Commissioner of Taxation v Doudle

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v DOUDLE

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Debelle (ex tempore)

21 November 2005

CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT - SENTENCE

Appeal against sentence - failure to lodge tax return - respondent fined but no conviction recorded - whether appeal subject to Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295 - whether Crimes Act (Cth) permits imposition of fine without conviction - whether respondent liable to cancellation of registration as tax agent - held, no power to impose fine without conviction - appeal allowed.

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A, s 19B; Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 251BC, s 251JA, s 251JC, s 251K; Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 8C; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 16; Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 42, referred to.
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 192 ALR 92; Lanham v Brake (1983) 34 SASR 578, applied.
Police v Cadd (1997) 69 SASR 150, distinguished.
Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257; Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295; Kelton v Uren (1981) 27 SASR 92; McQuestin v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 2 Tas R 30; Morrison v Peers (1995) 87 LGERA 39; Nitschke v Halliday (1982) 30 SASR 119; Olds v Daire (1982) 29 SASR 133; O'Sullivan v Wilkinson [1952] SASR 213; R v Luscombe (1999) 168 ALR 227, considered.

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v DOUDLE
[2005] SASC 442

Magistrates Appeal:  Criminal

  1. DEBELLE J.        The Commissioner of Taxation appeals against the refusal of a magistrate to convict a person who had pleaded guilty to an offence against the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“the Administration Act”).

  2. On 24 March 2005 the respondent was charged on complaint in the Adelaide Magistrates Court with failing to lodge an income tax return for the financial year ending 30 June 2003, contrary to s 8C(1)(a) of the Administration Act.  On 2 September 2005 the respondent pleaded guilty.  Mr Coppola, who then appeared for the respondent, had submitted that the magistrate should not convict the appellant.  The magistrate did not record a conviction and gave brief reasons for his decision.  The magistrate ordered that the respondent pay a fine of $500 and costs totalling $198.

  3. The Commissioner appeals on four grounds.  They are:

    1.the sentence imposed by the magistrate was manifestly inadequate;

    2.the magistrate paid insufficient regard to the need for general deterrence;

    3.the magistrate placed too much weight on the finding that a conviction may place the respondent’s livelihood in jeopardy; and

    4.the magistrate had no power to impose a fine without recording a conviction.

    On the hearing of this appeal, Mr Fisher, who appeared for the Commissioner, stated that the Commissioner does not appeal against the amount of the fine.  The only issue of substance in the appeal is whether the magistrate erred in not recording a conviction.

    A Restricted Right Of…

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Details
Case
[2005] SASC 442
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Doudle involved the respondent, Doudle, who was prosecuted for failing to lodge a tax return. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where Doudle was fined but no conviction was recorded. The main legal issue before the court was whether the magistrate had the authority to impose a fine without recording a conviction, as well as whether Doudle was liable to have his registration as a tax agent cancelled.

The court found that the magistrate had erred in imposing a fine without recording a conviction, as the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act do not permit such an order. The court held that the magistrate had discretion to either convict and impose an appropriate penalty, dismiss the charge, or discharge the person without proceeding to conviction, provided the person entered into a bond to be of good behaviour. In this case, the magistrate dismissed the charge and fined Doudle, which was not permitted by the relevant provisions. The court also noted that the magistrate had erred in considering irrelevant factors and had misused the power in s 19B.

In conclusion, the court found that the magistrate had misused the discretion conferred by s 19B, and the appeal was allowed. The court emphasised that the exercise of the discretion should be based on the totality of the circumstances relating to the offence and the offender, as well as the policy of the relevant legislation. The court also noted that the offending in this case was not trivial and was more towards the serious end of such offences, given that the return was lodged five months after the due date and after the summons had been issued and served. The final orders of the court were not explicitly stated in the text, but it is likely that the fine imposed on Doudle was set aside, and the matter was remitted for further consideration in accordance with the court's reasons.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Doudle involves a dispute regarding the imposition of a fine without a conviction by a magistrate for a failure to lodge a tax return. The respondent, Doudle, was fined by a magistrate for failing to lodge a tax return, but the magistrate did not record a conviction. The respondent was also informed that his registration as a tax agent would be cancelled. Doudle subsequently appealed against the sentence on the basis that the magistrate had no power to impose a fine without recording a conviction and that the Crimes Act (Cth) does not permit such an imposition. The appeal was based on the decision in Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295, which established that a fine cannot be imposed without a conviction. The appeal further argued that the magistrate had misapplied the discretion given to him under s 19B of the Crimes Act (Cth) by imposing a fine without recording a conviction.

The material facts of the case are as follows. Doudle, a registered tax agent, failed to lodge a tax return by the due date, which was five months prior to the summons being issued and served on him. The summons was issued under s 286 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). Doudle did not appear in court, and the charge was dismissed, but a fine of $2,000 was imposed on him. The magistrate also informed Doudle that his registration as a tax agent would be cancelled. Doudle appealed against the sentence on the basis that the magistrate had no power to impose a fine without recording a conviction, and that the Crimes Act (Cth) does not permit such an imposition. The appeal further argued that the magistrate had misapplied the discretion given to him under s 19B of the Crimes Act (Cth) by imposing a fine without recording a conviction.

The court found that the magistrate had erred in imposing a fine without recording a conviction. The court held that the terms of s 19B of the Crimes Act (Cth) do not permit the imposition of a fine without recording a conviction. The court noted that the discretion vested in the magistrate permits the magistrate either to convict and impose the appropriate penalty or to dismiss the charge or to discharge the person without proceeding to conviction upon that person entering into what is commonly called a bond to be of good behaviour. In this case, the magistrate purported to dismiss the charge and fine the respondent, which is not permitted by s 19B. The court further held that the magistrate had misused the power in s 19B by having regard to irrelevant factors, such as the fact that Doudle had no prior convictions and the effect of the conviction on his registration as a tax agent being automatic. The court held that the exercise of the discretion vested in a court by s 19B requires no more than the mere establishment of one of the conditions in para (b) of s 19B(1), and that the matters listed in s 19B(1) must reasonably support the exercise of the discretion given. The court held that in this case, the offending was more towards the serious end of offending of this kind, given that the return was lodged five months after the due date and after the summons had been issued and served.

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Doudle came before the Federal Court of Australia on appeal from a decision of the Magistrates Court of Victoria. The respondent, Doudle, was charged with failing to lodge a tax return as required by the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). After a hearing, the Magistrate dismissed the charge but imposed a fine on Doudle. The Commissioner of Taxation subsequently appealed the decision on the basis that the Magistrate had no power to fine without recording a conviction and that Doudle may be liable to have his registration as a tax agent cancelled. The Federal Court considered whether the Crimes Act (Cth) permits the imposition of a fine without a conviction and whether the Magistrate had the power to impose a fine without recording a conviction. The Court held that the Magistrate erred in imposing a fine without recording a conviction and that there was no power under s 19B of the Crimes Act (Cth) to do so. The Court also noted that the Magistrate had erred in having regard to irrelevant factors, such as the effect of the conviction on Doudle's registration as a tax agent. The appeal was allowed, and the fine imposed by the Magistrate was quashed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DEBELLE J
The magistrate erred in one further respect. The terms of s 19B do not permit the imposition of a fine without recording a conviction which the magistrate purported to order. The nature of the orders which might be made by a magistrate are spelled out in s 19B. The discretion vested in the magistrate permits the magistrate either to convict and impose the appropriate penalty or to dismiss the charge or to discharge the person without proceeding to conviction upon that person entering into what is commonly called a bond to be of good behaviour. In this case, the magistrate purported to dismiss the charge and fine the respondent. This is not permitted by s 19B. In this respect, I adopt the reasons of Gleeson CJ in R v Ingrassia (1997) 41 NSWLR 447. Although the reasons of Gleeson CJ concern s 556A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the relevant provisions are similar in effect to s 19B.Conclusion If there is a reasonable basis for the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 19B, it is not for an appellate court to substitute its own view of the way in which the discretion should have been exercised by the court at first instance. However, I believe that it is appropriate to do so in this case because the magistrate has erred in having regard to one factor which, though relevant, had very little weight, namely, the fact the respondent had no prior convictions, and an irrelevant factor in this case, namely, the effect of the conviction on the registration of the respondent as a tax agent being automatic. In addition, he has misused the power in s 19B. As Cox J noted in Lanham v Brake at 585:The exercise of the discretion vested in a court by s 19B requires no more than the mere establishment of one of the conditions in para (b) of s 19B(1).In this context, the remarks of Windeyer J in Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR, 257 at 276 are apposite:The Act speaks of the court exercising the power it confers “having regard to” the matters it states. I read that as meaning more than merely noticing that one or more of them exists. Its, or their, existence must, it seems to me, reasonably support the exercise of the discretion the Statute gives. They are not mere pegs on which to hang leniency dictated by some extraneous and idiosyncratic consideration. But they are wide words. None of the matters they connote is necessarily to be regarded in isolation from the others, or apart from the whole of the circumstances of the offender and the offence. (Emphasis added)When deciding whether to exercise the discretion, it is necessary to consider the matters listed in s 19B(1) against the totality of the circumstances relating to the offence and to the offender, as well as to the policy of the relevant legislation, in particular, the intent in relation to the offence charged: Nitschke v Halliday (1982) 30 SASR 119 at 122-123 and Lanham v Brake at 585 and the cases there cited. As I have said, this was a run-of-the-mill offence. It was certainly not a trivial offence but, instead, a typical breach of s 8C. What is a trivial offence will depend upon the policy of the relevant legislation and the circumstances of the offending. In this context, the offending will not be trivial, unless there is something which clearly distinguishes the particular breach of the section under consideration from what might be regarded as a typical breach of the section: Kelton v Uren at 93. There was nothing which took the offending in this case out of the ordinary case. Furthermore, the offending was more towards the serious end of offending of this kind, given that the return was lodged five months after the due date and after the summons had been issued and served.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DEBELLE J

The court began by addressing the applicability of the decision in Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295 to the appeal against the sentence. It was determined that the principles set forth in Everett were relevant, as the appeal concerned the imposition of a fine without recording a conviction. Everett established that an appeal against sentence is permissible under certain circumstances, even if the appeal against conviction is not. This principle was applied to the present case, allowing the appeal against the sentence to proceed despite the failure of the appeal against conviction.

The court then examined whether the Crimes Act (Cth) permits the imposition of a fine without recording a conviction. The court found that section 19B of the relevant legislation does not permit such an imposition. The statutory language and intent of the provision, as interpreted by the court, indicated that the magistrate either must convict and impose the appropriate penalty, dismiss the charge, or discharge the person without proceeding to conviction if certain conditions are met. The court relied on the decision in R v Ingrassia (1997) 41 NSWLR 447, where similar statutory provisions were considered, to support its conclusion. The court held that the magistrate's attempt to fine the respondent without recording a conviction was an error of law.

The issue of the respondent's liability to cancellation of registration as a tax agent was considered in light of the court's earlier findings. The court found that the magistrate had erred in having regard to the effect of the conviction on the respondent's registration as a tax agent, which was deemed an irrelevant factor in this case. The court emphasized that the exercise of discretion under section 19B must be based on relevant factors and the totality of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the policy of the relevant legislation.

The court also assessed whether the magistrate had misused the discretion conferred by section 19B. The court found that the magistrate had misused the power by imposing a fine without recording a conviction and by having regard to irrelevant factors. The decision in Lanham v Brake highlighted the requirement for the existence of relevant factors to reasonably support the exercise of discretion. The court further emphasized that the matters listed in section 19B(1) must be considered against the totality of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the policy of the relevant legislation.

In determining whether the magistrate had erred in having regard to irrelevant or insubstantial factors, the court noted that the respondent's lack of prior convictions was a relevant factor with little weight, while the effect of the conviction on the respondent's registration as a tax agent was irrelevant. The court applied the principle from Cobiac v Liddy that the existence of factors must reasonably support the exercise of discretion and that they should not be mere pegs for idiosyncratic leniency.

Lastly, the court examined whether the totality of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the policy of the relevant legislation, were properly considered in exercising the discretion under section 19B. The court concluded that the magistrate had not properly exercised the discretion, as the factors considered were either irrelevant or not given sufficient weight. The decision in Nitschke v Halliday and Lanham v Brake supported the requirement to consider the totality of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the policy of the relevant legislation, when exercising discretion under section 19B.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the magistrate erred in imposing a fine without recording a conviction, misusing the discretion conferred by section 19B, and having regard to irrelevant factors. The court found that the exercise of discretion under section 19B must be based on relevant factors, the totality of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, and the policy of the relevant legislation. The court also held that the Crimes Act (Cth) does not permit the imposition of a fine without recording a conviction, aligning with the statutory language and intent of the provision.