Young v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Adelaide No Al3 of 1993

B e t w e e n -

STEPHEN ELLIOTT YOUNG

Applicant

and

NM SUPERANNUATION PTY LTD

Respondent

Application for special leave

to appeal

DAWSON J

TOOHEY J

McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Young.S 1 26/8/93

FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON THURSDAY, 26 AUGUST 1993, AT 10.08 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear

with my learned friend, MR N.W. MORCOMBE, QC, for

the applicant. (instructed by Cowell Clarke)

MR J.R. MANSFIELD, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear

with my learned friend, MR I.C. ROBERTSON, for the

respondent. (instructed by Piper Alderman)

DAWSON J: Yes, Mr Bennett.

MR BENNETT:  May it please the Court, this case laid down

for the first time a proposition that where under a

policy of assurance the benefits are payable either

on death or on retirement at any time, then the

policy is a policy of life assurance within the

meaning of the Bankrupt~y Act which, of course, has

no definition of those terms. That is a

proposition which has not been stated before. The

novel aspect of the proposition is that a policy

under which benefits are payable on retirement at

any time, even before a fixed retirement date, at

any time selected by the assured, is a policy of

life assurance.

In this case it was a particularly strong

finding because the assured was a person called

Barrett. He was the only person who had a policy

of the relevant type under the superannuation
scheme for a private company, J.C. Barrett Pty Ltd,

and that policy provided that the whole of the

premiums were paid by the company and that he could

obtain the benefits which were effectively interest

to date at a rate determined annually by the life

assurance company by retiring at any time. I said

there was no case at all which establishes that.

There are two very passing pieces of dicta by two concurring Justices of this Court, which are both set out in the judgments in the appeal book, which

are the only authorities supporting that. One is

at page 66 of the application book in the middle of

the page in The Commissioner of Stamp Duties v

Jones, 125 CLR 511 at page 515, where

Mr Justice Menzies said:

"I do not know how a policy upon the life of a

person while he is in the employ of a company

is to be described if it is not to be

described as a poiicy on the life of that

person."

That is in the overall context of discussing a

policy dealing with retirement at a specific date,

but it certainly was not in the context of any

detailed discussion about early retirement at any

time at the assured's discretion.

Young.S 2 26/8/93

The other statements, on the next page…

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Details
Case
[1993] HCATrans 247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, brought by Stephen Elliott Young against NM Superannuation Pty Ltd. The dispute centred on whether a particular superannuation policy constituted a "policy of life assurance" within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy Act*. The applicant argued that a policy providing benefits payable on death or retirement at any time, at the assured's discretion, was a policy of life assurance, a proposition he contended had not been previously established by case law.

The legal issue before the Court was to determine the scope of the term "policy of life assurance" under the *Bankruptcy Act*, particularly in circumstances where benefits are payable not only upon death but also upon retirement at any time chosen by the assured, prior to a fixed retirement date. This involved considering whether such flexibility in benefit entitlement, including early retirement at the assured's election, qualified the policy as a life assurance policy for the purposes of bankruptcy law.

The applicant's argument relied on a novel proposition that a policy allowing retirement at any time, even before a fixed date, at the assured's selection, should be considered a policy of life assurance. This proposition was supported by only two passing references in previous High Court judgments. One reference, from Menzies J in *The Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Jones*, discussed a policy on the life of a person in company employ without detailed consideration of early retirement at discretion. The other, from a concurring Justice in the same case, casually mentioned surrender value being payable upon retirement before a retiring age, but in specific circumstances and with a reference to cancellation. The applicant highlighted that the benefit was contingent on the duration of human life, as retirement and thus the benefit would not occur if the assured died beforehand.

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