Commissioner of Taxation v McWilliam

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v McWilliam [2012] FCAFC 105

Citation: Commissioner of Taxation v McWilliam [2012] FCAFC 105
Appeal from: Taxpayer v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 142
Parties: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v BRUCE MCWILLIAM
File number: NSD 511 of 2012
Judges: EDMONDS, JAGOT AND ROBERTSON JJ
Date of judgment: 8 August 2012
Catchwords:

TAXATION – employee share schemes – employee acquired options to purchase shares – date on which employee acquired options – nature of right acquired – whether rights anterior – meaning of “right” in Division 13A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – whether s 139G(a) to (e) established mutually exclusive categories

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – competency of appeal – whether appeal on a question of law  

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 139B, 139C, 139CD, 139DD, 139FC, 139FF, 139G,

Cases cited:

ACP Publishing Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 142 FCR 533 referred to
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 applied
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Q) v Livingston (1964) 112 CLR 12 applied
Commissioner of Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (in liq) (2005) 220 CLR 592 applied
Donaldson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1974] 1 NSWLR 627; (1974) 74 ATC 4192 referred to
Fraunschiel v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1989] FCA 236; (1989) 89 ATC 4616; (1989) 20 ATR 955 referred to
Industry Research & Development Board v Bridgestone Australia Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 564 applied

Meagher R, Heydon D and Leeming M, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002)

Date of hearing:
Date of last submissions:
30 July 2012
3 August 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 88
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms J Needham SC with Mrs M Hirschhorn
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Taxation Office, Legal Services Branch
Counsel for the Respondent: Dr AS Bell SC with Mr BL Jones
Solicitor for the Respondent: Munro Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 511 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Applicant

AND:

BRUCE MCWILLIAM
Respondent

JUDGES:

EDMONDS, JAGOT AND ROBERTSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 AUGUST 2012

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 511 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Applicant

AND:

BRUCE MCWILLIAM
Respondent

JUDGES:

EDMONDS, JAGOT AND ROBERTSON JJ

DATE:

8 AUGUST 2012

PLACE:

MELBOURNE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and is on, and limited to, a question of…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Taxation v McWilliam, the dispute revolved around the interpretation of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) concerning employee share schemes. The central issue was whether the options acquired by Mr McWilliam were considered "rights" for the purpose of Division 13A, and if the categories of rights outlined in sections 139G(a) to (e) were mutually exclusive. The case was brought before the Federal Court of Australia.

The court was tasked with determining the nature of the rights acquired by Mr McWilliam on 1 July 2003, and whether these rights were considered "anterior" under the provisions of Division 13A of the Act. The Commissioner of Taxation argued that the option deed dated 22 December 2003 was not a mere act of supererogation and that the Tribunal's findings did not conclusively establish that Mr McWilliam had acquired options on 1 July 2003. The court had to consider whether the Commissioner's appeal was competent and whether it was indeed on a question of law.

The court found that the appeal was incompetent because it was not based on a question of law, but rather on the interpretation of facts. The Tribunal's findings that Mr McWilliam had acquired the options themselves as at 1 July 2003 were unchallenged by the Commissioner. The court held that the Tribunal's reasons should not be construed hypercritically and that the language used in the Tribunal's decision did not alter the fact that Mr McWilliam had acquired the options on the specified date. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as incompetent, and the court ruled that the appeal did not concern a question of law.

1. The appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Commissioner took issue with the contention of Mr McWilliam that the option deed of 22 December 2003 was an act of supererogation. The Commissioner submitted that the finding of the Tribunal at [45] that the agreement in force as at July was not conditional upon approval or a formal deed or upon shareholder approval did not amount to a finding that the Option Deed did actually formalise whatever rights Mr McWilliam had on 1 July 2003, much less did it amount to a finding that the Option Deed was not a source of any new right or rights. Consideration The starting point in an appeal under s 44 must be the findings of fact made by the Tribunal. We note that the Commissioner does not challenge those findings of fact. If the correct conclusion is that as at 1 July 2003 Mr McWilliam had the options then the question of law and the ground set out in the notice of appeal do not arise. The Commissioner accepted that an acquisition of options to acquire shares is an acquisition of rights for the purposes of Division 13A. We have set out those findings of fact above at [27] and [54]. Centrally relevant to the first issue agitated on this “appeal” were the additional references in the Tribunal’s reasons to Mr McWilliam’s entitlement to “then acquire the options and the shares” and to “the right to options” and “a right to be granted an option” and “a right to obtain options” and to “an immediate contractual right to obtain the options”. We accept Mr McWilliam’s submission that the appeal begins and ends with the Tribunal's unchallenged findings that Mr McWilliam had acquired the options themselves as at 1 July 2003. Although the Tribunal also used other language as described above, which was not expressed in the alternative, we accept that the Tribunal made a finding that Mr McWilliam had acquired the options themselves as at 1 July 2003. The reasons of the Tribunal should not be construed hypercritically: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272. Further, that other language, which we have set out at [66] above, was used in the context of the question of construction raised by the Commissioner. The effect of this finding is to defeat the Commissioner’s appeal by rendering the construction question immaterial. This also involves the consequence that the appeal is incompetent as not being on a question of law. Assuming that to be wrong, the Commissioner takes issue with the alternative finding of the Tribunal at [29] of its reasons “that the right to obtain options is a relevant right within the meaning of s 139B, and is not a form of anterior entitlement which does not come within that provision”. According to the Commissioner, anything less than a right which confers an immediate entitlement on the taxpayer to the acquisition of shares upon exercise of the right is not a relevant right for the purpose of Division 13A. Thus, so the argument goes, if the right which the respondent had on 1 July 2003 was no more than a contractual right to require Seven Network Limited to grant or issue options to acquire shares, it was not a relevant right.