Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Robson

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Robson

[2013] FCA 1430

Citation: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Robson [2013] FCA 1430
Parties: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v WILLIAM ROLAND ROBSON and GEOFFREY ANTHONY SHANNON
File number: NSD 1719 of 2013
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 16 December 2013
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Pt X, ss 178, 188A(2)(f), 188(2C), 190A(1), 190(2)(b), 204, 222
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, ss 37M(2), 37N
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005 (Cth)
rr 9.04 and 10.04
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 327
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australia National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 applied
Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 199 applied
Hingston v Westpac Banking Corporation (2012) 200
FCR 493 applied
Re Dingle;  Westpac Bank Corporation v Worrell (1993) 47 FCR 478 applied
Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625 applied
Shannon v Shannon [2013] NSWSC 608 referred to
Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212 applied
Date of hearing: 16 December 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D A McLure
Solicitor for the Applicant: Gadens Lawyers
First Respondent: Filed a submitting appearance
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr A J McQuillen with Mr S Lipp
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Blueprint Law

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1719 of 2013

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Applicant

AND:

WILLIAM ROLAND ROBSON
First Respondent

GEOFFREY ANTHONY SHANNON
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 DECEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The personal insolvency agreement deed dated 5 July 2013 between the second respondent and first respondent be set aside.

2.A sequestration order be made against the estate of the second respondent, Geoffrey Anthony Shannon.

3.The applicant creditor's costs be payable from the estate of the second respondent debtor in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

4.The applicant file any interlocutory application in respect of any orders it seeks as to costs against the first respondent on or before 7 days after the reasons for judgment have been authenticated by the associate to Rares J.

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

5.Maxwell Prentice is the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Geoffrey Anthony Shannon.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

6.The date of the bankruptcy is 21 May 2013, being the date of the second respondent's statement of affairs.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1719 of 2013

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Applicant

AND:

WILLIAM ROLAND ROBSON
First Respondent

GEOFFREY ANTHONY SHANNON
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

16 DECEMBER 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE JUDGMENT)

  1. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia has applied to set aside…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1430
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Robson was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The Commonwealth Bank sought to set aside a personal insolvency agreement (PIA) that had been approved by the debtor's creditors. The debtor, Geoffrey Anthony Shannon, opposed the application on the basis that the creditors had voted in good faith and that the Court should not interfere with their decision. The Bank argued that the trustee had erred in his valuation of the Bank's debt and that this had affected the outcome of the creditors' vote.

The legal issues before the court were whether the trustee had properly exercised his discretion in evaluating the Bank's debt and whether the composition was unreasonable, or not calculated to benefit creditors generally, such that it should be set aside. The court found that the trustee had not properly evaluated the Bank's debt and that this had affected the outcome of the creditors' vote. The court also found that the composition was unreasonable and should be set aside. In making this decision, the court considered the amount of the composition as compared with the debts owing by the debtor, the nature of the relationship between the debtor and those creditors who voted in favour of the composition, and whether any payments had been made to creditors or to the Trustee of the bankrupt estate.

The court set aside the PIA, made a sequestration order against the debtor's estate, and ordered that the Bank's costs be payable from the debtor's estate. The court also appointed Maxwell Prentice as the trustee of the debtor's bankrupt estate and noted the date of the bankruptcy as 21 May 2013, being the date of the debtor's statement of affairs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The personal insolvency agreement deed dated 5 July 2013 between the second respondent and first respondent be set aside.

2. A sequestration order be made against the estate of the second respondent, Geoffrey Anthony Shannon.

3. The applicant creditor's costs be payable from the estate of the second respondent debtor in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

4. The applicant file any interlocutory application in respect of any orders it seeks as to costs against the first respondent on or before 7 days after the reasons for judgment have been authenticated by the associate to Rares J.

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

5. Maxwell Prentice is the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Geoffrey Anthony Shannon.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

6. The date of the bankruptcy is 21 May 2013, being the date of the second respondent's statement of affairs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion, the trustee erred in failing properly to address the evaluation of the Bank’s debt. In Re Dingle; Westpac Bank Corporation v Worrell (1993) 47 FCR 478 and 489G-490B Wilcox, Ryan and Cooper JJ found that the trustee, Mr Worrell, had a duty to make a judgment about the prospects of success of a creditor, in a complex proceeding, in the face of conflicting legal opinions, when adjudicating on a creditor’s proof of debt. They said:“Mr Worrell was placed in a most difficult position, being required to assess the prospects of success of a complex proceeding in the face of conflicting legal opinions. Nonetheless, we have to agree with Drummond J that it was his duty to make a judgment about those prospects. It should have been obvious to him that Westpac would seek to vote in opposition to the composition and that its vote (if allowed) would probably be critical to the result. In that situation, we think that, before coming to the meeting, Mr Worrell should have obtained a considered opinion from a suitably qualified lawyer briefed with all available information about the case, including the foreshadowed defences.” In this matter, there is no evidence here that the trustee did any such thing. I am of opinion that his valuation at $1, for voting purposes, of the Bank’s debt claimed in the proceedings that were already substantively part heard before Sackar J demonstrated that the trustee gave no, or no real, consideration to the valuation of the debt in accordance his duty. The trustee made his valuation of a claim that was based on guarantees given by the debtor, as director, of his two companies to support their financing by the Bank to a sum of over $8.5 million. There is no evidence that the trustee sought legal advice, and if he did, there is no evidence as to how he could have come to the view that the Bank’s claimed debt was effectively worthless for voting purposes. Nothing in the evidence before me suggested, and the debtor did not identify any justification, for such a value. His Honour’s subsequent decision to give judgment in favour of the Bank in the full amount it claimed supports the inference that there was no reasonable basis for a valuation at $1. For those reasons, I am of opinion that the Bank’s claim to appeal against the trustee’s decision under s 178 of the Act should be allowed and that the trustee should have admitted the debt, having regard to the evidence now before me, at full value. Had he done so, that would have affected the result of voting on the resolution. Certainly, at the time of the meeting, the trustee must have been able to form a view that the debt was worth, for voting purposes, substantively more than the nominal sum of $1. Were it to be admitted now on the basis of Sackar J’s findings, as I find it should be, the resolution to approve the agreement would not have been passed as a special resolution. The Bank also complained that the trustee should not have admitted for full value the two judgment debts of the debtor’s father and DWS that he had expressed concern about in his report to creditors. A trustee in bankruptcy, and, likewise, a trustee for the purposes of a personal insolvency agreement, is not necessarily bound by Court judgments and, and in appropriate circumstances, can go behind them: see Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212. Nonetheless, at the time of the creditors meeting the trustee’s acceptance of those two judgment debts at face value is understandable. The Bank did not appeal against the trustee’s admission of those debts at full value.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The debtor argued that the Bank had an onus to establish that the Court should be satisfied that the agreement should be set aside under ss 222(1) and (5). He argued that in exercising the discretion to do so expressly, or by implication, the Court necessarily had to have regard to the interests of the creditors as a whole that were to be served by the making of any such order. In particular, he contended, the creditors could be assumed to know where their economic interests lay in voting for an agreement to be entered into and the Court would not lightly set the agreement aside in light of those considerations. He also argued that a relevant factor was that the Court must be satisfied, if it exercised the power to set the agreement aside, that by doing so there was a real prospect of improving the return for creditors from that offered by the agreement approved by the creditors. He submitted that mere speculation as to whether the debtor had other assets that may be available but undisclosed or that considerations of the public interest in proper scrutiny of the debtor’s affairs were not a substitute, or sufficient, to supplant the considered views of the majority of the creditors. He pointed to the fact that the proposal was intended to ensure that the creditors would receive a return with which the overwhelming majority by value and number were satisfied, albeit that it would be a very small return against very large debts. He said that there were no cases in which the mere fact of the disparity between the amount of the debtor’s debts and the sum offered in the composition or agreement was a sufficient ground by itself to set a personal insolvency agreement aside. He also argued that even if the trustee had made an error in rejecting Bankwest’s proof of debt, it is unlikely that it would have been admitted at that time for its full value. And so, he contended, there was every reason to think that a majority, sufficient to pass a special resolution, would still have been achieved. Indeed, had the Bank’s debt been admitted to proof at the full amount, with all the others that were admitted at the values that the trustee admitted, the resolution would have been defeated as a special resolution only by 1.2%: i.e. 26.2% of the creditors would have been against its passage.Consideration In Hingston v Westpac Banking Corporation (2012) 200 FCR 493 at 510-511 [90]-[93] Greenwood, McKerracher and Nicholas JJ approved of the principles applicable to s 222(1)(d) identified by the primary judge that they had earlier summarised at 505 [58], namely (omitting citations):“in assessing whether the composition is unreasonable, or not calculated to benefit creditors generally, the Court has regard to the amount of the composition as compared with the debts owing by the debtor; in making that comparison the relativity between the amount of the debts incurred and the proposed composition might suggest that the proposal is so trivial or so disproportionate (as, for all practical purposes, the creditors are receiving nothing or a negligible amount) that the administration of the estate is “better dealt with by way of bankruptcy” with an investigation by the Trustee in bankruptcy exercising relevant powers; the relativity of the amount of the debts owing, to the proposal made, is relevant but not determinative; whether any payments have been made to creditors or to the Trustee of the bankrupt estate is also relevant; and, the nature of the relationship between the debtor and those creditors who voted in favour of the composition is relevant.”