the Court must presume that CTC is insolvent except so far as the contrary is proved for the purposes of the winding up application. For reasons which I will explain later in these Reasons, I consider that CTC has not proved that CTC is solvent. The provisions of s 459S of the Act then fall for consideration. That section provides: 459S Company may not oppose application on certain grounds(1)In so far as an application for a company to be wound up in insolvency relies on a failure by the company to comply with a statutory demand, the company may not, without the leave of the Court, oppose the application on a ground:(a)that the company relied on for the purposes of an application by it for the demand to be set aside; or(b)that the company could have so relied on, but did not so rely on (whether it made such an application or not).(2)The Court is not to grant leave under subsection (1) unless it is satisfied that the ground is material to proving that the company is solvent. In the present case, CTC submits that it has lodged an appeal from the principal judgment and the second judgment, that that appeal is being pursued on genuine grounds, that that appeal has been and continues to be prosecuted with relative diligence and that its prospects are arguable. CTC accepts that, because it raised these matters in support of its application to set aside the statutory demand, it requires leave under s 459S(1) in order to traverse these matters again at the hearing of the winding up application. Its contention is that the existence and strength of the appeal are matters which are critical to assessing CTC’s solvency. This last submission is correct. Therefore, to the extent that leave is required, I grant leave to CTC to re-agitate these matters for the purposes of the hearing before me.