Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Jones

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ.

COMMISSIONER OF STAMP DUTIES (N.S.W.) v. JONES

(1971) 125 CLR 511

9 December 1971

Death Duties (N.S.W.)

Death Duties (N.S.W.)—Notional estate—Insurance policy—Superannuation scheme—Group insurance of employees taken out by employer—Whether premiums paid by deceased—Whether "policy of assurance on the life of the deceased"—Stamp Duties Act, 1920-1958 (N.S.W.), s. 102 (2) (h).

Decisions


December 9.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. In this matter I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by my brother Owen. I am in agreement with his conclusion that the premiums paid by the trustees of the Staff Superannuation Plan to the A.M.P. Society in respect of the group endowment insurance policy were not paid by the deceased within the meaning and operation of s. 102 (2) (h) of the Stamp Duties Act (N.S.W.) (at p513)

2. I share with my brother Owen the doubt as to whether the group endowment insurance policy with the A.M.P. Society is a policy on the life of the deceased within the meaning of s. 102 (2) (h) of the Stamp Duties Act. Indeed the inclination of my mind is that it is not. But like my brother Owen I have no need to resolve the question in this case. But in any case in my opinion the matter is not resolved merely by deciding that according to ordinary concepts of insurance the policy ought to be regarded as in the category of life insurance. The question is rather whether the nature of the policy satisfied the words of s. 102 (2) (h) bearing in mind the evident purpose of the subsection as a whole and to the provisions of the other paragraphs in association with which par. (h) is found. (at p513)

3. I would dismiss the appeal. (at p513)

McTIERNAN J. I agree, for the reasons given by Owen J., that this appeal should be dismissed. (at p513)

MENZIES J. The appellant Commissioner assessed the respondents, as executors of the will of David Lloyd Jones deceased, to duty upon the footing that $38,427, one half of the proceeds of a policy upon the life of the deceased in the David Jones Ltd. Special Staff Superannuation Plan with the A.M.P. Society, hereinafter called "the Society", was part of the dutiable estate of the deceased. Whether it was so or not depends upon whether or not the policy moneys fall within the scope of s. 102 (2) (h) of the Stamp Duties Act (N.S.W.), which is in these terms:

"For the purposes of the assessment and payment of death duty . . . the estate of a deceased person shall be deemed to include . . . (h) Any money payable to any person under a policy of assurance on the life of the deceased where the whole of the premiums have been paid by the deceased or a part of that money in proportion to the premiums paid by him…
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Details
Case
[1971] HCA 67
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning the assessment of stamp duty on a deed of settlement. The dispute centred on whether certain property transferred by the settlor to the trustees of the settlement was subject to ad valorem stamp duty as a conveyance on sale, or whether it fell within a statutory exemption.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the deed of settlement constituted a "conveyance on sale" for the purposes of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 (NSW). This required the Court to determine if the transfer of property to the trustees was made for "consideration in money or money's worth" as defined by the Act, or if it was a voluntary disposition.

The Court reasoned that the deed of settlement was not a conveyance on sale. It held that the consideration provided by the trustees, namely their undertaking to hold the property on trust for the beneficiaries according to the terms of the settlement, did not constitute "money or money's worth" in the sense required for a sale. The Court distinguished a sale, where the consideration is given in exchange for the property itself, from a settlement, where the property is transferred to be held for the benefit of others. The legal principle applied was that a settlement, even where trustees assume obligations, is fundamentally a voluntary disposition of property, not a transaction of sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

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