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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No Al3 of 1993 B e t w e e n -
STEPHEN ELLIOTT YOUNG
Applicant
and
NM SUPERANNUATION PTY LTD
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
| Young.S | 1 | 26/8/93 |
FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON THURSDAY, 26 AUGUST 1993, AT 10.08 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with my learned friend, MR N.W. MORCOMBE, QC, for
the applicant. (instructed by Cowell Clarke)
| MR J.R. MANSFIELD, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with my learned friend, MR I.C. ROBERTSON, for the
respondent. (instructed by Piper Alderman)
DAWSON J: Yes, Mr Bennett.
| MR BENNETT: | May it please the Court, this case laid down |
for the first time a proposition that where under a
policy of assurance the benefits are payable either
on death or on retirement at any time, then the
policy is a policy of life assurance within the
meaning of the Bankrupt~y Act which, of course, has
no definition of those terms. That is a
proposition which has not been stated before. The novel aspect of the proposition is that a policy
under which benefits are payable on retirement at
any time, even before a fixed retirement date, at
any time selected by the assured, is a policy of
life assurance.
In this case it was a particularly strong
finding because the assured was a person called
Barrett. He was the only person who had a policy of the relevant type under the superannuation
scheme for a private company, J.C. Barrett Pty Ltd,and that policy provided that the whole of the
premiums were paid by the company and that he could
obtain the benefits which were effectively interest
to date at a rate determined annually by the life
assurance company by retiring at any time. I said there was no case at all which establishes that.
There are two very passing pieces of dicta by two concurring Justices of this Court, which are both set out in the judgments in the appeal book, which
are the only authorities supporting that. One is at page 66 of the application book in the middle of
the page in The Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Jones, 125 CLR 511 at page 515, where
Mr Justice Menzies said:
"I do not know how a policy upon the life of a
person while he is in the employ of a company
is to be described if it is not to be
described as a poiicy on the life of that
person."
That is in the overall context of discussing a
policy dealing with retirement at a specific date,
but it certainly was not in the context of any
detailed discussion about early retirement at any
time at the assured's discretion.
| Young.S | 2 | 26/8/93 |
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- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 247
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the Court was to determine the scope of the term "policy of life assurance" under the *Bankruptcy Act*, particularly in circumstances where benefits are payable not only upon death but also upon retirement at any time chosen by the assured, prior to a fixed retirement date. This involved considering whether such flexibility in benefit entitlement, including early retirement at the assured's election, qualified the policy as a life assurance policy for the purposes of bankruptcy law.
The applicant's argument relied on a novel proposition that a policy allowing retirement at any time, even before a fixed date, at the assured's selection, should be considered a policy of life assurance. This proposition was supported by only two passing references in previous High Court judgments. One reference, from Menzies J in *The Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Jones*, discussed a policy on the life of a person in company employ without detailed consideration of early retirement at discretion. The other, from a concurring Justice in the same case, casually mentioned surrender value being payable upon retirement before a retiring age, but in specific circumstances and with a reference to cancellation. The applicant highlighted that the benefit was contingent on the duration of human life, as retirement and thus the benefit would not occur if the assured died beforehand.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi