Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Baxter

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Baxter [2003] FCAFC 119

TAXES & DUTIES – sales tax – importation of yacht – whether ‘applied to own use’ – where lease entered into prior to importation

Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ss 68, 71A, 71B
Sales Tax Assessment Act 1992 (Cth) ss 16, 23, 28, Sch 1, Table 1, AD10, AD13c, Note 1, Table 2

Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [2002] FCA 1256 affirmed
Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2002] FCA 1351 affirmed
Max Factor & Co Inc v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1971) 124 CLR 353 cited

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v MATTHEW ALEXANDER BAXTER

N1200 OF 2002

HEEREY, EMMETT & HELY JJ
30 MAY 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1200 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT

AND:

MATTHEW ALEXANDER BAXTER
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY, EMMETT & HELY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.the appeal be dismissed;

2.the  appellant pay the respondent’s costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1200 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT

AND:

MATTHEW ALEXANDER BAXTER
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY, EMMETT & HELY JJ

DATE:

30 MAY 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. In 1997, the respondent, Matthew Alexander Baxter, ordered a Swan 60 yacht from a Finnish company Oy NAUTOR Ab (‘the Finnish company’).  The Finnish company built the yacht and shipped it to Australia where it was unloaded at the Port of Sydney on 28 September 1998.  On 24 September 1998, while the ship was still at sea, Mr Baxter entered into a lease of the yacht to Michael Bell Marine Aust Pty Ltd (‘MBM’) for a term of two years

  2. The appellant, Commissioner of Taxation (‘the Commissioner’), assessed the yacht to sales tax under AD13c of Table 1 of Sch 1 to the Sales Tax Assessment Act 1992 (Cth) (‘the Assessment Act’) on the basis that the yacht was ‘applied to own use’ in taxable circumstances on or about 28 September 1998.  It emerged that the Commissioner contended there was an ‘application to own use’ (‘AOU’) ‘by a person who obtained the goods under quote’.

  3. The primary judge (Gyles J) found that the assessment was excessive in so far as it related to the hull and mast of the yacht (the sails were purchased by Mr Baxter in Australia): Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [2002] FCA 1256 and Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2002] FCA 1351. The Commissioner appeals.

    The legislation

  4. Table 1 of Sch 1 to the Assessment Act sets out all the assessable dealings that can be subject to sales tax: s 16(1). If no exemption applies to the assessable dealing then the dealing is a taxable dealing: s 16(2)(a). ‘[A]pplication to own use’ is defined…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Baxter, Mr Baxter was involved in the importation and leasing of a yacht manufactured by a Finnish company. Baxter entered into an agreement to purchase a yacht as a demonstrator, which was subsequently leased to MBM, an Australian company. The Commissioner of Taxation argued that Baxter’s dealings with the yacht constituted an assessable transaction under the relevant taxation legislation. The dispute centred on whether the Commissioner’s contention that Baxter’s actions, including obtaining Customs clearance and preparing the yacht for sailing, amounted to an application of the yacht for Baxter’s own use, thus making the transaction assessable. The court needed to determine whether Baxter's actions were genuinely for the purpose of fulfilling his obligations under the lease agreement or if they constituted personal use of the yacht.

The court found that the lease agreement was genuine and that Baxter’s actions were undertaken for the benefit of MBM, which had a legal right to the possession of the yacht upon entering into the lease. The court concluded that Baxter’s local entry of the yacht did not constitute a taxable event because the legislation provided that customs dealings involving a quoted exemption declaration are not taxable. The court also held that any actions Baxter took to prepare the yacht for leasing were for the benefit of MBM and not for Baxter’s personal use.

As a result, the court dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs. This decision highlights the importance of the genuineness of lease agreements and the need to distinguish between actions taken for the fulfilment of lease obligations and those taken for personal use.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the appeal be dismissed;

2. the appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Baxter’s local entry of the yacht was an ‘assessable dealing’ because it was a ‘local entry’: AD10 of Pt B of Table 1. Under s 23 and Table 2 of Sch 1 of the Assessment Act, there is a local entry when goods are taken to have been entered for home consumption under s 71A(6) of the Customs Act. Because it was a local entry, it was a ‘customs dealing’: see the definition of that term in s 5, which includes AD10. Since Mr Baxter had quoted an exemption declaration for the dealing before the time of local entry, s 28(1) has the effect that the dealing was not a ‘taxable dealing’. The facts Mr Baxter, who is now aged 59, has been interested in yachting all his life. He wished to get involved in the sale in Australia of yachts manufactured by the Finnish company. Mr Michael Bell, the principal of MBM, was an old friend and business associate of Mr Baxter. Mr Bell was the agent in Australia for the Finnish company. In June 1997, Mr Baxter and Mr Bell agreed in principle that Mr Baxter would buy one of the Finnish company’s yachts as a demonstrator and Mr Bell, or his company, would lease it for that purpose. On or about 10 July 1997, Mr Baxter contracted to purchase a Swan 60 yacht, hull number 60/014, to be built by the Finnish company. Pursuant to the contract, title in the yacht passed to him on 13 August 1998 upon his accepting delivery of the yacht at the company’s factory in Finland. The price of the yacht was the equivalent in Finnish currency of some $2.4 million. On or about 13 August 1998, Mr Baxter quoted an exemption declaration to the Commissioner under s 83(1) of the Assessment Act in respect of the yacht. The yacht and its mast were shipped as separate packages under a bill of lading. After transhipment at Hamburg, the yacht arrived at Fremantle on 21 September 1998 on board the MV Pegasus Bay. On 24 September 1998, when the Pegasus Bay was at sea between Fremantle and Sydney, Mr Baxter entered into the lease to MBM already mentioned. The lease recites that Mr Baxter is the owner of a ‘newly imported Swan 60 (serial number 60-014) vessel’. By cl 2.1, the lessor hereby leases ‘subject to the conditions and terms of this lease’ the yacht for the whole of the Term and for the Rental. The Term is defined in cl 1.1 as two years from the Commencement Date which is defined as the date of the lease (24 September 1998). The Rental is $950 per month. By cl 2.2, it is provided that the lessor is only obliged to lease the yacht to the lessee if at the time of the grant of the lease the lessor has been given evidence in a form approved by the Commissioner of Taxation of the intention of the lessee to use the yacht during the whole of the Term for purposes other than providing any of the following for any person (whether or not for reward):(a) pleasure, sport or recreation;(b) private transport; and(c) accommodation.It appears to have been implicitly accepted that this condition was satisfied on 24 September 1998. By cl 3.1, the lessor is to retain full title to the yacht notwithstanding that it is leased to and in the possession of the lessee. By cl 3.2(a), the yacht is to be at the risk of the lessor at all times during demonstration and test sales. That provision does not apply in the event of any claims or proceedings arising as a result of any negligent act or omission or intentional default of the lessee: cl 3.2(b). By cl 5.4, the lessee is not to remove the yacht from its mooring place except for the purpose of promotion or demonstration to potential customers and is to notify the lessor where and how the yacht is to be moored. By cl 5.8, the lessee is to keep the yacht in its own possession, control and custody.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The argument of senior counsel for the Commissioner can be encapsulated in his proposition that it does not matter if, in respect of dealings with the yacht when it arrived in Sydney, there were ends helpful to Mr Bell or MBM as long as there were also ends helpful to Mr Baxter. More specifically, senior counsel contended that one or more of the following amounted to an AD13c assessable dealing:(a)receiving permission from Customs following the entry for home consumption of the yacht hull and mast to deal with them in accordance with that entry;(b)‘handing over’ of the yacht hull and mast by Mr Baxter to Mr Bell on or about 28 September 1998 after Mr Baxter had received that permission from Customs;(c)unloading of the yacht hull and mast from the ship and subsequent motoring away of the yacht to the mooring of Noakes Rigging;(d)fitting out of the yacht at Noakes Rigging’s mooring, including fitting the sails;(e)use of the yacht on Mr Baxter’s honeymoon in November 1998.Conclusion on the appeal In essence, the Commissioner’s contention was that the subject matter of the lease was a yacht capable of use as a yacht. In its state on 24 September 1998, when the lease was entered into, the two packages on board the Pegasus Bay were incapable of use as a yacht. It was necessary that the hull be placed in the water, that the mast be stepped and that the yacht be rigged and fitted out. Accordingly, so the Commissioner contended, Mr Baxter’s obligations under the lease extended to entering the yacht for home consumption, obtaining authority from Customs under s 71B(4) of the Customs Act to take it into home consumption, unloading it from the Pegasus Bay, stepping the mast and rigging it and fitting it out. Only then was Mr Baxter in a position to deliver a yacht to MBM. The Commissioner contended that the actions that occurred after the Pegasus Bay arrived in Sydney were actions of Mr Baxter to satisfy his obligations under the lease and therefore constituted applying the yacht to his own use. Like his Honour, we consider that the lease, accepted to be genuine and not a sham, is largely determinative of this case. None of the events relied on by the Commissioner, singly or in combination, amount to an application by Mr Baxter of the yacht for his own use. The obtaining of the Customs clearance and the physical work on the yacht (in so far as Mr Baxter had anything to do with that) was for the use of MBM which, upon entry into the lease, became entitled to possession of the yacht against all the world, including Mr Baxter. Mr Baxter’s local entry of the yacht does not assist the Commissioner because, as explained in [7] above, the legislation specifically provides that where, as here, there is a quote of an exemption declaration for a customs dealing, the customs dealing is not taxable. Moreover, once the grant of a lease is specifically excluded (see [5] above), any act of Mr Baxter qua lessor granting a lease (for example putting the yacht in condition for sailing by fitting her with mast, rigging and sails) would seem to be necessarily excluded also, although it was Mr Bell who attended to these matters (see Appeal Book at 76).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established