COMMONWEALTH CENTRAL AUTHORITY & CAVANAUGH

[2015] FamCA 1005

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH CENTRAL AUTHORITY & CAVANAUGH [2015] FamCA 1005

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – HAGUE CONVENTION – habitual residence of children – children dual citizens of Australia and Finland – both parents and children in Australia at time of hearing – father preventing return of children to Finland with mother.

Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations1986 (Cth)

LK v Director-General, Department of Community Services [2009] HCA 9

Punter v Secretary for Justice [2007] 1 NZLR 40

R v Barnet London Borough Council; Ex Parte Shah [1983] 2 AC 309
SK v KP [2005] 3 NZLR 590

APPLICANT: Commonwealth Central Authority

RESPONDENT: Mr Cavanaugh

FILE NUMBER: CAC 702 of 2015

DATE DELIVERED: 6 July 2015

PLACE DELIVERED: Canberra

PLACE HEARD: Canberra

JUDGMENT OF: Faulks DCJ

HEARING DATE: 10-11 June 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Berger

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Akele (Australian Government Solicitor)

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Testart

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Brain (SMR Legal)

Orders

1. The application is dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Commonwealth Central Authority & Cavanaugh has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA

FILE NUMBER: CAC 702 of 2015

Commonwealth Central Authority

Applicant

And

Mr Cavanaugh

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The proceedings in this matter had been brought under Article 3 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Concluded 25 October 1980) (the Convention).

   Article 3

   The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –

   a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

   b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

   The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State

2. As can be seen, for an order to be made under the Convention it is necessary for there to be a wrongful removal or retention of a child who was habitually resident in the requesting country at the time of the wrongful removal or retention. 

3. The circumstances of this matter were somewhat different from those that I suspect were originally envisaged by the drafters of the Convention. 

4. The parents, Ms C, a citizen of both Australia and Finland and Mr Cavanaugh, an Australian citizen, relocated from Australia to Finland in June 2014 with their three children: N (born in 2002), X (born in 2004), and Y (born in 2008).  All three children are citizens of both Australia and Finland.

5. Prior to this move the parties had lived in Finland for 10 months in 1996, in the United Kingdom from  1996 to June 2002 (N was born in the United Kingdom), in Finland from June to November 2002, and in Australia from November 2002 to June 2014. Both X and Y were born in Australia.

6. In 2015 the family flew from Helsinki to Sydney to attend the wedding of the father’s brother in March 2015. Return tickets for both parents and the three children were booked for 31 March 2015.

7. On 29 March 2015 the parents separated. The mother and the three children stayed with friends from this time. The father had possession of the children’s passports and refused to return them so that the children and the mother could return to Finland on their scheduled flight.

8. On 31 March 2015 the father filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court at Parramatta to have the children placed on the Airport Watch List. On 8 April 2015 the father filed an application in a case seeking a recovery order in relation to the children. Both applications were heard on 12 May 2015 by Dunkley J who made orders transferring the proceedings to the Family Court of Australia, and listed the matter for directions before a Registrar in Sydney on 1 June 2015.

9. On 3 April 2015 the mother commenced proceedings in the Helsinki District Court for divorce, interim sole custody and the immediate return of the children to Finland.

10. On 12 May 2015 the Commonwealth Central Authority brought an application under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) seeking orders that the children be returned to Finland. The matter was listed before me on 20 May 2015. On that occasion I made interim orders placing the children on the Watch List and requiring the father to surrender the children’s passports to the Registrar of the Family Court of Australia. I also requested that the proceedings commenced by the father in the Parramatta Federal Circuit Court and transferred to the Family Court of Australia in Sydney be transferred to the Canberra Registry of the Family Court of Australia.

11. The matter proceeded to final hearing on 10 and 11 June 2015. It was agreed that the principal issue to be tried was whether Finland was the children’s habitual place of residence.

12. The issue of wrongful retention was not pursued before me although the abandonment of that particular ground did not occur until quite late in the proceedings. 

13. The real issue was whether the children were habitually resident in Finland at the time that they were “wrongfully retained” in Australia by their father.  If they were not habitually resident in Finland, the Convention had no application and the application must be dismissed. 

14. In many cases such an issue is able to be resolved in a straightforward fashion.  That was not the case in this matter.

DOMICILE – illustrative

1. It appears that the term “habitual residence” was adopted in about 1896 in various conventions emanating from the Hague as a substitute for the peculiarly English concept of domicile.  It would appear that it was not intended to be a restatement or a reiteration of the concept of domicile under a different name. 

2. Nevertheless, in this matter it may be illustrative to consider (not definitively or judicially) what might have been the situation about the children’s domicile. 

3. The father had a domicile of origin in Australia which he may or may not have abandoned at some point but certainly re-kindled when he returned to Australia in November 2002.  His eleven and a half years residence in Australia after that point would seem to have affirmed his domicile of choice if not a reinvigorating of his domicile of origin at the time when the family left for Finland in June 2014.  The father’s evidence would suggest that when he went to Finland he did so on the basis that he was giving it a trial for one year.  Such an intention would not have been sufficient to displace his existing domicile in Australia.  I accept and find that his intention was that he would go to Finland for a year and at the end of that time make a further decision about whether he and the family would remain in Finland or return to Australia. 

4. For her part the mother had a domicile of origin in Finland and the evidence before me would not enable me to determine accurately whether she had abandoned that domicile or acquired a further domicile of choice after she left Finland.  She certainly studied in England and it would be reasonable to suppose, although I could not on the evidence available to me find definitively, that she acquired a domicile of choice in Australia when the family moved here in 2002.

5. When the family moved to Finland the mother’s evidence was that they were going to Finland for at least one year.  I accept and find that it was her desire to live in Finland permanently with the family.  Her evidence, which was given in a straightforward fashion in the witness box in cross-examination, conceded that if the family had determined at the end of a year in Finland that the family as a whole (possibly with her as an exception) wanted to return to Australia then she would at the very least have considered that.  There can be little doubt however that her desire was to live permanently (or at the very least indefinitely) in Finland.  I suspect that a closer examination of the evidence would reveal that the mother had not, at the time of her departure from Australia or even at the time the family left Finland to come back to Australia for the wedding, acquired a domicile of choice in Finland.  Obviously, it is not necessary for the purposes of these proceedings for me to be definitive about it.  I am merely analysing this process to indicate the complications associated with the determination that this Court was obliged to make. 

6. One of the children had a domicile of origin in the United Kingdom and the other two had a domicile of origin in Australia, having been born here.  To the extent that they had not lived in Australia on a permanent basis before the family commenced its last longest stay in Australia they would, as a result of their parent’s joint intentions, have acquired a domicile of choice at the very least in Australia at that point.  Thereafter, when they moved to Finland they had, in my opinion, still a domicile in Australia because at the very least there was no common intention of the parents other than perhaps that they would remain in Finland for a year (at least).  If it were the case that the mother had acquired a domicile or reacquired her domicile in Finland then on the information set out above it seems to me the father did not and in those circumstances (where the parents might have had different domiciles) the children, in my opinion, would have most likely been properly found to have been domiciled in Australia. 

7. Domicile is not however the question.  It is common ground that while the parents were living in Australia for some eleven and a half years that they and the children would have been habitually resident in Australia whatever connotations that term may have.  There is equally little doubt that after the parents and the children moved to Finland in June 2014 they were living in Finland and their subsequent activities could reasonably be said to have constituted residence in Finland.  The children attended school.  The children attended language classes.  The father attended language classes.  The wife had a job.  The parties discussed acquiring property in which to live permanently.  The parents applied for and obtained for the children residence status.  The husband probably would have obtained employment if he had not been ill. 

8. If asked casually where they lived it is likely that both parents and the children would have said that they were living in Finland.  A question as to where their real home might be would perhaps have elicited different responses from different members of the family. 

INTENTION

1. The extent to which intention is to form a part of a consideration of whether the parties were habitually resident in Finland complicates rather than resolves the issue.  Attempts to identify what sort of intention was necessary (bearing in mind that it should be contrasted with the intention to acquire a domicile) had resulted in some courts referring to the “settled purpose” (of, one presumes, both parents).  However, in this case the question might be further refined to indicate whether the parties had a settled purpose to live in Finland permanently or for a year.  If the former, it would seem that there was no common purpose whether settled or not between mother and father.  If the latter, it would appear there was a common purpose that the parents would remain in Finland for a year.  That was the evidence of both parents in the course of cross-examination. 

2. The issue therefore would seem to be whether it is sufficient that there should be a settled purpose (coupled with the other relevant indicia of habitual residence) to live in Finland for a period - such as twelve months - or whether it had to be on a permanent or indefinite basis. 

3. In LK v Director-General, Department of Community Services[1] their Honours, after referring to the controversy between decisions in the United Kingdom and Australia and New Zealand, in a unanimous judgment said:

   … The approach adopted in Australia and the United Kingdom was identified as treating questions of “settled purpose” as a necessary and integral part of the determination, whereas that adopted in New Zealand was described as requiring “a broad factual inquiry” into all factors relevant to determining the habitual residence of a child, of which the settled purpose or intention of the parents is an important but not necessarily decisive factor. [2]

   [1] [2009] HCA 9.

   [2] Ibid [18].

4. Their Honours in their examination of what constituted habitual residence said:

   … Thus the Explanatory Report commenting on the Abduction Convention said that “the notion of habitual residence [is] a well-established concept in the Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile (emphasis added).[3]

   [3] Ibid [21].

5. In paragraph 23 their Honours said as follows:

   … First, application of the expression “habitual residence” permits consideration of a wide variety of circumstances that bear upon where a person is said to reside and whether that residence is to be described as habitual.  Secondly, the past and present intentions of the person under consideration will often bear upon the significance that is to be attached to particular circumstances like the duration of a person’s connections with a particular place of residence. 

6. Their Honours went on to say:

   … So, for example, a person may abandon a place as the place of that person’s habitual residence without at once becoming habitually resident in some other place; a person may lead such a nomadic life as not to have a place of habitual residence[4] (emphasis added).

   [4] Ibid [25].

7. In paragraph 27 their Honours said:

   When speaking of the habitual residence of a child it will usually be very important to examine where the person or persons who are caring for the child live – where those persons have their habitual residence. 

8. Later in the same paragraph their Honours said:

   But if, as the writings about the Abduction Convention and like instruments repeatedly urge, the question of habitual residence of a child is one of fact, it is important not to elevate the observation that a child looks to others for care and housing to some principle of law like the (former) law of dependent domicile of a married woman. 

9. Under a heading of ‘Purpose and Intention’ their Honours said:

   Although intention is a necessary element in deciding domicile of choice, and “habitual residence” is chosen as a connecting factor in preference to domicile, examination of a person’s intentions will usually be relevant to a consideration of where that person habitually resides.  Sometimes, intention will be very important in answering that question.  The example of a person who leaves a jurisdiction intending not to return is one such case.  But unlike domicile, considerations relevant to deciding where a person is habitually resident are not necessarily confined to physical presence and intention, and intention is not to be given controlling weight. [5]

   [5] Ibid [28].

10. Their Honours go on to comment that the intentions of individuals may not be clearly formed and may be ambiguous.[6]

    [6] Ibid [29].

11. And in relation to the case before them their Honours said:

    … it is important to recognise that a person may cease to reside habitually in one place without acquiring a new place of habitual residence.[7]

    [7] Ibid [32].

12. In paragraph 33 their Honours said:

    Secondly, because a person’s intentions may be ambiguous, in asking whether a person has abandoned residence in a place it is necessary to recognise the possibility that the person may not have formed a singular and irrevocable intention not to return, yet properly be described as no longer habitually resident in that place.  Absence of a final decision positively rejecting the possibility of returning to Israel [in that particular case] in the foreseeable future is not necessarily inconsistent with ceasing to reside there habitually.

13. Their Honours pointed to the fact that there are two parents who may have different intentions and said:

    Thirdly, when considering where a child is habitually resident, attention cannot be confined to the intentions of the parent who in fact has the day-to-day care of the child.  It will usually be necessary to consider what each parent intends for the child.  When parents are living together, young children will have the same habitual residence as their parents.[8]

    [8] Ibid [34].

14. Their Honours comment that it is necessary to look at all of the factors involved and not in accordance with “some predetermined hierarchy of importance” and concluded:

    And examination of decided cases in the area does not require the identification of a closed set of criteria, or the attribution of predetermined weighting between them.[9] 

    [9] Ibid [35].

15. Their Honours went on to consider the division of authority between various cases decided particularly in the United Kingdom and in Australia and New Zealand.  They quoted Lord Scarman in R v Barnet London Borough Council; Ex Parte Shah[10] as follows:

    I agree with Lord Denning MR that in their natural and ordinary meaning the words [‘ordinarily resident’] mean ‘that the person must be habitually and normally resident here, apart from temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration’.  The significance of the adverb ‘habitually’ is that it recalls two necessary features mentioned by Viscount Sumner in Lysaght’s case, namely residence adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes.

    [10] [1983] 2 AC 309 at 342.

16. Their Honours in the High Court of Australia commented that both Shah’s Case and Lysaght’s Case had nothing to do with the Abduction Convention and were about matters relating to child support and income tax.  They went on to comment however, [11]

    It will be observed that reference was made in Shah’s Case to residence “adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes” (emphasis added).  Subsequent decisions, both in Australia and in the United Kingdom, have often referred to “settled purpose” or “settled intention”. 

    [11] LK v Director-General, Department of Community Services [2009] HCA 9 [39].

17. Their Honours then concluded in paragraph 40:

    But for the reasons given by Lord Scarman in Shah’s Case, it would be wrong to treat the references to settled purposes (or settled purpose or intention) as importing the old law of domicile by directing an inquiry in cases arising in connection with the Abduction Convention into whether the person whose place of residence is in issue is shown to intend to live there permanently or at least indefinitely. 

18. Their Honours then went on to comment about the apparent divergence of opinion between Waite J in Re B (Minors) (Abduction) (No 2) and Rattee J in A v A and the fact that the conclusions expressed by Waite J were adopted by the Full Court of the Family Court in Cooper v Casey and Panayotides v Panayotides.[12]

    [12] Ibid [41].

19. Their Honours in the High Court[13] commented that the Full Court in the matter before them appeared to be preferring the view of Rattee J to that of Waite J and commented that the Full Court in the matter before the High Court had given particular attention to SK v KP.[14] Their Honours, without examining the decision in SK in detail observed that the decision of Punter v Secretary for Justice[15] held that the inquiry into habitual residence is “a broad factual inquiry.”

    [13] Ibid [42].

    [14] [2005] 3 NZLR 590.

    [15] [2007] 1 NZLR 40.

1. Their Honours in the High Court went on to quote from Punter as follows:

   Such an inquiry should take into account all relevant factors, including settled purpose, the actual and intended length of stay in a state, the purpose of the stay, the strength of ties to the state and to any other state (both in the past and currently), the degree of assimilation into the state, including living and schooling arrangements, and cultural, social and economic integration. In this catalogue, SK v KP held that settled purpose (and with young children the settled purpose of the parents) is important but not necessarily decisive. It should not in itself override what McGrath J called, at para [22], the underlying reality of the connection between the child and the particular state.

2. Their Honours in the High Court went on to comment[16]

   As the plurality rightly said, the search is for the connection between the child and the particular state. That being the nature of the search the plurality’s references to settled purpose are to be read as directing attention to the intentions of the parents. But as explained earlier in these reasons, the relevant criterion is a shared intention that the children live in a particular place with a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.

   [16] LK v Director-General, Department of Community Services [2009] HCA 9 [44].

3. This, they comment, shows no “disconformity” between the approach of the New Zealand courts and the need identified by Lord Brandon in re J “to decide the question of habitual residence by reference to all the circumstances of any particular case.”

4. Their Honours in the High Court comment that the Punter decision accords with the “general tenor of decisions in the United States of America.”[17]

   [17] Ibid [45].

5. Their Honours in the High Court then went on to consider the facts in the case before them, and said among other things in relation to the facts in that case:[18]

   The absence of an agreed and singular purpose or intention at the time of departure from Israel (which could only be completely described by reference only to residence in Australia or Israel) was not to be treated as deciding the question of habitual residence … and more importantly, the intentions of the parents are not the only factors which bear upon whether in July 2006 the children were habitually resident in Israel.

   [18] Ibid [48].

6. Their Honours commented that in the nature of the somewhat ambiguous intentions of the parties “the possibility that they might once again take up habitual residence in Israel (if their parents were reconciled) does not deny that they had ceased to be habitually resident there. Whether they were habitually resident in Australia when the father asked for their return need not be decided.”[19]

   [19] Ibid [49].

7. Applying that to the current situation it seems that the following matters would be supportive of the contention that the parties were habitually resident in Finland:

   a)The children and the parents had physically moved to Finland and had established initially one residence and thereafter another.  There had been discussions between the parents about a more permanent residence which they might acquire in the future.

   b)The children were attending school, were progressing satisfactorily at school and were apparently happy at their schools.  The children were coping with the Finnish language and receiving additional tuition in the Finnish language.

   c)The father was acquiring knowledge of the Finnish language himself and made some attempts to obtain employment. 

   d)The mother had acquired employment in Finland.

   e)The children were engaged in extra-curricular activities and had made friends in Finland. 

   f)I have already discussed the nature of the intention of each of the parents about what would happen in Finland for a year and what would be likely to happen thereafter.

8. Against those factors might be said the following:

   a)The parties retained their acquired house in Australia.

   b)The parties kept some, at least, of their furniture in Australia in the garage of the house that they previously owned but now had rented out. 

   c)The father had retained his employment in Australia and continued to receive some remuneration therefrom during his time in Finland. 

   d)At least the father would assert that the intention in going to Finland notwithstanding the concomitant immersion in Finnish activities, schooling and the like was intended as an experience rather than as a permanent life choice.  The mother at least acknowledged that there was a possibility that after a year in Finland the parties would return to Australia.

9. In my opinion, it could not be said that there was a settled purpose or intention on the part of both parents to live indefinitely in Finland.  There is no doubt that that could have been something which happened in the future, perhaps at the end of one year.  It was not however the settled purpose of both the parents at any time either before they left Australia or while they were living in Finland.  That would be relevant to the acquisition of a change of domicile from Australia.  Whether it is relevant for a determination about whether as a consequence of the move to Finland the parents of the children and in this instance most particularly the children were habitually resident in Finland, at least at the time when they returned to Australia and relevantly at the time when their father retained them in Australia or prevented their departure from Australia, is a different question.

10. Little assistance is derived from a consideration of dictionary definitions of the word habitual.  The Macquarie Dictionary[20] defines ‘habitual’ as ‘of the nature of a habit, or fixed by or resulting from habit.’  The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary[21] defines it as ‘of the nature of a habit; fixed by habit; existing as a settled practice or condition; constantly repeated or continued; customary.’

    [20] Fourth Edition p639.

    [21] Third Edition p910.

11. It might be said without any damage to the language that the parties were at the time when they returned to Australia at least “ordinarily resident” in Finland.  It might even be said that they had been continually resident in Finland since they arrived there.  Whether there are additional connotations to the word “habitual” really depends upon whether a degree of permanence is to be attributed to the adverb “habitually”. 

12. The term habitual residence seemingly includes some time element.  At one end of the spectrum it would seem to be straining any reasonable concept of the language to say that someone could be habitually resident in a country for a day.  Equally, at the other end of the scale, residence for some years might be readily seen to be habitual residence. 

13. Counsel in their submissions to me wisely avoided committing themselves to where on the spectrum “habitual” might fit in.  Counsel for the Central Authority (Mr Berger) conservatively and wisely submitted that it was unnecessary for the Court to determine precisely where the relevant time cut in or continuing the analogies set out above, at what point on the continuum the habitual residence cut in, but that in his submission, wherever the point may be it had been exceeded in this matter.  When pressed by me as to why that should be so and what factors might influence that conclusion, Mr Berger refrained from identifying any particular time saying merely that it was enough that the point had been passed (wherever it may be set) and that in determining whether the point had been passed it was reasonable and proper to look to all of the circumstances in the matter.  He submitted that taking account of the factors set out above a year would constitute, in his opinion, in combination with those factors a long enough time for there to be habitual residence.  Of course, the parties did not spend a year in Finland.  However, a short absence for a holiday would not appear to be something which would affect the ongoing nature of the residence otherwise in place.  In this matter, there is no doubt that the parties left Finland on the basis suggested by the father at least, that they would be absent from Finland only for a fortnight.  Such a disruption for such a short and temporary period for a designated temporary purpose would not in my opinion constitute a disruption of the habitual residence if it existed, and would not of itself demonstrate a change in the settled purpose of the parties to the extent that that might be relevant. 

14. Because the concept of habitual residence is to be contrasted with domicile I do not believe that it can be reasonably said that to live permanently or indefinitely can be imputed to the concept of “habitual”.  In my opinion, if the parties were asked at the time when they moved to Finland they would probably have agreed that they proposed that they would be ordinarily resident in Finland for a year.  They would probably have agreed that they would be continually resident in Finland for a year.   

15. It was urged on me by counsel for the respondent that the parties remained habitually resident in Australia because of the connexions between that country and the parties and the children.  I do not agree with that submission.  It seems to me that at the time the parties left Australia that both parents were agreed that they were abandoning Australia as their habitual residence at least for the time being.  The real issue is whether in the circumstances the parties’ residence in Finland can be described as habitual and whether the parties had acquired such a habitual residence such as to constitute that as the habitual residence of the children. 

16. The evidence of the parties includes their contrasting evidence about their respective intentions.  As appears from LK[22] for the children of parents to acquire a habitual residence requires more than the unilateral act of one parent if the parents are together.  It would seem in this matter from the contrasting evidence of the parents that their intentions were not necessarily the same beyond one year.  At the end of the year if there was a decision to return to Australia no doubt the parties would thereafter have acquired at some point a habitual residence again (anew) in Australia.  If they remained in Finland they would probably from that time in the light of their intention and their continued residence there have become habitually resident in Finland. 

    [22] Ibid

17. Acknowledging that the intention of the parents is not the determining factor but also acknowledging that a common intent is a necessary factor if it is to effect the children in my opinion, it cannot be said that the parents (and hence the children) had acquired at the time of the alleged wrongful retention in Australia an habitual residence in Finland.  It seems to me that this was a case where the parents having abandoned their habitual residence in Australia had not yet acquired a habitual residence anywhere else. 

18. In the light of all of the circumstances although the parents may have been approaching a situation where it might have been appropriate to regard their residence in Finland as habitual (as contrasted perhaps with a family travelling around Finland by caravan and not stopping at any place or become immersed in the culture, or attending educational institutions or obtaining employment or any of the other matters that these parents did) there was no settled common intent sufficient in all of the circumstances to permit of the description of their residence in Finland as a habitual residence. 

19. In coming to that conclusion I am conscious of the fact that it is not necessary as it would be in the case of a consideration of whether a domicile had been established, to find an intention to live indefinitely or permanently in a country.  However, the nature of the circumstances of the parents and the children and in particular the potentially disparate intentions of the parents are such that in my opinion it could not be said that whatever may have been the appropriate “settled purposes” or “settled intention” it was such as to allow a finding of habitual residence. 

20. Accordingly, in my opinion, the application should be dismissed. 

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice Faulks delivered on 6 July 2015.

Associate: 

Date:  6 July 2015