Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TAXATION - income tax - document described as an assessment, under which no tax is assessed or payable, issued by Commissioner - meaning of “assessment” - whether document an “assessment” for purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 or making amendments to assessments under s 170(3) - whether a “nil” assessment is an assessment under the Act.

WORDS AND PHRASES - “assessment”.

Ex parte Hooper (1926) 37 CLR 368 - cited
Taylor v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 16 FCR 212 - cited
Thai v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 53 FCR 252 - cited
Batagol v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 243 - considered and distinguished
Lloyds Bank Export Finance v Commissioner for Inland Revenue [1991] 2 AC 427 - considered and applied
Scott v The Minister of National Revenue [1961] Exch. C.R. 120 - considered
F. J. Bloemen Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth (1981) 147 CLR 360 - considered
The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth v Prestige Motors Pty Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 1 - considered
Webb v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 394 - considered
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Stokes (1997) 97 ATC 4001 - considered
Prestige Motors v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 47 FCR 138 - considered
Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Sheehan (1986) 86 ATC 4718 - considered
Stuart (No 2) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) ATC 4942 - considered

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 17, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 170(3), 170AA, 171(1), 173, 174(1), 177(1), 204

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v GWENDA BLANCHE RYAN
VG 476 of 1997

BURCHETT, FRENCH AND MERKEL JJ
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)
2 APRIL 1998

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

 VG 476 of 1997

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
APPELLANT

AND:

GWENDA BLANCHE RYAN
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BURCHETT, FRENCH AND MERKEL JJ

DATE:

2 APRIL 1998

PLACE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT the appeal is dismissed.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

 VG 476 of 1997

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Appellant

AND:

GWENDA BLANCHE RYAN
Respondent

JUDGES:

BURCHETT, FRENCH AND MERKEL JJ

DATE:

2 APRIL 1998

PLACE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BURCHETT J:

I agree with the reasons for judgment of Merkel J.

I certify that this page is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Burchett

Associate:

Dated:             2 April 1998

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

   VG 476 of 1997

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

APPELLANT

AND:

GWENDA BLANCHE RYAN

RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BURCHETT, FRENCH AND MERKEL JJ

DATE:

2 APRIL 1998

PLACE:

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Details
Case
[1998] FCA 320
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerns the interpretation of the term "assessment" under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), particularly in relation to a document issued by the Commissioner of Taxation that indicates no tax is assessed or payable. The case, Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan, was heard in the Federal Court of Australia and involved a dispute over whether the document in question constituted an assessment for the purposes of the Act. The Court was required to determine whether a notice of assessment under which no tax is assessed or payable can be considered an assessment under the Act, and if so, whether such an assessment triggers the limitation periods for amending assessments under s 170(3) of the Act.

The Court considered the definition of "assessment" in s 6(1) of the Act, which includes the ascertainment of taxable income and the tax payable thereon, as well as the notice to the taxpayer of the outcome. The Court examined relevant case law, including Batagol v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, and the statutory scheme under the Act, particularly ss 166, 170, and 204. The Court also looked at the policy of certainty and finality in taxation assessments.

The Court concluded that a nil assessment, where the Commissioner ascertains the taxable income and the tax payable thereon as nil and serves notice of this to the taxpayer, is indeed an assessment under the Act. This conclusion was based on the definition of "assessment" and the policy reasons supporting the finality and certainty of assessments. The Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that an assessment must result in a positive amount of tax being assessed as due and payable. The Court further held that a nil assessment triggers the limitation periods for amending assessments under s 170(3) of the Act, as the notional date for payment under s 204(1) applies to such assessments.

The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the trial judge was upheld, with costs awarded to the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

Gwenda Blanche Ryan, the taxpayer, lodged a tax return for the year ended 30 June 1987, reporting a taxable income of $4,470. She claimed a deduction of $10,000 for expenses incurred in her business as a timber merchant. Based on her return, the Commissioner issued a document on 11 December 1987, stating her taxable income as nil and no tax payable, accompanied by a refund cheque for $3,653.40. This document, referred to as the 1987 determination, was intended to notify Ryan of the assessment of her taxable income and the tax payable thereon. In February 1994, after an audit, the Commissioner issued another document, the 1994 assessment, stating her taxable income for the 1987 year as $14,470, with tax payable. Ryan objected to the 1994 assessment, which was disallowed by the Commissioner. She appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which affirmed the Commissioner's decision, leading to the current appeal.

The case originated in the Federal Court of Australia, with the appeal being heard by the Full Court. The matter arose from Ryan's objection to the Commissioner's disallowance of her objection to the 1994 assessment. The trial judge, Spender J, allowed the appeal, declaring that the 1987 determination was an assessment under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). The Commissioner appealed to the Full Court against the trial judge's decision. The Full Court, comprising Burchett, French, and Merkel JJ, heard the appeal on 2 April 1998 and dismissed the Commissioner's appeal with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the document issued by the Commissioner, which states the taxpayer's taxable income as nil and no tax payable, is an "assessment" for the purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) or making amendments to assessments under s 170(3).
2. If such a document can be considered an assessment, whether it triggers the time limits for amending assessments under s 170(3) of the Act.

Held
1. The document issued by the Commissioner, which states the taxpayer's taxable income as nil and no tax payable, is an "assessment" for the purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) or making amendments to assessments under s 170(3).
2. If such a document can be considered an assessment, it triggers the time limits for amending assessments under s 170(3) of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the statutory definition of "assessment" in s 6(1) of the Act, which refers to the ascertainment of the amount of taxable income and of the tax payable thereon. The court found that the definition does not require a positive amount of tax to be payable for an assessment to be valid. The reasoning of Kitto J in Batagol v Federal Commissioner of Taxation was considered, but the court concluded that it did not mandate a positive tax amount for an assessment. The court also noted that the general scheme of the Act, including provisions for review and appeal, supports the notion of assessments fixing the taxpayer's liability to tax. The court held that a nil assessment can be made under the Act and is an assessment for the purposes of s 170(3), as it provides certainty and finality in the assessment process. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that a nil assessment is impossible or that it cannot trigger the time limits for amending assessments. The court found that the date upon which tax "became due and payable" under s 170(3) is either the date specified in the notice of assessment or, if no date is specified, the thirtieth day after service of the notice. Consequently, the 1987 determination was an assessment, and the 1994 assessment was an amended assessment that was not authorised by s 170(3).