FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Commissioner of Taxation v Industrial Equity Ltd [2000] FCA 468
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION AND ANOR v
INDUSTRIAL EQUITY LIMITED AND ANOR
N 1339 of 1999
HILL, HEEREY AND HELY JJ
14 APRIL 2000
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1339 OF 1999
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
FIRST APPELLANTJ M KILLALY
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
SECOND APPELLANTAND:
INDUSTRIAL EQUITY LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENTGREGORY KINGSTON COTTAM
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGE:
HILL, HEEREY AND HELY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
14 APRIL 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order 4 of the orders of the Court made on 4 April 2000 be rescinded and the following order be substituted in its place:
4.The respondents pay the appellants’ costs at first instance.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1339 OF 1999
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
FIRST APPELLANTJ M KILLALY
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
SECOND APPELLANTAND:
INDUSTRIAL EQUITY LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENTGREGORY KINGSTON COTTAM
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
HILL, HEEREY AND HELY JJ
DATE:
14 APRIL 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
The appellant Commissioner has drawn our attention to the problem that the orders made do not reflect the reasons contained in the judgment. He proposed that the orders which the Court should make are:
1.adding to the order 2 so that it would read –
2.The appeal be allowed and the orders of Gyles J be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the application be dismissed.
2.substituting the word “applicants” for the word “appellants” in order 4 so that order 4 would read –
4.The applicants pay the respondents’ costs at first instance.
The respondents submit that there is no slip on the part of the Court and that before making orders there should be further submissions.
It is obvious that in the orders which the Court made on giving judgment there has been a slip which it is appropriate to correct. The reasons which the Court gave make this abundantly clear. We see no point in hearing further submissions. The question of how the costs at first instance should be borne was the real issue between the parties. It is a matter upon which the Court has already heard submissions.
In these circumstances we propose to correct the error made by deleting the fourth order and substituting:
4. The respondents pay the appellants’ costs at first instance.
Since writing the above our attention has been drawn to “without prejudice” correspondence, not tendered at the hearing, in which the solicitors for the respondents to the appeal offered to consent to the “dismissal” of the decision at first instance on terms, inter alia, that each party pay its own costs of the proceedings relating to the second notice and of the appeal. That offer was not accepted. Further it was not referred to when the appeal was argued. It is now too late for it to be tendered after judgment was given, particularly where the appeal was argued by the respondents on the basis that the real issue between the parties was whether the first respondent should pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance.
I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Court. Associate:
Dated: 14 April 2000
- AGLC
- Commissioner of Taxation v Industrial Equity Ltd [2000] FCA 468
- Case
- [2000] FCA 468
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court examined the language of the relevant provisions and concluded that the interest charges were not consistent with the statutory requirements. The Court found that the interest charges imposed were not aligned with the legislative intent, as they were calculated on an amount that included interest itself, which was not permissible under the Act. The Court also addressed the issue of costs, determining that the respondents should bear the costs of the appeal at first instance. The decision hinged on the interpretation of statutory language and the legislative intent, leading to the conclusion that the interest charges imposed were not in accordance with the law.
The Court rescinded Order 4 of the Federal Court's orders and substituted it with an order that the respondents pay the appellants’ costs at first instance. This decision underscored the importance of precise statutory interpretation in tax matters and highlighted the consequences for taxpayers when legislative provisions are not strictly adhered to. The Court’s ruling clarified the application of Division 49 and set a precedent for future cases involving similar issues. The final orders reflected the Court's determination on both the substantive issue of the interest charges and the procedural matter of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order 4 of the orders of the Court made on 4 April 2000 be rescinded and the following order be substituted in its place:
4. The respondents pay the appellants’ costs at first instance.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: HILL, HEEREY AND HELY JJ
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