Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Mare

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

CDPP v Mare & Ors [2008] QCA 373

PARTIES:

COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
(applicant/appellant)
v
JOHN DALZELL MARE
(first respondent)
GARAH HILLS PTY LTD
ACN 101 383 751
(second respondent)
WDPT INVESTMENTS LIMITED
(third respondent)
VANUATU POOLED INVESTMENT MANAGERS
LIMITED

(fourth respondent)
STAR GATE INVESTMENTS LIMITED
(fifth respondent)
SILK ROAD TRADERS PTY LTD
ACN 103 778 525
(sixth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 5573 of 2008
DC No 2446 of 2005

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

28 November 2008

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 September 2008

JUDGES:

Fraser JA, Mackenzie AJA and Daubney J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

Allow the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary judge dated 6 June 2008.1.   

Instead of those orders:2.   

Grant the application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on 3 March 2008.(a)  

Dismiss the application filed by the second respondent and sixth respondent on 28 April 2008.  (b) 

The respondents pay the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions’ costs of and incidental to both applications, to be assessed on the standard basis.(c)  

The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.3.   

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS – FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION – Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) – where restraining orders made pursuant to s 18 of the Act – where s 45(2) provided that unless a confiscation order had been sought within 28 days after the making of the restraining order the restraining order would expire – where appellant brought an application for the forfeiture of property pursuant to s 49(1) of the Act, a section which applied only when a restraining order had been made under s 19 of the Act – where the second and sixth respondents sought to have the appellant’s application struck out on the basis that the appellant should have brought a confiscation order under s 47(1) of the Act – where the appellant sought leave to amend the appellant’s application under s 62 of the Act by substituting s 47(1) instead of s 49(1) – where the primary judge found that the appellant had not brought an application for a confiscation order within the terms of s 45(2) of the Act – where the primary judge refused the appellant’s application under s 62 – whether the primary judge erred by striking out the appellant’s application for a forfeiture order – whether the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s application to amend under s 62

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 29D
Judiciary Act
1903 (Cth), s 79
Proceeds of Crime Act
2002 (Cth), s 18, s 19, s 20, s 33, s 34, s 36, s 45, s 47, s 49, s 59, s 62, s 66, s 388
Supreme Court Act 1995…

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Details
Case
[2008] QCA 373
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, brought an application under section 49(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) for the forfeiture of property. The respondents, Mare and others, sought to have the application struck out on the basis that the appellant should have brought a confiscation order under section 47(1) of the Act. The appellant then sought leave to amend its application under section 62 of the Act by substituting section 47(1) instead of section 49(1). The primary judge found that the appellant had not brought an application for a confiscation order within the terms of section 45(2) of the Act and refused the appellant’s application to amend. The appellant appealed, contending that the primary judge erred in striking out the application for a forfeiture order and in rejecting the application to amend.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in striking out the appellant’s application for a forfeiture order and in rejecting the appellant’s application to amend. The court considered whether the primary judge’s interpretation of section 45(2) of the Act was correct and whether the appellant’s application to amend its application under section 62 of the Act was valid. The court also considered whether the appellant’s failure to bring a confiscation order within the terms of section 45(2) of the Act was fatal to its application for a forfeiture order. The court held that the primary judge erred in striking out the appellant’s application for a forfeiture order and in rejecting the appellant’s application to amend. The court found that the primary judge’s interpretation of section 45(2) of the Act was incorrect and that the appellant’s application to amend its application under section 62 of the Act was valid.

The court held that the primary judge erred in striking out the appellant’s application for a forfeiture order and in rejecting the appellant’s application to amend. The court found that the primary judge’s interpretation of section 45(2) of the Act was incorrect and that the appellant’s application to amend its application under section 62 of the Act was valid. The court held that the appellant’s failure to bring a confiscation order within the terms of section 45(2) of the Act did not necessarily mean that its application for a forfeiture order was invalid. The court held that the appellant’s application for a forfeiture order was valid and that the primary judge should have allowed the appellant to amend its application under section 62 of the Act. The court also held that the respondents should pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the appellant’s costs of and incidental to both applications.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary judge dated 6 June 2008. The court granted the application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on 3 March 2008. The court dismissed the application filed by the second respondent and sixth respondent on 28 April 2008. The court ordered that the respondents pay the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions’ costs of and incidental to both applications, to be assessed on the standard basis. The court also ordered that the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

Allow the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary judge dated 6 June 2008.1.

Instead of those orders:2.

Grant the application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on 3 March 2008.(a)

Dismiss the application filed by the second respondent and sixth respondent on 28 April 2008. (b)

The respondents pay the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions’ costs of and incidental to both applications, to be assessed on the standard basis.(c)

The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.3.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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