Commissioner of Taxation v Miley

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Miley [2017] FCA 1396

File number: NSD 366 of 2016
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 28 November 2017
Catchwords:

TAXATION – appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – where Commissioner of Taxation assessed Respondent as not being entitled to small business capital gains tax concessions under subdivision 152-C of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1977 (Cth) – where Tribunal set aside objection decisions and found that the Respondent satisfied the basic conditions for relief – whether Tribunal erred in so finding – whether Respondent satisfied the minimum net asset value test – proper enquiry for valuing equal third minority shareholding in company – whether value of shares should be discounted for a lack of control

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – notice of objection to competency of appeal – whether appeal raises a question of law within the meaning of s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44, 44(3)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Divs 104, 152, 855, Subdivs 152-A, 152-C, ss 995-1, 104-10, 108-5, 116-30, 152-10, 152-15, 152-20, 152-205

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 33.21

Cases cited:

Abrahams v Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 70 CLR 23

Alcan NT Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NTSC 9; (2007) 208 FLR 159

Attorney-General of Ceylon v Mackie [1952] 2 All ER 775

Australian Gas Light Company v Valuer-General (NSW) (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126

Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 64; (1999) 167 ALR 575

Byrne v A J Byrne Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 667

Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26; [1936] 1 All ER 762

Commissioner of State Revenue v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 651

Commissioner of Taxation v AP Energy Investments Pty Limited [2016] FCA 577; (2016) 341 ALR 265

Commonwealth Custodial Services Ltd v Valuer General [2007] NSWCA 365

Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135

Faraday v McKenzie [2007] FamCA 1626

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Byrne Hotels Qld Pty Ltd (2011) 196 FCR 524

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 336

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Westgarth (1950) 81 CLR 396

Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315

HTW Valuers (Central QLD) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640

Inez Investments Pty Ltd v Dodd (1979) 26 The Valuer 501

Inland Revenue Commissioners v Gray [1994] STC 360

Inland Revenue Commissioners v Clay [1914] 3 KB 466

International Petroleum Investment Company v Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea [2015] NSWCA 363

Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494

McCathie v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 1

Minister for Public Works (NSW) v Thistlethwayte [1954] AC 475

Mordecai v Mordecai (1988) 12…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1396
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Taxation v Miley, the respondent, Mr Miley, appealed against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that had set aside objections he had lodged against amended assessments made by the Commissioner of Taxation. The primary focus of the appeal was the valuation of Mr Miley's shares in AJM, specifically whether the Tribunal had erred in applying a discount for lack of control in determining the market value of those shares. The Tribunal had valued Mr Miley’s 100 shares at $4,914,700, which was lower than the valuations provided by two experts. The Commissioner argued that the Tribunal’s valuation was incorrect and that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the valuation arguments presented by Mr Miley.

The court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and if it correctly applied the principles of valuation as required by the law. The Commissioner submitted that the Tribunal should have relied on the valuation provided by the expert, Mr Samuel, and that the Tribunal had incorrectly applied a discount for lack of control. The Commissioner also argued that the Tribunal had not adequately considered other valuation arguments put forward by Mr Miley. The court found that the Tribunal had indeed erred in its application of the discount for lack of control and in its consideration of other valuation arguments. Consequently, the Tribunal’s decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for reconsideration in accordance with the law.

The court ruled that the Tribunal’s approach to valuing Mr Miley’s shares was flawed because it had not properly considered the market value of the shares independently, without the assumption that they would be sold as part of a package. Furthermore, the court held that the Tribunal had failed to adequately address all valuation arguments made by Mr Miley. The decision underscored the importance of correctly applying valuation principles and considering all relevant arguments in tax assessments. The court ordered that the Tribunal’s decision be set aside, and the matter be remitted for reconsideration. Additionally, the court ordered that Mr Miley pay the Commissioner’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 15 February 2016 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for determination according to law.

3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of this proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal raises two main issues. The first issue, expressed in broad and simple terms, is whether the Tribunal erred in applying a discount for control in arriving at the valuation of Mr Miley’s parcel of AJM shares. The second is whether the first issue raises a question of law as required by s 44 of the AAT Act. A third issue arose in the course of the hearing and was ultimately the basis of a notice of contention filed by Mr Miley. It concerned whether the Tribunal failed to address certain other arguments advanced by Mr Miley about the valuation of his parcel of AJM shares.BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY AJM was registered on 27 August 1999. Immediately prior to 7 March 2008, the 300 issued shares in AJM were owned by three shareholders: Mr Miley, Mr Jonathan Perry and Mr Adrian Minshull. Each of the three shareholders held 100 shares in the company. On 7 March 2008, the shareholders executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement pursuant to which they each agreed to sell their shares in AJM to EIMCO Water Technologies Pty Ltd. It was a condition of the Agreement that EIMCO would buy and acquire all of the shares held by each of the shareholders contemporaneously and that EIMCO was not obliged to purchase and acquire the shares held by one of the shareholders to the exclusion of the shares held by either of the other shareholders. The purchase price and consideration for all the shares was $17.7 million. That purchase price was to be paid by EIMCO paying $4.9 million to each of the shareholders. A further $3 million was to be paid into an escrow account to be held pursuant to an escrow deed. It was not in dispute that each of the shareholders was to receive $1 million from the escrow account. Accordingly, the total consideration received by Mr Miley was $5.9 million. The Agreement separately provided that each of the shareholders was also required to transfer their legal and beneficial interest in shares in a related company, AJM Property Holdings Pty Ltd. On 5 June 2009, Mr Miley lodged his income tax return for the income year ended 30 June 2008. In working out his net capital gain for the 2008 income year, Mr Miley applied the CGT concession in calculating the capital gain arising from his sale of his AJM shares. He applied that concession on the basis that he satisfied the MNAV test. The result was that the net capital gain arising from his disposal of the AJM shares was reduced to nil. On 12 June 2013, following an audit of Mr Miley’s tax returns, the Commissioner issued an amended income tax assessment for the 2008 income year. Mr Miley was denied the benefit of the further 50% CGT reduction, and was also issued with an administrative penalty assessed at the rate of 25%. An amended assessment was also issued for the 2010 income year, though the details of that amended assessment are not presently relevant. On 7 August 2013, Mr Miley lodged objections against the amended assessments. On 2 October 2013, a Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, on behalf of the Commissioner, disallowed Mr Miley’s objections to the amended assessments, disallowed his objections to the administrative penalty, and allowed in part his request for remission of the shortfall interest charge. It is perhaps worth noting that the arguments advanced by Mr Miley in support of his objections did not relate to the valuation of his parcel of 100 AJM shares just before their disposal. It would appear that Mr Miley prepared his return, and advanced his objections, on the basis that the value of the shares was $5.9 million. The arguments advanced in respect of his objections concerned the way in which the Commissioner took into account, in applying the MNAV test, Mr Miley’s legal fees, a bank loan and a provision for tax liabilities.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Commissioner advanced three main submissions. First, he submitted that s 152-20(1), properly construed, required that the market value of a CGT asset which was the subject of a CGT event be taken to be the amount of the capital proceeds arising from the CGT event unless one of the “market valuation substitution rules” in s 116-30 applied. Second, he submitted that the most reliable evidence of the market value of the parcel of shares sold by Mr Miley was the price that the unrelated purchaser in fact paid for them. Third, he submitted that the valuation report of the expert retained by the Commissioner, Mr Samuel, should be preferred to the expert report prepared by Mr Miley’s valuer, Mr Halligan. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION AND REASONS The Tribunal’s decision turned entirely on the issue concerning the valuation of the shares sold by Mr Miley. The Tribunal rejected the Commissioner’s submission based on what he contended was the proper construction of s 152-20(1) of the Assessment Act. It is unnecessary to refer to the Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting that submission. The Commissioner did not challenge this aspect of the Tribunal’s decision and reasons. Having rejected the Commissioner’s case based on the construction of s 152-20(1) of the Assessment Act, the question for the Tribunal to determine was: what was the market value of Mr Miley’s 100 shares in AJM just before Mr Miley sold them? As stated earlier, the Tribunal’s answer to that question was, in short, that the market value of Mr Miley’s shares at that time was $4,914,700. It is worth noting that this valuation amount was different to the valuations of both Mr Halligan and Mr Samuel. The Tribunal’s reasons for valuing the parcel of shares at $4,914,700 were short and to the point. After briefly summarising the different approaches taken by the valuers, Mr Halligan and Mr Samuel (at Reasons [29]-[32]), the Tribunal reasoned as follows (at Reasons [33]-[36]):33. Mr Halligan’s reasoning appears to me to be sound and logical. Mr Samuel’s reasoning, on the other hand, seems to proceed on an assumption that the enquiry is one directed towards determining the market value of Mr Miley’s shares subject to special circumstances – namely, that the sale of Mr Miley’s shares should contemplate the sale of the shares owned by all the other shareholders. I think that is the wrong enquiry. That is an enquiry that suffers from the problem the High Court warned about in Pioneer Concrete: see [20] of these reasons.34. I think the correct enquiry is directed towards determining the market value of Mr Miley’s 100 shares alone – not as part of a package comprising the entire 300 shares in the Company.35. I accept the opinion Mr Halligan expresses in [135] of his report: see [30] of these reasons. I find that the consideration that Mr Miley received for his shares, which formed part of the consideration paid by the Buyer for all the shares in the Company, is more than a hypothetical willing but not anxious purchaser would have paid if it had purchased Mr Miley’s shares alone – and that is the basis on which the market value of Mr Miley’s shares should be determined. Therefore, while the actual consideration received by Mr Miley should not be ignored as an indicator of the market value of his shares just before the time of the CGT event (Inez Investments: [26] of these reasons), it is not determinative of that market value.36. The market value of Mr Miley’s shares, arrived at by reference to the correct enquiry, is $5,900,000 less 16.7% of that amount, for lack of control. That equates to $4,914,700.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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